PREVENTING COLLAPSE: THE NPT AND A BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

October 2013
INTRODUCTION

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is usually described as the “cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime”. It has arguably been so successful because of the so-called “grand bargain” struck between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear weapon states: the five recognized nuclear-armed states offered a promise of disarmament in exchange for concrete obligations preventing proliferation. In addition, all state parties were guaranteed access to nuclear technology for non-weapon purposes.

This combination made the agreement attractive for the overwhelming majority of governments. The NPT restricts countries that do not have nuclear weapons from acquiring or developing them. It provides for safeguards against the diversion of nuclear material and equipment from peaceful uses—e.g. nuclear power or medical isotopes—to nuclear explosive devices.

While it has been largely successful in preventing proliferation, the Treaty has some inherent shortcomings and faces significant challenges stemming primarily from implementation inconsistencies and imbalances. As others have noted, the NPT “encapsulates some dangerous and outdated prescriptions to proliferate dual-use nuclear technology while simultaneously not really having the teeth to hold nuclear-weapons states to their disarmament obligations.”

Yet while the NPT currently suffers from perhaps its most serious crisis of credibility, the discourse around nuclear weapons is finally changing. Even in the NPT context, nuclear weapons are starting to be viewed and described as dangerous weapons. The 2010 NPT Review Conference expressed “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.” Since then, these consequences have increasingly become a focal point for discussion and proposed action on nuclear weapons.

16 governments delivered a joint statement at the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee highlighting the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and calling on all states to intensify their efforts to outlaw and eliminate these weapons. 35 governments echoed this call at the 2012 General Assembly First Committee session, while 80 countries at the 2013 NPT Preparatory Committee expressed dismay with the “unacceptable harm caused by the immense, uncontrollable destructive capability and indiscriminate nature of these weapons.” In March 2013, the government of Norway hosted a conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. The government of Mexico will host a follow-up meeting in February 2014.

The renewed attention to nuclear weapons as instruments of terror and destruction rather than of security and prestige has reinvigorated global determination to eliminate them once and for all. For many, a key strand of the humanitarian discourse on nuclear weapons is the call for negotiations to commence on a new treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons. Some have expressed concern that such a treaty would cut across the NPT and divert attention from it. This paper argues that rather than constituting a challenge to the NPT, a process to ban nuclear weapons that arises from the discussion around the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons has the potential to prevent the NPT’s collapse.
VALUE OF THE NPT

The NPT has served the international community well. It contains a legal commitment by 185 states never to develop nuclear weapons, and a view that possessing nuclear weapons does not provide these states with security. Several key aspects of the Treaty have contributed to the development of a global norm against the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons. The Treaty has clear aspirations of preventing nuclear war, stopping the nuclear arms race, ceasing the manufacture of nuclear weapons, eliminating existing arsenals, and easing international tensions and strengthening trust between states. All of these are valuable objectives, the achievement of which must continue to be sought with vigour.

The NPT also provides for groups of states to conclude regional treaties to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their respective territories. This has paved the way for nuclear weapon free zone treaties that currently cover 115 countries.

However, three qualities of the NPT stand out as significantly valuable for contributing to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons:

1. **Its near universality**
   The NPT serves as the legal architecture that has largely prevented proliferation—of its 190 state parties; only one (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) has ever left the Treaty and developed nuclear weapons. Only three states have never joined the Treaty—India, Israel, and Pakistan, all of which now possess nuclear weapons. This Treaty has persisted with near-universal membership through tumultuous times, including the end of the Cold War and the emerging, converging crises of the 21st century.

2. **A legal commitment to nuclear disarmament**
   The NPT currently contains the only binding commitment to nuclear disarmament in a multilateral treaty. It mandates negotiations on ending the arms race and nuclear disarmament. Its “good faith” provision means that states not only have to engage in but also conclude these negotiations.2

   **Article VI**
   “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

3. **Legally-binding safeguards**
   The Treaty mandates each non-nuclear weapon state party to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This agreement is used to monitor the state’s compliance with the NPT’s non-proliferation provisions. The safeguards system is a valuable mechanism that should create confidence amongst all member states that no one is developing nuclear weapons in secret. The absence of nuclear weapons has the potential to prevent the NPT’s collapse.

