With the recent conclusion of the third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in Vienna on 5 September, the prospects for the entry into force of the CTBT do not appear good. The CTBT was negotiated in Geneva by the Conference on Disarmament and was adopted by the UN General Assembly as a resolution (A/RES/50/245) on 10 September 1996 and opened for signature in September 1996. The CTBT will ban any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. Despite the progress made and the international community's strong support for the CTBT, it has not entered into force seven years after its opening for signature. One hundred and four states have ratified the Treaty, including 32 of the 44 Annex II “nuclear-capable states” required for the Treaty to enter into force. A complete table of signatories and ratifications can be found here.

The Conference (known also as the Article XIV Conference, after the entry into force provision in the CTBT), was opened on 3 September by a message from the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, stating that “entry into force of the CTBT…cannot come too soon.” All states were invited to attend the Conference as well as specialized agencies, international governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. A representative of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War addressed the Conference on behalf of non-governmental organizations. IPPNW reminded states that “efforts to improve nuclear arsenals and to make nuclear weapons more useable in warfare will jeopardise the test-ban and nonproliferation regimes… and therefore called on all states possessing nuclear weapons to halt all qualitative improvements in their nuclear armaments, whether or not these improvements require test explosions.”

The Final Declaration
The Conference ended on 5 September with the unanimous adoption of a Final Declaration that reaffirmed “the importance of the Treaty and its entry into force for the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.” The Declaration noted with concern that despite the progress made and the international community's strong support for the CTBT, the Treaty had not entered into force seven years after its opening for signature. The Conference stressed the particular importance of prompt signature and ratification by those whose ratification was needed for its entry into force.

Noting that international developments had occurred since the 2001 Conference, which make the Treaty's entry into force as urgent today as when it was negotiated, the Conference reaffirmed that the CTBT had an essential role to play in strengthening global peace and security. The prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the most important challenges facing the world.

The Declaration contained 12 recommended measures to promote the CTBT’s entry into force:
• All states should sustain the momentum generated by the Conference by continuing to discuss the issue at the highest political level.
• All states should support and encourage bilateral, regional, and multilateral initiatives by interested countries and the PrepCom for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to promote the entry into force of the Treaty.
• Ratifying states should select one of their number as a coordinator to promote cooperation, through informal consultations with all interested countries, aimed at promoting further signatures and ratifications.
• All ratifying states will establish a contact list of countries of ratifiers which volunteer to assist the coordinator in various regions, as appropriate, in promoting activities enhancing the entry into force of the Treaty.
• Ratifying states should consider appointing a Special Representative to assist the coordinating state in the performance of its function in promoting the entry into force of the Treaty.
• Ratifying states should consider establishing a trust fund, financed through voluntary contributions, to support an outreach program for promoting the Treaty.
• The organization of regional seminars is encouraged in conjunction with other regional meetings in order to increase the awareness of the important role that the Treaty plays.
• The PrepCom for the CTBTO should continue its international cooperation activities and organizing seminars for experts in the legal and technical fields.
• The CTBTO PrepCom should continue to promote understanding of the Treaty and to demonstrate the benefits of the civil and scientific applications of the verification technologies, inter alia, in such areas as environmental and earth science and technology.
• The Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO should continue to provide states with legal assistance with respect to the ratification process and implementation measures and, in order to enhance these activities and their visibility, establish a contact point for a better exchange and dissemination of relevant information and documentation.
• The Provisional Technical Secretariat should act as a “focal point” where information about activities undertaken by ratifiers and signatories is collected to assist in promoting the entry into force of the Treaty.
• Cooperation with non-governmental organizations and other elements of civil society is encouraged to raise awareness of and support for the Treaty and its objectives, as well as the need for its early entry into force.

Key Issues
A key issue at the Conference was the fear that further delay in the CTBT's entry into force could lead to a resumption of nuclear testing, resulting in the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Delegates also emphasized the need for the universal and complementary application of all instruments dealing with nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Afghanistan, a non-signatory, highlighted the fear of “the eventual transfer of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to the evil hands of irresponsible groups such as Al-Qaida and the remnants of Taliban.”

