North Korea and Nuclear Weapons
Background Information

Introduction

On 9 October 2006, the Korean Central News Agency announced "the field of scientific research in the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] successfully conducted an underground nuclear test under secure conditions on October 9, Juche 95 [2006] at a stirring time when all the people of the country are making a great leap forward in the building of a great, prosperous, powerful socialist nation. It has been confirmed that there was no such danger from radioactive emission in the course of the nuclear test, as it was carried out under scientific consideration and careful calculation. The nuclear test was conducted with indigenous wisdom and technology, 100 percent. It marks a historic event as it greatly encouraged and pleased the KPA [Korean People’s Army] and people that have wished to have powerful self-reliant defense capability. It will contribute to defending the peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the area around it."

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) is outraged by the claimed October 9, 2006 nuclear explosion conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). This action threatens international peace and security, the environment, and the nuclear disarmament and non proliferation regime. The test, supposedly conducted near Mount Mantap, in the north east of the country, threatens surrounding towns with radioactive contamination. WILPF recognizes that long-lived radionuclides from nuclear weapons testing impact the water systems beneath the site for thousands of years. There is no way to clean up a nuclear test site.

WILPF calls on the DPRK to cease its nuclear weapons programme immediately and return in good faith to the six-party talks. WILPF calls on the UN Security Council to take immediate action on this test and to work with all parties in the region to find a way to condemn this test without creating a devastating humanitarian impact on the region.

WILPF calls on all UN Member States to immediately desist from trading any arms, or arms related materials with the DPRK. WILPF calls on all nuclear weapons states, to immediately begin negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, to cease and desist from any nuclear weapons development and modernization, and to immediately begin developing national level disarmament processes.

WILPF calls on the remaining 10 states whose signature is required for the entry into force of the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty, to immediately ratify that treaty. Failing ratification by these, WILPF calls on the states already party to the treaty to convene a conference to allow the treaty to provisionally enter into force, in order that the International Monitoring System established by the CTBTO can come into full operation and provide international, independent verification of any future tests. This is a depressing example of why an international verifiable legally-binding ban on all nuclear tests is necessary, and a pressing reason to institute international law as the only alternative to the rule of force.

Leading Up to the October 2006 Detonation

On 12 December 1985, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) became a party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On 12 May 1992, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began its initial inspections after the NPT Safeguards Agreement entered into force. Shortly after inspections began, inconsistencies emerged between the DPRK's initial declaration and the Agency's findings, centering on a mismatch between declared plutonium product and nuclear waste solutions and the results of the Agency's analysis. IAEA analysis suggested that the DPRK had undeclared plutonium. In order to find answers to the inconsistencies detected and to determine the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration provided, the IAEA requested access to additional information and to two sites that seemed to be related to the storage of nuclear waste. The DPRK, however, refused access to the sites.

The IAEA’s request for a special inspection was subsequently refused, so, determining North Korea to be in non-compliance with the NPT, the IAEA referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council. On 11 May 1993 the Security Council called upon North Korea to comply with the NPT. A day later, on 12 March 1993, North Korea announced that it was withdrawing from the NPT amid suspicions that it was developing nuclear weapons. North Korea cited the NPT's escape clause in its announcement of its planned withdrawal, noting its priority to defend supreme national interests. North Korea’s stated reasons for withdrawing were: (1) the Team Spirit "nuclear war rehearsal" military exercises, and (2) the IAEA demand for special inspection of two suspect sites. North Korea attached a statement to its withdrawal notice that was sent to the three NPT depository states and the 154 NPT member states, in which it accused the IAEA of violating its sovereignty and interfering in its internal affairs, attempting to stifle its socialism, and of being a "lackey" of the United States. According to North Korea, the United States influenced officials of the IAEA Secretariat and Member States at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 25 February 1993 to adopt a resolution requiring North Korea to open military sites to inspection that are not nuclear-related. On 11 June 1993, one day before its notice of withdrawal from the NPT was due to take effect, the US persuaded North Korea to suspend the "effectuation" of its withdrawal and to accept normal IAEA inspection of the seven sites it had declared in the Initial Report to the Agency.

