|
Fissile Materials
Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
Background
to the FMCT
Since the signing of the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a significant issue for the
disarmament and arms control community has been the continued production
of fissile materials - the fuel for nuclear weapons. Many states
have long been calling for a ban on the production of fissile materials,
and the issue has been on the proposed agenda of the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) for years.
In December 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus
a resolution recommending the negotiation
of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively
verifiable treaty banning the production
of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices - which became known as a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT).
Early on, the issue of existing stocks blocked consensus on the
negotiation of an FMCT. Some states, such as those belonging to
the Non-Aligned Movement, believe that a cut-off level should include
fissile materials already produced and stockpiled, requiring the
nuclear weapon states to irreversibly downblend existing stocks
of weapons-grade fissile materials so that they can never be used
for nuclear weapons again. Other states, such as the United States,
United Kingdom, and Japan, favour a future-production cut-off. Some
states also think an FMCT should include management of fissile material,
not only a ban on production.
Another contentious element to an FMCT is its scope. While a treaty
would ban the production of most fissionable materials, it would
not include tritium, an element used to amplify the explosive power
of a nuclear weapon. Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen
that has a half-life of 12 years. Were it to be included in an FMCT,
the decaying
tritium in existing stocks could not be replaced, in effect limiting
the weapon's destructive power. Other materials, such as depleted
uranium, neptunium, natural uranium, plutonium 240 and 242, americium,
curium and californium, though not fissile, are used in weapons
programs.
On 25 January 1994, the CD appointed a Special Coordinator, Ambassador
Gerald Shannon of Canada, to seek the views of member states on
the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate the type of FMCT requested
by the UN General Assembly. In March 1995, the resulting “Shannon
Mandate” proposed that an ad hoc committee, charged to
pursue the negotiations, would settle the issue of existing stocks
and other issues. The committee did not get off the ground, but
many states refer to the Shannon Mandate as the basis for future
negotiations.
All of states parties to the NPT endorsed the immediate commencement
and early conclusion of FMCT negotiations at the 1995 and 2000 NPT
Review Conferences, and the negotiation of an FMCT was agreed as
one of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament at the 2000 NPT
Review Conference.
In 2003, Japan, a leader in the campaign for an FMCT, held informal
discussions both at home as well as in Geneva, and produced a draft
text of a potential Treaty.
For years, China and Russia insisted that starting work on the
prevention
of an arms race in outer space be linked to starting work on
an FMCT in the CD. In August 2003, China and Russia broke from this
position, and agreed to go forth with FMCT negotiations based on
the Shannon Mandate.
The United States did not announce its position on an FMCT until
July 2004, when Ambassador Sanders declared
that while the US supported negotiations on an FMCT, they did not
believe that such a treaty would be verifiable. This is contrary
to the UN Disarmament Commission's 16
principles of verification published in 1988, as well as a US
National Academy of study in 2005, which indicated that a verifiable
FMCT would be expensive, but achievable. This change in US policy
appears more politically driven than scientifically sound. The US
also tabled a draft
treaty on 18 May 2006, which many delegations argue is far removed
from the original concept of a non-discriminatory, verifiable treaty.
Many delegations have argued that specific references to matters
such as verification and existing stocks in the negotiation mandate
is crucial, worried that if negotiations begin “without any
preconditions,” as described in the CD's programme of work
proposed in 2007, these issues are sure to be rejected during negotiations
by key players such as the United States. Pakistan in particular
has argued this, pointing out that if an FMCT does not include existing
stocks or verification, it will freeze or accentuate asymmetries
between the nuclear weapons possessors—especially between
Pakistan and India—and thus undermine regional “strategic
balance” and international security. The US-India
deal, which would allow India to import nuclear fuel from the
US for its energy reactors, freeing up its own indigenously-produced
materials for military purposes, further exacerbates Pakistan’s
concerns about an FMCT.
In 2007, the long-awaited start of negotiations on an FMCT never
seemed closer. At the end of its 2007 session, the CD was near agreement
on a package deal, L.1, which would have enabled it to begin negotiations
on an FMCT in 2008. Many delegations expressed support for the package
deal, including those of Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
Australia. The Netherlands and the European Union called for commencement
of negotiations without preconditions. Although the United States
prefers to proceed with the FMCT without discussion of any other
of the CD’s priority issues, the US delegation explained a
conscious decision had been made this year to not block consensus
on the P6 proposal.
Critical issues of
FMCT
The concept of a cut-off of the production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons has been discussed for a long time, and the
agreement on a mandate (known as the Shannon Mandate) to begin negotiations
in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) broke down in 1995. Since
then, there has been very little formal progress.
