applause broke out at the beginning of the day when the President of the conference to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapons, Ambassador Elayne White of Costa Rica, opened the proceedings. Applause also broke out at the end of the day when she declared the first meeting over. Clearly, diplomats and activists alike are excited about this treaty.

They should be. As Ambassador Patricia O’Brien of Ireland said in her remarks, this “is a pivotal point in our international relations, a time to take stock and honour the testimony of the past, to decide what sort of present we wish to live in and what sort of legacy we wish to leave for future generations.” She noted, “We are not just writing a new and complementary treaty here, we are taking the opportunity to write a new history and in so doing to create a new, more stable, more secure and more equal future for all.”

This is the crux of the ban treaty. It is being negotiated on the basis of courage and hope, rather than fear and inequality. It is an act of states and civil society coming together to stand up to power and violence and say, enough, we are going to craft a different world, whether you like it or not.

Day one of the negotiations could not have gone better. Many delegations issued eloquent explanations of their belief in and hopes for this treaty. Several outlined in detail (in many cases for the first time) what they see as the preferred scope of the treaty in terms of prohibitions, shedding more light than ever on the possibilities for this instrument. The vast majority of countries clearly want a strong, comprehensive prohibition treaty that covers a wide range of nuclear weapon-related activities and that carves out space for future negotiations on nuclear disarmament and related verification measures.

That space is a sign to nuclear-armed states that we have faith in this treaty. That we believe that it will be effective in its normative, legal, political, economic, and social transformation of the nuclear world order and that will help compel them to eliminate their genocidal weapons.

Most of us—whether diplomats, activists, academics—have had to live in the space created for us by the nuclear-armed states that have decided they have the power and authority to determine when and where they will eliminate nuclear weapons. So far their obligations and commitments have amounted to naught, and now one of the states with the biggest arsenals is reconsidering whether it even thinks disarmament is a “realistic objective” that it will continue even as a rhetorical commitment. Yet these states have controlled the narrative and even much of the scholarship for so long that most of the world believes they have the right and legitimacy to do so.

But they don’t.

On Monday morning, a representative of the Trump regime stood outside of the General Assembly Hall to belittle the participants negotiating this treaty. The US ambassador to the United Nations, which is supposed to be the number one venue for multilateralism and the pursuit of cooperative peace and security, denounced the negotiations and suggested that the states pursuing this treaty must not have the security of their own citizens in mind.

Of course, the opposite is true. This treaty, and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament more broadly, is all about trying to protect civilians from harm. The vast majority of governments recognise that nuclear weapons are a risk to human beings and the environment everywhere. Nuclear weapons “are not useful deterrents,” said Amb. Walton Webson of Antigua and Barbuda
on behalf of the Caribbean Community. Rather, they “cultivate a state of insecurity and false defensiveness that only increases the chances of proliferation with devastating impact on all of us.” Thus prohibiting nuclear weapons, Alfredo Labbe of Chile said, is a “liberating initiative,” freeing us from the nuclear threat rather than being a threat to nuclear-armed states. States that have acquired nuclear weapons, he argued, are “captives in the Faustian trap of nuclear deterrence;” this is a way to help them out.

Certainly it is a better idea to try to help them out now than to wait until nuclear weapons are detonated, either by accident or design. As Austria’s Ambassador Alexander Marschik stated, waiting for a nuclear disaster is not a strategy. We must prohibit nuclear weapons now.

Over the past few years, those advocating for a ban on nuclear weapons have been told we are unrealistic or that we don’t understand the “security dimensions” of nuclear weapons. Echoes of this played out in the sit-in attended by some of the nuclear-armed states outside the conference room on Monday morning. But we are neither unrealistic nor ignorant of security dimensions. We just have a different perspective—a perspective that is rooted in what Ambassador Mr. Amr Aboulatta of Egypt described as “collective security as opposed to selective security.”

