NGO Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT) for the Fourth Article XIV Conference on Accelerating
Entry-Into-Force
To be delivered 22 September
2005
Mr. Chairperson, Distinguished Delegates, and Colleagues,
1. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been a
centerpiece of the international disarmament and non-proliferation
agenda since the 1950s. It is essential to recall that the 1996
CTBT is largely the product of decades of hard work, dedication,
and advocacy by NGOs, scientific experts, and millions of ordinary
people around the world. They have long understood that ending
nuclear testing is essential for three powerful reasons: to impede
the development of new types of nuclear warheads and reduce dangerous
nuclear arms competition; to obstruct the emergence of new nuclear
powers; and to prevent further devastation of human health and
the global environment.
2. Nine years ago, states gathered here at the United
Nations to endorse and open the treaty for signature. In light
of ongoing tensions between nuclear weapons states and would-be
nuclear weapons states, illicit nuclear trading, and efforts by
the nuclear weapon states to improve their nuclear weapon capabilities,
the CTBT is more important than ever. Its entry into force is
overdue.
3. Over the past several years, CTBT member states
have made significant strides in moving closer to fulfilling the
treaty’s difficult entry into force requirements and the
CTBTO Preparatory Commission is well on its way to completing
the sophisticated and ambitious monitoring system that will verify
compliance. Despite such progress and widespread public support
for the treaty, inaction and opposition by a few states have delayed
its full implementation. There remains much to be done at this
conference and beyond to ensure that the CTBT is not tossed aside
at the whim of a few states.
4. We, the NGOs attending this fourth Article XIV
Conference, represent millions of people around the world who
continue to support a permanent, complete, and verifiable ban
on nuclear weapons test explosions. We call upon each of the CTBT
Ratifying States in attendance to step up their efforts to win
the necessary signatures and ratifications for entry into force
of the treaty. In particular, we urge the eleven remaining Annex
II states that have either not signed or ratified the treaty to
do so without further delay. We also urge you to: a) support efforts
to ensure the continuation of the global nuclear test moratorium;
b) help advance the completion and augmentation of the treaty’s
monitoring and verification system; and c) seek changes to nuclear
weapons policies that threaten to undermine the norm against testing.
5a. We welcome the steady support for the CTBT as
demonstrated by numerous statements made by individual governments
and regional groupings at this conference, at the 2000 and 2005
NPT Review Conferences, the United Nations General Assembly, and
elsewhere. The ratification of the treaty by three nuclear weapon
states — France, Russia, and the United Kingdom —
is especially important. We also note the strong support for the
treaty expressed by the European Union, the Non-Aligned Movement,
and the Organization of American States (despite objections raised
by the United States).
5b. We also welcome the statement issued in September
of 2004, by over 40 Foreign Ministers in support of the Treaty,
as well as recent statements from Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi
and the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the 60th anniversary
of the first atomic bombings, which call for CTBT entry into force.
Such statements are essential to the maintenance of the test ban
norm and pressure on hold-out states to sign and/or ratify the
treaty.
5c. Although these statements and activities are
important, they are not sufficient. Some states that express their
support for the CTBT — such as China, Colombia, Egypt, and
Indonesia — have themselves not yet ratified the treaty.
Unfortunately, top leaders from other states committed to the
CTBT also often fail to press their counterparts in the eleven
CTBT hold-out states to reconsider their opposition to the treaty
or move forward with ratification. We urge such states to exercise
much more consistent, top-level diplomacy in support of CTBT entry
into force.
6. You must be sure to communicate that entry into
force is not simply needed for the treaty's sake. Rather, the
CTBT is vital because it directly contributes to national and
international security.
6a. As has been noted at this conference, the CTBT
is a critical building block in the architecture of the global
nuclear nonproliferation system. The de facto global nuclear test
moratorium and CTBT’s entry into force are crucial barriers
to help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states
and are essential to the future viability of the nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT). They are the first two of the 13 practical steps
for systematic and progressive nuclear disarmament that were unanimously
adopted in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
In fact, the nuclear weapon states' commitment to the CTBT was
vital in securing the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.
6b. We urge states to consider how the CTBT might
contribute to nuclear risk reduction in regions of tension. Recently,
concerns have been expressed that North Korea might conduct a
nuclear test explosion to demonstrate its claims of a nuclear
weapon capability. There are doubts about Iran's claim that its
nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes. Though the
government of Israel does not acknowledge that it possesses nuclear
weapons, it is widely known that it does. And despite recent peace
talks, the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry continues. If all or
some of these states were to formally join the CTBT, it would
contribute to the credibility of their peaceful intentions and
build confidence and reduce tensions with their neighbors.
