When the Cold War abruptly ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, anti-nuclear activists and ordinary people everywhere collectively breathed a huge sigh of relief, hoping and believing that they had walked away from a nuclear holocaust and putting nuclear weapons out of their minds. Many activists went on to different issues, while others went back to their day-to-day lives, raising families and working to make a living in an increasingly demanding economy. Meanwhile, deeply embedded in the US military-industrial-academic complex, the nuclear juggernaut rolled on, as militarists in the Pentagon and scientists at the nuclear weapons labs conjured up new justifications to project the nuclear weapons enterprise into the future.

In 1991, following the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, Colin Powell, then-Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained, “You’ve got to step aside from the context we’ve been using for the past 40 years, that you base [military planning] against a specific threat. We no longer have the luxury of having a threat to plan for. What we plan for is that we’re a superpower. We are the major player on the world stage with responsibilities around the world, with interests around the world.” To implement this new strategy, “non-proliferation”—stopping the spread of nuclear weapons—was turned

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on its head. The new buzzword was “counter-proliferation”—including the threat of a nuclear strike to dissuade other countries from developing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons that could be used to threaten the United States or its allies.

During the 1990s, nuclear weapons—especially US nuclear weapons—disappeared from the public’s radar screen. Questions of nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament became increasingly isolated from issues of concern to most ordinary people—including issues of war and peace—and increasingly relegated to elite policy circles inside the Washington, DC beltway.

Meanwhile, independent grassroots groups monitoring local nuclear weapons facilities were documenting US plans to replace underground nuclear tests with a new generation of high-tech experimental laboratory facilities and supercomputers, and challenging proposals for new weapons production processes and capabilities. For the most part, that information was kept out of Washington discourse by DC arms control lobbyists who were focused almost exclusively on securing ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—at any price—while protecting their access to policy and decision makers. Apparently, from their point of view, it was an “inconvenient truth” that nuclear weapons research and development was going forward hand in hand with evolving counter-proliferation policies reliant on “credible” US nuclear threats.

To make matters worse, as the decade wore on, funding for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working for disarmament began to dry up. Those funders still in the field increasingly withdrew support for independent local and regional groups advocating for the abolition of, rather than US control of, nuclear weapons in a broader context. Instead they encouraged an increasingly centralized, narrowly framed, “top down” approach, comprised mainly of legislative initiatives targeting individual budget line items for proposed new nuclear weapons programmes. Those programmes were addressed, for the most part, in isolation, without reference to existing nuclear weapons or any broader military or foreign policy considerations.
Nuclear weapons and security discourses

With nuclear weapon issues effectively removed from grassroots organizing agendas, the connections between nuclear weapons and broader issues of peace, security, and justice were severed. Thus nuclear weapons were not initially brought into the human security discourse as it developed. However, the relationship between nuclear weapons and human security is similar to that of the relationship between economic inequalities and social justice: if you have the first, the second is very difficult to obtain.

Nuclear weapons foremost act as an existential threat to humanity and life on this planet. As recent studies by climate scientists have shown, a nuclear war involving no more than 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons—about 0.3% of the global nuclear arsenal—could have terrifying, long-lasting effects on the global climate, leading to a drop in average surface temperatures, reduction of the ozone layer, and shortened agricultural growing seasons.

And, as the terrible earthquake in Haiti, which has killed roughly the same number of people as the two primitive atomic bombs dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has shown us once again, there could be no adequate response to the far larger catastrophe of a nuclear explosion in a city anywhere today. An earthquake is an act of nature. A nuclear weapon use, on the other hand, is a 100% preventable man-made event.

While the use of nuclear weapons clearly would not bring anyone security, nuclear weapons nevertheless have become a central feature of the “national security” discourse. This discourse ensures the security of elites who seek to maintain instruments of violent destruction for their own benefit. The “national interest,” as it is typically invoked in this sense, does not refer to the well-being of the general population, but of those managing the military-industrial-academic complexes. Nuclear weapons are instrumental for nuclear weapon states in maintaining the structural inequalities between the elite, technologically-proficient classes and the rest of humanity, between those with power and money and those without either.

