POLITICAL MESSAGES AND PROHIBITIONS

Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

19 June 2017
Vol. 2, No. 3

What do we want from a treaty banning nuclear weapons?

This is the most important question when considering both the preamble and the prohibitions, as delegates did on Friday. It will also be imperative when it comes to the provisions related to the elimination of nuclear weapons, which negotiators will consider this week. While the answer may seem obvious—we want the prohibition of nuclear weapons as a means to achieve their total elimination—there are nevertheless different understandings of what that means and how to best accomplish it.

The atmosphere in the negotiating room is constructive and dynamic, with delegations supporting and building off of each other’s suggestions, or engaging in debate about the merits of particular proposals. However, there is also a sense that different agendas are afoot. For some states, a crisp preamble setting out the objectives and political message of the treaty, followed by strong, clear, and meaningful prohibitions, seems to be the goal. Others appear to be approaching this treaty as they do UN General Assembly resolutions—as a text to set out their frustrations and their general commitments to disarmament. Some explicitly want to have a concrete impact on the activities and policies that facilitate the maintenance of nuclear weapons, while others seem to hedge away from that objective, not wanting to add too many elements that would necessitate change in their own or other states’ behaviour.

These competing agendas mean that the draft text is currently being pulled in various directions. This is bound to happen in negotiations, especially in a setting with well over 100 participants. This is an incredibly open and inclusive negotiating process, but this means that states that truly want this treaty to have an impact on current practices and help lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons need to figure out, together, how to advance the text in this direction.

The preamble contains the overarching political message of the treaty. As such, it’s extremely important, as Ireland’s delegation said on Friday, not to inflate it so much that it dilutes that message. There are a few essential items that should be included in this part of the text—such as stronger language on gender and the environment; a recognition of the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons on indigenous communities; and references to human rights and education. Such elements should be streamlined within the existing text and not be burdened by the further addition of language that is not directly related to the treaty’s core objectives. This is not a UN resolution and must not be treated as one. For purposes of credibility and clarity, it should only take on board those adjustments that are absolutely necessary to orient the treaty as a humanitarian disarmament instrument grounded in human rights and environmental justice.

When it comes to the prohibitions, we need to focus on those that will reinforce existing norms and obligations and that will affect current nuclear weapon practices and policies.

Among other things, this means maintaining the prohibition on testing—which Sweden and Mexico, and possibly others, want to delete. Their argument is that we already have the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, the CTBT has not yet entered into force. Thus prohibiting testing in the ban treaty—as it has been prohibited in all of the regional nuclear weapon free zone treaties—would serve to reinforce and strengthen the norm against nuclear weapon testing. It will also help to strengthen efforts for maintaining the funding and legal authority for the CTBT Organisation’s verification regime, which consists

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Of over 300 monitoring facilities around the world that are already in operation.

As the ban treaty builds upon and deepens global norms against the existence and maintenance of nuclear weapons, the prohibition on testing will be an important element of demonstrating the renunciation of nuclear weapons. Omitting testing from the prohibited activities in the ban treaty could leave a crucial gap in the treaty’s core prohibitions that will be instrumental in preventing future development or reconstitution of nuclear arsenals.

In addition to maintaining the prohibition on testing and the other activities already included in the draft text, two other sets of activities should be prohibited as a means to impacting the practices of nuclear deterrence that currently are used to “justify” the retention of nuclear weapons by the United States and others. These include a prohibition on planning and preparations to use nuclear weapons; and an obligation on states parties not to permit transit of nuclear weapons through their airspace or territorial waters, or to permit visits to their ports or airfields of ships or aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.

Existing nuclear alliances and bilateral relations vary in terms of the level of cooperation and coordination in planning and preparation activities. Any related activities—such as planning operations (strike plans, training, exercises), policy (declaratory policy, strategy), and infrastructure (installations, functions)—are not be compatible with a prohibition on nuclear weapons. This should be made explicit in the treaty.