   Photo by Mark Garten

**Non-parties to the NPT**

- **India.** Tested nuclear weapons in 1974 and has around 80 warheads.
- **Pakistan.** Tested nuclear weapons in 1998 and has around 100-120 warheads.
- **Israel.** Has not tested nuclear weapons officially but are believed to have 80 warheads.
- **Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.** Withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and tested nuclear weapons in 2006. There is no publicly available evidence that North Korea has operationalized its nuclear weapons capability.
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

The strengths of the NPT make it more urgent than ever to look at the significant challenges it faces. It has often been said that the NPT has been in danger since its inception, but since the end of the Cold War, the challenges are consistently growing and tensions are escalating.

The promise of the NPT to achieve nuclear disarmament has gone unfulfilled while new restrictions to guard against proliferation have been imposed. Nuclear-armed states modernize and maintain their nuclear arsenals in a way that belies their legal obligations to pursue disarmament. The "step-by-step" agenda for nuclear disarmament has not achieved interim objectives such as entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiations of a fissile materials cut-off treaty, or full implementation of the 2010 NPT action plan, let alone the requirement of elimination. Some NPT state parties have engaged in nuclear-related cooperation with non-state parties, directly or indirectly facilitating their nuclear weapons programmes.

A number of states characterised the 2010 NPT Review Conference as a success, but its outcome document leaves many issues unresolved. In terms of disarmament provisions in particular, concerns about the ongoing lack of progress were masked by vague language that allows for wide interpretation when it comes to implementation. While a few concrete and measurable commitments were agreed upon in its action plan, the ones on disarmament are not being implemented. The current review process that will culminate in the 2015 Review Conference will likely be the one of the most challenging phases in the Treaty's history.

Lack of progress on disarmament by the 2014 Preparatory Committee

A fundamental problem with the NPT is the special status it grants to five states on the basis of their prior possession of nuclear weapons—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and United States. This status has been used by these states to argue the legitimacy of this possession. Tony Blair, then-UK prime minister speaking in the House of Commons in 2007, argued that the NPT “makes it absolutely clear that Britain has the right to possess nuclear weapons.” This is not a good-faith interpretation of the NPT; the treaty simply acknowledges that five states possessed tested nuclear arsenals at the time of its negotiation, and further subjects those states to an obligation of negotiating disarmament. Nonetheless, as decades have gone by without disarmament the NPT has seemed to formalize a regime of nuclear weapon “haves and have nots” that undermines its legitimacy and effectiveness in the eyes of many governments and publics. As long as nuclear weapons continue to exist—and to be revered as tools of national security—proliferation risks will remain. Yet the Treaty’s provisions and implementation efforts remain focused almost exclusively...
on constraining future proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states. In particular, the nuclear-armed states have failed to implement agreements like the 13 practical steps from the 2000 Review Conference and the 23 actions on nuclear disarmament in the 2010 NPT action plan.\textsuperscript{6}

The 2010 NPT action plan was hailed as a success and many believed it would start multilateral work towards nuclear disarmament. It is therefore extremely worrying that the five nuclear-armed state parties to the NPT have already indicated they will not meet even the limited commitments contained in the 2010 NPT action plan. Under action 5, for example, they committed to engage with other on matters of global stockpile reduction; tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear “sharing”; diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies; preventing nuclear weapons use and eliminating nuclear weapons; reducing operational status of nuclear weapons; reducing the risk of accidental use; and increasing transparency and mutual confidence. The five nuclear-armed states have met with each other on a number of occasions since the 2010 conference. However, it is clear from the reports on their discussions and in statements these countries have made at NPT and First Committee meetings that they have had limited discussions on elements of transparency and have focused on developing a glossary of nuclear terminologies.\textsuperscript{7}

Furthermore, they have already (at least unofficially) implied they will not complete action 21 of the 2010 outcome document. This action encourages the nuclear-armed state parties to agree on a standard reporting form, which they would submit at agreed intervals to a public repository established by the UN Secretary-General. The UN has established this online repository, which remains empty as of yet. Several of the five have noted that they feel a standard form is unacceptable to them, suggesting that this agreement will also be unfulfilled by 2015.

The NPT’s five nuclear-armed states are mandated to report to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee on their progress in implementing action 5. Based on available information, it is difficult to see how they will be able to do so in a meaningful way.

After the failure to implement the 13 steps from 2000, the perception of further failure at the 2014 Preparatory Committee will be a significant challenge for NPT. If the NPT’s nuclear-armed states were unable to present credible evidence that they are fulfilling their commitments, the trust that the NPT will ever be able to achieve nuclear disarmament would be significantly harmed.