Whether the military-industrial-academic complex is in the United States, India, France, or any other country, it is in its interest to keep money pumping into its nuclear weapon programmes. For the United States, as Andrew Lichterman of the Western States Legal Foundation points out, “The nuclear weapons establishment constitutes a formidable set of institutions.
And they are part of a far broader constellation of powerful institutions and organizations, never far, if at all, out of power, that see their interests as being well served by a mode of US global military dominance ultimately underwritten by nuclear weapons. This current, highly-militarized order also benefits those who profit from all the other elements of an economically stratified world maintained in large part by force or threat of force.

US President Obama, while on the one hand committing the United States to “pursuing a world without nuclear weapons,” is quick to caveat this goal with the disclaimer that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a credible deterrent to ensure the security of the US and its allies. The Vice-Admiral of US Strategic Command, the institution responsible for US nuclear war planning, has argued that contrary to the belief that the only “legitimate” role for nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear weapon attack by others, “the deterrence role of US nuclear forces goes well beyond” this formulation. He explained,

US nuclear forces continue to play other roles in strategic deterrence. They cast a long shadow over the decision-making of any adversary attempting attacks on US vital interests or contemplating such attacks. They make it clear that the American President always has an option of last resort for which the adversary has no effective counter. They pose what’s been called the threat that leaves something to chance, the possibility in the mind of the adversary that their actions could result in unintended or uncontrolled escalation. And these are the deterrence dynamics that only nuclear weapons can provide.

According to its proponents, maintaining this “credible” deterrent will require a massive investment in the nuclear weapons infrastructure. In her address to the US Institute of Peace in October 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pledged a “robust nuclear complex budget in 2011” that presumably would include support for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s two major construction projects: the multi-billion-dollar Uranium Processing Facility planned for the Y-12 National Security Complex and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facility planned for Los Alamos National Laboratory. “The United States must maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies and partners while we pursue our vision” of a world without nuclear weapons, Clinton said.
On 18 February 2010, in what can best be described as an “Orwellian” presentation at the National Defense University, US Vice-President Joseph Biden defended the Obama administration’s decision to massively increase spending for maintenance of the US nuclear stockpile and modernization of the nuclear weapons infrastructure as consistent with President Obama’s Prague agenda. According to Biden, “Guaranteeing our stockpile, coupled with broader research and development efforts, allows us to pursue deep nuclear reductions without compromising our security.” In a stunning series of contradictions he declared, “As I speak, US and Russian negotiators are completing an agreement that will reduce strategic weapons to their lowest levels in decades.” This was followed a few paragraphs later with, “our budget proposal reflects some of our key priorities, including increased funding for our nuclear complex, and a commitment to sustain our heavy bombers and land and submarine-based missile capabilities, under the new START agreement.” Acknowledging that “Some in [the Democratic] party may have trouble reconciling investments in our nuclear complex with a commitment to arms reduction,” he explained, “As both the only nation to have used nuclear weapons, and as a strong proponent of non-proliferation, the United States has long embodied a stark but inevitable contradiction.”

Security without nuclear weapons

The 2006 final report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission, headed by Hans Blix, recommends, “All states possessing nuclear weapons should commence planning for security without nuclear weapons.” But, while advocating for “preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons through joint practical and incremental measures,” the Commission did not directly address what “security without nuclear weapons” means, leaving this fundamentally important question open to a wide variety of interpretations.

One disquieting view of security without nuclear weapons has been offered by Robert Einhorn, now Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control to Secretary of State Clinton. In 2007, he argued, “We should be putting far more effort into developing more effective conventional weapons. It’s hard to imagine a president using nuclear weapons under almost any cir-
cumstance, but no one doubts our willingness to use conventional weapons.”

This statement, unfortunately, is all too true. But an even more overpowering conventional US military threat surely is not the desired outcome of the nuclear disarmament process. Moreover, how practical would that approach be? How would countries with fewer economic resources—especially those on the “enemies” list—respond? Wouldn’t they have an incentive to maintain or acquire nuclear weapons to counter overwhelming US conventional military superiority? And wouldn’t that, in turn, even further entrench US determination to retain and modernize its own nuclear arsenal, thus rendering the goal of nuclear disarmament nearly impossible?