Furthermore, nuclear weapon deployment and preparations to use of nuclear weapons may entail the transit of such weapons through others’ airspace and waters. Ending the possibility of nuclear forces to be temporarily present in or to transit through national territory and airspace could curtail some avenues in which nuclear-armed states are able to engage in nuclear brinkmanship. It could also end a means by which non-nuclear-armed states can assist nuclear weapon programmes by facilitating training activities of nuclear-capable military units. Thus prohibiting transit of nuclear weapons may be one of the few ways in which non-nuclear-armed states can most effectively impact operational practice related to the unfettered global exercise of “extended nuclear deterrence”.

On Friday, a large number of states supported the addition of a prohibition on “military preparations to use nuclear weapons”. Several have also indicated support for language on transit. Austria raised concerns about prohibiting transit in this treaty, arguing that states cannot be expected to know the contents of every single shipping container brought into its territory. But as the delegation of Ecuador pointed out, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (1979) obligates states parties to “not allow the transit of its territory by land or internal waterways or through its airports or seaports of nuclear material.” Ecuador asked, if states can be expected to not permit the transit of nuclear material why could they not be expected to do the same for nuclear weapons?

Similarly, it’s worth pointing out that UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) already obligates states to “develop and maintain appropriate border controls and law enforcement efforts” and to “establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls” in order to “detect, deter, prevent, and combat” the proliferation of “nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery”. In this sense, including an obligation for states to not permit transit or port visits of nuclear weapons would seem to be consistent with and reinforce existing non-proliferation obligations.

There are a lot of moving parts in these negotiations. Many ideas sound constructive and helpful, and are offered in good faith. But they must be considered against the overarching objective of impacting current nuclear weapon practices and policies that facilitate or are used to “justify” the maintenance of these heinous radioactive weapons of genocide. This week states and others participating in these negotiations will consider the rest of the draft treaty text; keeping in mind what is best for the treaty rather that various political agendas is paramount to achieving a credible, resilient, and effective legal instrument by 7 July.

What is happening here inside the UN is not happening in a vacuum. On Saturday, about a thousand activists turned up in torrential downpour to march from Bryant Park to the United Nations in the Women’s March to Ban the Bomb organised by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. People around the world—in at least 200 locations—supported this event with marches, vigils, teach-ins, or poster-making activities. All support the nuclear ban treaty and are looking to governments participating here in New York to match their passion and commitment in helping to reach a nuclear weapon free world. The back page of this edition of the Nuclear Ban Daily has some photos from the march in NYC. More images from around the world are being shared online at #womenbanthebomb and #nuclearban. The world is watching.
The News in Brief may not capture every proposal or position but provides an overview of the discussion.

Preamble

**PP1-5**
- Netherlands voiced a set of views on PP1-5, noting that states should make efforts to use existing consensus NPT language. It supports omitting “under any circumstances” in PP1. It noted that references to international security and stability are missing. It supports the reference to gender language used by Sweden. It supports the inclusion of language by ICJ.

**PP2-3**
- Thailand supported stronger language in PP2 and 3 on human rights and environmental issues.

**PP4**
- Fiji supports a strengthened reference to IHL and environmental law, and suggested the preamble could also reference the environmental legacy of waste and harm from nuclear weapon production.

**PP5**
- Brazil, Fiji, Mexico, and Peru agreed to the suggestion made earlier about including “threat of use” in addition to “use”.

**PP7**
- Mozambique proposed making this the first paragraph in the preamble. Ghana, Mexico, and Palestine supported this. Thailand would like the reference to the UN Charter be strengthened and more detailed.
- Mozambique also proposed replacing the current text with the actual wording of articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter, which was supported by Iran. Iran suggested it would be good to be more specific about precisely which principles of the UN Charter are important to this treaty.
- Holy See suggested a reformulation so that it would read “Determined to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN, in particular strengthen universal peace as built on justice, fundamental HR and integral human development”. It would like to see a stronger reference to UN Charter.

**PP8**
- Indonesia proposed replacing the words “would” with “will” and “comprehensive nuclear disarmament” with “achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons”. This was supported by Brazil, Ghana, Mexico, and Peru. New Zealand supported inclusion of the latter phrase.
- New Zealand suggested merging PP8 and PP9. It supports Indonesia’s suggestion on a “nuclear weapons free world” and would want to retain the word “comprehensive”.
- Cuba’s earlier suggestion to add the words “legally binding” ahead of “prohibition” was supported by Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Palestine, and Peru.
- Liechtenstein felt that this paragraph has an ambiguity in current drafting and proposed re-arranging the paragraph to read: “Bearing in mind the important contribution of the prohibition of ND to comprehensive nuclear disarmament”. It said that this could be combined with other proposals to strengthen the paragraph overall.
- Iran suggested a reformulation to read “Recognizing that complete and effective prohibition of nuclear weapons will be a necessary step in achieving comprehensive nuclear disarmament and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons.”
- Netherlands expressed that how the objective of this paragraph will be achieved is not outlined anywhere in the text and must be clarified.