Because of the value ascribed to it by many states, the Treaty has survived the lack of implementation of the 13 steps. If, however, the already modest commitments from 2010 go unfulfilled, one of the Treaty’s main raison d’êtres would be under serious threat.

\textbf{A zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East}

The 1995 and 2010 NPT outcomes both contain specific obligations toward establishing such a zone, with the 2010 outcome document specifying that a conference on this matter should be held by 2012 latest.\textsuperscript{8} However, by the 2013 NPT Preparatory Committee, the appointed facilitator for this matter had not yet achieved agreement on the parameters for hosting the first conference mandated by the 2010 outcome document. Ambassador Jaakko Laajava of Finland reported that as “not all states” have taken a position regarding participation or arrangement of the conference, “it was not possible to convene a Conference in 2012 as planned.” Following the postponement of the conference, Ambassador Laajava proposed holding multilateral consultations on the topic.\textsuperscript{9}

\textbf{Action 5 of the 2010 NPT action plan}

“The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, \textit{inter alia}:

- Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3;
- Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;
- To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;
- Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;
- Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;
- Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and
- Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.”
Many governments view the suggestion of holding a preparatory meeting for the conference as a step backwards. Having discussions about multilateral consultations that could lead to the convening of a conference that could discuss a process for the possible establishment of a WMD free zone in the Middle East, 20 years after the NPT first decided to pursue this matter, is unacceptably slow progress for most states in the region.

Because the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995 in exchange for, among other things, the resolution on the Middle East, the failure to make progress on this issue poses an acute challenge to the NPT’s credibility. Just as with the Treaty’s nuclear disarmament provisions, conditions and external circumstances are used as an excuse for not achieving the goals of the commitments and for not fully implementing previous decisions.

The issue of a WMD free zone in the Middle East might be the most serious challenge to the NPT in this review cycle. The inability to hold a meeting on the topic by the 2014 Preparatory Committee could reduce the confidence of many Middle Eastern states that remaining in the NPT is in their interests. “We cannot continue to attend meetings and agree on outcomes that do not get implemented, yet to be expected to abide by the concessions we gave for this outcome,” said the Egyptian delegation as it walked out of the 2013 Preparatory Committee because of the failure to hold the Middle East conference in 2012. This was the first walk-out in the NPT’s history, and perhaps a signal of what could lie ahead.

**Politicization of safeguards**

The NPT is also facing increasing tensions over the perception of bias in the interpretation of safeguards obligations. The additional protocol on safeguards is voluntary, so many NPT state parties do not have one in force. Due to selective application of obligations under the NPT, many state parties argue against considering the additional protocol as the new “safeguards standard”. It is increasingly seen as unfair to put in place stronger legal mechanisms for non-proliferation obligations while disarmament obligations remain unfulfilled. This creates tension and polarization of positions.

The selected or politicized approach to safeguards implementation is also increasing tensions. For example, many countries question the motivations behind the ongoing scrutiny of Iran’s nuclear facilities and worry that they too could one day be subjected to similar discriminatory action. Even former IAEA representatives have expressed concern that the Agency has become politicized through its conduct over the Iran case.

The lack of confidence in the IAEA as a trustworthy and impartial verification mechanism is a significant challenge. If state parties view safeguards and IAEA inspection as tools used by the powerful to achieve political objectives, there will be a growing reluctance to increase transparency and less openness to inspec-
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– Mr. Eamon Gilmore T.D., Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Ireland, 26 September 2013, New York

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In conclusion, the fundamental challenges facing the NPT stem from the inherent imbalance within the Treaty’s obligations and the sense of entitlement to the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons felt by the NPT’s nuclear-armed states. Few tangible efforts are being made to universalize the NPT or to move towards negotiations for nuclear disarmament. The NPT’s nuclear-armed states and many of their allies maintain that nuclear weapons are still essential for their security; most of their efforts and resources to date are focused on non-proliferation.

This situation has created a sense of mistrust and frustration that will only continue to escalate if the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee again highlights the lack of progress on disarmament.

These increasing tensions can significantly put at risk the key benefits of the NPT, such as its near-universalization, its safeguards system, and the commitment from 185 states that the possession of nuclear weapons is not beneficial for their security. If the international community does not act now, we risk not just a potential catastrophic scenario where existing nuclear arsenals might be used—with catastrophic consequences, but we also risk destroying the only non-proliferation regime we have.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

In order to counter the perception that the NPT serves the interests only of the Treaty’s nuclear-armed states and their allies, the rejection of nuclear weapons must be reinforced. The lack of progress on nuclear disarmament, coupled with the insistence of some states that these weapons have security value, makes preventing proliferation and achieving a world free of nuclear weapons difficult if not impossible.

