1. What are
biological weapons?
Biological warfare is the deliberate spreading of disease amongst
humans, animals, and plants. Biological weapons introduce a
bacteria or virus into an environment for hostile purposes,
that is not prepared to defend itself from the intruder. As
a result, this agent can become very effective at killing plants,
livestock, pets, and humans. There are a huge variety of genetically
or traditionally modified bacterias and viruses to withstand
antibiotics, that could be used as biological weapons, but some
of the most common types today are bacteria, rickettsiae, viruses,
toxins, and fungi.
Bacteria
Bacteria are single-cell organisms. Bacteria vary greatly in
their level of lethality and infectivity. Although many pathogenic
bacteria are susceptible to antibiotic drugs, strains can be
selected that are resistant to antibiotic and occur naturally.
Bacteria can be readily grown in artificial media using facilities
similar to those found in the brewery industry.
Examples of Bacteria: Bacillus Anthracis (causes anthrax),
Yersinia pestis (causes plague), Brucella suis (causes brucellosis)
Pasturella tularensis (causes talaremia also known as rabbit
fever or deer fly fever) Vibrio cholera(causes cholera) , and
many other less dramatic but still pathogenic species like Salmonella
typhi and Staphylococcus aureus. Effects of anthrax: About 1-6
days after inhaling Bacillus anthracis spores there would be
a gradual onset of vague symptoms of illness such as fatigue,
fever, mild discomfort in the chest and a possibly a dry cough.
The symptoms would improve for a few hours or 2-3 days. Then,
there would be sudden onset of difficulty in breathing, profuse
sweating, cyanosis (blue colored skin), shock and death in 24-36
hours.
These symptoms are essentially those of Woolsorter's disease,
which is caused by inhalation of Bacillus anthracis spores rather
than contact with the bacterium through the skin. Contact through
the skin is the most common "naturally" occurring form of Anthrax
and is characterized by swelling and boils on the skin. Skin
symptoms would not necessarily be expected with Anthrax resulting
from inhaled spores in BW.
http://www.bact.wisc.edu/Bact330/lectureanthrax
Rickettsiae
Rickettsiae are similar to bacteria in structure and form,
but must be grown in living tissue. Examples of Rickettsiae:
Coxiella burnetti (causes Q fever) and Rickettsia prowasecki(causes
epidemic typhus).
Effects of Rickettsiae: Gradual onset of fever with
severe headache, chills, generalized pains and dry cough (sometimes
developing to bronchopneumonia) of about 2 weeks. A macular
rash appears by about 5 days, first appearing on the trunk and
lasting about six days. CNS manifestations are possible. Damage
is caused to vascular endothelia by invasion of rickettsiae,
possibly leading to thrombosis and hemorrhage. http://www.mitretek.com/mission/envene/biological/agents/rickettsia.html
Viruses
Viruses are 100 times smaller than bacteria. They mostly consist
of DNA and need other living organisms to replicate. Viruses
can mutate to adapt to their environments, either naturally
or through genetic engineering to increase their pathogenicity/virulence.
Examples of viruses include: Variola virus (causes smallpox),
and Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (causes VEE), Yellow fever
virus (causes yellow fever), Ebola virus (causes Ebola hemmorrhagic
fever), Hanta Virus (causes a haemorraghic fever as well)
Effects of Variola virus: The usual entry of variola
virus is through the respiratory tract with infection of the
oropharyngeal (mouth) or respiratory (trachea and lung) mucosa.
Secretions from the mouth and nose, rather than scab material,
are the most important source of human-to-human transmission.
The initial infection in the oropharynx or respiratory tract
produces neither symptoms nor local lesions, and patients are
not infectious until an oropharyngeal enanthem appears at the
end of the primary incubation periodScab material forms as the
rash dries and usually consists of large fragments of cellular
debris, with virions bound within a dense, fibrous mesh containing
a large amount of the antiviral substance interferon.
http://books.nap.edu/html/variola_virus/ch3.html
Toxins
Toxins are the non-living products of micro-organisms. Although
they are often subsumed under bioweapons agents, they represent
a special category, sharing many characteristics with chemical
warfare agents. Toxins can also be produced by chemical synthesis.
Toxins, like chemical warfare agents, can only affect those
exposed to the toxin and cannot produce transmissible diseases.
Because they are non-living organisms, producing a large quantity
of toxins requires more time than would be needed to make a
similar quantity of other biological agents.