In fact, Russian security analysts have raised concerns that conventional US “alternatives” to nuclear weapons might pose an obstacle to US-Russian nuclear arms control negotiations. According to Alexi Arbatov, a scholar in residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center, “There are very few countries in the world that are afraid of American nuclear weapons. But there are many countries which are afraid of American conventional weapons. In particular, nuclear weapons states like China and Russia are primarily concerned about growing American conventional, precision-guided, long-range capability, [or] Prompt Global Strike systems.” Arbatov added that what he termed “threshold states,” countries with potential for developing a nuclear weapon, are similarly concerned about US conventional capabilities.

These countries have good reason to be concerned. In his 18 February 2010 speech, Vice-President Biden was clear:

We have long relied on nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries. Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective. The Quadrennial Defense Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which Secretary Gates released two weeks ago, present a plan to further strengthen our preeminent conventional forces to defend our nation and our allies. Capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield, conventional warheads with worldwide reach, and others that we are developing enable us to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, as other nuclear powers join us in drawing down. With these modern capabilities, even with deep nuclear reductions, we will remain undeniably strong [emphasis added].

Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev saw this coming. At a high-
level conference in Rome last year he warned, “The United States spends on military purposes almost as much as the rest of the world put together…. Military superiority would be an insurmountable obstacle to ridding the world of nuclear weapons. Unless we discuss demilitarization of international politics, the reduction of military budgets, preventing militarization of outer space, talking about a nuclear-free world will be just rhetorical [emphasis added].”

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has likewise argued that effective nuclear disarmament will require the elimination and control of other weapons, noting that “the world is over-armed and peace is under-funded.” In its 2006 report, the WMD Commission also noted the disparity between nuclear disarmament and development efforts, arguing, “It is time for all governments to revive their cooperation and to breathe new life into the disarmament work of the United Nations. Efforts to eradicate poverty and to protect the global environment must be matched by a dismantling of the world’s most destructive capabilities. The gearshift now needs to be moved from reverse to drive.”

But, what it will take to “move the gearshift?” Governments of non-nuclear weapon states routinely pay lip service to this subject. Though he didn’t mention nuclear weapons by name, Brazilian President Lula da Silva, in his statement commencing the General Debate of the 61st session of the United Nations General Assembly, summed it up this way: “There will only be security in a world where all have the right to economic and social development. The true path to peace is shared development. If we do not want war to go global, justice must go global.”

You get what you pay for

In 2008, global military expenditure reached approximately $1464 billion, which represents a 45 percent increase over the last decade. This spending comprises 4.2 percent of the world’s gross domestic product, or $217 per person. Fifteen countries—including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—accounted for over 80 percent of the 2008 expenditure. The United States alone is responsible for 41.5 percent.

*Atomic Audit*, a study by the Brookings Institution completed in 1998,
found, as a conservative estimate, that the United States spent $5.5 trillion on nuclear weapons from 1940–1996 (in constant 1996 dollars). The Brookings study found that nuclear weapon spending during the 56 year period it examined exceeded the combined total federal spending for education; training, employment, and social services; agriculture; natural resources and the environment; general science, space, and technology; community and regional development, including disaster relief; law enforcement; and energy production and regulation.\(^{17}\)

While military expenditure increases every year, investment in conflict resolution, peace-building, and development—elements recognized by the United Nations, most governments, and civil society to be necessary for sustainable security—lags far behind. Since the end of the Cold War, militarism has been growing in response to an increasingly unstable world, propelling the world even further into instability and war. Armed conflict—and the constant threat of war or terrorism—has become both the cause of and response to this growing militarism. War and the threat of war destroy lives, infrastructure, and well-being, creating a culture of fear, violence, and instability. This impedes development by upsetting social programmes, education, transportation, business, and tourism, which prevents economic stability, mental well-being, and sustainable livelihoods. The manufacture and use of weapons also prevents sustainable ecological development and preservation, creating unequal access to resources.

Governments that spend excessive financial, technological, and human resources on their militaries divert resources from economic, social, and environmental programmes. The military-industrial-academic complexes absorb vast amounts of funding that could otherwise be spent on human security, including education, health, housing, etc. Furthermore, funds reserved for development initiatives are increasingly spent on emergency relief and rehabilitation operations to clean up after violent conflict.