**PP9**
- Egypt suggested an amendment that would add the word “total”, before “…elimination of nuclear arsenals…”
- Brazil suggested amending the paragraph to read “…facilitate the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.
- Brazil, Iran, Mexico, and Sweden support removing the reference to “means of delivery”. Palestine and Sweden support deleting “from national arsenals”. Austria said that it supports not going beyond the scope of the treaty in this paragraph.
- Austria, Brazil, Ireland, Iran, Mexico, Palestine, and Sweden support removing the reference to “national arsenals” and “means of delivery”. Peru supports the suggestion on removing the reference to national arsenals.
- Ireland and South Africa support simplifying this paragraph.
- Iran suggested a reformulation to read, “Stressing the urgent need to take effective measures to achieve nuclear disarmament”.

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News in brief, continued

**PP10**
- Egypt suggested deleting this paragraph in light of their suggested amendment to PP9.

**PP11**
- Iran suggested a modification: “Determined to act with a view to act toward achieving an effective prohibition of nuclear weapons.”
- Iran also suggested an 11bis that could read, “Convinced that the only absolute and effective guarantee against the use of nuclear is their complete elimination under strict and effective int’l control”. Austria supported.
- Peru would like to maintain the concept of general and complete disarmament because it’s found in other instruments, such as the CWC. Chile agreed.

**PP12**
- Philippines, New Zealand, and ASEAN supported the suggestion by Cuba to reference Article VI of the NPT and the ICJ advisory opinion. Mozambique and Palestine supported the reference to the ICJ opinion.
- Iran suggests adding PP12bis referencing Article VI of the NPT.
- Liechtenstein prefers to say, “reaffirming existing obligation”.

**PP13**
- Brazil suggested separating the paragraph into three parts, each of which would correspond to a single instrument (the NPT, the CTBT, the NWFZ treaties) rather than combining them into one paragraph. Egypt, Kazakhstan, Ecuador Switzerland, Mozambique, Ireland, Mexico and Iran supported this. Cuba supported comments by Brazil but wants to see this all in one paragraph to avoid fragmentation, but will consider proposal to split. Cuba mentioned that reference to article VI of the NPT could be included here, which Zimbabwe supported.
- Brazil thinks it may be “pushing it” to say that the NPT has been an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, given that the current negotiations would not be necessary if the NPT had been successful in that area.
- Brazil encouraged formulating a new paragraph mentioning the NPT and CTBT as having a vital role in promoting international peace and security and reaffirming the conviction of internationally recognized NWFZs enhances global and regional peace and security. Philippines, Nigeria, Guatemala, and New Zealand supported this. Ecuador proposed new language and paragraph on the NWFZs recognizing their positive impact.