Examples of Toxins include: Saxitoxin (produced by blue
green algae), Botulinum toxin (causes botulism), Ricin (derived
from castor beans), Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (causes fever,
vomiting, nausea)
Effects of botulinium toxin: Botulinum toxin, produced
by the bacteria Clostridium botulinum, is the most poisonous
substance known. The bacteria grows on, e.g., poorly preserved
food and causes a severe form of food-poisoning (botulism).
The incubation period is between one and three days after which
the victim becomes ill with stomach pains, diarrhoea, disturbances
to vision, giddiness and muscular weakness. The whole body including
the respiratory musculature becomes paralyzed which leads to
death by suffocation within a few days. http://www.opcw.nl/chemhaz/toxins.htm
Fungi
Fungi are almost entirely multicellular (with yeast, Saccharomyces
cerviseae, being a prominent unicellular fungus), heterotrophic
(deriving their energy from another organism, whether alive
or dead), and usually having some cells with two nuclei (multinucleate,
as opposed to the more common one, or uninucleate) per cell.
Evolution of multicellular eukaryotes increased the size and
complexity of organisms, allowing them to exploit the terrestrial
habitat. First classified as plants, fungi are now considered
different enough from plants to be placed in a separate kingdom.
Fungi also are important crop parasites, causing loss of food
plants, spoilage of food and some infectious diseases.
Examples of Fungi infectious diseases include: Aspergillosis,
Blastomycosis, Candida, Coccidioidomycosis, Cryptococcosis,
Histoplasmosis, Mucormycosis, Paracoccidioidomycosis, Sporotrichosis
Effects of fungi: Isolated skin lesion(s), focal lesions of
bone, central nervous system, visceral organs, and if you are
a male, lesion in the genito-urinary system
Other anti-human agents, better known as anti-plant and
anti-animal agents: Anti-Animal Biological Agents include:
Aspergillus (poultry), Foot and Mouth Disease (cattle, pigs,
sheep, goats), Heartwater (cattle, sheep, goats, deer), Newcastle
Disease (poultry), Rinderpest (cattle)
Anti-Plant Biological Agents include: Rice Blast (fungus
causing lesion on leaves), Stem Rust (fungal disease affecting
cereal crops), Sugarbeet Curly Top Virus (dwarfed leaves and
swollen veins), Tobacco Mosaic Virus (virus affectnig wide range
of plants, stunted growth) http://gened.emc.maricopa.edu/bio/bio181/BIOBK/BioBookDiversity_4.html
Deadly and Cheap
When compared to the cost of a nuclear weapons program, biological
weapons are extremely cheap. It is estimated that 1 gram of
toxin could kill 10 million people. A purified form of botulinum
toxin is approximately 3 million times more potent than Sarin,
a chemical nerve agent. As a comparison, a SCUD missile filled
with botulinum toxin could affect an area of 3700 sq.km, an
area 16 times greater than could be affected with Sarin.
It is important to note that while it is relatively cheap to
produce the biological weapons agents in large quantities, sophisticated
weapons are slightly more difficult to develop and produce.
For example, when a missile is flying it gets very hot, biological
agents are killed. Therefore, the missile has to be fitted with
a cooling system. In addition, storing biological weapons agents
requires much effort, due to the quick decay of many of these
sorts of agents. However, as far as weapons of mass destruction
are concerned, biological weapons are relatively cheap to develop
and produce. In one analysis, the comparative cost of civilian
(unprotected) casualties is "$2,000 per square kilometer with
conventional weapons, $800 with nuclear weapons, $600 with nerve-gas
weapons, and $1 with biological weapons." Not surprisingly,
biological weapons have long since become known as the poor
man's atom bomb.
Any nation with a reasonably advanced pharmaceutical and medical
industry has the capability of mass producing biological weapons.
This fact also leads to problems with determining what countries
have programs. Anything from a piece of fruit to a ballistic
missile could be used to deliver a biological weapon to a target.
Along with this is the fact that with certain organisms, only
a few particles would be needed to start an infection that could
potentially cause an epidemic. Conventional weapons explode
once and are finished. With a few particles of Hanta virus many
thousands of people could become carriers that infect thousands
more people.
A seed culture of anthrax bacteria could be grown to mass quantities
in around 96 hours. The level of technology needed to do this
kind of work is also much lower when compared to Nuclear weapons.