It is evident through commitments governments have made on paper to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness that the international community recognizes investment in development is necessary to create conditions for sustainable security. Yet in 2008, as noted above, military spending amounted to $1464 billion, while Official Development Assistance (ODA) amounted to about $145 billion—several billions of which went to reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan.\(^{18}\)
In fiscal year 2008, the United States spent an estimated $52.4 billion on nuclear weapons-related programmes alone, more than the entire military budgets of nearly every other country in the world. Yet, according to the 1998 United Nations Development Programme report, an additional $40 billion a year would be enough to achieve and maintain universal access to basic education for all, basic health care for all, reproductive health care for all women, adequate food for all, and clean water and safe sewers for all.

The United Nations 2005 Human Development Report notes, “On any assessment of threats to human life there is an extraordinary mismatch between military budgets and human need.” The report states that for every $1 invested in development assistance, another $10 is spend on military budgets. “No G-7 country has a ratio of military expenditure to aid of less than 4:1. That ratio rises to 13:1 for the United Kingdom and to 25:1 for the United States.” Indeed, the United States is at the bottom of the list when it comes ODA. In terms of percentage of its Gross National Product, the United States has almost always given less to ODA than any other industrialized nation in the world. Meanwhile, the United States transfers more weapons and military services than any other country in the world. For example, in 2008, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations, with $29.6 billion or 70.1% of these agreements. Russia came in a distant second with $3.3 billion or 7.8% of such agreements.

The MDGs, agreed by all of the world’s governments, are designed to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development. Fulfilling these commitments will cost far less than war. The best estimates are that a ten year commitment of around $76 billion per year, less than 7% of current military expenditures, would lead to fulfillment of the MDGs.

However, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) recently warned that world hunger is worsening and that unless investments are greatly increased the MDG goal of halving the number of those living in hunger and poverty by 2015 will not be met. The FAO projects that global food output will have to increase by 70% to feed a projected population of 9.1 billion in 2050. To achieve that, poor countries will need $44 billion
yearly in aid to agriculture, compared with the current $7.9 billion, to increase access to irrigation systems, modern machinery, as well as to build roads and train farmers.\textsuperscript{25}

In his 1999 Olof Palme Memorial Lecture, then-UN Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala declared:

We have all heard quite a bit about the ‘military-industrial complex’ ... but perhaps not enough about a new player in this game, namely the diverse coalition of individuals and groups who have committed themselves to converting disarmament from a dream into a reality. If we wish to take on the ‘nuclear weapons complex’ or any other institutional bastion of support for weapons that jeopardize international peace and security, we will need to mobilize what might be called a ‘disarmament complex.’ We will need to find some enlightened leaders who can operate on the basis of sustained political and institutional support from throughout throughout society, and who recognize that disarmament is both an efficient and an effective means to advance national security interests.\textsuperscript{26}

Dhanapala made the case for “sustainable disarmament,” which he defined as a “dynamic process—sustained by deliberate action on the part of leaders throughout the world community and from civil society—to address the combined needs of development and security through the reduction and elimination of arms.” And, he issued a challenge: “If we have indices of sustainable development, we can surely have indices of sustainable disarmament. If we have results-based budgeting in our public and private institutions, we can also have results-based disarmament.”\textsuperscript{27}

We are not starting empty-handed. Governments and NGOs have in many cases already established tools that simply need to be put to use, such as the MDGs. Another example, Article 26 of the UN Charter, offers evidence of assumptions made at the founding of the UN about how nations united and working together could actually prevent conflict and deliver peace and security—not just talk about it. Article 26 gives the UN Security Council the responsibility for creating a plan for regulating armaments and reducing military expenditures.\textsuperscript{28}