There are two draft treaty texts which have been presented as documents
of the Conference on Disarmament - one, a draft
treaty presented by the United States on 18 May 2006 and the
other is a model
treaty text presented by Greenpeace International . These texts
vary widely as they deal with the critical issues outlined below.
An FMCT will require many technical issues to be resolved, from
actually defining fissile material to ensuring that the treaty is
effective by developing specific procedures for verification. There
are a number of different approaches to these issues ranging from
a simple approach to a more comprehensive one.
Key players for FMCT
Whatever the scope of the eventual FMCT, most of the non-nuclear
weapons states that are parties to comprehensive safeguard agreements
associated with the NPT will already satisfy the requirements of
an eventual FMCT. These states have undertaken not to produce or
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and
to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on
all their nuclear material to verify this.
The states that will be most affected by such a treaty are the nuclear
weapons states: the United States, Russian Federation, China, France,
and the United Kingdom, and the nuclear weapons possessing states
that are not parties to the NPT: India, Pakistan, and Israel. Other
states that also will be affected by such a treaty are the states
that produce the greatest amount of fissile material for non-military
purposes, like Canada, Australia, and Japan.
The 35 member states of the Zangger
Committee (also known as the "NPT Exporters Committee") also
have a special interest in how the FMCT will look like, since a
comprehensive FMCT has the possibility of universalizing export
control. These states have different positions on the critical issues
that have prevented negotiations from starting. These critical issues
include: definitions, existing stocks and verification.
Definitions
How fissile material is defined is important as it has direct implications
on the scope of the treaty. But it is not only fissile material
that has to be defined - production, civilian use, and military
use need clarification.
Official definitions from the International
Panel on Fissile Material:
Fissile material: Material that can sustain an explosive
fission chain reaction - notably highly enriched uranium or plutonium
of almost any isotopic composition.
Fissionable material: A heavy isotope with an atomic nucleus
that can undergo fission when struck by a neutron. Uranium-238 is
a fissionable isotope, in that it can be fissioned by high-energy
neutrons. Unlike uranium-235, which is fissile as well as fissionable,
[uranium-238] cannot sustain a fission chain reaction.
Some argue that a treaty should only include those materials most
likely to be used in nuclear weapons; others have argued that it
should focus on wider range of weapons-grade materials. "Weapon-grade"
or "weapon-usable" are two different definitions often used by states.
In its draft treaty, the United States defines fissile material
as "(a) Plutonium except plutonium whose isotopic composition
includes 80 percent or greater plutonium-238 (b) Uranium containing
a 20 percent or greater enrichment in the isotopes uranium-233 or
uranium-235, separately or in combination or in (c) any material
that contains the material defined in (a) or (b) above."
"Produce fissile material means (a) To separate any fissile material
from fission products in irradiated nuclear material; (b) To enrich
plutonium-239 in plutonium by any isotopic separation process; or
(c) to enrich uranium-233 or uranium-235 in uranium to an enrichment
of 20 percent or greater in those isotopes, separately or in combination,
by any isotopic separation process."
Russia calls it weapon-grade uranium and plutonium for the purposes
of nuclear weapons. Italy used the definition "plutonium
and/or highly enriched uranium enriched over 20 percent U235"
in their working
paper. Japan used the definition from Article 20 of the IAEA
statue - plutonium 239, uranium 233 and uranium enriched in the
isotopes 235 or 233.
Greenpeace drafted a comprehensive treaty in April 2004, and their
definitions were slightly different than those in the US draft treaty.
Greenpeace defined fissile material as "an isotope whose nucleus
readily fissions after absorbing a slow (thermal) neutron, emitting
2 or 3 neutrons, and includes uranium-235, plutonium-239 and uranium-233".
Their draft treaty also had specific definitions for weapon-usable,
weapons-usable plutonium, weapons usable uranium, production, separation,
processing, enrichment plant, laser isotope separation, controlled
storage, and fuel elements.
Existing Stocks
Differences on the question about existing stocks were one of the
main reasons that negotiations were blocked in 1995. There are still
great differences between positions on this matter. The United States
and the Russian Federation have the largest stockpiles, and most
other states are waiting for these two to take the lead. The nuclear
weapons states have either stated or indicated that existing stocks
will not be an issue of the treaty. The United States made this
clear in their draft treaty "the term produce fissile material does
not include activities involving fissile material produced prior
to entry into force of the Treaty." Russia also stated "the scope
of the treaty should not cover existing stocks."
China has said, "Future FMCT negotiations should not involve the
issue of stockpiles" and the general position of France is to ban
just the production of fissile material for use as nuclear weapons.
