As the third Preparatory Committee for an arms trade treaty gets under way, diplomats and civil society alike are hoping for substantive and effective discussions on implementation and final provisions for an ATT. The week ahead will be challenging on several levels, notably the time constraints that seem ever more apparent to delegations—the pressure of only five days for these deliberations and the consciousness that only one more PrepCom remains following this week’s meeting prior to the 2012 Conference, where final negotiations will be conducted and, expectantly, a treaty adopted.

The provisional programme of work for the week focuses explicitly on ‘final’ provisions and issues of implementation for a legally-binding arms trade treaty to regulate the transfer of conventional arms. There is a palpable sense of urgency accompanied by calls for more concrete movement forward on key issues as a full year has already passed since the first PrepCom in July 2010.

The qualifying adjective ‘final’ clearly adds an element of additional pressure. The urgency of these preparatory deliberations continues to increase as time draws short to conclude discussions effectively so that member states are in the best possible position to conduct successful negotiations next year. These ‘final’ discussions are particularly important to help delegations accelerate their move away from broad policy positions and recommendations towards more concrete contributions to an implementable ATT.

Although it is both necessary and helpful to bear in mind that we are, in fact, moving into the ‘final’ stage of the ATT process, it is just as crucial to recognize the questions left unanswered. Provisions of an ATT to be discussed this week should include: how strictly the ATT will be interpreted—as either a treaty to regulate the legal trade of conventional arms or a broader agreement seeking to highlight and address illicit trade; if there will be inclusion of small arms and light weapons, and even ammunition, in the scope
of the treaty; where, if at all, will there be references to international human rights and humanitarian law; and how expansively international cooperation and assistance will be accounted for—whether limited only to that which directly relates to arms transfer or more widely to include training, stockpile management, and technological transfers.

In order to determine adequate parameters for implementation of what will become final provisions of the ATT, it is necessary that these and other considerations are fully vetted and concretely addressed prior to next year’s conference. Delegations are encouraged to be as diligent and thorough as possible in this process. As they proceed, the ‘final’ dimension of this week’s PrepCom can provide both a healthy measure and useful reminder of the urgency of this work for all whom are invested in successful ATT outcomes.

Six-point plan to promote the implementation of the arms trade treaty
Roy Isbister | Saferworld

The topic of conversation at this ATT preparatory committee is implementation of the eventual treaty. To help support the talks the Control Arms Alliance has published an updated version of its “Position Paper 4: Promoting Implementation of the ATT”. The paper sets out a six-point roadmap to ensure strong implementation of the ATT.

1. The main responsibility for effective implementation rests with national authorities. They will need to have clear national legislation and effective administrative systems capable of fulfilling all the obligations set out in the Treaty.

2. Effective implementation requires transparency. The treaty must oblige States to collect and report on data sufficient to enable meaningful independent scrutiny of implementation of the Treaty.

3. Monitoring and reviewing the Treaty will require at a minimum an annual Meeting of States Parties (MSP) as the main Treaty oversight and decision-making body. In addition a Review Conference should be held every five years. An independent Treaty institution, such as an ATT Implementation Support Unit (ISU), will be necessary to support and promote day-to-day implementation by States.

4. Raising questions and concerns relating to compliance and disputes should be every State’s right, bilaterally or at the annual MSP. However, where all co-operative means to resolve an implementation failure have been exhausted it may be necessary to involve an external body, such as the International Court of Justice.

5. The ATT should include a comprehensive framework for international co-operation and support, where States can request and receive implementation assistance from other states and relevant international, regional, and sub-regional bodies.

6. Entry into force should not be dependent on ratification by any one country or specific group of countries. It should be based on the minimum number necessary for the Treaty to be workable, for example, 30 state ratifications.

For more information on what would be necessary at the national level to implement a robust Treaty, please read “National implementation of the proposed Arms Trade Treaty: a practical guide”, published by CITS, Oxfam and Saferworld.

For more on the international aspects of Treaty implementation, see “Making it work: monitoring and verifying implementation of an ATT”, by Saferworld.