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**CALENDAR OF EVENTS: MONDAY, 19 JUNE 2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When</th>
<th>What</th>
<th>Where</th>
<th>Who</th>
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<tr>
<td>08:00</td>
<td>Morning Inter-Faith Vigil</td>
<td>Isaiah Wall</td>
<td>Humanitarian Disarmament Interfaith Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>09:00-09:50</td>
<td>ICAN campaigners meeting</td>
<td>CR B</td>
<td>ICAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>CR 1</td>
<td>ICAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00-12:30</td>
<td>Youth Actions for Nuclear Abolition Day and the 2018 UN Conference</td>
<td>CR B</td>
<td>Abolition 2000 Youth Working Group</td>
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<td>13:15-14:30</td>
<td>Articles 2-5</td>
<td>CR 1</td>
<td>President of the conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:00-18:00</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>CR 1</td>
<td>Physicians for Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>15:00-18:00</td>
<td>Congressional education</td>
<td>CR B</td>
<td>Physicians for Social Responsibility</td>
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- Austria and South Africa voiced support for Brazil’s proposals, noting that they could help the conference in finding common ground.
- Brazil and Switzerland suggested adding language on recognizing the vital importance of the entry into force of the CTBT, rather than just a reference to instrument’s importance. Ireland and Mexico supported.
- Switzerland proposed reaffirming that the NPT is the cornerstone by taking language from the UNGA resolution that mandated these negotiations. Sweden and New Zealand supported. Ireland said it has no problem with “cornerstone” but said that the full and effective implementation of NPT is also important.
- Switzerland stated that the link between PP13 and Article 19 should be coherent and will speak more to that later in the conference.
- Switzerland, New Zealand and Kazakhstan supported including a reference to the IMS of CTBT and its important contribution to delegation.
- Iran said that as long as CTBT has not entered into force, it does not see any need to mention it here. New Zealand said it can’t support the suggestion for removal of the CTBT reference, given important contributions of the IMS and verification system.
- Guatemala suggested a separation into two paragraphs; one referencing the treaties that have established NWFZs and a second that states the ban treaty will “complement and reinforce” the NPT.
- Philippines wants to see reference to three pillars of NPT, including a reference to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- Iran would like to see a reference to the importance of establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East, suggesting “…and in this regard, underlining the importance of establishing these zones in parts of the world where they do not exist, such as in the Middle East.” Nigeria agreed.
- Singapore was going to suggest a standalone paragraph on NWFZs, but recognized that the other proposals might have made this redundant.

PP14
- Austria and Philippines would like to add a reference to the victims of nuclear testing.
- Cuba said that it has no substantive difficulty with the paragraph, but feels it has some holes and could be broadened to not look at specific groups. It suggested adding “among others” and “other international and regional organizations”. Egypt, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela supported.
- Ireland proposed adding the need to recognise and support disarmament education, as well as the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons for current and future generations. Austria, Brazil, Fiji, Mexico, and Venezuela supported.
- Egypt would like to replace the word “furthering” with “advancing”.
- Holy See would like to add new language about the role education in fostering a culture of peace, which Fiji supported.
- Iran and the Holy See would like to add a reference to the role of religious leaders. Austria said it would be positive to this.
- Holy See suggested a final conclusion that will reflect that nuclear weapons do not bring a long-term security. Austria supported.
- Netherlands suggested adding a reference to “states” because they will be the ones to implement this agreement.
- Uganda prefers public “awareness” rather than “conscience”.
- Thailand would like to insert “civil society” after the reference to the ICRC. Iran suggested a list of examples of civil society, including “academics and religious leaders” and to delete the word “numerous” in front of NGOs.
- ICRC would like to refer to the Red Cross movement.

New paragraphs
- Egypt suggested two new paragraphs. PP7bis would reflect dissatisfaction with current status of nuclear disarmament. This was supported by Brazil, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Palestine, and Peru.
- Egypt also suggested adding a PP12bis to reflect concern about the reliance on nuclear weapons and deterrence in military and security. Brazil, Ecuador, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Peru, and Thailand supported.
- Sweden proposed a new paragraph that would read “Recalling the importance for states with nuclear weapons to take practical steps to address the significant number of nuclear weapons that remain on high alert by reducing the risk of accidental use of
nuclear weapons and further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence in order to promote stability and security.

- Sweden would also like to see language that states concern about the “waste of resources resulting from the production and modernization of nuclear arsenals”.

- Iran supported the Cuban proposal on including references to the SSOD1 final document.

- Brazil feels that human rights law is a missing dimension in the Preamble and suggests drawing from General Comment 14 of Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to read “Convinced that nuclear weapons are among greatest threats to human rights, especially the right to life...”. Mozambique supported this suggestion.

- Holy See supported South Africa’s earlier suggestion for a new paragraph on moral and ethical imperatives.

- Ecuador supported the proposal to reference the first UNGA resolution as well as the later ones. Thailand supported.

- Algeria proposed a new paragraph relating to nuclear energy and is flexible on where it is placed. Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland, and Venezuela supported this proposal. Thailand suggested stronger language in PP2 and PP3 about the peaceful uses of nuclear power.

- Cuba would like to see more language on environmental concern through a PP14bis.