Most of the techniques used can be found in textbooks and journals
available worldwide. The information is not considered "hot"
like certain kinds of nuclear information. The techniques are
taught in undergraduate courses in Colleges and Universities
worldwide.
2. When have biological weapons
been used - a short history
The first recorded use of biological agents is the Romans using
dead animals to foul the enemies water supply. This had the
dual effects of decreasing enemy numbers and lowering morale.
1346-1347 - Mongols catapult corpses contaminated with
plague over the walls into Kaffa (in Crimea), forcing besieged
Genoans to flee. Some historians believe that this event was
the cause of the epidemic of plague that swept across medieval
Europe killing 25 million.
1710 - Russian troops allegedly use plague-infected
corpses against Swedes 1767 - During the French and Indian Wars,
the British give blankets used to wrap British smallpox victims
to hostile Indian tribes
1916-1918 - German agents use anthrax and the equine
disease glanders to infect livestock and feed for export to
Allied forces. Incidents include the infection of Romanian sheep
with anthrax and glanders for export to Russia, Argentinian
mules with anthrax for export to Allied troops, and American
horses and feed with glanders for export to France 1937 - Japan
begins its offensive biological weapons program. Unit 731, the
BW research and development unit, is located in Harbin, Manchuria.
Over the course of the program, at least 10,000 prisoners are
killed in Japanese experiments
1939 - Nomonhan Incident - Japanese poison Soviet water
supply with intestinal typhoid bacteria at former Mongolian
border. First use of biological weapons by Japanese
1940 - The Japanese drop rice and wheat mixed with plague-carrying
fleas over China and Manchuria
1942 - U.S. begins its offensive biological weapons
program and chooses Camp Detrick, Frederick, Maryland as its
research and development site May,
1945 - Only known tactical use of BW by Germany. A large
reservoir in Bohemia is poisoned with sewage (BW)28 September,
1950-February, 1951 - In a test of BW dispersal methods, biological
simulants are sprayed over San Francisco June,
1966 - The United States conducts a test of vulnerability
to covert BW attack by releasing a harmless biological simulant
into the New York City subway system November 25,
1969 - President Nixon announces unilateral dismantlement
of the U.S. offensive BW program
February 14, 1970 - President Nixon extends the dismantlement
efforts to toxins, closing a loophole which might have allowed
for their production
1978 - In a case of Soviet state-sponsored assassination,
Bulgarian exile Georgi Markov, living in London, is stabbed
with an umbrella that injects him with a tiny pellet containing
ricin
April 2, 1979 - Outbreak of pulmonary anthrax in Sverdlovsk,
Soviet Union.
1992- Russian president Boris Yeltsin acknowledges that
the outbreak was caused by an accidental relase of anthrax spores
from a Soviet military microbiological facility
1985-1991 - Iraq develops an offensive biological weapons
capability including anthrax, botulium toxin, and aflatoxin.
3. Efforts to Ban
Biological Weapons
Using biological and chemical weapons was condemned by international
declarations and treaties, notably by the 1907 Hague Convention
(IV) respecting the laws and customs of war on land. Efforts
to strengthen this prohibition resulted in the conclusion, in
1925, of the Geneva Protocol which banned the use of asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, usually referred to as chemical weapons,
as well as the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. The
latter are now understood to include not only bacteria, but
also other biological agents, such as viruses or rickettsiae
which were unknown at the time the Geneva Protocol was signed.
(On 1 January 1997, 132 States were party to this Protocol.)
However, the Geneva Protocol did not prohibit the development,
production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons.
Attempts to achieve a complete ban were made in the 1930s in
the framework of the League of Nations, but with no success.
The prohibition of chemical and biological weapons appeared
on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
in Geneva (now called the Conference on Disarmament)in
1968. One year later, the United Nations published an
influential report on the problems of chemical and biological
warfare, and the question received special attention at
the UN General Assembly. The UN report concluded that
certain chemical and biological weapons cannot be confined
in their effects in space and time and might have grave
and irreversible consequences for man (sic) and nature.
This would apply to both the attacking and the attacked
nations. Due to interest in the topic in the end of the
1960s, the Biological Weapons Convention was signed in
1972 and entered into force in 1975.
4. What
is the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention?