Implementation issues
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

One of the primary focal points of this week’s preparatory committee will be modes of implementation for the anticipated arms trade treaty (ATT). The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) believes that an ATT should be a strong tool with the primary purpose of preventing armed conflict, preventing the violation of human rights and international
humanitarian law, and seriously reducing the culture and economy of militarism. In this context, WILPF agrees with the Control Arms Campaign that states parties will need comprehensive national legislation and systems that criminalize non-compliance and define sanctions and penalties; administrative systems and capacity for implementing and monitoring compliance of the treaty; end-user documentation, follow-up, and record-keeping procedures; and more.

To help facilitate implementation of the treaty, ATT states parties should establish an independent implementation support unit (ISU) that could serve as a repository for national reports; review and analyze data in these reports; provide administrative and technical support to states parties in their efforts to implement the treaty, report, and convene meetings to review implementation; assist with peer review of national implementation systems; and help match assistance needs and resources. If this ISU is to be housed in the United Nations, its mandate to facilitate implementation of the ATT should by no means limit or restrict the UN from promoting and contributing to other principles and tools to regulate the arms trade and advance disarmament.

An important aspect of ensuring compliance with the treaty is transparency. As Amnesty International notes in its 2011 report *Our right to know: transparent reporting under an arms trade treaty*, the ATT provides an opportunity to address the lack of transparency in the arms trade by improving the quality and quantity of national reports and providing a comprehensive framework for standardized reporting. Among other things, Amnesty notes, transparency around arms transfer decisions will build confidence and security among states; encourage democratic accountability by national legislatures; allow for public scrutiny of the application and implementation of the ATT; and help prevent diversion of arms to illicit markets. To ensure effective transparent implementation, WILPF urges that the ATT require that all states parties keep records of arms transfers that their national authorities have authorized and that have cleared customs; of all of the information required to issue authorizations or customs clearance; of brokering, transport, and finance; of licenses, permits, or other authorizations; and all information regarding the description of the arms, quantity, value, final destination and end-user, the importing, exporting, and transit states involved, and the names of other companies and individuals involved. The treaty should also provide for a schedule of public reporting through which states parties are required to provide accurate, comprehensive, and timely information on exports, imports, and other transfers of the weapons systems covered by the treaty, as well as on their implementation of the treaty through national laws and procedures.

The treaty could provide for or encourage the establishment of multilateral and bilateral mechanisms for information sharing and consultations among states parties; provide for a review of the quality and quantity of reporting and a venue for states parties, UN bodies, and civil society to make proposals to improve standards of public reporting; provide for the convening of periodic meetings of states parties to review the treaty’s effectiveness and to address specific concerns of states parties; and affirm the role of civil society in monitoring implementation of the treaty.

**Civil society’s expert voice and passion at this week’s meeting**

*Jeff Abramson | Control Arms Secretariat*

Members of civil society from 50+ countries will be on hand at the UN this week as part of the Control Arms coalition’s collective work for a robust Arms Trade Treaty to end the human suffering caused by the irresponsible arms trade. Comprised of survivors of armed violence, doctors, lawyers, advocates, development specialists, parliamentarians, former military officers, human rights and international humanitarian law experts, and others, the coalition’s members are eager to see that the week builds on successes of previous PrepComs.

In the next 5 days, states need to insist that the Treaty contains strong provisions for
reporting and transparency, monitoring, review, consultation, compliance clarification, dispute settlement, technical cooperation and assistance. Because many states will need to be supported in developing strong national systems and measures for ATT implementation, an independent institution will be required that has the mandate and the capacity to support states in meeting their obligations under the Treaty.

As at previous meetings, organizations and individuals associated with the coalition will bring expert civil society voice and passion to the meeting, host side events, meet with delegates, and provide the proof that civil society must be present as discussions move forward. The coalition will also for the first time have in place a rapid response legal advice network of lawyers to review questions posed by states’ delegates and civil society members.

While of course pushing hard for what we believe, Control Arms is ready to help states work out the details of what is needed this week and in the coming months. A Control Arms Secretariat has recently been formed, based in New York City, to continue work with missions and other experts here at the UN. The Secretariat also looks forward to facilitating work back in capitals drawing upon the international network of members that are part of Control Arms coalition.