Although the DPRK remained a State Party to the NPT, the IAEA later determined that it was continuing to breach the treaty and widen its non-compliance. On 10 June 1994, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution that concluded "the DPRK is continuing to widen its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement by taking actions which prevent the Agency from verifying the history of the reactor core and from ascertaining whether nuclear material from the reactor had been diverted in past years". The Board also decided to suspend all non-medical technical assistance to the DPRK. On 13 June 1994, North Korea withdrew as a member state from the IAEA.

Former US President Jimmy Carter diffused the near crisis in 1994 with a visit to North Korea. President Carter’s visit helped broker subsequent negotiations that ultimately led to the US-North Korea Agreed Framework. Under the framework the US committed itself to make arrangements for the provision of a light water reactor (LWR) with a generating capacity of approximately 2000 MW(e) in exchange for a DPRK "freeze" and ultimately the dismantlement of its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities. The arrangements for the LWR project led to the creation, in 1995, of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

However, as NTI research concludes, "neither party was completely satisfied with either the compromise reached or its implementation. The United States was dissatisfied with the postponement of safeguards inspections to verify Pyongyang’s past activities, and North Korea was dissatisfied with the delayed construction of the light water power reactors. In fact, Pyongyang had demanded compensation from Washington, but the US position has been that 2003 was only a 'target date' and not a strict contractual commitment." While it is true that the agreement never imposed legal obligations, the US seems to consider North Korea's responsibilities under the agreement to be a strict contractual commitment.

In December 2002, the United States accused North Korea of having a uranium based nuclear weapons programme, in violation of the Agreed Framework and the NPT, and suspended heavy oil shipments. North Korea confirmed that it had a clandestine enriched uranium weapons programme, and responded to US sanctions by lifting the freeze on its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program and expelling IAEA inspectors who had been monitoring the freeze. North Korea withdrew from the NPT on 10 January 2003 (the first state ever to do so), and on 10 February 2005, the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced that North Korea had manufactured nuclear weapons.

On 15 July 2006, a consensus was finally reached enacting the U.N. Security Council resolution 1695. The resolution consisted of a diluted version of the Japanese-sponsored resolution proposed primarily because it refrained from implementing the ability to permit sanctions or compel military action. Although this legally binding tactic was eliminated from the Japanese and U.S. desired rhetoric the resolution still made concrete demands Bolton described as “unambiguous.” The events leading up to the resolution escalated on July 4th when North Korea launched seven missiles.

According to the UN Journal, “The draft resolution (S/2006/488) received 15 votes in favour, none against and no abstentions, and was adopted unanimously as resolution 1695 (2006).” It was decided not to include Chapter Seven of the U.N. Charter, as China would have vetoed it. The resolution, “demanded that the country suspend all related activities and required States to prevent the import or export of funds or goods that could fuel Pyongyang's missile or weapons of mass destruction programmes” (UN News).

Additionally, the resolution states it reaffirms both resolutions 825 and 1540 already set in place and highlights two crucial steps for North Korea to follow. The removal from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations are crucial faults cited by the resolution in which it “deplores the DPRK.” Furthermore it “stresses the importance of the implementation of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005” and that it is urgent that the “DPRK return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition.” North Korea’s U.N. ambassador, Pak Gil Yon, however rejected the resolution after it passed and reportedly left the chamber. After this event North Korea reconfirmed its position by expressing that Pyongyang would “bolster its war deterrent.” As a result, Japan is claiming that it may go further to pursue other sanctions if North Korea does not abide by the resolution that it has already condemned.

On 9 October 2006, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test, which was met with unanimous condemnation from the international diplomatic and non-governmental community. Speculation abounds regarding the possibility of a second nuclear test in the near future; South Korea, Japan, and the United States have increased their surveillance of the country.

Six-party talks continue struggling to reach any successful conclusion; the latest round in December 2006ended without progress.  North Korea continues to demand the US lift its financial restrictions against the country while the US continues to demand North Korea dissolve its nuclear weapon programme.

Please see Most Recent Developments for more details.

The Players

North Korea
Pyongyang was formally introduced to the threat of nuclear weapons during the Korean War, when the US "threatened to use nuclear weapons to end the Korean War on terms favorable to the United States," and deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea. They remained there until 1991, when they were removed under the American-Russian Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. It is conceivable that North Korea's use of the threat of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to hostile US policies and possible aggression by the US against North Korea stems from these incidents.

