Reaching Critical Will

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

The CWC and OPCW After 10 Years
An update and commentary on the
10th anniversary of the entry into force of the CWC, 2007

The 10th anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and its corollary treaty body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was celebrated on the 7th of August 2007 in the Palais de Nations, Geneva, where the Convention was negotiated ten years before. The Director-General of the OPCW, Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter gave a special address on the status of the chemical weapons legal regime in the Conference on Disarmament and shortly after, the OPCW, UNIDIR, UNODA, and Pugwash International co-hosted a special seminar on the CWC and OPCW. The seminar featured the following speakers: Sergei Ordzhonikide, Director-General, UNOG; Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General, OPCW; Sergey Batsanov, Director, Geneva Office of Pugwash International; Krzysztof Paturej, Director, Office of Special Projects, OPCW; and Per Runn, Head of Policy and Review Branch, Verification Division, OPCW.

The events framed the successes and challenges of the CWC against its unique status in the field of disarmament. The CWC is a "disarmament and non-proliferation instrument that is unprecedented in the history of arms control. Never before had the international community banned so comprehensively an entire category of weapons of mass destruction together with creating the verification tools necessary to assure compliance with these prohibitions," Director-General of the OPCW, Ambassador Pfirter said.

Currently, the CWC has 182 members, which represent over 95% of the world's population. 24,000 metric tons of chemical materials—or 33% of the world's known stockpiles—have been certifiably destroyed in 11 destruction facilities, operating in 5 countries. 94% of the chemical weapons production facilities in 12 States Parties have been destroyed; OPCW inspection teams have made over 3,000 inspections in over 1,080 military and industrial sites in 80 countries; and 5,600 participants have been involved in OPCW led activities on international cooperation and peaceful uses of chemistry, Ambassador Pfirter declared.

A key factor of these stunning figures is the commitment of two of the world's largest possessor states to fulfilling their stockpile destruction obligations. The US and Russia have both made significant reductions in their stockpiles. Russia has destroyed 22% of its chemical weapons—a figure that is rapidly increasing, as it had only destroyed less than 10% as of last year. The US has destroyed 46% of its total stockpile, and continues to provide assistance to other possessor states attempting to destroy their own stocks. India, Libya, and others have also made significant reductions in their stockpiles.

The success of the CWC has surprised skeptics who thought that a “Treaty containing such sweeping provisions affecting both militaries and the industry; governments as well as the private sector may be difficult to implement." Despite containing what has been perceived as intrusive verification provisions, the CWC has one of the highest memberships and the fastest rate of accession of any disarmament treaty. Ambassador Pfirter credited the CWC and OPCW's "exemplary spirit of dialogue and a continuous search for balance," and inclusion of every party concerned as the cornerstones of the Convention's achievements.

In line with the commemorative spirit of the events, the unique history of the CWC was a frequent topic of discussion. Ambassador Pfirter said that while this was a year of celebration, it was only with a certain humility. Many of the successes of the CWC came from the fact that it was a product of the end of the cold war and the international climate in which it was negotiated played a major part in creating the CWC’s unique attributes. While there appears to be some debate about the most influential period of the CWC’s negotiations, it is agreed that the CWC’s comprehensive and intrusive verification provisions were possible largely in part because of the trend towards confidence-building and assurances that existed at the end of the cold war. In an unconventional fashion, the treaty began to take significant shape in bilateral negotiations between the US and the USSR in the later half of the 1970s. This bilateral pairing was joined by another regional grouping—the Western Group or the ‘gang of four,’ or the US, UK, Japan, and Australia. When the US became opposed to provisions on inspections, the remaining States of the ‘gang’ ganged up on the US to pressure it into acceptance.

Reflective of the cold war climate, the CWC is a complicated document with many elements of psychology and a ‘lack-of-trust mentality.’ Yet despite its complications, the CWC’s verification mechanism is impressive while still allowing for flexibility and restraint. The Director-General of the UN, Mr. Sergei Ordzhonikide, perhaps summed up the CWC’s historical context most aptly, calling it ‘one of the good-looking babies of the cold war.’

Besides its unconventional and highly successful history, including exceptional rates of universalization and participation from key players, flexibility and balance by the OPCW in dealing with stockpile destruction obligations and deadlines has been another important component of the CWC's success. Albania became the first country to completely destroy its chemical weapons on 11 July 2007. It achieved its goal with the assistance of a number of other States Parties, despite narrowly missing its deadline requirement. Verification procedures are also staggered not to start simultaneously so to avoid being overly demanding on States Parties.