Yellow card
Dr. Robert Zuber | Global Action to Prevent War

For many involved in ATT PrepCom discussions, a key focus is on the various facets of diversion—weapons that are resold to generate illegal revenues, weapons that end up in the hands of non-state actors, or weapons that are subsequently used to violate the human rights of populations.

Along with legitimate concerns regarding diversion comes the obligation to create some kind of structure—whether minimal or more substantial—with the requisite expertise to flag arms transfers that have been determined to be most likely to be diverted to actors or purposes inconsistent with the obligations of supplier and recipient states.

A structure sufficient to highlight actual and potential cases of diversion is not without controversy, in part due to the cost of maintaining such expertise as well as concerns about political misapplication—specifically that some states’ transfers might come under far greater scrutiny than others. The concern with misapplication is magnified whenever an ATT structure is proposed that combines essential monitoring with punitive authority for non-compliance with treaty provisions.

Underlying these concerns is a widespread belief—communicated to us directly by a fairly diverse group of parliamentarians, civil society leaders and others—that states determined to conduct ‘suspect’ arms transfers will find a way to do so. Even in a post-ATT world, these leaders note, transparency in the global arms trade sufficient to highlight let alone prevent the trade in weapons with serious diversion potential will still be lacking.

Those cautions noted, virtually all individuals with whom we spoke maintained that a structure to monitor the global arms trade should be vigorously pursued. The question is how much structure can be integrated into the treaty process without incurring backlash from wary diplomats?

We share the view that structural concerns must be addressed at this Prep Com, as it is critical for both governments and the broader public that parties to arms transfers are not given license to ‘self regulate.’ But we also feel that a viable structure to monitor the ATT can be engaged in stages. In order to push forward successfully towards consensus on the multiple facets of a robust treaty, it might be wise at this point to establish parameters for a monitoring structure with the capacity to identify potential diversion-related problems and even to refer such problems for further review, but without the authority or capacity to inflict punitive measures or unilaterally prevent suspicious transfers—measures that would clearly be ‘deal breakers’ for some delegations.
From our vantage point, drawing the analogy between ATT structural functions and a 'yellow card' in football seems about right at this stage. Yellow cards are useful in highlighting instances of troublesome behavior that should not be replicated. They create mindfulness about proper conduct and reinforce the basic rules of the game, but without immanent threats of banishment or major disruptions to the game itself. The cards are not welcome by any participants, but any allegations of prejudice in their application is offset by the lack of immediate punitive measures.

Our sense is that, once an ATT is formally established, it will become increasingly clear that more robust structures and responses will be necessary to flag or prevent arms transfers with major potential for diversion. How those structures and responses will be administered, paid for, authorized and supervised will require extensive discussions. During this Prep Com, delegations can satisfy at least one part of the public demand for a viable monitoring structure and lay the groundwork for more robust measures in the future. For all its limitations, a 'yellow card' is far preferable to no card at all.

Social media and the arms trade treaty
Jessica Erdman | Global Action to Prevent War

Over the past two preparatory committees, non-governmental organizations and the media have provided reporting on arms negotiations. There has been an undeniable force present as these negotiations move forward: social media. On the pages of Facebook and Twitter, users ranging from diplomats to students have chosen to discuss, critique, and analyze the ATT.

The advantages of social media, particularly used in conjunction with arms trade issues, can be seen with a simple search of #ArmsTreaty on Twitter. While the discussions at the United Nations may end at 6 PM, the tweeting continues. Social media will undoubtedly remain a forum for users to discuss the issues—thus, we must ask: how can we balance the simultaneous informal debate by literally any user, and the formal diplomatic debate at the United Nations?