It is widely conjectured that North Korea has an incentive to “exaggerate the external threat for domestic political reasons.” Expert Daniel A. Pinkston and Harvard researchers Hui Zhang and Anne Wu agree that North Korea is flaunting is nuclear weapons programme to the international community in order to secure its survival and to prevent external aggression against the regime.

Researcher David C. Kang from Dartmouth College explains that “without movement toward resolving North Korea’s security fears, progress in resolving the nuclear weapons issue will be limited. The United States and North Korea are still technically at war: the 1953 armistice was never replaced with a peace treaty. The United States has been unwilling to discuss even a nonaggression pact, much less a peace treaty or normalization of ties. With the United States openly belligerent toward it, labeling North Korea a terrorist nation, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld discussing the possibility of war, it is no surprise that North Korea feels threatened.” North Korea is eligible for preemptive strike in the United States’ 2002 Nuclear Posture Review.

Kang goes on to emphasize the strategic importance nuclear weapons represent to those who possess them: “Nuclear weapons are political, not military, instruments. Nuclear weapons are far more valuable to North Korea unused than deployed and delivered. Particularly if the North Korea weapons stockpile is small (five or six), it would do virtually nothing that conventional weapons cannot already do. North Korea already has the conventional capability to destroy Seoul. North Korea can already target the Japanese islands with their Scud missiles. North Korea pursues a nuclear weapons program for the same reason that other highly vulnerable nations arm themselves—to deter an adversary. North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons, missile programs, and massive conventional military deployments are aimed at deterrence and defense.”

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei agrees with this research, arguing that “feelings of insecurity and humiliation, exaggerated by the nuclear imbalance, are behind the spread of bomb development programs at the national level,” and therefore, “the world should stop treating the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea as isolated cases and instead deal with them in a common effort to eliminate poverty, organised crime and armed conflict.”

United States
Throughout the North Korean nuclear crisis, the United States’ position has centered on containment through economic sanctions and political pressure. According to a study by John S. Park, fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) and leader of its North Korea Analysis Group, after September 11th, "Washington's focus on North Korea shifted from preserving the international nuclear nonproliferation regime to preventing terrorist organizations and rogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons or fissile material." The US finds North Korea's nuclear weapons programme, developed in tandem with a ballistic missile programme, alarming. Washington views the DPRK as projecting "longstanding hostility" towards the United States, as being a "chronic military concern," and as sponsoring or harbouring terrorists.

The possibility of North Korea transferring nuclear weapons or fissile material to states or terrorist groups is one of the United States' major concerns. A special report by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies explains how "this fear has increased with recent reports that North Korea could have exported uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the feedstock for gas centrifuges, to Libya prior to Tripoli's decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program in December 2003.” Park's study shows how the American government's terrorism-centric view has presented the North Korean nuclear imbroglio, which has been neither directly nor peripherally related to the current war on terrorism, as a terrorist threat: "President George W. Bush's 'axis of evil' speech was in some respects an ineffective attempt to link the North Korean nuclear issue to countering terrorism. Despite the North's terrorist acts against its southern neighbor in the 1980s and its harboring of Japanese Red Army faction members, the threat emanating from North Korea at present is less terrorism and more regional instability spawned by nuclear proliferation or an increase in the flow of refugees."

The greatest challenge facing the Bush administration in dealing with North Korea has been lack of cooperation and strong policy coordination with China in jointly leading the multilateral diplomatic talks. Although the Bush Administration has been supportive of Chinese efforts to coordinate and lead the Six-party talks, Washington has also been highly critical of Chinese officials for not putting enough pressure on North Korea to make concessions. This stance is predicated on the belief that China and North Korea still maintain the “lips and teeth” relationship the two countries established during the Korean War, despite their more recent history of mutual distrust and suspicion.