Such reinforcement could take the form of an international treaty banning nuclear weapons. A ban on nuclear weapons would make it illegal for all states to use or possess nuclear weapons and would help pave the way to their complete elimination. Negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapons could be undertaken by committed governments now—even without the participation of the nuclear-armed states.

Banning nuclear weapons would not solve all of challenges facing the NPT immediately. If undertaken carefully and in a considered manner, it could, however, go a long way towards addressing many of the concerns and problems facing the NPT regime.

The NPT itself sets out both the rationale and obligation to ban nuclear weapons. The NPT highlights the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons as its motivation for preventing proliferation and achieving disarmament. The NPT specifically seeks to end the arms race and the production of nuclear weapons, and to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons through good faith negotiations. Banning nuclear weapons, which also has as its primary motivation the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, likewise seeks to end the production and possession of nuclear weapons.

Taking the step of categorically prohibiting the existence of these weapons is fully consistent with the NPT and will only help to achieve its goals.
HOW A BAN COULD ADDRESS THE CURRENT CHALLENGES FACING THE NPT

The shortcomings inherent in the NPT and the challenges to its credibility that have arisen from its problematic implementation suggest that new endeavours are necessary to strengthen the norm against nuclear weapons. A ban on nuclear weapons could be the catalyst to solving many of these challenges. Functioning in concert with the NPT, a ban on nuclear weapons would strengthen state parties’ ability to achieve the goals set forth in the NPT.

Banning nuclear weapons could be seen as making operational the NPT’s key objectives and its ultimate aim of achieving both non-proliferation and disarmament.

Leveling the playing field

Most of the challenges identified in the previous chapter stem from the sense of imbalance of the NPT’s application to states based on whether or not they possess nuclear weapons. A nuclear weapons ban treaty would make no such division. All states would be either nuclear weapons-free or remain outside the prevailing international norm until they disarm. This would contribute to restoring trust and confidence among state parties to a ban treaty that participating states are serious and committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons. A treaty banning nuclear weapons would put more pressure on states outside the treaty to eliminate their weapons of terror by stigmatizing the weapons and mounting financial challenges to their continued production.

Stigmatizing nuclear weapons

Banning specific weapon systems can and does have a wide-ranging ethical standard-setting function that goes far beyond the terms and signatories of a particular treaty. Banning nuclear weapons will affect the calculations of the nuclear-armed states. It will be an additional obstacle to justifications of their continued possession and modernization of these weapons.

The treaties banning landmines and cluster munitions brought the international community to rightly perceive these weapons as illegal and immoral, causing even those governments that have not ratified the relevant conventions to comply with many of their provisions. While it is true that nuclear weapons are perceived as having greater strategic value than these conventional weapons, banning nuclear weapons could be expected to affect the behaviour of the nuclear-armed states. It would change the legal and political landscape, creating a new norm against the possession and financing of nuclear weapons. It will also support a new discourse about nuclear weapons that understands them as weapons of terror, instability, and insecurity rather than as “deterrents” or instruments of “security”.

A ban on nuclear weapons would challenge the assertion that nuclear weapons provide security. The 115 countries that have already committed to a nuclear weapons ban through nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) treaties have demonstrated their conviction that they are more secure without nuclear weapons. A global ban on nuclear weapons will shrink the “zone of insecurity” constituted by states currently outside of NWFZs. In addition, the stigmatization effects described above will make nuclear weapons incompatible with the principles of human rights and humanitarian law, becoming increasingly unattractive to governments that wish to be viewed in good standing in the international community.
ments made under the NPT—to never develop nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

IAEA safeguards could still function as the primary mode of verification both with existing obligations to not develop or possess nuclear weapons under the NPT and the obligations of a ban. All non-nuclear weapon states will retain their safeguards agreements under the NPT with the IAEA. Any state currently possessing nuclear weapons that decides to join the international community in renouncing nuclear weapons would accept the same safeguards on all relevant facilities.

Creating conditions for disarmament

The NPT has thus far been a forum where nuclear-armed state parties to the Treaty have been able to dominate discussions and focus attention on non-proliferation while avoiding discussions about their lack of progress towards disarmament. With a ban in place, the context and dynamics of the NPT would drastically improve.