Social media has changed the way news is spread, as well as the role of the “audience” member. Through Twitter, a user who was once a reader of a media source is now an aggregator. What does this mean for the upcoming ATT negotiations? There is no telling the effect social media may have, but there is vast opportunity in the simple Twitter question “What’s happening?” Besides the user answering this question, Twitter offers users a public discussion forum where group interaction is inevitable. It would be to the advantage of states, non-governmental organizations, and individuals interested in the process to engage in the lively debate on Twitter during the Third Preparatory Committee. Twitter can serve as a platform for users to convene and have the frank discussions necessary to understand the facets of an arms trade. Follow @DisarmDialogues on Twitter for real-time updates on the Arms Trade Treaty, and take part in the discussion. For more information about the effects of social media:

Factoring arms trade into global military spending
Allison Pytlak | International Peace Bureau

The arms trade is a profitable and flourishing business. In fact, the Small Arms Survey estimates that the annual, legal trade in small arms exceeds USD 6 billion and that there are an estimated 875 million small arms in circulation worldwide, produced by more than 1,000 companies from nearly 100 countries. These are not insignificant figures.

Thankfully, the world is moving forward to negotiate a much-needed Arms Trade Treaty as a way to mitigate the humanitarian effects of the unregulated trade in arms. As it develops however, we must also remain cognizant of another and larger problem, of which the arms
trade is merely a symptom – excessive military expenditure and the distorted perception of security and priority that fuels it.

In 2010, global military spending reached new heights of $1.6 trillion USD, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The United States is responsible for 43% of this amount, which is more than the next ten countries combined. The other largest spenders are China, the United Kingdom, France and Russia – Permanent Members of the UN Security Council who possess a special potential and responsibility for upholding international peace. A few governments in Europe have recently reduced defense budgets as response to economic pressures, but some in other regions actually increased their spending in this area during 2010.

It is striking that there is so little attention accorded this subject, given the continued rise of military expenditure even during a time of global economic downturn. This is an area that the International Peace Bureau (IPB) is keen to see progress on, particularly given the huge disparity in spending between military budgets and the targets for the Millennium Development Goals.

Both broader military expenditure and the arms trade specifically have serious effects on development. This is true not only in terms of the direct effects of weapons in conflict situations, but also in respect to the ‘opportunity cost’ effects that occur when public money is siphoned away from developmental or environmental needs. Although arms do not cause violent conflict, they are the principal tools through which these conflicts are waged and perpetuated.

In September 2010, the UN Summit on MDGs stressed the need to find more funds to achieve the MDGs by 2015. It was calculated that the annual extra effort for meeting the MDGs by 2015 is $329 billion. This is the same amount of military expenditure for all of Western and Central Europe in 2009, or a mere 21% of global military spending in 2009.

The challenges to an honest re-evaluation of spending priorities are formidable, but not insurmountable. Military expenditure is considered an issue of national security and national preparedness. While every nation has the right and the need to ensure its territorial security, must this come at the expense of other sorely needed and vital human security items such as education, employment, or healthcare?

Another challenge remains the lack of transparency in reporting on military expenditure. The ensuing culture of secrecy makes it difficult for concerned citizens and others to bring this discussion into open debate. The UN Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, for example, would be an excellent tool and resource but is underutilized.

In order to raise awareness of all these issues, the International Peace Bureau organized the first ever Global Day of Action on Military Spending in April 2011. Organized in partnership with the Institute for Policy Studies, the Day of Action coincided with SIPRI’s release of new information on global military spending in 2010. It was marked by more than 90 events in over 35 countries, and included events at the international, national, and local levels. Activists produced videos, constructed powerful public displays and performances, held press conferences and seminars, and mobilized public opinion in favor of reducing military spending. Significantly, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs issued a supporting statement that concluded that the Day of Action “should serve as a catalyst for shifting global and national priorities from massive military spending to creating human security and safety for all.”

During this third Preparatory Committee meeting, the focus will turn to the biggest challenge of all – implementation. A properly implemented treaty should serve to prevent future suffering caused by armaments. However, unless the prevailing mentality that permits gross spending on arms production, procurement, use and a predilection for military solutions over diplomatic ones does not change too, than true human security will remain elusive. Let us remember to factor the arms trade into the global problem of military spending.
Women call for a strong arms trade treaty

We, peacemakers advocates from 53 countries, call for a strong Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

We laud the fact that nations of the world are deliberating a Treaty on the arms trade. Women have paid the cost of arms proliferation for too long. We suffer the consequence for the lack of controls on today's billion-dollar trade in arms. We are particularly at risk of certain crimes because of our sex - crimes such as violence in the home, on the streets and in the battlefield.