As Park writes, “at successive rounds of the six-party talks in Beijing, to the irritation and frustration of North Korea in particular, U.S. officials have insisted on the multilateral adoption of a Libyan case approach. The Kim Jong-il regime believes, however, that fundamental differences set North Korea apart from Libya. Indeed, Pyongyang argues that, given the early stage of Libya's program, the Libyans did not have much to lose by agreeing to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. In contrast, North Korea seeks a comprehensive negotiated settlement that would compensate it for relinquishing its entire nuclear arsenal. Unlike Libya, whose reward for nuclear dismantlement was access to assets frozen in Europe and the United States following the Libyan-sponsored 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, North Korea is demanding large-scale economic development assistance, diplomatic normalization, and a security guarantee.”

China
After North Korea revealed its clandestine nuclear programme in October 2002, Chinese officials took a more pro-active role than its 1994 “hands-off” approach in order to ease rapidly building tension between the United States and North Korea. China new leadership role in the multi-party talks is also predicated on its desire to maintain its economic growth and ultimately achieve its goal of having a society in which the majority of the population in middle class. “Three major components are deemed essential to realize this goal: fostering a stable external political and security environment necessary for internal economic development; integrating China further into the international political and economic order to help secure stable markets, as exemplified by its active participation in multilateral institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the World Trade Organization; and developing broad and deep relations with the United States to eliminate the need for excessive military spending.” (inside multilateralism) China has been extremely vigilant against all security threats that might disrupt its economic growth and the flow of direct investment into the country.

According to research by Hui Zhang, an expert on China's nuclear policy, China's main concern in this situation is maintaining regional stability. While China is an ally of North Korea with great influence over Kim Jong Il, China worries that if North Korea does not abandon its nuclear weapons programme, either a regional nuclear arms or all-out war between the United States and North Korea will erupt. At the same time, Beijing is reluctant to pressure Pyongyang with economic and diplomatic sanctions, understanding that "poverty would not change the behaviour of [North Korea's] political leadership, but would only worsen social conditions." The collapse of Kim Jong Il's regime based on "an imploding North Korean economy" would lead to a massive flow of refugees into China. From China's perspective, economic pressure will result in as much regional instability as North Korea continuing with its nuclear weapons programme. Hui Zhang argues that "rather than provoking Pyongyang or siding against the Bush administration, China is positioning itself as an impartial arbitrator."

South Korea
While the Bush Administration has focused mainly on terrorism, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun’s primary concern throughout his tenure has been maintaining regional stability and security. A stable Koran peninsula allows President Roh to maintain an environment in which to promote his administration’s "Peace and Prosperity Policy," a continuation of Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy." South Korea is seeking a gradual integration and reunification of the two Koreas through direct investment and inter-Korean trade. However, the Bush Administration’s “tailored containment” of North Korea has largely hindered South Korean efforts to economically integrate the Korean peninsula. Following North Korea’s October 2002 admission that it had been secretly developing a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) weapons programme, the United States sought to force a rollback of North Korea’s weapons programme through economic and political pressure.

Economic sanctions and political pressure from Washington have thus far been unsuccessful in halting North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme. However, the tailored containment policies have been both the impetus and impediment to stronger inter-Korean ties. The first unintended consequence of the Bush administration policies toward North Korea, was a rising wave of anti-Americanism in South Korea that led to the election of President Roh and defeat of the ultra-conservative Lee Hoi-chang who had aligned himself with US policies just days before a South Korean school was trampled by a US military vehicle. The second unintended consequence was the increase in pro-active negotiations between North and South Korea, in direct opposition to US policy ad its refusal to negotiate with Pyongyang. Despite Roh’s unprecedented plans for inter-Korean economic engagement, North Korea suspended inter-Korean talks until June 2005 in an attempt to “drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington.”

Japan
Similar to South Korea and China, Japan’s top priority in dealing with the North Korean nuclear imbroglio has been maintaining regional peace and stability. In addition, "Japanese government officials are concerned that applying excessive pressure on North Korea may elicit a radical response that would threaten Japan's security. Of specific concern is the potential for a nuclear- or chemical-warhead–armed No-dong missile attack on Tokyo." Japanese policy makers seek to avoid such a situation through pro-active engagement and dialogue with North Korea.

