• Text of the CTBT
• What is the CTBT?
• What are the problems with its entry into force?
• CTBT Article XIV Conferences
  • 2011
  • 2009
  • 2007
  • 2005
  • 2003
  • 2001
• CTBT Ministerial Meetings
  • 2010
• WILPF Statements on the CTBT
  • 2009
  • 2007
  • 2005
  • 2003

• The CTBT bans all nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosions. The full text is available here. Also check out this chronology of key events in the effort to end nuclear weapons testing, 1945-1999.
• The Treaty was negotiated in Geneva by the Conference on Disarmament, was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution A/RES/50/245 on 10 September 1996, and opened for signature in September 1996.
• However, it has not yet entered into force.
• All forty-four members of the Conference on Disarmament with nuclear power and/or research reactors must sign and ratify the Treaty before it enters into force; they are listed in Annex II of the Treaty. The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the ratification by all states listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty.
• The CTBT has been signed by 182 countries and ratified by 154. Out of the 44 Annex II states, 35 have ratified. Three have not even signed. See below for details.
• The Treaty is intended to stop the qualitative nuclear arms race. Unfortunately, the CTBT does not prohibit research on nuclear weapons, including subcritical tests. But the Treaty's stated objectives are disarmament and the prevention of further nuclear weapon modernization and subsequent arms races.

Basic components of the Treaty

• Organization. The Treaty established an organization to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification measures. The organization includes a Conference of States Parties, an Executive Council, and a Technical Secretariat, which includes the International Data Center.
• Verification and inspections. The Treaty's verification regime includes an international monitoring system composed of seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound monitoring; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence-building measures. Requests for on-site inspections must be approved by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the Treaty's 51-member Executive Council. The Executive Council must act within 96 hours of receiving a request for an inspection.
• Treaty compliance and sanctions. The Treaty provides for measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions, and for settlement of disputes. If the Conference or Executive Council determines that a case is of particular gravity, it can bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations.
• Amendments. Any state party to the Treaty may propose an amendment to the Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol. Amendments shall be considered by an Amendment Conference and shall be adopted by a positive vote of a majority of the states parties with no state party casting a negative vote.
• Protocol. Amendments shall be considered by an Amendment Conference and shall be adopted by a positive vote of a majority of the states parties with no state party casting a negative vote.
• Duration. The Treaty is of unlimited duration. Each State Party has the right to withdraw from the CTBT if it decides that extraordinary events related to its subject matter have jeopardized its supreme national interests.
• Depository. The Secretary General of the United Nations shall be the Depository of this Treaty and shall receive signatures, instruments of ratification and instruments of accession.

What are the problems with CTBT entry into force

China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States are the nine states preventing the CTBT’s entry into force. Three countries—India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea—have tested nuclear explosive devices since the CTBT was negotiated. And since then, the United States has carried out over 20 subcritical nuclear tests at its Nevada Test Site.

The excuses for not ratifying the Treaty vary between countries, though many suggest, or expect, that US ratification would lead to a ricochet effect for other ratifications. The merits of this analysis are debatable; regardless, all current Washington discourse indicates that the price of US ratification will be high—too high.

A Congressional Research Service report from June 2009 explains that when the US Senate ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conditioned their support for the Treaty on four safeguards: an aggressive nuclear test program; maintaining nuclear weapon laboratories; maintaining the ability to resume atmospheric tests promptly; and improving intelligence and nuclear explosion monitoring capabilities. The report emphasises that safeguards were key to securing Senate ratification of the 1963 Treaty. The report goes on to explain that updated safeguards have been part of CTBT ratification negotiations in the Senate. The report’s author notes, “Safeguards could be updated, such as by adding Safeguards for the nuclear weapon production plants and strategic forces, and could be augmented with implementation measures” that enforce the updated safeguards and prevent any erosion of the anti-disarmament scheme behind ratification.

Furthermore, as Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group argues, the opposition in the Senate to ratifying the Treaty is not about preserving the United States’ ability to test a nuclear weapon—it has no reason to ever test a nuclear weapon again and if there were such a circumstance, it would be able to withdraw from the Treaty under its withdrawal clause. Mello writes, “Any ratification deal would be aimed, in part, precisely at negating the Treaty’s disarmament impact ... In this shifting and uncertain scene, the CTBT ratification process will be viewed by many actors—defense ideologues, nuclear contractors, and pork-barrel politicians—as a means to protect the U.S. nuclear establishment against the vicissitudes of time.”

Other governments and international civil society advocates need to be wary of the process underway in the United States toward CTBT ratification and in their advocacy must emphasise core value of the Treaty: that a ban on nuclear weapon testing is intended to prevent the design, development, or modernision of nuclear weapons. Any deals given in trade for ratification will only serve to undermine the Treaty and cannot be accepted.

CTBT Article XIV (Entry-Into-Force) Conferences

In October 1999, the first such Conference on Facilitating the Entry-Into-Force of the CTBT was held in Vienna. Ninety-two states unanimously adopted a Final Declaration at that meeting hearing over fifty statements examining measures consistent with international law to accelerate the Treaty's ratification.