Small arms are the weapons of choice in committing violence against women. Hence, we call for a strong and robust Treaty containing the highest possible, legally-binding standards for the international transfer of conventional weapons, including small arms and ammunition within its scope.

Small arms facilitate a vast spectrum of women’s rights violations, including killing, threats and intimidation, rape and other forms of sexual violence. They facilitate the assault on women in both conflict and non-conflict situations. We hardly ever fight the world's wars, but we often suffer the most – directly and indirectly.

Hence, we ask that the ATT does not authorise the transfer of arms if they will be used to perpetrate acts of armed violence, especially gender based violence including sexual violence used as a weapon and tactic of war.

International law includes women’s rights, but these are not explicit within the UN Charter or the Geneva Conventions and other instruments of international law used by diplomats in the disarmament community. However, they have been recognised by UN Security Council resolutions and other binding instruments of international law and form part of international law that is relevant for the ATT.

Therefore, to protect women’s rights, the relevant binding international instruments covering gender-based violence, including rape and sexual violence, must be included in an arms trade treaty to be applied in arms transfer decisions.

It is time that women take on the role of peacebuilders and our role is recognised. Stop the victimisation of women fuelled by the irresponsible trade in small arms. Forge a strong Arms Trade Treaty that will complement the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms - now!

Signatories

National Organisations

1. Reconstruction, Health and Humanitarian Assistance Committee (HEWAD), Afghanistan
2. Asian Circle 1325, Asia
3. Amnesty International, Belgium
4. Mouvement d’Actions à Travers Monde, Belgium
5. ESPASSO CONSEG, Brazil
6. Amnesty International, Burkina Faso
7. Dounia Solidarité, Burkina Faso
8. Coalition pour le Développement et la Réhabilitation Sociale - CODR UBUNTU, Burundi
9. Fontaine Isoko for Good Governance and Integrated Development, Burundi
10. Ligue Burundaise des Droits de l’Homme Iteka, Burundi
11. Women and Allies Peacebuilding Network, Burundi
12. Cameroon Youths and Students Forum for Peace (CAMYOSFOP) Cameroon
13. Women in Alternative Action, Cameroon
14. Amnistie Internationale Canada francophone
15. Partnership Africa Canada (PAC), Canada
16. Vision Gram, Canada
17. Centro Popular para AL de Comunicación, Colombia
18. Colectivo de Mujeres Pazificas de Cali, Colombia
19. Liga Internacional de Mujeres por la Paz y la Libertad (LIMPAL), Colombia
20. Red Nacional de Mujeres de Colombia  
21. Sororidad, Ecumenismo y Democracia (SED), Colombia  
22. Mouvement Panafrcain de la Jeunesse Féminine pour la Paix (MOPAFJE), Côte d'Ivoire  
23. Femmes, Droits et Développement (FE2D), Côte d'Ivoire  
24. Amnesty International, Czech Republic  
25. Association Féminine pour la Lutte contre les Violences faites à la Femme et Enfant (AFLVF), DR Congo  
26. Collectif des Femmes Rurales pour le Développement, DR Congo  
27. Femmes des Médias pour la Justice au Congo, DR Congo  
28. Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), DR Congo  
29. Amnesty International, France  
30. African Women’s Active Nonviolence Initiatives for Social Change (AWANICH), Ghana  
31. Cultural-Humanitarian Fund “Sukhumi”, Georgia  
32. Pacific Regional Media and Policy Network, Femlinkpacific, Fiji  
33. Peace and Disarmament Program - Pacific Foundation for the Advancement of Women, Fiji  
34. Manipur Women Gun Survivors Network, India  