The point of the treaty is, according to those states, to quantitatively
freeze the maximum level of nuclear material around the world.
On the other side, Pakistan is strongly urging this treaty to include
existing stocks. Its delegation argues that it is necessary to include
past production of fissile materials, otherwise the inequalities
of power in the world will simply be further enhanced.
There is enough existing fissile material in the world to create
new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. Many other western countries
and some developed countries share this view. Some of these states
choose not to call it Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty since this
would imply only a halt in production, a cut off. Instead they use
FMT, a Fissile Material Treaty. Countries that use this term include
Pakistan, South Africa, and Brazil.
A FMCT without existing stocks is seen by some as useless and weak.
The question is whether to go along with a streamlined cut-off that
at least is a cut-off or to have no treaty at all. But even if the
scope of stocks in a FMCT would be limited to future production,
there will still be issues with ensuring that material produced
in the future is not falsely declared as earlier production. Therefore
the issue of safeguarding all civilian and military materials produced
after entry into force would be needed to be put under safeguards.
This brings us in to another critical issue of a FMCT, verification.
Verification
The non-nuclear weapon states that are parties of the NPT have
already agreed to accept comprehensive safeguards by the IAEA. The
nuclear weapon states and those non-parties of the NPT are not legally
obligated to accept these kinds of safeguards.
There is considerable sentiment to use a cut-off verification regime
as a means to rectify this situation and impose a more equal safeguards
standard on the nuclear weapon states. These states argue that comprehensive
safeguarding would foster greater transparency among the five nuclear
weapon states, lessen mutual suspicions among them, and enhance
wider confidence in their compliance. This also reflects a strong
underlying political interest in eliminating the current disparity
in safeguards between the nuclear 'haves' and 'have nots'.
The United States has stated that even with extensive verification
mechanisms there would still not be high confidence in the ability
to monitor compliance with an FMCT. They also said that not only
would negotiating verification provisions prolong a difficult enough
task; it would actually be dangerous by providing a false sense
of security.
Pakistan is of the opinion that a verifiable FMCT will be able to
control the spread of nuclear materials, enhance the proportion
of weapon usable material under international safeguards, and strengthen
nuclear export control and reduce the discrimination in the present
NPT regime.
Many states also argue that since one of the most common objectives
of an FMCT is to prevent terrorists from having access to fissile
material, a strong verification mechanism that includes present
and past production will plug such leakage.
India has mentioned that a treaty should incorporate a verification
mechanism in order to provide the assurance that all states are
complying with their obligations. China was more vague when it stated,
"its necessary to have the verification issue carefully explored
and prudently handled. Opinions of all parties concerned, including
the specific considerations of those who advocate a FMCT without
verification must be taken on board."
How to move
forward
Since the P6 (the six presidents of the CD sessions) in 2006 decided
to focus on each of the four core issues (nuclear disarmament, FMCT,
PAROS, and negative security assurances) one at a time, an FMCT
was discussed furing the first two weeks of the second session.
The discussions
about the FMCT were active and resulted in the CD meeting more than
the usual once a week, submission of several
working papers, and a draft
treaty from the US. The Conference also decided to invite experts
from the IAEA to talk to the conference later in the third session,
and indicated that this issue will be discussed again. Many states
clarified their positions on this issue, and you can find this in
our positions
matrix.
The FMCT has been called "ripe for negotiations" by many states,
but no one has opposed negotiations openly. An FMCT is sometime
seemed as the most likely next step of the CD. The Conference on
Disarmament is the negotiation forum for this kind of treaty, but
since they have not come to a consensus there could be a possibility
to create an Ad Hoc committee through the First Committee in the
General Assembly. The Weapons
of Mass Destruction Commission recommended that the Conference
of Disarmament abolish the consensus on procedure in order to be
able to start working.
There is nothing stopping members of the CD coming together an negotiating
in informal groups. The reason why they don't do this is that it
is essential for disarmament treaties to include key states. States
that have huge interests in an issue wont sign a treaty unless they've
been involved in negotiations. We have seen that in the 1997 Mine
Ban Treaty, where the United States wasn't involved in the negotiations
and haven't signed the treaty. However, the Mine Bine Treaty is
one of the most widely respected treaties in the world, and eleven
years after its entry into force, is thriving. States that are not
parties to the treaty respect many of its tenants. This shows the
non-conventional route is not impossible.
Creating an ad hoc committee through the General Assembly is possible
and has benefits. The CD is limited to only 65 member states and
since the General Assembly is open for all states, its possible
to use this to build momentum and generate political will to put
more pressure on other states. The General Assembly can also vote
on their decision and does not need to struggle to achieve consensus.