The Article XIV Conferences are opportunities for:

• announcing ratifications and signatures;
  
• calling on those states that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT to join the international consensus to end nuclear testing;
  
• urging states with active nuclear weapon research programmes and test sites to take actions that would reinforce the CTBT and support its goals, such as refraining from activities at test sites that might be construed as CTBT violations, halting research, development and production of nuclear warheads based on modifications of existing designs, that give them new military capabilities;
  
• examining ways and means of removing obstacles which delay Entry-Into-Force;
  
• discussing and agreeing on specific measures to convince the last holdout states to support the test ban;
  
• support for the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organisation in Vienna that has made significant progress in setting up the International Monitoring System and International Data Center, so that the CTBT's verification system is ready by the time the treaty enters into force;
  
• condemning any future testing; and,
  
• calling upon governments, businesses, and peoples to take decisive action in reaction to any future testing.

2011 Article XIV Conference
23 September 2011, New York City

Chairs: Patricia Espinosa Cantellano (Foreign Minister of Mexico) and Carl Bildt (Foreign Minister of Sweden)

• Aide Memoire for NGO participation (pdf)
• Application Form for NGO participation (pdf)
• Draft Provisional Agenda (pdf)
• Government Statements
• Final Declaration (pdf)
• WILPF Statement

2009 Article XIV Conference
24–25 September 2009, New York City

• Draft Provisional Agenda
• Draft Rules of Procedure
• Information for NGOs
• Aide Memoire for NGO participation (pdf)
• Official CTBTO Website
• Governmental Statements
• WILPF Statement
• NGO Statement to Conference
• Official Documentation
• WILPF Report

2007 Article XIV Conference

The fifth conference on facilitating the Entry Into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conference) was held on 17-18 September 2007 at the Hofburg Congress Centre, Heldenplatz, A-1014, Vienna, Austria.

The Treaty opened for signature eleven years ago and, with 177 signatures and 140 ratifications, is close to universality. The Conference directed particular attention at the 44 so-called Annex 2 States whose ratification is a precondition for the Treaty’s entry into force. Only 34 of the 44 have already ratified the Treaty. The ten remaining States are: China, Colombia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Pakistan and the United States of America. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan have not yet signed the Treaty.

• Draft Rules of Procedure
• Draft Provisional Agenda
• Aide Memoire for NGOs

Conference highlights:

• UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's message for the conference, delivered by H.E. Sergio Duarte, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. Ban remarked that the eleventh anniversay of the CTBT's opening for signature is a time not for celebration but for "re-dedication to the noble work that lies ahead in achieving the Treaty's entry into force. Persistent efforts on the part of States and civil society will be required to achieve that historic goal."


• CTBTO Executive Secretary Mr. Tibor Toth's statement. He noted that since the last Article XIV conference, twenty more states have signed or ratified the CTBT, "bringing it significantly closer to the level of ratifications of other WMD prohibition norms." In addition, 76 more certified facilities of the verification regime have been built, up to 211 from 135 in 2005. He also mentioned the DPRK nuclear weapon test in October 2006, which was "regrettable and disquieting" in its challenge to norm against nuclear testing, but also validated the CTBTO's verification system, and it "served to refocus the attention of the international community on the relevance of the CTBT as a key disarmament and non-proliferation instrument." He also called upon the Annex II states who haven't signed the Treaty to "consider the value of the CTBT for their national and international security."


• The statements from the Foreign Ministers of Austria and Costa Rica, H.E. Ursula Plassnik and H.E. Bruno Stagno Ugarte, who share the presidency of the Conference. Plassnik noted, "This shared presidency by two CTBT Member States representing two different geographic regions symbolizes the global support for the Treaty." He emphasized that the collection of international organizations in Vienna, including OPEC, UNIDO, the IAEA, and the CTBT, provides a platform to promote new ideas on how to address human security challenges. Meanwhile, Ugarte identified arguments for the universalization of the CTBT, including that the CTBT, "as an important non-proliferation instrument . . . constrains the development and qualitative improvement of new and more advanced nuclear weapons; it severely constrains the capacity of non-nuclear weapon states to develop new nuclear weapons and it prevents the proliferation of materials, technologies and knowledge that can be used for nuclear weapons." He also emphasized that the CTBT "not only contributes to international, regional and national peace and security, it also helps prevent further devastation of human health and the global environment," and that it "would greatly reduce the climate of distrust and discontent which has been penetrating the field of disarmament, which distorts all discussions and which makes it even more difficult to address some of today's key challenges posed by the threats of nuclear proliferation."


• The statement by Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, Special Representative to promote the CTBT ratification process. Ramaker said, “the world needs a complete ban on nuclear weapon test explosions. It needs the CTBT. This Treaty will cap the development of ever more destructive weapons. It constitutes the last barrier against a nuclear programme turning into a nuclear weapons programme.” In his capacity as Special Representative, Ramaker had visited most of the Annex 2 non-ratifying countries. He pointed out their primary concerns: the financial implications and lack of resources; the need to give higher priority to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation; and, on the positive side, a growing interest in the concrete benefits of the verification regime.