The Biological Weapons Convention entered into force in March
1975 after 22 governments had ratified, and was the first multilateral
disarmament treaty banning an entire category of weapons of
mass destruction. The Convention, about four pages long, bans
the development, production stockpiling, or acquisition of biological
agents or toxins of any type or quantity that do not have protective,
medical, or other peaceful purposes, or any weapons or means
of delivery for such agents or toxins. Under the treaty, all
such materiel is to be destroyed within nine months of the treaty's
entry into force.
The Treaty has been ratified by 143 states and has review conferences
every five years, the next one will be in November 2001.
5. The
Convention has a number of inadequacies
Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention that has an unprecedented
on-site inspection provision, the Biological Weapons Convention
has no verification provisions.
The Convention has not defined the prohibited items nor the
targets to which the prohibitions relate. There exists, however,
an authoritative definition of biological warfare agents formulated
by the World Health organization (WHO). In a 1970 report the
WHO described biological warfare agents as those that depend
for their effects on multiplication within the target organism
and are intended for use in war to cause disease or death in
man (sic), animals or plants; they may be transmissible or non-transmissible.
Toxins are poisonous products of organisms; unlike biological
agents, they are inanimate and not capable of reproducing themselves.
The Convention applies to all natural or artificially created
toxins, "whatever their origin or method of production" (Article
I). Thus, it covers toxins produced biologically, as well as
those produced by chemical synthesis. Since toxins are chemicals
by nature, their inclusion in the BW Convention was a step towards
the projected ban on chemical weapons.
The term "other peaceful purposes" in the Convention has remained
unclear, a reason why the BW weapons control has been so difficult.
One can assume that it includes scientific experimentation.
Under the BW Convention, the prohibition to develop, produce,
stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain biological agents and
toxins is not absolute. It applies only to types and to quantities
that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other
peaceful purposes. The stipulation that any development, production,
stockpiling or retention of biological warfare agents or toxins
must be justified and does not carry sufficient weight. Retention,
production or acquisition by other means of certain quantities
of biological agents and toxins to be used for hostile purposes
may thus continue, and there may be testing in laboratories
and even in the field which may lead to the development of more
progressive and sophisticated biological agents for the purpose
of warfare.
There are no provisions in the BW Convention restricting biological
research activities. This circumstance and the express
authorization to engage in production (for peaceful purposes)
of biological agents and toxins that may be used in warfare
create a risk that the provisions of the Convention will
be circumvented. There are no agreed standards or criteria
for the quantities of agents or toxins that may be needed
by different States for the different purposes recognized
by the Convention. The parties are not even obliged to
declare the types and amounts of agents or toxins they
possess and the use they make of them.
6. What
is the Ad Hoc Group and what is it doing?
The Ad Hoc Group is working to strengthen the BWC with a verification
protocol.
The mandate to negotiate a Protocol on verification came from
the 1994 Special Conference of States Parties to the BWC. The
revelation that some states parties had been discovered to have
developed covert biological weapons programmes added to the
recognition that the effectiveness and implementation of the
BWC needed to be strengthened. A group of governmental experts
(VEREX) met from 1992-1993 to consider verification measures
from a mostly technical perspective . Negotiations on a Protocol
began in earnest in January 1995 in the current Ad Hoc Group
(AHG) format. The group meets several times a year for two to
four weeks each time and has now met for a total of about 60
weeks.
The group's work is to be completed by the Fifth Review Conference.
This Review Conference will take place in November-December
of 2001, preceded by a Preparatory Commission in April.
By July 1997, the AHG had before it the first draft of the
verification protocol, the so called rolling text, which
it has since been negotiating on. The rate of progress
in removing brackets (which are the indicators of disagreement)
has varied over the last three years, and slowed down
recently. Only the most contentious issues in the Protocol
are left unresolved, and therefore discussion now centers
on the question of when a Chair's text (i.e. a text without
brackets, which shows the possible final shape of the
protocol) should be produced.
7. What do Individual
Governments have to do after they sign?
Under the future Protocol, States have to initially declare
past offensive and defensive BW programmes. They have
then to declare annually dual-use capabilities, such as
facilities with high biological containment, large production
facilities, facilities working with certain very dangerous
agents, and facilities working in the national biodefence
programmes. These declarations will randomly be checked
by on-site visits. If there are ambiguities in the declarations,
the future organization or individual states can request
a clarification, including a clarification visit. If a
state suspects that another state is violating the BTWC,
i.e. possesses or uses BW, it can request a short-notice
challenge investigation. Under the Protocol, States also
have to implement national legislation prohibiting their
citizens from engaging in activities prohibited by the
BTWC worldwide. Each State will have to set up a national
authority which is responsible for implementing the protocol
and cooperating with the future organization for the Prohibition
of Biological and Toxin Weapons.