We also understand how change happens. It happens “when this discomfort of doing something new becomes less than keeping things the same,” as Ambassador O’Brien said. A nuclear weapon ban treaty is already making nuclear-armed and nuclear-reliant states increasingly uncomfortable. The process of developing this treaty, and as well as its adoption and entry into force, will have a transformative effect on nuclear weapon policies and practices. It is only a matter of time.
NEWS IN BRIEF
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

The news in brief is not a comprehensive overview of all statements or positions. It is a brief summary of key points. Statements that have been made available are online at www.reachingcriticalwill.org; you can also visit the ICAN blog for further coverage at http://www.icanw.org/updates.

Opening of conference
- In her opening statement, the President said she aims to prepare first draft in the spring.
- The Deputy President of the General Assembly and UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs welcomed the negotiations.
- A representative of the Holy See delivered a message from Pope Francis welcoming the negotiations, noting that “peace cannot be based on the threat of destruction”.
- The ICRC said nuclear ban is historic and essential step to bringing era of nuclear weapons to an end.
- Atomic bomb survivor Toshiko Fujimori on called on states to reflect the call of hibakusha in the nuclear ban treaty.

High-level segment

Framing of the treaty
- Austria, Costa Rica, Mexico, El Salvador, and others highlighted consistency of banning nuclear weapons with prohibitions on other weapons, noting that prohibition leads to stigmatisation and facilitates disarmament.
- Cuba argued that a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons alone will not lead to nuclear disarmament immediately, but that it would codify the illegal and illegitimate nature of nuclear weapons; would help establish norms and rules; and would reinforce regimes of nonproliferation and disarmament.
- The Arab Group affirms nuclear ban conference is a concrete step toward total elimination of nuclear weapons.
- Chile said ban treaty is consistent with objectives of Agenda 2030.
- The Arab Group called for redirection of resources from nuclear weapons to social needs.
- Egypt indicated its support for a prohibition treaty is because it would: formalise the categorical rejection of possession and use of nuclear weapons; solidify the international denunciation of nuclear weapons; emphasise the urgency and criticality of realizing a nuclear weapon free world; significantly challenge the conceptional rationale for “nuclear deterrence”; address the extensive humanitarian consequences of any nuclear detonation; and highlight the lack of fulfillment of nuclear-armed states’ commitments.
- Jamaica noted that in contrast to the other WMD or landmines or cluster munitions, the nuclear regime does not comprehensively or categorically prohibit nuclear weapon-related activities, and argued this “unacceptable legal anomaly” must be corrected.
- Indonesia argued for a shift from the principle of “undiminished security for all,” which “has provided elusive legitimation for the existence of nuclear weapons, to “increased security for all”.
- The vast majority of states cited the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (HINW) as the motivation for developing this treaty.
- In this vein, the African Group called on nuclear-armed states to consider the HINW and to renounce and dismantle their arsenals.
- The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) called for HINW to remain forefront of efforts to prohibit nuclear weapons.

Principles and objectives
- Indonesia said the principle objective of the treaty should be to “eliminate and further deligitimse the development, possession, transfer, and use of nuclear weapons by anyone by any means against anyone for any purpose on this planet, in its orbits, atmosphere, air, oceans, underwater, inland, ashore, seabeds, subterranean, etc."

Key provisions of treaty
- The Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Philippines want to develop a comprehensive prohibition treaty covering all nuclear weapon-related activities, with verification being necessary if nuclear-armed states join.
- CARICOM called for the development of a comprehensive prohibition treaty, including possession, use, development, production, stockpiling, and transfer.
- Algeria called for a comprehensive prohibition treaty, including possession, storage, transfer, use, and threat of use.

continued on next page
News in brief, continued

- Ecuador said the treaty should include prohibitions on development, production, transfer, transit, commercialization, import, transport, stockpiling, threat of use, use, as well as on assistance, financing, and promotion of prohibited activities. Ecuador said the treaty should lay the foundations for, possibly through protocols, to incorporate fundamental elements such as verification and future accession of nuclear-armed states.