Article 26 directly challenges the concept that international relations and national security can only be determined through the threat of military force, as well as continuous preparation and readiness for armed conflict.
Unfortunately, at the moment of great opportunity that occurred at the end of the Cold War, Article 26 was undermined by the UN Security Council’s Presidential Statement of 31 January 1992, memorializing the first meeting of the UN Security Council held at the level of Heads of State. This statement arguably represents an agreement between the nuclear-armed permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—on the post-Cold War world order, in which proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The statement tacitly reaffirms the continuation of unchecked militarism and military spending, with the Council committing itself to take “appropriate action” to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. While the statement calls on all UN member states to “fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament,” it does not mention the UN Security Council’s own obligation under Article 26.29

The United Nations did establish an Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures in 1980, to enhance transparency of spending on military personnel, operations, maintenance, procurement, construction, research, and development, and a Register of Conventional Arms in 1991 to enhance transparency of international arms transfers, procurement through national production, holdings, and relevant policies. However, in any given year, less than a third of UN member states contribute to the Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures. More states participate in the Register of Conventional Arms but it is not nearly universal in use.30

**Changing the discourse**

If the most powerful military force that has ever existed on the face of the earth premises its national security on the threatened first use of nuclear weapons, why shouldn’t we expect less powerful countries to follow suit? This model is simply unsustainable. A radically new definition of security, based on profoundly different values, is needed. It is time to throw away the outdated notion of “national” security, and replace it with a new concept of “human” security.

In a 1994 presentation to NGOs, Dr. Mahbub Ul Haq, head of the United
Nations Development Programme, spoke eloquently of the need for a fundamental transformation in the concept of security, which he described as “the security of people, not just of territory; the security of individuals, not just of nations; security through development, not through arms; security of all the people everywhere—in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities and in their environment.” This new interpretation, he explained, requires us to regard human security as “universal, global and indivisible.” In other words, it applies equally to all people everywhere.\textsuperscript{31}

That kind of security cannot be brought about through nuclear weapons and military might. It can only be ensured through the equitable distribution of adequate food, shelter, clean water and air, health care, education, and even the arts. And, somewhat paradoxically, if funding was shifted from armaments to fulfilling those basic human needs, some of the root causes of violence—namely poverty and injustice—would at the same time be addressed, thus reducing the “need” or excuse for military action or other expressions of violence.

States’ traditional insistence on their nearly exclusive role governing military and security policy is vastly amplified with respect to nuclear weapons. The centrality of secrecy, the quasi-theological and allegedly subtle doctrines of nuclear “deterrence” and “counter-proliferation,” the technical complexity and sheer scale of the nuclear enterprise, the unimaginable power and horror of the weapons, all reinforce the nuclear weapon states’ extremely strong resistance to any significant role for the public and NGOs in setting or changing entrenched policies. Therefore, the most important task for NGOs is to articulate and promote a programme for the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world and to demand that the programme be implemented. Given the reluctance of even the most progressive governments to assess partial or limited measures within a broader, more holistic framework, NGOs have a special responsibility to identify and make visible the economic, health and environmental, and democratic imperatives for the elimination of nuclear weapons, to mobilize public opinion, and at the same time to begin addressing the root causes of reliance on nuclear arms.

As a starting point, we need to critically analyze the practical security requirements of ordinary people, wherever they live, in order to develop a new commonly shared understanding of security, defined in human and ecological terms. That understanding can help people begin to realize that
their own security is tied more closely to the security of other people around
the world than to the security of any national government and its elites. As a next step, hopefully it will move them to action, educating others and pressing their own governments to change their policies. One of the reasons the American public has been so slow to challenge US reliance on nuclear weapons is because the idea that their “national security” is dependent on unbridled military might is repeated on a daily basis by high-ranking government officials—of both political parties—reinforced ad nauseum and unquestioned in the mainstream media.

NGOs by definition are non-governmental organizations, meaning that they do not represent governments. It is not their role to try and cut deals with governments, or to work out the precise sequence of steps or timing on the path to nuclear abolition. Their job is to work with civil society to create the conditions and the will necessary to eliminate nuclear weapons. Among other things, that will require a fundamental reexamination of the military-industrial-academic complex.

To advocate successfully for nuclear disarmament and human security, civil society needs to take apart the traditional national security discourse. It needs to get away from the language and politics of the elites and create our own discourse—one that helps to illuminate the relationship between nuclear weapons and the structures that maintain them. Civil society must take care to identify who benefits from the maintenance of nuclear weapons—what their interests are and what their role is in sustaining high-tech militarism.