**Civil society remarks on preamble**

- ICAN supported language recognising impacts on indigenous people and environmental harm. It also stressed that in a world where basic human needs have not been met, resources should be directed to social and economic development rather than nuclear weapon modernisation.

- IPPNW strongly supported including a preambular element on the disproportionate impact of nuclear weapons on indigenous people around the world. She noted that the indigenous peoples of Australia, South Pacific, the United States, and Marshall Islands endorse this call.

- Nuclear Age Peace Foundation agreed with Indonesia on the need to delegitimise nuclear deterrence as a concept and thus supported threat of use in the preamble.

- Western States Legal Foundation noted the draft preamble is in good shape, but urged reference to the principle of distinction and inclusion of threat of use as illegal. She also encouraged reference to international human rights law, and above all, the right to life. She suggested adding of the word “climate,” while referencing the humanitarian consequences resulting from harm to the environment.

- World Council of Churches supported the reference to Hibakusha as victims. It also welcomed language on the impact of nuclear weapons on the environment, while noting that the Convention should include positive obligations on remediation.

- SGI encouraged reference to IHRL in PP7, in particular the right to life.

- Global Security Institute supported the inclusion of immorality of nuclear weapons and language on the irreparable environmental damage and climate change that can be caused by nuclear weapons.

**General obligations**

- The President noted at the outset that general obligations should be as exhaustive as possible and should be aimed at lastling into the future. She underlined the significance of crafting an instrument that could one day be universally accepted, and that design efforts should work toward that goal. She stated that if nuclear weapon-possessing states decide to get rid of their nuclear weapons, they would be subject to the same rules as the states that do not possess nuclear weapons. Therefore, in order to avoid any kind of gap, the draft includes obligations of the NPT, CTBT, and NWFZs. She noted that provisions of draft article 1 relate directly to proposals made by delegations in March.

- Costa Rica suggested the treaty should include the obligation to destroy stockpiles, and is flexible on how to include this. Mozambique, Palestine, and Venezuela supported.

- Netherlands and Iran would like to see elaborated definitions of the prohibitions. Mozambique thinks this would take more time than we have, pointing out that the interpretations of treaties would play a role and that NPT and CTBT do not have such definitions.

- Netherlands would like to improve the temporal aspect of these prohibitions to bring them into sequence with provisions for Article VI of the NPT.
News in brief, continued

- Sweden said balance is needed between obligations and verification, or this treaty will not be seen as credible. It noted that verification is currently limited to safeguards under INFCIRC/153, and that both an IAEA safeguards agreement and an additional protocol (INFCIRC/540) would be needed to verify a more comprehensive set of prohibitions. It argued that if the AP is not included, then development of nuclear weapons should be removed as a prohibition.

**On proposals to combine paragraphs 1 and 2**

- Argentina and New Zealand suggested merging paragraphs 1 and 2. Lichtenstein, Brazil, Switzerland, and Egypt would also like to merge and simplify. Ecuador thinks merging the paragraphs could help to clarify that all prohibitions apply for both governments and those in areas under its jurisdiction or control. Iran, Sweden, and Cuba requested time to consider merit of the proposal of merging. Sweden and Indonesia warned there is a distinction between 1 and 2 that must be preserved.

- UNODA noted that there is a distinction between paragraphs 1 and 2, citing that paragraph 1(e) and 2(b) come from article 1 of the CTBT, which separates the prohibition to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion and to prevent such activities being carried out on its territory.

- New Zealand argued that the conference could combine 1 and 2 given Article 7 on national implementation. The President and Secretariat underlined the need to also analyse the content in conjunction with rest of the draft treaty. Austria supported the point that the prohibitions should be directly tied to national implementation.

**General obligations part 1**

- Ireland suggested adding “at any time” as a strong signal that these undertakings apply at all times, even under times of war. New Zealand and Iran supported.

**General obligations part 1(a)**

- Thailand would like to add the elements of “have control, store, station or transport” as prohibitions.

- Cuba would like to include research, retain, and design. Ecuador and Venezuela supported including design. Austria sees design and research as part of nuclear development, arguing that prohibiting research runs the risk of having basic research being limited even if it is not intended to develop nuclear weapons. Bangladesh agreed with Austria’s concerns.