- Peru called for prohibitions to include possession, use, and threat of use.

- Cuba said the treaty should prohibit possession, production, development, testing (including computer or subcritical tests), acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, deploying, positioning, use, threat of use; any activity related to military preparation for use of nuclear weapons; research, design and production; incentivising any nuclear weapon activities including financing; and transit through airspace or on land. Cuba also argued the treaty should also include provisions for nuclear-armed states, e.g. to destroy their arsenals (whether stationed on their territory or not) in defined timeframes; reconverting or destroying facilities and systems that allow transport of nuclear weapons; and ending the production of fissile material of nuclear weapons. Cuba also said the treaty should include verification and mechanisms responsible for applying and enforcing provisions. The treaty should also enable or create forum for cooperation among member states and should include recognition of victims rights.

- Colombia said treaty must lay down basic prohibitions and obligations and establish legal architecture that will facilitate total elimination. It must include new incremental commitments irreversible in nature.

- Peru called for a universal instrument that prohibits nuclear weapons in a transparent, irreversible, verifiable manner, within a timeframe mutually agreed and leading to total elimination.

- South Africa said it supports a comprehensive prohibition; and that it will elaborate on this during thematic discussions.

- Egypt said the treaty should be “ambitious and comprehensive” that is non-discriminatory, has wide-ranging scope, and sets timeframes for verifiable nuclear disarmament.

- Ireland emphasised the treaty is a legal instrument, not a political declaration, and thus will need to be given effect in national systems. It will need to reaffirm that nuclear weapons are inhumane, indiscriminate, and beyond any possible legal use. As the negotiating mandate also refers to elimination, the treaty will need to indicate its place in this pathway.

- Venezuela called for the treaty to prohibit acquisition, possession, stockpiling, production, development, testing; allowing nuclear weapons to enter national territories including permitting ships to port in territorial waters or aircraft to enter airspace or to circulate on national territory or to station or deploy on national territory; it should also apply to planning nuclear war including through security doctrines. It should also recognise victims of use and testing of nuclear weapons and pay attention to contamination caused by nuclear weapon programmes. In this vein the treaty should include a commitment to provide assistance to victims including restoration of environment and safe resettlement and restoring economic productivity of affected areas.

- Indonesia said the legal provisions and norms of the treaty need to be firm, strong, and unambiguous.

- Jamaica suggested the treaty would establish a universal norm against the possession use and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, thereby stigmatizing such weapons and discouraging horizontal and vertical proliferation. This requires a comprehensive prohibition with an obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons. Core prohibitions should include acquisition, stockpiling, development and testing,

- transfer, stationing and deployment, assistance, encouragement or inducement to

- engage in prohibited acts, including the financing of nuclear weapons.

- Cambodia argued that nuclear disarmament “should be the center of our negotiation which needs to be strengthened in the provisions of the draft instrument.”

- Argentina said the treaty must include prohibitions but also provisions that make it possible to move towards total elimination in verifiable fashion.

Institutional arrangements

- ASEAN and Philippines want the treaty to include institutional arrangements for help with implementing the treaty.

- Jamaica recommended that existing bodies be utilised, in order to avoid duplication of roles and to strengthen the framework, with prospects for regular meetings of states parties.
News in brief, continued

- Indonesia said the biggest question for the treaty is how to organise the implementing and enforcement of its principles and norms, either by relying on existing modalities or building something from scratch.