8. Countries Suspected
of Possessing Biological Weapons
i) Russia
As revealed by Yeltsin, the Soviet Union maintained an offensive
biological weapons program from 1972 until 1992. Yeltsin signed
a decree in April 1992 to terminate its offensive research,
dismantled experimental biological agent production lines, closed
a biological weapons testing facility, cut the number of personnel
in the program by fifty percent and the funding by thirty percent,
and submitted information about its biological weapons program
to the UN. According to its declaration, Russia maintained an
offensive research and development program until March 1992
that worked with anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis, plague, Venezuelan
equine encephalitis, typhus, and Q-fever. With respect to toxins,
Russia claimed that the only natural toxin studied in its program
was botulinum toxin. Apparently, Russian scientists developed
a genetically manipulated strain of the plague.
ii)Iraq
Iraq had advanced facilities studying anthrax, botulism, brucellosis,
tularemia, and gas gangrene organisms were found alongside a
wide array of potential delivery systems from aerial bombs to
surface-to-air-missiles(SAM's). For a complete timeline of Iraq's
WMD program, see The Arms
Control Association
iii) United States
On 14 February 1970, the United States also formally renounced
the production, stockpiling and use of toxins for war purposes.
It stated that military programmes for biological agents and
toxins would be confined to research and development for defensive
purposes
iv)UK
Great Britain abandoned its offensive biological weapons capabilities
in the late 1950s.
v)China
China, a member of the BWC since 1984, is believed to have maintained
an offensive biological weapons program throughout most of the
1980s that included "development, production, stockpiling or
other acquisition or maintenance of biological warfare agents
vi) Egypt
Egypt, a signatory but not a member of the BWC, has a program
of military-applied research in the area of biological weapons
dating back to the 1960s. No publicly available data to date
indicates that Egypt has produced its own biological agents.
Bilateral cooperation between US and Egypt has resulted in a
military-medical laboratory in Egypt, recognized as one of the
region's leading medical-biological centers, equipped with the
latest equipment and staffed with highly qualified American
specialists. The research conducted by this laboratory is highly
classified. The US assessment is that it remains likely that
Egypt continues to maintain a capability to conduct biological
warfare.
vii) Iran
Iran, which joined the CWC on 3 November 1997, has been a member
of the BWC since 1973. Iran conducts legitimate biomedical research
at various institutes, which are suspected of involvement in
this biological weapons program. The Iranian military has used
medical, education, and scientific research organizations for
many aspects of biological agent procurement, research, and
production. The US finding is that Iran probably has produced
biological agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity
of those agents.
viii) Syria
Syria has signed but not ratified the BWC. Israel has expressed
concerns that Syria has biological agents for contaminating
drinking water. However, no reliable information is available
about the existence of biological weapons in Syria or a directed
program for the creation of an offensive potential in the biological
realm. Syria nonetheless remains among those countries that
the United States believes to be developing an offensive biological
warfare capability
ix)) Israel
Israel's national biological weapons program is unknown. An
Israeli biological weapons program is likely to be patterned
after those formerly maintained by the United States and the
former Soviet Union. In other words, the agents likely to be
involved in an Israeli program are anthrax, botulinum toxin,
tularemia, plague, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, and Q-fever.
Similarly, Israeli delivery systems are likely to mirror those
developed by the United States, namely spray systems or missile
warheads and submunitions. Israel is one of the few states that
has not signed the BWC.
x) Libya
Libya is thought to be attempting to weaponize biological agents,
although little is known about Libya's biological weapons program.
While Libya has been a member of the BWC since 1972, there is
information indicating that it is engaged in initial testing
of biological weapons. Presently, Libyans are expressing interest
in information on work overseas involving biological agents.