• The NGO statement, read by Lilly Gundacker of the Women's Federation for World Peace International.


• The Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry Into Force of the CTBT, in which states "affirmed the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications without delay to achieve early entry into force of the Treaty as one of the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation". They also called upon all states to sustain the voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosions, and to "refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. In addition, the document outlines eleven practical measures to promote the Treaty's entry into force.

Statements:

• NGO Statement
• WILPF Statement
• All governmental and organizational statements to the Conference are on the CTBTO website.

Side Events:

Monday - Tuesday, 17-18 September 2007
PTS Exhibition:
"Verifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban"
Experts from the CTBTO's technical divisions will demonstrate how a seismic station works, how data is processed, and how an on-site inspection is conducted. The 2007 re-release of the CTBTO Movie "CTBT: For a Safer and More Secure World", which includes CTBTO findings with regards to the announced nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in October 2006, will also be shown in the exhibition area.
Time and Place: all day, Dachfoyer, Hofburg Congress Centre

Tuesday, 18 September 2007
VERTIC and ACA Seminar
"The CTBT Achievements, challenges and opportunities"
The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) and the Arms Control Association (ACA) will be holding a seminar on political and verification challenges and opportunities for the Treaty and its verification system.
Time and place: 13:00 - 15:00, Kleiner Redoutensaal, Hofburg Congress Centre

Relevant Publications:

CTBTO Press Releases

• 17 September 2007: Summary of statements from the first day of the Conference
• 18 September 2007: Summary of the Final Declaration from the second day of the Conference
• 18 September 2007: Feature article on conclusion of conference

CTBTO Spectrum: 2007 Article XIV Conference Special Edition

• "Renewed opportunities to bring the CTBT into force," by Dr. Rebecca Johnson
• "CTBT: going the last mile to banish nuclear weapon testing," by Dr. Hans Blix
• "2007 Article XIV Conference: sending powerful signals for CTBT's entry into force," by Ambassador Jaap Rapmaker
• "History and mechanism of the Article XIV Conferences," by Dr. Andrea Wurm

2005 Article XIV Conference

21-23 September 2005
New York, NY, USA

Parties to the Comprehensive nuclear Test-Ban Treaty gathered in New York City for the fourth Entry-Into-Force (Article XIV) Conference from 21 to 23 September 2005. These conferences are held every two years so signatories to and ratifiers of the CTBT can strategize about how to facilitate the CTBT's early entry-into force. Although the conference this year took place at a time when the CTBT appears particularly embattled, it was clear that slow progress on the Treaty's entry into force is being made. A few states, lead by the United States, continue to refuse to ratify, but the CTBT is gradually gaining momentum and becoming an international legal norm, through its 176 signatures and 125 ratifications as well as its increasingly operational verification system, two-thirds of which has now been built.

The Conference's highlights include:

• Secretary-General Kofi Annan's statement to the conference. Annan told the conference that although the treaty is an effective measure of disarmament and non-proliferation, the delay of its entry into force heightens the risk that "someone, somewhere, will test nuclear weapons." He also advised the group to take heart, because "progress on difficult nuclear issues is possible." [see the UN press coverage of Annan's statement here]
  
• Ambassador Jaap Ramaker's Report on his activities as Special Representative to promote the ratification process, including his impressions of the status of those Annex II states that have not signed or ratified. He said he thought Vietnam's ratification could be expected in the not too distant future. Despite Indian Prime Minister Singh's declaration that India seeks to live up to the same nonproliferation standards that the five original nuclear weapon states are expected to observe, Ramaker was given to understand that in his promotional visits he "was not welcome in India."
  
• Ambassador Tibor Toth's statement as the new Executive Secretary of the Prepatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO). He reported that 217 of 321 monitoring stations have been built, 115 of which were built in the last two years. The information flow over the last two years has also nearly tripled, from five to 14 gigabytes of data per day. Executive Secretary Ambassador Toth replaced Wolfgang Hoffman who stepped down after 10 years of commendable service.
  
• Antigua and Barbuda's announcement of its ratification of the CTBT. Antigua and Barbuda informed the conference that its instrument of ratification was being deposited during the conference proceedings.
  
• Haiti's announcement of its intended ratification of the CTBT. Haiti will soon be publicly announcing a Haitian law required for them to ratify, and will deposit their ratification as soon as the law has been made public. The connection between disarmament and development, with arms spenditures diverting needed money from development, and the CTBTO's potential contributions to warning small states about seismic disasters were both important factors in Haiti's decision to ratify.
  
• the United States being a no-show at the Conference, despite being a signatory. The NGO statement advised the conference that the one nation should not be allowed to determine whether the entire world will continue to face nuclear annihilation.
  
• the NGO Statement to the Conference. The NGO statement, endorsed by 33 NGOs, was delivered by Daryl Kimball to a rapt audience, and can be viewed on video here.