- Chile would like to include deploy and maintain and modernise. Egypt would like to include modernise.

- Switzerland and Bangladesh would like to know why retain was not included.

- Cuba would like to include transit, transshipment, and deployment. Austria sees transit as a prohibition that is difficult to enforce and should be left out. Ecuador argued that there is a precedent for transit, including in the Arms Trade Treaty, and that transit is also covered in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (Article 4).

**General obligations part 1(b) and (c)**

- Ecuador suggested using “under any title or modality” before “whatsoever” under both 1(b) and (c) to further reduce legal ambiguity.

- Austria thinks that transfer should be allowed in the cases of destruction, and we should therefore include an exception.

- Lichtenstein would like to better streamline the text and combine (b) and (c). Malaysia views receiving as inherent in transfer, and supports streamlining these two sections.

- Iran thinks that transfer should be added to sub-paragraph (a), arguing that having the separate paragraphs of (b) and (c) creates a category of haves and have-nots.

- Switzerland is concerned that the inclusion of transfer may be unnecessary.

**General obligations part 1(d)**

- The President explained that 1(d) only refers to nuclear weapons and not nuclear explosive devices (NEDs), because NEDs were included in the NPT as a way to deal with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, but in light of CTBT those devices would be prohibited under paragraph 1(e) of the Convention.

- Lichtenstein would like to move this paragraph up to the top of paragraph 1.

- Indonesia suggested including threat of use to contribute to delegitimising nuclear deterrence. This was supported by Palestine, Argentina, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Thailand, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Ecuador, Philippines, Chile, Egypt, Uganda, Mozambique, Viet Nam, Algeria, Singapore, Bangladesh, and Guatemala, the last of which pointed out that this is a prohibition of the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone. Cuba, Kazakhstan, and Brazil would prefer the language to be “threaten to use.” Nigeria would like to include “use, cause to use, assist to use and threat to use” nuclear weapons. Mozambique thinks the UN Charter supports the inclusion of “threat of use.”
News in brief, continued

- Switzerland argued that including threat of use is not necessary based on the other prohibitions. Malaysia questioned how states would define a violation of “threat of use” and called for caution.

- Indonesia suggested a new paragraph between 1(d) and 1(e) prohibiting states from engaging in any military preparations to use nuclear weapons. This was supported by Palestine, Thailand, Iran, Mozambique, and Venezuela. Uganda and Bangladesh also voiced support and suggested adding “planning.” ICRC supports inclusion of provision on military preparations.

General obligations part 1(e)
- Netherlands said a reference to CTBT is important here, including ratification of CTBT. Switzerland also supports mentioning CTBT so that we do not create new norm without verification an attached verification system.

- Cuba would like to add after “weapon test” the words “including by” to better capture computer-based nuclear testing, subcritical tests, or other non-explosive testing methods. Iran, Egypt, Vietnam, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Singapore supported. Brazil supported Cuba’s statement, but suggests using Article 14 language from the CTBT conference of 2015, referring to any other activity associated with the development and use of nuclear weapon technologies. Guatemala would like to just use the word “test”.

- Sweden would like to delete 1(e) because it believes it undermines the CTBT. Mexico supports deletion of 1(e) and 2(b), believing it’s already covered by the CTBT.

- New Zealand questioned the basis for repetition in paragraph 1(e) and 2(b), in line with its suggestion to combine paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1.

General obligations part 1(f)
- Indonesia proposed including finance after the word “encourage”. This was supported by Thailand, Kazakhstan, Guatemala, Ecuador, Philippines, Iran, and Cuba. Kazakhstan, with the support of Egypt, would like to include language against funding any research in the area of nuclear weapons, with exception to research on nuclear disarmament.

- Ireland, Austria, and Mexico see finance as part of assistance.

- Austria said the scope of a prohibition on financing is not clear, and argued it would be difficult to differentiate and hard to implement with Ministries of Finance and in a free-market society. Mozambique, Sweden, and Switzerland supported this. Switzerland says the “devil is in the detail” and we would need detailed technical parameters to understand what financing means. Bangladesh encouraged caution on further defining assistance.

- Sweden suggested an amendment to the language, to include assistance with critical components or technologies, and to assist or induce intentionally. Sweden and Bangladesh supported a specification that the paragraph say peaceful uses are exempt.