Libya has also failed to submit a confidence-building data declaration
to the UN. According to the US assessment, Libya is seeking
to acquire the capability to develop and produce biological
agents.
xi)North Korea
North Korea has been a member of the BWC since 1987. During
the early 1960s, North Korea initiated an offensive biological
warfare program. Presently, North Korea is engaged in applied
military-biological research at universities, medical institutes,
and specialized research centers. Research at these centers
involves pathogens for malignant anthrax, cholera, and bubonic
plague. Evidence indicates that North Korea has been testing
biological weapons on its island territories.
xii)Taiwan
Taiwan, which joined the BWC in 1973, is another country
suspected of proliferating both chemical and biological
weapons. Taiwan is said not to have biological weapons,
but it continues to manifest an active interest in conducting
biological research of a military-applied nature. Taiwan
has a significant scientific and technical base in microbiology
and a large number of skilled biotechnology specialists,
mostly trained in America and Western Europe. Taiwan is
moving to upgrade its biotechnology sector, which makes
wide use of technologies basic to the production of biological
weapons.
9. How can
biological weapons be defended against?
Biological defense may be divided into the following categories:
prevention, protection, detection, treatment, and decontamination.
Prevention
Prevention may take several forms. In the case of biological
warfare, international disarmament and inspection regimes may
deter production and dissemination of biological warfare agents.
Intelligence assets may indicate potential threats and allow
for preventative action to be undertaken.
Protection
Forms of protection against biological warfare agents are limited
in capacity. Protective suits, clothing, gas masks and filters
may provide limited protection for short periods of time. However,
the persistence of biological agents such as anthrax makes such
protections mainly useful for military personnel and first responders.
Anthrax can remain active and potentially lethal for at least
40 years. (source: Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective)
It should be noted that anthrax is an exception, as most other
agents do not live that long. Protection (as detection and treatment)
of Biological Warfare is the establishment and maintenance of
a good health care system. In addition, vaccination is a form
of protection, which may provide substantial protection against
naturally occurring agents, although vaccines often provide
limited or no protection against genetically engineered variants
designed to defeat such vaccines.
Detection
During the Gulf War, US and allied forces suffered from a lack
of reliable biological agent detection systems. Subsequently,
a number of detection systems have been developed. Often
it takes from a few hours to a few days to detect exposure
to a biological weapon. However, with advances in biotechnology
will help develop improved and quicker detectors. Current
detectors include: SMART (Sensitive Membrane Antigen Rapid
Test) JBPDS (Joint Biological Point Detection System)
BIDS (Biological Integrated Detection System) IBAD (Interim
Biological Agent Detector) (source: Biological Warfare
and Detection Capabilities) Treatment Treatment options
after infection depend on whether or not the infectious
agent is identified. If not identified, massive doses
of antibiotics may be given in hopes that something may
work. Again, treatment of victims of biological warfare
largely depends on the establishment and maintenance of
a good health care system. Decontamination Unlike chemical
weapons, which disperse over time, biological agents may
grow and multiply over time. Anthrax can remain active
in the soil for at least 40 years and is highly resistant
to eradication. (Source: Biological Warfare: A Historical
Perspective) However, the anthrax contaminated Gruinard
Island in the UK was decontaminated - decontamination
is possible, using chemicals, heat or rays (UV).
10. What
should WILPF groups do to support this treaty?
WILPF can serve an important role in raising awareness about
biological warfare. For example, there is the sign-on
initiative by The Sunshine Project (www.sunshine-project.org).
The principle challenge in addressing biological warfare
is to expose and prevent the misuse of biosciences. Therefore,
interaction with environmental and consumer protection
groups in relevant fields would be useful. Once the Protocol
exists, it will be very important to lobby for ratification,
although this will be an arduous fight, especially in
the United States.
11. Other
Conventions, Laws and Agreements Relating to Biological Warfare
and Biological Weapons
1. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare (The Geneva Protocol): Opened for Signature: June
17, 1925, Entered into Force: February 8, 1928 The Geneva Protocol
prohibits the use of all asphyxiationg, poisonous, or other
gases; all similar liquids, materials, or devices; and all methods
of bacteriological warfare during war.
2. UK-US-Russian Joint Statement on Biological Weapons,
Meeting Held in Moscow, September 10-11, 1992 In a joint
statement issued at the conclusion of a trilateral meeting,
the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and
the Russian Federation affirmed their commitment to full compliance
with the 1972 BWC. In order to address concerns about compliance,
the states agreed on reciprocal measures to remove any ambiguities.