35. Coalition of Women for Peace, Israel  
36. Gun Free Kitchen Tables, Israel  
37. Movement of Democratic Women in Israel, Israel  
38. New Profile and Machtsom Watch, Israel  
39. Violence Prevention Alliance, Jamaica  
40. Amnesty International, Japan  
41. Amnesty International, Jordan  
42. Tears of Women Organisation, Kenya  
43. Lebanese Council to Resist Violence Against Woman (LECORVAW), Lebanon  
44. Center for Democratic Empowerment (CEDE), Liberia  
45. Liberians United to Expose Hidden Weapons (LUEHW), Liberia  
46. Voice of the Voiceless, Liberia  
47. Centre For Conflict Management and Women Development Affairs (CECOWDA), Malawi  
48. Amnesty International, Mali  
49. Association des Femmes pour les Initiatives de Paix (AFIP), Mali  
50. Swe Tha Har Social Services Yangon, Myanmar  
51. Namibia Non Governmental Organisations’ Forum (NANGOF) Trust, Namibia  
52. Women for Peace and Democracy Nepal (WPD-Nepal), Nepal  
53. YWCA, Nepal  
54. IANSA Women’s Network, Nigeria  
55. Defend International, Norway/Denmark/MENA region  
56. Organisation for Development and Peace, Pakistan  
57. Rozan, Pakistan  
58. Society for The Empowerment of People (STEP), Pakistan  
59. Women’s Action Forum, Pakistan  
60. Leitana Nehan Women’s Development Agency, Papua New Guinea  
61. Amnesty International, Peru  
62. Movimiento Manuela Ramos, Peru  
63. Red Nacional de Promocion de la Mujer, Peru  
64. Aksyon para sa Kapayapaan at Katarungan (AKKAPKA) Philippines  
65. Ang Komunidad para sa Ikaunan ng Tao, Inc., Philippines  
66. Center for Peace Education, Philippines  
67. CORE, Philippines  
68. SLCB-Cultural Heritage Research Center, Inc., Philippines  
69. Mindanao Commission on Women Butuan City, Philippines  
70. Paghilusa sa Paghidaet-Negros, Philippines  
71. Pax Christi Metro Manila, Philippines  
72. Philippine Action Network to Control Arms, Philippines  
73. Sulong CARHRIHL, Philippines  
74. Women Engaged in Action on 1325, Philippines  
75. Young Moro Professionals Network, Philippines  
76. Observatory on Gender and Armed Violence (OGAV), CES, University of Coimbra, Portugal  
77. Groupe de Travail Femmes, Paix et Sécurité, Senegal  
78. Réseau Sénégalais pour la lutte contre les ALPC (RESAAL), Senegal  
79. Victimology Society of Serbia, Serbia  
80. National Organisation for Women, Sierra Leone  
81. MARWOPNET, Sierra Leone  
82. Sierra Leone Action Network on Small Arms (SLANSA), Sierra Leone  
83. Amnesty International, South Africa  
84. Ceasefire Campaign, South Africa  
85. Amnesty International, Spain  
86. Centro de Educación e Investigación para la Paz (CEIPAZ), Spain  
87. Mannar Women’s Development Federation, Sri Lanka  
88. Women’s Action Network, Sri Lanka  
89. Amnesty International, Sweden  
90. SweFOR, Sweden  
91. Sudanese Women’s Voice for Peace (SWVP), Sudan  
92. Christlicher Friedensdienst (cfd), the feminist peace organisation, Switzerland  
93. Vois Blong Mere Solomons, Tonga  
94. Ma’afafine moe Famil Inc, Tonga  
95. Women’s Institute for Alternative Development (WINAD), Trinidad and Tobago  
96. Umut Foundation, Turkey  
97. Eastern African Sub-regional Support Initiative for the Advancement of Women (EASSI), Uganda  
98. Women Worldwide Advancing Freedom & Equality (WWSAFE), UK/Australia  
99. Amnesty International Women’s Human Rights Coordination Group, USA  
100. Center for Women’s Global Leadership, Rutgers University, USA  
101. Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, USA  
102. Global Action to Prevent War, USA  
103. Global Justice Center, USA  
104. Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns, USA  
105. Women’s Action for New Directions (WAND), USA
International Organisations