Relationship to other instruments
- Austria said a prohibition treaty will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and bring more security to everyone, not less.
- Chile says both the NPT and the ban treaty should be seen as part of the normative set of international disarmament law.
- Colombia noted shared responsibility of article VI of the NPT nuclear ban is part of fulfilling.
- Indonesia is convinced the nuclear ban is complimentary to the NPT and suggested the treaty should reaffirm this.
- Cambodia stressed the importance of ensuring the nuclear ban compliments the NPT.
- Kazakhstan said the ban treaty supports the NPT.
- Jamaica noted that the NPT does not provide guidance on the kind of negotiations or effective measures that should be pursued in good faith.
- Argentina said the treaty should reaffirm the importance of the NPT, in particular article VI. It argued it will be necessary to consider including specific measures clarifying the relationship between the two instruments, including an express recognition that joining the ban can’t be used to justify withdrawal from NPT. None of the future provisions should be able to subsume, replace, or be considered equivalent to NPT, which are based on system of verification.
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Civil society
- Austria thanked civil society for its role in the ban treaty.
- Chile said involvement of civil society is absolutely crucial.
- CARICOM acknowledged the role of civil society in this endeavor.
- The Dominican Republic recognised role of civil society, religious organisations, activists, doctors, scientists, academics, and other experts.
- Ireland noted that state “not have reached this point without the support and advocacy of our civil society partners and we welcome their full and active engagement with us.”
- Jamaica acknowledged “the dedication and commitment of civil society in this ongoing effort to address this issue,” noting, “Their resolve, determination and unwavering support have been instrumental in getting us to this stage.”

Against the ban
- Japan said a ban treaty, if it does not lead to an actual reduction of a single nuclear warhead, would be of little significance and would undermine goal of nuclear weapons free world. Japan said it would be unable to participate in the conference constructively and in good faith.

Rules of procedure
- The President outlined an amendment to the previously circulated rules of procedure (L.1), noting that Palestine and Holy See would like to participate in the conference with right to vote. The resolution establishing the conference only indicated the participation of UN member states, therefore the President proposes that without setting a precedent they participate on an equal basis with member states with a right to vote for this conference.
- Iran took the floor after the adoption to ask for more time to consult capital on the rule regarding how decisions are taken, wishing to use NPT language on consensus instead. The President clarified that the rules had already been adopted.
- New Zealand wanted to clarify whether some states in its region would be able to participate as observers even though the relevant paragraph in the revised rules had been deleted. The President said that would be possible.
- Iran and Austria were elected vice-presidents. Other regions are still deciding their nominations.
UK BOYCOTT IGNORES WISHES OF 75% OF BRITISH PEOPLE
Rebecca Johnson | Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy

Last week a YouGov opinion poll asked a representative sample of British adults if they “think the UK government should or should not be participating” in the UN multilateral negotiations to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading to their elimination. The results showed that 75% thought Britain should be in the room and participating. Only 9% thought the government should not attend, while 16% said they didn’t know or were undecided.

This is a far higher proportion than the 52 to 48 vote for Brexit in June last year. Even more interestingly, an unexpected large majority of 79% of people who voted Conservative in the 2015 General Election stated that the UK government should be represented at the UN talks on nuclear disarmament—the same proportion as those who voted Labour. The younger age brackets had the highest percentages of “don’t knows,” but still registered over 70% in favour of negotiating to prohibit nuclear weapons.

When broken down by geographical region, the highest support—82% in favour of UK participation in the nuclear ban negotiations—came from Scotland. This is unsurprising, as the UK’s nuclear warheads are stored at Coulport, and the nuclear-armed submarines are home-ported at Faslane, both bases within 35 miles of Glasgow. As expressed in recent elections as well as opinion polls, the majority of Scots want to get rid of the nuclear weapons and resent that the UK Government in Westminster has decided to spend some £205 billion on replacing Trident instead of engaging multilaterally to ban and eliminate all nuclear weapons. In the past decade Scottish opposition to nuclear weapons has become inextricably bound up with aspirations to become an independent country. During recent elections many adapted the 1980s slogan made famous by Pacific nations opposed to nuclear testing: “Nuclear Free and Independent Scotland”.

The standard FCO response is that “the negotiations on a nuclear weapons ban treaty... will not bring us closer to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.” They say the UK government “will continue to press for key steps towards multilateral disarmament” such as the CTBT and a fissile materials treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. This means that the UK supports any disarmament step that is structurally blocked by one or more of the nuclear club. In both the CTBT and FMT there has been no progress for over twenty years because nuclear-armed states have upheld the “principle” that every single one of the necessary states is given a veto so that they can prevent any relevant disarmament step from happening.