Another key element in building a movement toward the abolition of nuclear weapons is including a diverse range of actors. In order for nuclear disarmament to work for human security, disarmament activists have to work with development, environmental, and social justice activists—and they need a common discourse. NGO advocacy for nuclear disarmament must be linked to local, national, and international multi-issue campaigns, coalitions, and social movements promoting social justice, environmental protection, democratization, economic development, respect for human rights, conflict resolution, and comprehensive disarmament.

In linking their campaigns, activists can find common threads between seemingly unlikely issues. For example, those who work on ending impunity for sexual violence against women in conflict can talk about ending
militarism and about nuclear disarmament. Sexual violence is a weapon. Ending impunity is only a step—an important strategic step—toward ending violence against women, toward ending human rights violations, toward establishing norms and measures of human security. This step, and all the others, cannot be worked upon independently from those working to end war, to end militarism, or to end the structures, assumptions, and modes of thinking that enable the continued existence of nuclear weapons.32

The Oxford Research Group (ORG) in 2006 issued a briefing paper, “Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century”. ORG identified four main likely determinants of future conflicts that are likely to lead to substantial global and regional instability and large-scale loss of life: climate change; competition over resources; marginalization of the majority world; and global militarization. And it warned that unless urgent action is taken in the next five years, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to avoid a highly unstable global system by the middle of the century.

The ORG report characterizes current responses to these threats as a “control paradigm”—an attempt to maintain the status quo through military means and control insecurity without addressing the root causes, and it argues that such an approach is self-defeating in the long term. As an alternative, the report offers a new approach to global security—a “sustainable security paradigm”—that does not attempt to unilaterally control threats through use of force, but rather aims to cooperatively resolve the root causes of the threat using the most effective means available. For example, a sustainable security approach prioritizes renewable (not nuclear) energy as a response to climate change; energy efficiency as a response to resource competition; poverty reduction as a means to address marginalization; and the halting and reversal of WMD development and proliferation as a main component of checking global militarization. Those approaches provide the best chance of averting global disaster, as well as addressing some of the root causes of terrorism.

Significantly, the ORG report recognizes the essential role of civil society and NGOs: “Governments will be unwilling to embrace these ideas without pressure from below.” And it contends that maximizing the possibilities for creating such pressure “will mean a closer linking of peace, development and environmental issues than has so far been attempted.”33

New opportunities for concrete action on nuclear disarmament have
been created by the crises we collectively face: climate, energy, economy, food, water, poverty, education, housing, justice. It is up to us to not just connect the dots and link the issues but to push forward an agenda for change. As Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group says, “Nuclear disarmament was always about other things as well as mere survival, even in the depths of the Cold War. Now it strongly appears that the best way to get nuclear disarmament is to demand those other things, which are suddenly critical, not just nice to have. The background in the nuclear disarmament picture is the foreground now.”34
Recommendations

- Governments and NGOs should make nuclear disarmament the leading edge of a global trend towards demilitarization and redirection of military expenditures to meet human and environmental needs.

- The financial and human resources currently used to develop and maintain nuclear weapons systems should be used instead to meet social and economic needs consistent with the UN MDGs.

- Only a comprehensive view of disarmament based on human security will lead to progress toward an equitable and secure nuclear weapon free world. The concept of security should be reframed at every level of society and government, with a premium on universal human and ecological security, multilateralism, and a commitment to cooperative, nonviolent means of conflict resolution. Civil society should actively seek to create a new discourse for nuclear abolition advocacy that illuminates the relationship between nuclear weapons and the structures that maintain them and that identifies the beneficiaries of nuclear weapons. Governments should reframe their approach to disarmament, employing a humanitarian perspective rather than a military one.

- Nuclear disarmament activists should link their efforts with those of activists working on a broad range of issues to draw a complete picture of security, peace, and justice, forging a stronger, more unified call for human and ecological security.

- NGOs should call on governments, the UN Security Council, and civil society to report on ways and means for implementing Article 26 of the UN Charter.

- All governments should contribute data annually to the UN Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditure and the UN Register for Conventional Arms and constructively participate in efforts to enhance and upgrade both instruments.