106. Amnesty International, International Secretariat
107. Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS)
108. Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) International Coordinating Team
109. IANSA Women’s Network
110. International Alliance of Women (IAW)
111. Open Society Foundation
112. Pax Christi International
113. Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)

Individuals

1. Elba Zeballos, Bolivia
2. Nelly Neema, Canada
3. Sahar Vardi, Israel
4. Ronit Marian-Kadishay, Israel
5. Fatima Zafar, Pakistan
6. Tomasa Ravines Burga, Peru
7. May Magno, Philippines
8. Krystel Robiso, Philippines
9. Stephanie Ortega, Philippines
10. Key Bobadilla, Philippines
11. Katherine Abulencia, Philippines
12. Raevene Morillo, Philippines
13. Charlene De Perio, Philippines
14. Aila Conopio, Philippines
15. Kezia Ortiz, Philippines
16. Sarah Garcia, Philippines
17. Meriel Perez, Philippines
18. Erika Diaz, Philippines
19. Sarah Garcia, Philippines
20. Jayme Uy, Philippines
21. Nikki Delfin, Philippines
22. Beverly Orozco, Philippines
23. Mirma Tica, Philippines
24. Loreta Castro, Philippines
25. Frances Piscano, Philippines
26. Dyan Mendoza, Philippines
27. Criselle Rosales, Philippines
28. Raquel Callangan, Philippines
29. Jazirah Janaubal, Philippines
30. Kelly Ann Rala, Philippines
31. Katrina Fernis, Philippines
32. Renee Facelo, Philippines
33. Kerstin Tagumpay, Philippines
34. Angelica Reyes, Philippines
35. Cristina Lopez, Philippines
36. Cherie Maglasang, Philippines
37. Catherine Paciencia, Philippines
38. Jermaine Pena, Philippines
39. Anna Rica Tagad, Philippines
40. Aimee Rentoy, Philippines
41. Ysabel Rodriguez, Philippines
42. Regine Reyes, Philippines
43. Clara Paulite, Philippines
44. Jamila Monjardin, Philippines
45. Catalina Garcia, Philippines
46. Ma. Patricia Suarez, Philippines
47. Johanna Acha, Philippines
48. Ruviemel Dangcalan, Philippines
49. Maria Melissa Tenazas, Philippines
50. Gisells Robles, Philippines
51. Jeanette Sabella, Philippines
52. Jaimee Vidal, Philippines
53. Marion Cortes, Philippines
54. Bonghui Ham, Philippines
55. Hannah Garduque, Philippines
56. Pfiiona Ajialle Canapi, Philippines
57. Maria Rosario Galvez, Philippines
58. Anne Esmele, Philippines
59. Camille Quiangco, Philippines
60. Angelica Cimatu, Philippines
61. Charmaine Aguilar, Philippines
62. Jinky Semana, Philippines
63. Hazel De la Rosa, Philippines
64. Johanna Acosta, Philippines
65. Rarah Lykal Takai, Philippines
66. Armina Aaron, Philippines
67. Jean Claisses Carlos, Philippines
68. Mikael Cruz, Philippines
69. Clara Emmanuel, Philippines
70. Samantha Asuncion, Philippines
71. Kim Coronado, Philippines
72. Francesca Cortes, Philippines
73. Jaon Balonkita, Philippines
74. Alexca Potillos, Philippines
75. Jean Patindol, Philippines
76. Sr. Arnold Noel, Philippines
77. Marco Ortiz, Philippines
78. Mike Ortiz, Philippines
79. Marissa Ortiz, Philippines
80. Moreeen Ortiz, Philippines
81. Miriam Tica, Philippines
82. Faye Tica, Philippines
83. Rae Tica, Philippines
84. Aileen Cruz, Philippines
85. Victoria Cruz, Philippines
86. Miguel Ortiz, Philippines
87. Jay Tampus, Philippines
88. Karlo Kardenio, Philippines
89. Marta Pietrobelli, UK/Italy
90. Garba Audu, USA