- Switzerland thinks that this paragraph should be based on language from the CCW, APLC, and CCM.

General obligations part 1(g)
- Sweden argued that nothing in this article should prevent civilian nuclear activities.

- ICRC questioned whether this paragraph, along with 1(c), were necessary, given that it seems that these would be covered by 1(a).

General obligations part 2
- Thailand called for expanding the use of the word territory to include continental shelf and exclusive economic zones. Philippines and Viet Nam supported this.

- Thailand would like to add a third paragraph on acts to assist or encourage.

- Cuba would like to expand territory to include airspace and waters.

General obligations part 2(a)
- Thailand would like to include here: development, production, manufacture, acquire, possess control, stockpile, store, use or threaten to use.

- Nigeria would like to include transporting.

General obligations part 2(b)
- Sweden called for the deletion of subparagraph 1(e), and Mexico supported the deletion of 1(e) and 2(b), believing it’s already covered by the CTBT. New Zealand questioned the basis for repetition in paragraph 1(e) and 2(b), in line with its suggestion to combine paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1.
All their lives, Hibakusha—survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—have courageously and tirelessly spoken about their tragic experience of nuclear weapons, to tell the world about the humanitarian imperative to prohibit and eliminate them. This year, their dream of a world free of nuclear weapons has come closer than ever to reality.

Seizing the unique opportunity offered by the UN conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons leading towards their total elimination, a delegation of first, second, and third generation Hibakusha left Japan on 12 April onboard Peace Boat to travel around the world to share their personal testimonies and call for the conclusion of a nuclear ban treaty.

As part of this tenth edition of Peace Boat’s Hibakusha Project, they have visited over 15 countries to date. During the European segment of their voyage, Hibakusha met with policy-makers including high-level representatives in foreign ministries and regional governments, parliamentarians, senators, and City Council officials, to urge them to convince their governments to actively take part in the negotiations and support the ban treaty.

In the context of their visit, the parliament of the Valencia region unanimously adopted a declaration urging the Spanish central government to reverse its opposition to the ban treaty and join the negotiations. The Catalan Parliament later issued a similar statement.

In Cagliari, Italy where NATO holds military bases and training facilities, they met with the president of the Commission of Inquiry on Depleted Uranium and other officials to discuss the humanitarian and environmental impact of weapons, and in St. Petersburg, they met with Chernobyl victims and discussed the importance of passing on memories to new generations. In Italy, Portugal, and Denmark, they met with elementary, high school, and university students to educate them about the consequences of war and nuclear weapons.

In Sweden, they held a substantive discussion with Ambassador for Disarmament Eva Walder and in Finland, they discussed with Ambassador Jarmo Viinanen the similar position held by their respective governments on nuclear weapons issues. In all ports visited, they gave testimonies to galvanize public support and spoke to local media. They also promoted the Hibakusha Appeal and collected signatures in support of seeing nuclear weapons eliminated during their lifetime.

Members of the delegation are now in New York, where they will hold a side event together with survivors of nuclear tests from the Pacific, where each will give personal testimonies of the suffering they endured due to the use or testing of nuclear weapons. The draft treaty explicitly refers to the suffering of both Hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and survivors of nuclear testing. Together, they will speak on why nuclear disarmament is an urgent priority, which matters to everyone in the global community.

Join them at the UN side event, Global Call of Hibakusha – The Humanitarian Imperative to Prohibit and Eliminate Nuclear Weapons, organized by Peace Boat and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, on Monday, 19 June at 13:15 in United Nations Conference Room E (located along the corridor linking the Gift Shop area & the Vienna Café, 1B of UNHQ).

Speakers include Ambassador Amatlain E. Kabua, Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Dr. Masao Tomonaga, former Director of Nagasaki Red Cross Atomic Bomb Hospital, Mr. Roland Oldham, founder and President of Moruroa e Tatou, Tahiti, Ms. Karina Lester, Second Generation Nuclear Test Survivor from South Australia, Mr. Seiichiro Mise, Nagasaki Survivor and Ms. Toshiko Tanaka, Hiroshima Survivor.

WOMEN’S MARCH TO BAN THE BOMB, NEW YORK CITY
Saturday, 17 June 2017