Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Action 10:
All nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have the beneficial impact towards the ratification of the Treaty, and that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.

Action 11:
Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all States commit to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained.

Action 12:
All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty recognize the contribution of the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures adopted by consensus at the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in September 2009, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.

Action 13:
All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty at the national, regional and global levels.

Action 14:
The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is to be encouraged to fully develop the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including early completion and provisional operationalization of the international monitoring system in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, which should, upon entry into force of that Treaty, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with that Treaty.

New developments for the CTBT
The Treaty has been signed by 183 states, and ratified by 163. Since the adoption of the 2010 NPT Action Plan, ten additional states have become parties, including one Annex II country, Indonesia.

13 countries have not yet signed the CTBT and 20 countries have signed but not yet ratified it. Formal entry into force of the CTBT requires that a specific group of 44 states listed in Annex II of the Treaty ratify it. Eight more ratifications are needed before it can enter into force, including that of four NPT states: China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States.
In May 2011, the US Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security said "The Obama Administration is preparing to engage the Senate and the public on an education campaign that we expect will lead to ratification of the CTBT." On 6 December 2011, US President Barack Obama welcomed Indonesia’s ratification and stated, "The United States remains fully committed to pursuing ratification of the Test Ban Treaty and will continue to engage members of the Senate on the importance of this Treaty to U.S. security. America must lead the global effort to prevent proliferation, and adoption and early entry into force of the CTBT is a vital part of that effort."

Secretary of State John Kerry reaffirmed that commitment on 26 September 2014 during the latest Ministerial Meeting of the CTBT.

Since May 2010, the US administration has held informal briefings of Senators and staff on key technical and scientific issues related to the CTBT. However, the change in composition of the US Senate and US House of Representatives following the 2012 and 2014 elections have made any prompt ratification of the CTBT even more unlikely.
China
The 2010 white paper on China’s National Defence stated it has strictly abided by its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear testing. Furthermore it has “actively participated in the work of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, and is steadily preparing for the national implementation of the Treaty.” However, despite the support for the CTBT, the Chinese government has not yet initiated the ratification process.\(^9\) The 2013 white paper does not address nuclear testing.\(^6\)

Other NPT states
In addition to the two above mentioned NPT nuclear-armed states there are two more states parties to the NPT that are Annex II states that have not yet ratified the CTBT: Egypt and Iran.

Egypt
In 2009, the Egyptian delegation to the UNGA First Committee stated that it has not ratified the CTBT because doing so "would only result in widening the steep gap in commitments undertaken by States member to the NPT and States outside the Treaty which enjoy unlimited freedom in the nuclear area."\(^{10}\) In 2011, the Egyptian delegation made it clear that Egypt would not ratify the Treaty without a change in Israeli policy with regard to nuclear weapons. No change in the Egyptian position has been reported.

Iran
At the Fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in 2007, Iran outlined a number of negative developments that "have jeopardized the prospects of entry into force of the Treaty," including lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament, upgrading and modernization of existing nuclear weapons, rejection of the CTBT by some nuclear-armed states, and acknowledgement of the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel.\(^{11}\) No change in the Iranian position has been reported.

CTBT Conferences
Since the 2010 NPT Action Plan was adopted, three Ministerial Meetings of the CTBT (September 2010, September 2012, and September 2014) and two CTBT Article XIV Conferences (September 2011 and September 2013) were held in New York on the margins of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). These meetings concluded with joint statements, which reaffirmed the commitment of the parties to the CTBT and called upon the states that had not yet ratified the Treaty to do so.\(^{12}\)

During the 2013 CTBT Article XIV Conference, a Group of Eminent Persons was launched on 26 September 2013. The Group consists of 17 eminent personalities and international experts whose goal is to support and complement efforts achieve the CTBT’s entry into force. The Presidents of the Article XIV Conference will also be members of the group.\(^{13}\) In April 2014, the Group met in Stockholm, Sweden, to discuss ways to promote the CTBT.\(^{14}\)

Verification
Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is establishing a verification regime to detect nuclear explosions anywhere on the globe. The CTBTO detected a nuclear test explosion in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the morning of 12 February 2013 and could inform its member states with data one hour before the DPRK’s announced its test.\(^{15}\)

From 28 November to 9 December 2011, over 60 participants including International Monitor Station (IMS) operators, National Data Centre staff, diplomats, academics, and members of civil society attended the Advanced Science Course on the verification technologies of the CTBT. In total, participants from more than 100 different countries followed the event.\(^{16}\) Furthermore, the CTBTO continues to host various other trainings and workshops on verification related issues.\(^{17}\)

From 3 November to 9 December 2014, the CTBTO’s most sophisticated on-site inspection was conducted in Jordan, searching and area of nearly 1000 square kilometres using 15 of the 17 techniques permissible under the CTBT. The so-called Integrated Field Exercise, IFE14, took place after four years of preparation and involved 150 tonnes of specialised equipment and over 200 international experts.\(^{18}\)

However, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission lists several key challenges for the completion of the verification regime. For example, stations intended for India and Pakistan cannot be started until these two countries sign the CTBT.\(^{19}\)
References:

1. Brunei Darussalam, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iraq, Niue and Trinidad and Tobago.
2. Bhutan, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Dominica, India, Mauritius, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tonga, Tuvalu.
3. Angola, China, Comoros, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, United States, Yemen, Zimbabwe.
8. According to experts, the Chinese ratification is dependent on US ratification. For more information see for example here: *CTBT At Fourteen: Prospects For Entry Into Force*, Center for Arms Control and Non Proliferation, 2010; http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/nuclearweapons/articles/ctbt_at_fourteen_prospects_for_entry_into_force/ (retrieved 2015-02-18).
11. Statement to the Conference on the Entry into force of the CTBT, delivered by Iran on September 2007.