Current status
Estimates about the size of the arsenal are based on the power capacity of the nuclear reactor near Dimona. Experts and analysts outside of Israel estimate that Israel’s current nuclear force ranges from 60–80 weapons at the low end to over 400 at the high end. The most recently cited figure is 80 warheads.\(^5\) It is assumed that Israel has a triad of delivery systems: land, air, and sea. It is estimated that, Israel could have produced approximately 840 kg of weapons-grade plutonium.\(^3\) Estimates of HEU production are even more difficult to make though public information suggests Israel has a uranium enrichment programme.\(^7\) A recent estimate has assumed Israel possesses approximately 300 kg of HEU.\(^8\)

Modernization
In light of current and planned nuclear capabilities, it seems that the country is continuing to “enhance” its triad of delivery systems.\(^8\) Nuclear weapons modernization is related to modernization activities in the security sector generally, including in areas of information technology, advanced military technology, and outer space technology.

Economics
There is no reliable public estimate on nuclear weapon spending in Israel.

International law and doctrine
Israel has not signed or ratified the NPT and interprets this as meaning it is not bound by the article VI disarmament obligation. Israel has signed but not ratified the CTBT, citing concern with the as-yet incomplete development of the verification regime and potential abuse of this regime; Israel’s status in the policy making organs of the Treaty; and concerns with the regional security situation in the Middle East.\(^4\) It is party to a number of non-proliferation-related agreements, on the basis of which it projects itself domestically and internationally as a responsible non-proliferant. Its position of opacity means it has no public nuclear weapon doctrine.

Public discourse and multilateral engagement
The policy of opacity entails a nuclear weapons capability about which “everyone knows” (domestically and internationally) and an umbrella of secrecy covering the physical and doctrinal elements of this capability. The secrecy surrounding Israel’s nuclear programme has taken on a life of its own at the domestic level with Israelis practicing self-censorship on a wide range of nuclear issues. At the same time, a discourse does exist at the academic level and increasingly in the media, driven in large part by debate over Iran’s nuclear programme. This discourse relies primarily on foreign sources. Historically, public opinion polls have indicated support for the nuclear option though a new survey has indicated that 65% of Israelis would prefer a nuclear weapon free Middle East to the current situation.\(^4\)

Israel did not attend either of the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in Norway or Mexico, nor did it participate in the open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament in 2013. Through General Assembly resolutions it has supported the concept of the development of a WMD free zone in the Middle East and has engaged in informal discussions to establish such a zone through the process mandated by the 2010 NPT Review Conference. However, it has been clear that it does not consider itself to be bound by the decisions of this Conference, and its future willingness to participate in any formal meetings stemming from the 2010 outcome remains unclear.