7. The CTBT is also an essential step towards nuclear
disarmament because it helps to discourage dangerous nuclear competition
and block new nuclear threats from emerging. However, it must
be recognised that technological advances in nuclear weapons research
and development mean that a ban on nuclear test explosions by
itself cannot prevent qualitative improvements of existing nuclear
arsenals. Efforts to improve nuclear arsenals and to make nuclear
weapons more useable in warfare will jeopardise the test ban and
non-proliferation regimes. We call on all states possessing nuclear
weapons to halt all qualitative improvements in their nuclear
armaments, whether or not these improvements require test explosions.
7a. In this context, we are deeply concerned that
the current U.S. administration is seeking funding for a controversial
program of research on a new generation of high-yield earth-penetrating
nuclear warheads, as well as new types of so-called "replacement"
warheads. While the current U.S. administration claims that these
efforts will not lead to the resumption of nuclear weapons testing,
it is possible that if the warheads are extensively reworked,
technical uncertainties may arise that lead some in the U.S. nuclear,
military, or political establishment to press for the resumption
of nuclear testing. Furthermore, the development, production,
or testing of such weapons by the United States or any state is
likely to lead to a dangerous nuclear action-reaction cycle that
would not only undermine the test ban, but international security
as a whole, likely serving as a catalyst for a new nuclear arms
race.
8. The CTBT also reduces uncertainties in an increasingly
uncertain world. The CTBT establishes a far-reaching global monitoring,
verification, and compliance system that has already and will
continue to build confidence that no state can defy the non-testing
norm and escape detection. A series of independent studies, including
a 2002 U.S. National Academy of Sciences report, have all concluded
that the system is capable of detecting nuclear explosions in
all environments with a high degree of confidence, thereby deterring
potential treaty violators. We commend the PrepCom and Provisional
Technical Secretariat for their work in establishing the International
Monitoring System and International Data Centre, which are already
proving their capabilities beyond expectations. We support efforts
to promote the civil and scientific applications of the CTBT verification
technology as a means of recouping costs and expanding the range
of CTBT stakeholders.
8a. We are deeply troubled that some states continue
to delay full construction of the CTBT's verification system and
the finalization of the on-site inspection (OSI) arrangements
for the Treaty by not paying their dues, not participating in
relevant discussions, or by adopting unreasonable positions in
those negotiations. We call on all Signatory States to provide
the political, financial, and technical support necessary for
the earliest feasible implementation of all elements of the CTBT's
verification system.
8b. Until the treaty enters into force, nuclear
weapon states should implement confidence-building processes,
including transparency measures at their sites, to build confidence
that they are not currently engaged in prohibited activities.
We urge the United States and Russia in particular to reinvigorate
discussion on mutual confidence-building measures at their respective
test sites. We also call on China, India, Pakistan, Russia and
the United States to pursue initiatives to increase transparency
at their test sites to dispel any concerns about ongoing activities
at those sites, including subcritical tests.
9. On this 60th anniversary year of the first nuclear
test explosion, it is important to recall the devastating effects
of nuclear weapons testing on human health and the environment
and the importance of the CTBT in preventing such damage in the
future.
9a. Since 1945, seven countries have conducted 2,051
nuclear test explosions. Most of these tests were conducted at
U.S. test sites in Nevada and the Marshall Islands, the Soviet
Union’s test sites in Kazakhstan and Novaya Zemlya, France’s
test site on the Polynesian atolls of Fangataufa and Moruroa,
China’s Lop Nor test site, and in Algeria and Australia.
Most of the test sites are in the lands of indigenous peoples
and far from the capitals of the testing governments. The 528
atmospheric tests delivered radioactive materials that produced
approximately 430,000 additional cancer fatalities by the year
2000, according to a 1990 report by the International Physicians
for the Prevention of Nuclear War. The U.S. National Cancer Institute
estimated in a 1997 report that the 90 dirtiest U.S. tests could
cause 7,500-75,000 additional cases of thyroid cancer.
9b. While underground nuclear blasts pose a smaller
radioactive hazard than atmospheric tests, there has been widespread
venting from underground explosions, especially at the Semipalatinsk
test site in Kazakhstan. The United States has acknowledged that
433 of its 824 underground tests released radioactive material
into the atmosphere. In addition, underground nuclear blasts leave
a legacy of radioactive contamination, which eventually might
leak into the surrounding environment.
10. For all of these reasons, the states participating
at this conference must train their attention and future efforts
on achieving the signatures and ratification of those states that
are required by Article XIV to effect entry into force. Despite
overwhelming international support for the CTBT and the many ways
it contributes to our security, eleven key states have not yet
signed and/or ratified.
10a. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
India, and Pakistan must sign and ratify the CTBT. China, Colombia,
Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the United States, and Viet Nam
should ratify, without further delay. The longer these states
wait to join the Treaty, the greater the chance that some nation
may begin testing and set off a dangerous international action-reaction
cycle of military and nuclear confrontation.