Though there will not be any formally instructed government diplomats to represent British interests, at least the Labour Party’s Shadow Minister for Peace and Disarmament, Fabian Hamilton, will be present, along with Scottish parliamentarians and a cross section of civil society. This is important, as the envisaged nuclear weapon ban treaty will undoubtedly have impact on the UK’s nuclear options, whether or not the government negotiates or signs in the short term.

By outlawing the use and deployment of nuclear weapons, the treaty will greatly reinforce the normative and legal regimes to prevent the use of nuclear weapons—and by extension, all inhumane weapons. Outlawing the production and acquisition of nuclear armaments will address a major gap in the non-proliferation regime and enable governments to develop better legal, technical, and institutional tools to prevent the spread of nuclear capabilities and technologies. Making it unlawful to assist, induce, encourage, or finance anyone to violate the treaty’s prohibitions and obligations will apply not just to states but non-state actors as well. This will greatly reduce the incentives and drivers that prevent progress towards security and the world free of nuclear weapons that the vast majority of the world clearly wants. Even if the UK and other nuclear-armed states delay joining the treaty, it will make it increasingly difficult to keep spending their taxpayers money on endless rounds of modernisation.

Banned weapons are stigmatised, which makes it easier to control and eliminate them. This treaty will have immediate impact on the high and counter-productive value attached to getting and having nuclear armaments. Instead of getting kudos for declaring their willingness to launch nuclear weapons, bellicose leaders will put themselves on the wrong side of the law.

We can’t keep turning a blind eye to nuclear threats, proliferation and modernisation. Nor should we let countries like the UK get away with hiding behind the deadlocked CD. A fissile materials treaty is far more likely to be achieved once nuclear weapons are prohibited than when they are treated as high status items of political value.

It’s time for the responsible members of the non-nuclear club to show the way. Britain and the others will follow sooner or later.
The ban treaty is the next big thing in multilateral nuclear disarmament. It is a chance for governments that support the rule of law, that believe in the power of multilateral institutions, and that believe rules matter, to engage in negotiations to uphold those beliefs. The timing could not be better to put forward a simple, clear, and strong reaffirmation of the rule of law and power of multilateralism. It’s time to finally make it illegal to make, get, have, use, or help with nuclear weapons.

Across the European Union (EU) there is a bit of a crisis of credibility right now when it comes to nuclear weapons. It’s the topic that is the most difficult. It’s why statements at international forums on nuclear weapons have been sparse, and why the EU has been unable to come to terms with the core question—are nuclear weapons legitimate or not? This means that the EU has found it difficult to speak with one voice on the issue, and has relied on the same formulations for decades.

The EU’s Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy says, “The EU is committed to a global order based on international law, which ensures human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons. This commitment translates into an aspiration to transform rather than to simply preserve the existing system. The EU will strive for a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, and develop globally coordinated responses with international and regional organisations, states and non-state actors.”

The EU is predicated on a commitment to multilateralism, a commitment to settling disputes without force, and a commitment to cooperation- and nuclear weapons do not fit into these parameters. The EU, and its member states, cannot be emphatic in calls for the promotion of fundamental EU principles—including human rights, the rule of law and democracy—with such a divide about the legitimacy of maintaining a capacity for murdering millions of people.

In looking to build EU security, addressing this crisis in credibility should be a priority. Europe is a region that has prospered greatly from the rule-based global order, with multilateralism as its key principle. It is therefore important to recognise that the European Parliament has welcomed these negotiations, and called on EU member states to “participate constructively in its proceedings”, in the European Parliament resolution on nuclear security and non-proliferation (2016/2936(RSP)).