In September 2002. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made a high profile trip to Pyongyang in an attempt to visibly engage North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il. However, during Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit Kim Jong-Il admitted that North Korea had abducted Japanese citizens during the 1970s and 1980s. This admission by the “Dear Leader” effectively halted Japan’s willingness to actively move forward and lead the Six-party talks. Despite many in Tokyo’s belief that Japan could effectively lead multilateral talks to achieve a nuclear weapons free Korean peninsula and ensure regional and international security, their actions are constrained by the majority of Japanese citizens who feel that the abduction issue must be resolved first.

Russia
Moscow's main interest in the North Korea nuclear crisis appears to be mercantile: as Park writes, "Rather than seeking ways to gain an edge in a global ideological contest, Russia is now keen to leverage its substantial oil resources strategically to play China and Japan off of each other. Although the oil pipeline deals are economically lucrative for the Russians, they also serve an important political function as a tool with which Moscow can create influence in Northeast Asia." Although the nuclear impasse has forced most countries to halt relations with North Korea, Russia has stayed open for business and continued to pursue economic deals within Northeast Asia. While Moscow is supportive of the multilateral efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, it has also actively pursued oil pipeline and railway deals with North Korea. In October 2004, Russia disclosed a deal made with North Korea to link the Trans-Siberian railroad with Rajin, a port in Northeastern North Korea.

Key Issues

(1) Lack of trust
The US wants to see North Korea completely dismantle its nuclear weapons programme before reaching a settlement (as American negotiator Christopher Hill has said, "If they get rid of their weapons we can start opening the country,'') while North Korea is only willing to temporarily suspend plutonium enrichment while negotiations are under way. The US, China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan have offered 2 million kilowatts of electricity in exchange for the permanent abandonment of North Korea's nuclear activities and submission to international inspections. North Korea asserts its right to develop peaceful nuclear programmes and offers the abandonment of its nuclear weapons activities in exchange for a civilian light-water reactor, further energy assistance, and assurances against a US attack or invasion of North Korea.

In a press briefing, Deputy Spokesperson Adam Ereli said "President Bush and every senior member of his Administration who has spoken on this issue has made it clear that the United States has no hostile intent towards North Korea and that we have no intention of invading or attacking North Korea. We've also made it clear that we would be prepared to participate in security assurances on a multilateral basis in the context of dismantlement of its nuclear programs." CNS reports that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, "security assurances will of course include the United States, if they are prepared to take a definitive decision to dismantle their nuclear weapons programs and to do so in a way that is verifiable."

Yet North Korea has not accepted these "assurances" at face value - an impediment to negotiation that is further impacted by the refusal of either side to take the first step towards diffusing the crisis. The US' security assurances are based on North Korea's rejection of their nuclear weapons programme. North Korea wants the assurances before they abandon their weapons. Hui Zhang, research associate with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, argues in an article for Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that North Korea sees the current situation as a struggle for regime survival. Since "the only leverage that Kim Jong Il possesses is a threat to go nuclear . . . Pyongyang will continue to escalate the crisis until it obtains" security assurances from Washington.

Researchers Jason Qian and Xiaohui (Anne) Wu cite lack of trust as the ultimate impediment to the main issues under negotiation, and emphasize that "adversarial gestures between Pyongyang and Washington in any of these areas jeopardize recent achievements and the future success of the negotiation."

Issues not directly related to nuclear proliferation confuse the situation and make compromise and trust even more important in negotiations: North Korean negotiators have repeatedly argued they would discuss the nuclear issue after the United States lifts financial sanctions against their country.  The US Treasury Department accused the Banco Delta Asia of money laundering in September 2005, asserting that the bank provided financial services to North Korean government agencies and front companies engaged in illicit activities such as drug trafficking.  Since then, the bank has frozen North Korea's accounts, and other financial institutions have curtailed their dealings with Pyongyang.

North Korean officials have complained these sanctions are part of the US' hostile policy towards North Korea.  For more details, please see David Lague and Donald Greenlees, "Squeeze on Banco Delta Asia hit North Korea where it hurt," International Herald Tribune, 19 January 2007.

In an interview with Foreign Policy, Joel Wit, who served for 15 years in the State Department in positions related to Northeast Asia and nuclear arms control, expressed the US administration's distrust of North Korea’s negotiating sincerity, saying “the North Koreans change their tune depending upon the time of day. I wouldn’t read a lot into that stuff. The North Koreans have been saying all along that they’re willing to give up their nuclear program in exchange for a change in the U.S. attitude toward North Korea. That’s just rhetoric. It’s nothing more than that. It’s just mom and apple pie language.”