10b. We are particularly dismayed with the policies
of the Bush administration, which is not even seeking Senate approval
for ratification, and that of China, which — to our knowledge
— has failed to take any further action toward ratification
since the last Article XIV conference.
First, although the U.S. remains a signatory, the current U.S.
administration has actively opposed endorsement of CTBT entry
into force by other states at the UNGA, the NPT Review Conference,
the Organization of American States, and the recently concluded
Millenium + Five Summit. The Bush administration has also unilaterally
declared its intent not to contribute financially or to participate
in non-IMS activities of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO,
including preparations for on-site inspections.
Delegates at this conference must realize that while the Bush
administration's active opposition to the treaty is damaging to
the prospects for entry into force, it is not for the Bush administration
alone to decide the fate of the treaty, which remains on the calendar
of the U.S. Senate and which may be reconsidered by the next U.S.
administration. We therefore urge the governments represented
at this conference to actively urge -- at the highest level --
the U.S. administration to join the list of responsible and civilized
states and reconsider its opposition to the treaty.
10c. Second, we are disappointed that progress on
ratification in China has ground to a halt. There does not appear
to be any domestic political obstacle in the way, and we therefore
respectfully urge China to complete ratification before the end
of this year. In the absence of such action, China owes the other
CTBT member states a detailed explanation for its continued delay
and a timetable for its ratification process.
10d. Given the series of crises with grave nuclear
overtones that have shaken the South Asian sub-continent since
the 1998 nuclear explosions, it should be self-evident that another
round of tit-for-tat testing would adversely affect regional and
international security. More so than any other region in the world,
South Asia needs a nuclear-test-ban. We urge leaders in India
and Pakistan to embrace the CTBT as a sign of their mutual desire
to move back from the brink and to cultivate peaceful relations.
10e. We welcome the bilateral statements that express
both nation’s continued support for their voluntary nuclear
test moratoria and Indian Prime Minister Singh’s comments
that India seeks to live up to the same nonproliferation standards
that the five original nuclear weapon states are expected to observe.
We would note that this implies that India should, in the very
least, sign the CTBT, along with Pakistan.
11. Entry-into-force of the CTBT is within reach.
But as a result of the actions of a few of states, the viability
of a verifiable, comprehensive ban on nuclear tests – and
the future of the NPT itself – is in jeopardy. No single
government should be allowed to stand in the way of the historical
opportunity to permanently end the scourge of nuclear testing,
an indispensable step towards eliminating nuclear weapon threats
and preventing nuclear war.
12a. People the world over have been part of the
coalition working for a comprehensive nuclear test ban and an
end to the arms race. While the concerns of this statement focus
on technical and political aspects of nuclear testing, there is
a moral and ethical value imperative for achieving CTBT entry
into force. If our generation and that of our children are to
thrive in a more just, equitable, environmentally sustainable,
and free society, we must seize every opportunity to halt the
proliferation of the world’s most deadly weapons and accelerate
progress toward their elimination.
12b. We do not accept, nor should any of you in
this chamber, that any state or group of states should hold the
world hostage to fear and the potential for destruction with the
continued capacity of nuclear weapons. While we believe that the
CTBT will eventually enter into force, we are concerned that the
lack of political will on the part of many governments, the arrogant
opposition of the few, and the persistent illusion of the utility
of nuclear weapons will delay the CTBT even longer.
13. Finally, we wish to express our gratitude for
the important contributions of Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffman to
the CTBT Preparatory Commission. We extend our best wishes and
offer our support for Ambassador Tibor Toth, the new Executive
Secretary. We also applaud the decision to appoint Ambassador
Jaap Ramaker as an emissary for the treaty.
14. We, NGO supporters of the CTBT, stand ready
to contribute to the effort to secure CTBT entry into force. This
presentation was prepared and supported by NGOs who have worked
for a comprehensive test-ban treaty for many years, in many countries,
and in many ways.
Thank you.
Abolition 2000, New York
The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy
Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire
Arms Control Association
Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, USA
British American Security Information Council
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
Council for a Livable World
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)
Franciscans International
Friedens- und Begegnungsstaette, Pressehuette Mutlangen, Germany
German Peace Council
Global Constitution Forum, Inc.
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy
Mayors for Peace
Natural Resources Defence Council
NGO Committee on Peace, Vienna
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
Pax Christi USA
Pax Christi International
Peace Action and the Peace Action Education Fund
PeaceWorks, Kansas City
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Steven and Michele Kirsch Foundation
Tri-Valley CAREs (Communities Against a Radioactive Environment)
Livermore, CA USA
West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Birmingham, UK
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, U.S. Section
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