The European Parliament’s resolutions are not binding on member states in regards to foreign policy matters, but act as recommendations and send a message to the governments across Europe that parties from the entire political spectrum are supportive of this process.

Austria and Ireland are two EU member states that are clearly working to prevent and mitigate this crisis in credibility through their clear and defined support for these negotiations. These two states deserve the support and positive cooperation of other EU members. As stated in the Global Strategy, “To engage responsibly with the world, credibility is vital. The EU’s credibility hinges on our unity, on our many achievements, our enduring power of attraction, the effectiveness and consistency of our policies, and adherence to our values.”

Outlawing nuclear weapons because of their catastrophic humanitarian consequences is a values-driven process. It’s a way to recognize that all humans deserve to live without the threat of any hands, (tiny or not) on nuclear buttons. There is an opportunity to strengthen EU credibility on all of its issues, and the door remains open for everyone to participate in these negotiations.

“Let all who hope for a world free of nuclear weapons join in seizing the opportunity to ban nuclear weapons this year. Let us protect the gift of life so that others may live.”

From the interfaith vigil for the nuclear ban treaty conference, 27 March 2017. All are welcome, at 8:00-8:15 a.m. each day, the Isaiah Wall (1st Ave. between 42nd and 44th St.).
PAX and the Future of Life Institute hosted a side event on the impact a treaty banning nuclear weapons would have on nuclear-armed states. Speakers included Fabian Hamilton, Member of the UK Parliament; John Tierney (Council for a Livable World); Max Tegmark (Future of Life Institute & MIT); and Ray Acheson (Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom).

Mr. Hamilton noted that this is a key moment in history and that any country committed to a world without nuclear weapons should be in the room negotiating the ban. He expressed disappointment with the UK’s failure to attend and its recent decision to renew the Trident nuclear weapons programme, both of which demonstrate a lack of commitment to nuclear disarmament. After hearing statements by survivors of the bomb, he said, there is no way anyone could believe nuclear weapons were ever acceptable. For him, the ban is the backdrop by which we will advance nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Tierney, a former US Congressperson, discussed the impact a nuclear weapons ban treaty could have on the United States. He reflected on previous experiences with weapons prohibitions, which show the US is impacted by norms and stigma against inhumane weapons. A nuclear weapon ban treaty could have a comparable effect on the United States—though the Trump administration represents a wild card. He noted that the difficulty of something does not convey the right to oppose it. He suggested three steps to a world without nuclear weapons—first the NPT, second the ban, and third the verifiable elimination of stockpiles.

Mr. Tegmark provided a scientific perspective for nuclear disarmament. The Future of Life Institute gathered over 3000 signatures of scientists, including Peter Higgs and Stephen Hawking. As someone who looks at the universe from a 13.8-billion-year perspective, the concept of nuclear weapons is “absolutely ludicrous”. The risk of near misses is a case study in recklessness. As a physicist, he referenced using force to move something as analogous to the ban and its associated stigma: this could be the push to get disarmament going.

Ms. Acheson explained how a financial ban of nuclear weapons production could significantly impact the nuclear-armed states, since private companies are responsible for a major part of those arsenals. Divesting from those companies would send a clear signal that nuclear weapons are unacceptable, making production economically unviable. Thus it would significantly impact the nuclear-armed states opposing the ban treaty. She also discussed other transformative potentials of the ban treaty, including on international relations at large.

The discussion covered a variety of issues, yet came back repeatedly to the power of including a specific reference to financing in the provision prohibiting assistance in the new treaty. Despite coming from varied experience and backgrounds, all panelists agreed that the prohibition would have an impact on the nuclear-armed states—maybe not today, but soon, and for the rest of time.

Reaching Critical Will has published a paper providing our views and encouraging discussion on the principles, prohibitions, and positive obligations that should be included in a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Such a treaty has the transformative potential to codify the illegality of nuclear weapons, stigmatise their possession, and facilitate nuclear disarmament. This paper is available online at www.reachingcriticalwill.org or in hard copy outside the conference room.