Pakistan
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Pakistan is currently estimated to have 100–120 nuclear weapons. It has a number of short-range, medium, and longer-range road-mobile ballistic missiles as well as ground and air-launched cruise missiles in various stages of development. It is estimated that Pakistan could have a stockpile of 3±1.2 tonnes of weapon-grade HEU and may be producing about 150 kg of HEU per year. Estimates suggest Pakistan has produced a total of about 0.15 ± 0.5 tonnes of plutonium.

Modernization
Pakistan has been rapidly developing and expanding its nuclear arsenal, increasing its capacity to produce plutonium, and testing and deploying a diverse array of nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. Pakistan is moving from an arsenal based wholly on HEU to greater reliance on lighter and more compact plutonium-based weapons, which is made possible by a rapid expansion in plutonium production capacity. Pakistan is also moving from aircraft-delivered nuclear bombs to nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles and from liquid-fueled to solid-fueled medium-range missiles and to cruise missiles. Pakistan also has a growing nuclear weapons research, development, and production infrastructure. A long-term concern now driving Pakistan’s nuclear programme is the US policy of cultivating a stronger strategic relationship with India to counter the rise of China. This may tie the future of Pakistan and India’s nuclear weapons to the emerging contest between the United States and China.

Economics
There is almost no information about the funding of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. It is clear that a significant fraction of Pakistan’s financial resources go to its nuclear weapons, but that this cost is not a large share of its overall military spending. Estimates indicate that Pakistan may spend about US$2.5 billion a year on nuclear weapons. Despite extensive foreign military assistance, Pakistan’s effort to sustain its conventional and nuclear military programmes has come at increasingly great cost to the effort to meet basic human needs and improve living standards. The 2013-2014 budget increased military spending by 10% to over 627 billion rupees ($6.3 billion), making it larger share of national government expenditure than the Public Sector Development Programme which covers social and economic development projects.

International law and doctrine
Pakistan is not a signatory to the NPT nor has it signed the CTBT and it appears to recognize no legal obligation to restrain or end its nuclear weapons and missile programme.

The government has, however, said it supports negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention. Pakistan has blocked negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty at the Conference on Disarmament, arguing that it would only further entrench asymmetries between the nuclear-armed weapon states. It has indicated it would allow talks to start if were granted an exemption from the nuclear trade sanctions implied by the Nuclear Suppliers Group as India has been.

Public discourse and multilateral engagement
The government has sought to create a positive image of the nuclear weapons programme, often by linking it to national pride and identity. Pakistan’s major political parties publicly support the nuclear weapons programme. The central thrust of most public debate about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is the struggle with India. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are widely seen as a response to India’s.

Pakistan attended the conferences in Norway and Mexico on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and participated in the open-ended working group on nuclear disarmament and the high-level meeting in 2013. It has also nominated a representative to the fissile materials cutoff treaty Group of Government Experts established in 2014. However, its positions have not changed to reflect these developments.