Another element contributing to the success of the CWC regime has been the emphasis placed on establishing a comprehensive regime, not only for disarmament but also for non-proliferation, Ambassador Pfirter stated. The CWC's provisions requiring national measures such as "systematic declarations, industry monitoring, controls on transfers of chemicals, and regulatory measures to identify and track chemicals of concern," along with penal legislation allowing for the detection, pursuit, and prosecution of persons committing breaches of the Convention, have been vital for the CWC's implementation and concrete results.

Along with national measures, the unique verification regime of the CWC was a central theme of discussions. The CWC has one of the most intrusive and comprehensive verification mechanisms in the disarmament field. The key aims of the verification process is to maintain confidence that all State Parties comply with the Convention, to enhance security through transparency, and to enhance knowledge about global use and trade of dual-use chemicals. The verification process of the CWC can be described in a few steps:

A declaration by State Parties—evaluation by the secretariat—onsite inspection or data monitoring (reporting on trade and comparison with others)—analysis(clarification of data)/reporting (on inspections)—A new declaration

This yearly cycle comprises a comprehensive set of declaration requirements. Declarations are required on existing chemical weapons stocks, production facilities, riot control agents, and import and export chemical materials. Under Article VI of the Convention, declarations are made twice a year on anticipated and past activities for each country. For smaller countries this is a significant requirement and often a time-consuming task. Certain chemicals are not easily identified under the ‘scheduled’ classification system of the CWC and the declaration system is often technically difficult. Countries must also have trade controls in place in order to collect data on imports and exports. Chemical destruction facilities also receive continuous on-site monitoring under the convention, along with abandoned production facilities. In order to facilitate the verification process, the OPCW and States Parties must support each other with information sharing and assistance.

Lastly, the partnership that the CWC has fostered with the chemical industry and private sector has been an essential part of its development. The OPCW has designed a number of programs and courses to provide chemists and industry-related persons with training dedicated to enhancing understanding of the CWC, national implementation, and safe and peaceful uses of chemistry. As Ambassador Pfirter explained, "We are committed to seeking the continued engagement and support of industry, which, by and large understands that our intrusiveness is well justified by the benefits that the CWC brings in terms of peace, security and better conditions for a prosperous commercial activity."

To continue this critical partnership between scientists, industry, and States Parties, several important events are planned for 2007. On the 18th and 19th September in the Hague, the OPCW will host an Academic Forum which will be a world-wide event for scientists. The OPCW will also hold a meeting on the 1st and 2nd of November to foster dialogue between States Parties and global chemical industry representatives on the issue of protecting critical infrastructure and facilities related to the chemical industry and States' security needs, such as protection against terrorism. At this forum, for the first time, all key authorities supporting national industry and a protection network will come together. Workshop topics will be security and coping with new challenges in the modern international environment.

These elements—a high rate of universalization, participation by key players, emphasis on national implementation, strong verification, balance, flexibility, assistance, and a partnership and compromise between all relevant players—have been the foundations of the CWC's success. However, as Ambassador Pfirter pointed out, many challenges still face the CWC today.

As chemical weapons are some of the "most toxic and dangerous substances ever invented and produced," it is imperative that accession to the Treaty must be universal. Even one absence is a threat to global peace and security. Today, only 13 states are not party to the Convention. While some states, such as Iraq, Lebanon, Congo, Angola, and Guinea Bissau, have indicated their willingness to join in the near future, other states show continuing reluctance. Ambassador Pfirter highlighted two areas which represent "a serious void on our map." In the Middle East, Egypt, Israel, and Syria still refuse to join the CWC regime, while in Asia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Myanmar are not States Parties. Israel, in particular, has signed but not ratified the Convention. Meanwhile, the US and Russia still have a significant portion of their stockpiles to destroy. They have already extended their deadlines until the maximum time allowed, April 2012.

The challenge of destroying all stockpiles by 2012 presents enormous difficulties. Yet Ambassador Pfirter remains optimistic. For once, he said, it is not a question of political will, but of how effective States Parties and the OPCW can be in carrying out an already proven program.

--report by Katherine Harrison and Enid Györke
August 2007