Measures include reciprocal visits to military and non-military
biological facilities, and the convening of expert groups to
ensure continued compliance. U.S. and U.K. officials visited
Russian sites in October 1993 and January 1994. In February
and March 1994, Russian officials visited three facilities in
the United States and one in Britain.
3. Environmental Modification Convention, entered into force
on October 5, 1978. In August 1975, the chief representatives
of the U.S. and the Soviet delegations to the Conference of
the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) tabled, in parallel, identical
draft texts of a "Convention on the Prohibition of Military
or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques."
The Convention defines environmental modification techniques
as changing -- through the deliberate manipulation of natural
processes -- the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth,
including its biota, lithosphere, hydro-sphere, and atmosphere,
or of outer space. The Convention entered into force on October
5, 1978, when the 20th state to sign the Convention deposited
its instrument of ratification. The Convention entered into
force for the United States on January 17, 1980, when the U.S.
instrument of ratification was deposited in New York.
4. The Hague Convention (IV), Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907. Section
II: Hostilities. Chapter I: Means of Injuring the Enemy, Sieges,
and Bombardments Art. 22. The right of belligerents to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. Art. 23. In addition
to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially
forbidden - (a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons.
5. Chemical Weapons Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction, was opened for signature
in 1993, and entered into force in 1997. On January 13,
1993, in Paris, 130 countries signed the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) to ban the entire class of chemical weapons.
Many of those nations have since ratified it. In this
country, debate continues on the strategic implications
of the convention, as drafted, and whether it is in the
U.S. national security interest. This convention covers
the toxins section in biological weapons
12. Sources
on biological weapons
Acronym Institute: Biological Weapons Convention http://www.acronym.org.uk/bwc/index.htm
Arms Control Association: Biological Weapons: Documents,
News, and Analysis http://www.armscontrol.org/subject/bw/
Australia Group: Relationship with the Biological Weapons
http://www.australiagroup.net/agbwc.htm
Basic: A Guide to Biological Weapons Control (October
2001) http://www.basicint.org/biobrochure.htm
Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Report # 2000/05:
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION (June 9, 2000) http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/miscdocs/200005_e.html
Carnegie Endowment for Internaitonal Peace. Proliferation
News and Resources http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/weapons/weapon.asp?ID=1&weapon=biological
Center for Defence and International Security Studies:
Biological Weapons http://www.cdiss.org/bw.htm
Center for Defense Information's Chemical and Biological
Weapons Proliferation Web Site http://www.cdi.org/issues/cbw/
Center for Nonproliferaton Studies, Monterey Institute
of International Studies: Chemical and Biological Weapons
Resource Page http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw.htm
*Including: Federal Agencies and Programs, Federal Publications,
Think Tanks and Non-Governmental Organizations, Journals
Federation of American Scientists: Chemical and Biological
Arms Control Program http://www.fas.org/bwc/
Henry L. Stimson Center:. Chemical and Biological
Weapons Nonproliferat ion Project http://www.stimson.org/cwc/
John Hopkins University: Center for Civilian Biodefense
Studies http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/pages/library/published.html
Pugwash Onlice: Chemical and Biological Weapons: Reports
and Statements
http://www.pugwash.org/reports/cbw/cbwlist.htm
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute:
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/bw-btwc-mainpage.html
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute:
Educational Module on Chemical and Biological Weapons
Nonproliferation http://cbw.sipri.se/
Sunshine Project: Research and facts about biological
weapons and biotechnology http://www.sunshine-project.org/
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR):
Biological Weapons: from the BWC to Biotech http://www.unog.ch/unidir/e-df0-4.htm
University of Bradford, Peace Studies Department: Preventing
Biological Warfare: Strengthening the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/
Verification Research, Training and Information Centre
(VERTIC), Promoting effective verification of the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention
http://www.vertic.org/programmes/BWC.html
13. Meetings
of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Meeting
of States Parties, 10-14 December 2007.
The Meeting of States Parties was chaired by Ambassador Masood
Khan of Pakistan. In accordance with the decision of the Sixth
Review Conference, the Meeting of States Parties considered
the work of the Meeting of Experts (20-24 August 2007) to discuss,
and promote common understanding and effective action on:
1. Ways and means to enhance national implementation, including
enforcement of national legislation, strengthening of national
institutions and coordination among national law enforcement
institutions.
2. Regional and sub-regional cooperation on implementation
of the Convention.
