Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom
Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
for the Fifth Article XIV Conference on Facilitating Entry Into
Force
The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)
is the oldest women’s peace organization in the world, established
in 1915 to oppose the war raging in Europe. It has been working
ever since to study, make known, and abolish the causes of war,
and for total and universal disarmament.
Women have organized to oppose nuclear weapon testing since it
began. For example, women collected and tested their children’s
teeth for iodine 131 contamination as an important awareness raising
action. Nuclear weapons are weapons of terror, weapons of a genocidal,
ecocidal, and suicidal nature. Their abolition is fundamental to
the security and prosperity of humanity. Security, for citizens
and for nations, cannot exist when the threat of nuclear annihilation
is maintained through government policies and defense industry priorities;
when money is used to further develop technologies of destruction
rather than education, health, employment, and the environment.
As with militarism in general, nuclear weapon testing represents
an ultimate injustice to people around the world. Furthermore, the
effects of nuclear testing, such as cancer, birth defects, and environmental
degradation, have been felt primarily by indigenous people, as most
of the nuclear test sites are situated on their lands.
The entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
would constitute an important step towards the nuclear free world
envisioned by the vast majority of the world's citizens. The cessation
of all nuclear test explosions would constrain the development and
improvement of nuclear weapons. The CTBT provides measures both
to determine compliance with the Treaty (ie. to detect nuclear tests)
and to remedy any situation of non-compliance. It is thus one of
the best tools the international community currently has at its
disposal to establish a process of complete nuclear disarmament.
With minor exceptions, the problems of the CTBT lie not with its
provisions, but with the refusal of key governments to implement
them.
There was universal condemnation of the October 2006 nuclear test
by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in October
2006. Yet, the US, the UK, Russia, and possibly China have continued
conducting subcritical tests to maintain and upgrade their nuclear
arsenals. The nuclear weapon states, in particular the US and the
UK, have also continued with or introduced plans to modernize or
extend the lifetime of their nuclear arsenals. These actions violate
the spirit of the CTBT.
It is unfortunate that the CTBT does not expressly forbid qualitative
improvements to nuclear weapons through subcritical testing and
experimentation. Its stated ultimate objective, however, is the
prevention of further nuclear weapon modernization and subsequent
arms races. WILPF calls upon the nuclear weapon states to cease
subcritical testing immediately. A special emphasis should be put
on the UK and Russia, who have ratified the CTBT, yet undermine
its efficacy by continuing to conduct these tests. In addition,
the US and the UK should be condemned for their nuclear weapon modernization
and extension programmes, which also weaken the CTBT.
WILPF totally opposes the US-India deal which undermines the CTBT
and violates the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The deal
also contradicts the US' condemnation of India's nuclear weapon
tests in 1998, for which economic sanctions were imposed. The proposed
deal does not require a commitment from India that it will refrain
from nuclear testing in the future. WILPF opposes specially tailored
safeguard agreements for India, and exceptions for certain countries,
as undermining multilateralism and the standards it has established.
Both the US and India need to make legally-binding commitments to
core non-proliferation and disarmament standards, including the
CTBT.
Every signature and ratification of the CTBT increases its strength
and normalizes its provisions, which contributes greatly to international
security. WILPF calls on those who have already ratified the Treaty
to use their influence to encourage those standing outside the treaty
to sign and ratify. We appreciate the comments of the UK's Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Margaret Beckett,
at the Carnegie Conference in June 2007, wherein she expressed interest
in the US ratifying the CTBT as an impetus to its entry into force.
We encourage the UK as a close ally of the US to continue pressuring
for US ratification of the CTBT immediately. We also urge the UK
to maintain a more consistent policy on nuclear disarmament—it
is difficult to accept its support of the CTBT at face value while
it continues subcritical testing of nuclear weapons and has decided
to renew its Trident nuclear submarine system.
WILPF also urges China, Colombia, DPRK, Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the US to sign and ratify. Every state
has more to gain by ratifying the Treaty than by remaining outside
of the international cooperative security regime.
It has been more than a decade since the CTBT was opened for signature—it
is well past time for the Treaty to enter into force. In the meantime,
it is imperative that the voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing
remain in place, that the Provisional Technical Secretariat and
the CTBTO maintain their efforts to drive the Treaty's entry into
force, and that the citizens of the world continue monitoring, questioning,
and pressuring their governments to support the strengthening of
international treaties and agreements such as the CTBT, with faith
that international law will prevail over the absurdity of nuclear
militarism.
WILPF believes that through confidence-building measures, the strengthening
of verification systems and regimes, and strict adherence to international
law, nuclear disarmament is possible. We do not have to reinvent
the wheel—we just have to support, use, and reinforce the
existing viable and effective tools we have already created through
diplomacy and multilateralism.