A ban would raise expectations on the nuclear-armed states that are party to the NPT—as well as on those that have remained outside of the Treaty. Experiences from the negotiations of the prohibitions on anti-personnel landmines and on cluster munitions, shows how the main users and producers of these weapons modified their behavior and positions radically in just a few years. In the case of cluster munitions, even if some states remained outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), they were pushed far beyond their original positions in both multilateral negotiations at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and on a national level. By initiating and concluding a process to ban cluster munitions even without initial support from several of the major users and producers, proponents of the ban helped bring about changes in policy and practice around cluster munitions in both national and international contexts within a very short time frame.16

Nuclear-armed states already seem uncomfortable with discussions about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. These discussions are challenging because they highlight how unconscionable it is for anyone to possess these weapons. By moving ahead with a ban on nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-armed states are setting the stage to change the status quo in discourse and elaborate an explicit legal standard prohibiting these weapons.

The nuclear-armed countries have so far faced no effective pressure to advance with their disarmament commitments within the NPT context or other UN fora, because they can veto or ignore decisions to which they object. Banning nuclear weapons without expecting their consent will remove a key obstacle to progress—the veto—and empower non-nuclear-armed states to make effective change.

A ban on nuclear weapons could also have a direct impact on existing nuclear arsenals. It would provide an impetus for financial institutions to divest from companies involved in nuclear weapons production. A ban will raise the political and economic costs of maintaining nuclear weapons by prohibiting the assistance of or investment in the development, production, or testing of nuclear weapon systems.

A treaty that prohibits business with corporations materially involved in the production of nuclear weapons or that prohibits material assistance or investment in the development, production, or testing of nuclear weapon systems would undermine these companies' rationale for being involved with the nuclear weapons business. For nuclear warheads per se, only a fairly small number of companies are involved, but many of these companies greatly value their international business.16

And of course, there is the possibility for all nuclear-armed states to join a ban at any point. Once nuclear-armed states are ready to join, they would have to take their nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and nuclear weapon materials out of service; remove nuclear weapons from their security policies, doctrines, and arrangements with allies; and submit a time-bound plan for the elimination of their stockpiles, materials, and production facilities in order to be in compliance with the ban. It’s likely that these measures will be undertaken bilaterally and multilaterally amongst the nuclear-armed states.

It took many years before nuclear-armed China and France joined the NPT, but when they eventually did, they quickly became two of the most prominent supporters of the Treaty.17 History shows that membership of treaties grows over time as international norms are established.
CONCLUSION

Forty-three years since the entry into force of the NPT, the international community is facing significant challenges around nuclear weapons. If not addressed, the core principles of the NPT and the existing norms constraining nuclear weapons could be weakened or even lost. There is an urgent need to reinforce the principles of the NPT by addressing the fundamental problems facing the treaty. A treaty banning nuclear weapons could be instrumental in this regard.

The preamble of the NPT is explicit in its objective of facilitating “the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons,” “the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles,” and the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery systems. Yet the operative paragraph dealing with nuclear disarmament is comparatively vague. Banning nuclear weapons would promote each of the goals and obligations as set forth by the NPT. It would make operational the Treaty’s goal of achieving a nuclear weapons free world and ensure that its non-proliferation aspirations are thoroughly supported.

It has been 68 years since nuclear weapons were used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States. The continued possession of nuclear weapons undermines the existing non-proliferation regime and presents a significant risk that nuclear weapons will be used again one day. It is time to establish a legal standard against the use, possession and development of nuclear weapons. This will change the political and economic landscape that currently allows some states to remain nuclear-armed.

It’s time to ban the bomb.

NOTES

3. For more information about the nuclear energy cooperation agreements between United States and India, see http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5451-us-india-nuclear-deal
4. For more information about the implementation of the 2010 NPT Action Plan, see http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-research/publications/5456-npt-action-plan-monitoring-reports
6. For more information about the implementation of the 2010 NPT Action Plan, see http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-research/publications/5456-npt-action-plan-monitoring-reports
7. See press release from the fourth joint meeting of the five nuclear weapon states under the NPT, http://www.state.gov/r/pra/prs/ps/2013/04/207768.htm
15. For more information about changes in non-states parties policy and practice around cluster munitions, see the Cluster Munitions Monitor, http://www.the-monitor.org
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Reaching Critical Will is the disarmament programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the oldest women’s peace organization in the world. Reaching Critical Will works for nuclear and conventional disarmament, the reduction of global military spending, and the demilitarization of politics and economics in order to achieve human security and social, economic, and environmental justice.

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