Along with the US' mistrust of North Korea, Daniel A. Pinkston argues that the main problems on the US side is its “failure to be more proactive, [its] reliance on the Chinese, and [its] refrain that the Chinese aren’t doing enough.” He believes these failing elements of US strategy “run the risk of really marginalizing the United States in the region. If North Korea gets nuclear weapons, it’s not in the interests of other countries in the region. It destabilizes the region and is a security threat to everyone. But what could happen is that North Korea could carry out this test and continue to increase their nuclear capability, and the perception will grow in East Asia that the United States did not do enough to prevent this. East Asians will argue the United States didn’t put a credible offer on the table. A lot of people in East Asia believe the United States has exacerbated the situation, and if they begin to blame the United States, that causes problems for U.S. interests in the region.”

(2) Verification of North Korea's nuclear programme
In regards to the North Korea nuclear programme, verification is necessary not just to ensure disarmament once an agreement is reached, but also to confirm the existence and extent of the DPRK's nuclear arsenal. Verification has not been effective to this end, nor has there been great success determining the extent of North Korea’s fissile material production. A Congressional Research Services report for Congress, RS21391, points out that “information about North Korea’s nuclear weapons production has depended largely on remote monitoring and defector information, with mixed results. Satellite images correctly indicated the start-up of the 5MWe reactor, but gave no detailed information about its operations. Satellites also detected trucks at Yongbyon in late January 2003, but could not confirm the movement of spent fuel to the reprocessing plant; imagery reportedly detected activity at the reprocessing plant in April 2003, but could not confirm large-scale reprocessing; and, satellite imagery could not peer into an empty spent fuel pond, which was shown to U.S. visitors in January 2004. Even U.S. scientists visiting Pyongyang in January 2004 could not confirm North Korean claims of having reprocessed the spent fuel or that the material shown was in fact plutonium. Verification of those claims would require greater access to the material and North Korean cooperation.”

As of 3 March 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors “noted with concern that the DPRK has not permitted any Agency verification activities since December 2002, and thus the Agency was still not in a position to provide any assurances about nuclear material and activities in the DPRK.” On 24 November 2005, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reiterated the Agency’s lack of verification capabilities in the DPRK, and expressed hope in the six party talks as an effective vehicle for North Korea’s return to the NPT and the granting of permission to the IAEA for inspections.

On 9 October 2006, North Korea conducted what they declared to be a successful underground nuclear test. The test was met with unanimous condemnation from the international diplomatic and non-governmental community. Speculation abounds regarding the possibility of a second nuclear test in the near future; South Korea, Japan, and the United States have increased their surveillance of the country.

(3) Provision of light-water reactors to North Korea
Under the 1994 Agreement, the United States is supposed to help North Korea build light-water reactors, which cannot be used to make nuclear bombs, in order to cover its energy needs in return for the dismantlement of the military’s plutonium production. These reactors were supposed to be built by 2003, but it became clear early on that the US would not meet this deadline. The current date is projected for 2006, though the construction of the reactors now appears to be dependent on the resolution of the impasse, rather than a bargaining chip to arrive at a resolution.

(4) North Korea’s alleged uranium enrichment programme
The Congressional Research Services report RS21391 explains that in 2002, an “unclassified CIA working paper on North Korea’s nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment estimated that North Korea ;is constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational — which could be as soon as mid-decade.’ Such a plant would need to produce more than 50kg of HEU per year, requiring cascades of thousands of centrifuges. The paper notes that in 2001, North Korea ‘began seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities.’ Although not much is known about the program or facilities, Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan probably offered the same P-2-design centrifuges to North Korea as he did to Libya and Iran.”

However, the Congressional Report also notes that “US intelligence officials have said they do not know where the uranium program is.” A briefing by nuclear researchers Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen further notes that “the United States has not provided any public information that substantiates [a uranium enrichment program’s] existence. Following the U.S. manipulation and distortion of intelligence about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, some countries and analysts are now skeptical of any U.S. allegations regarding other nations' nuclear programs."