Several states referred to the entry into force of the CTBT as an important step towards implementing the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). For example, Germany’s representative said, “We firmly believe that the entry into force of the CTBT is an important ‘practical step’ towards the implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligation laid down in Article VI of the NPT.” Germany added that in its final declaration, the NPT Review Conference in May 2000 agreed upon this principle by consensus, which remains valid with a view to the ongoing preparations for the 2005 Review Conference. South Africa reinforced the decisions reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference by emphasizing the “inextricable link between the CTBT and the NPT nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation obligations, including the agreements reached at the NPT Conferences in 2000 and 1995.” South Africa also voiced its concern about the weak nature of the Declaration and its repetition of the content of previous Article XIV conference declarations. It emphasized that the strong rhetorical commitment of ratifiers to the CTBT should be reflected in the Declaration itself. Canada, Japan, and others also reaffirmed this point. France once again emphasized the linkage between nuclear disarmament and “general and complete disarmament” despite the separations of these concepts in the Final Declaration of the 2000 Review Conference. In the negotiations for the Declaration, South Africa, together with its New Agenda Coalition (NAC) partners, strongly and successfully opposed an attempt by France to reinterpret the NPT’s 2000 Review Conference decision on nuclear disarmament and to have this reflected in the Declaration. France had attempted to revive the linkage between nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, which had been de-linked by the 2000 decision. Despite the strong emphasis on the linkage between the NPT and the CTBT, there is no reference to the NPT in the Final Declaration of the September 2003 Conference. Israel, while not a ratifier of the CTBT, refused to have a direct reference in the Declaration to the NPT and also insisted that decisions on nuclear disarmament decisions at meetings (such as in the context of the NPT) could only relate to the states participating in the meetings. While there was resistance to Israel’s insistance, certain CTBT ratifiers took fright when Israel threatened to discontinue its attendance of CTBT preparatory commission meetings if an NPT reference was included.

Nuclear Weapon States
As with the second Article XIV Conference in November 2001, the United States was not represented officially at the meeting. While a junior official did attend, the representative did not sit behind the nameplate. Since 13 October 1999, when the U.S. Senate voted not to give its advice and consent to ratify the CTBT, the United States has continually announced its lack of support for the CTBT at every UN General Assembly from 1999-2002. While the Bush administration has repeatedly declared that it has no current plans to resume nuclear testing, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated as recently as 8 August 2003, “we can’t rule it out forever.”

All the NPT recognized nuclear weapon states, with the exception of the United States, gave statements at the Conference expressing support for the entry into force of the Treaty. “China firmly supports the CTBT. As a nuclear-weapon state and one of the 44 states whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force, China fully realizes its special responsibility for the EIF of the Treaty.” France stated, “The pursuit of this effort [for the CTBT to enter into force] is a determining factor in our fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” The Russian Federation said, “We are convinced that facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization character meet national interests of all states.” The United Kingdom added, “The prohibition of all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and entry into force of a CTBT will constitute an essential step towards achieving nuclear non-proliferation and towards nuclear disarmament.”

The only non-NPT state with nuclear weapons to speak was Israel. Israel's representative emphasized that given the non-compliance with nonproliferation regimes, especially in such regions as the Middle East, the importance of the CTBT as a tool to close such gaps was paramount. Israel also blocked attempts to make any reference to the NPT in the Final Declaration. The representative from Egypt addressed the Middle East context, noting that the matter of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East must be dealt with in a universal manner and any comprehensive settlement in the region must include the ratification of the CTBT.

Conclusion
Once entered into force, the CTBT will be of one of the most scientifically sophisticated treaties on weapons of mass destruction, with 321 monitoring states to verify compliance.
While progress has been achieved, with 104 states on board and the establishment of an impressive international monitoring system to deter and detect explosive nuclear tests, the process of the installation of this system is more advanced than the real prospects of entry into force of the Treaty. Although informal voluntary moratoria on nuclear testing have held since the 1998 tests by India and Pakistan, such moratoria cannot replace the legally binding commitments represented by the signing and ratification of the Treaty.

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