Six Nation Initiative
In the first week of the 2005 UN
General Assembly First Committee meetings, Brazil, Canada, Kenya,
Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden introduced a non-paper,
with an explanatory
note outlining elements of a draft resolution that would establish
four open-ended ad hoc committees on the four priority issues of
the Five Ambassadors (A5) proposal for a programme of work in the
CD. These committees would meet in Geneva with resources from within
the regular CD budget, and be open to the 65 CD member states as
well as any interested UN member state. The initiative was squased
by the United States, which circulated a memo
to member states' capitals calling the proposal a "divisive proposal"
that would "likely spell the end of the CD."
Although it was not introduced, the initiative did have several
positive impacts. First, it put the CD on notice that if it cannot
agree on a programme of work, the First Committee is willing to
step in and initiate discussions following the broadly supported
programme of work developed by the Five Ambassadors for the CD.
Second, it reignited discussions on the relationship between and
among different pieces of international disarmament machinery. Third,
it got member states and civil society thinking creatively about
how to work together to address the current impasse in the disarmament
and non-proliferation regime.
Canadian initiative
In 2007, the Canadian delegation to the General Assembly attempted
to garner support for “a strictly procedural draft decision
that would have added the issue of the prohibition of the production
of fissile material to next year’s First Committee agenda."
However, it was unable to reach consensus in prelimintary consultations
and withdrew the draft decision. In 2006, for the same reason, Canada
had to withdraw its minimalist draft resolution that simply called
on the CD “to commence immediately negotiations on a treaty
banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons,”
without prejudice to any issue any delegation might want to raise
in the course of negotiations. The failure to adopt the decision
in the General Assembly has no direct bearing on the struggle to
adopt a programme of work in the CD, but further signifies lack
of consensus on the issue.
Model Nuclear Inventory
In 2005, and
again in 2007,
Reaching Critical Will published the Model Nuclear Inventory:
Accountability is Democracy, Transparency is Security, a comprehensive
database of all nuclear materials, both military and civilian, in
order to produce a model for governments to use to enhance transparency
on issues of fissile material stocks, production, and policies.
Statements, resolutions,
and other governmental materials
General Assembly:
General
Assembly resolution 48/75L of 16 December 1993: "Prohibition
of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices"
General Assembly First Committee: Statements referencing
fissile materials
2007 Government Statements
2005 Government Statements
2004 Government Statements
- United
States, Norway,
Australia,
Turkey,
Sweden
(on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition), China,
Republic
of Korea, Pakistan,
Ghana,
Nepal,
Nigeria,
Canada
Conference on Disarmament
2007
Statements
on an FMCT in the 2007 session
Working
Paper: An FMCT Scope-Verification Agreement. Submitted by Canada.
2006:
White
Paper: White Paper on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Submitted
by the United States
Draft
Treaty: Draft Mandate for negotiating a Fissile Materials Cut-off
Treaty and Draft Text of a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. Submitted
by the United States
Working
Paper: Suggestions for progressing the Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty. Submitted by Australia
Working Paper:
FMCT: A Contribution to Contructive Discussions (CD/1774) Submitted
by Japan
Working
Paper: FMCT's Entry Into Force: Possible Options (CD/1773) Submitted
by Italy
Working
Paper: Banning the Production of Fissile Material to Prevent
Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism (CD/1772) Submitted by Italy
Working
Paper: A Pragmatic Approach to the Verification of a FMCT (CD/1771)
Submitted by Switzerland
Working
Paper: Elements of an Approach to Dealing With Stocks of Fissile
Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices.
(CD/1770) Submitted by Canada
August 1998: Geneva CD decides to establish the Ad Hoc committee
in CD/1547
Working
paper and draft treaty submitted by Japan
Working
paper submitted by South Africa (CD/1671)
Statements
on an FMCT in the 2006 CD session
Statements
on an FMCT in the 2005 CD session
Statements
on an FMCT in the 2004 CD session
Statements
on an FMCT in the 2003 CD session
March
1995: The Shannon Report and Mandate (CD/1299)
A report from Ambassador Gerald Shannon on finding the most efficient
means to"negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally
and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."
The mandate establishes the Ad Hoc Committee and its terms, and
was agreed upon through consensus by the Member States.
January 1995: Canada's Working Paper with Regard to an Ad Hoc Committee
on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (CD/1485)
Governmental Statements in other fora:
NPT
2007 Preparatory Committee Official statements, NGO statements,
working papers, Chairmen's summaries, NGO Analysis and News
NPT
2005 Review Conference Official statements, NGO statements,
working papers, Chairmen's summaries, NGO Analysis and News
NPT
2000 Review Conference working paper submitted by Belgium, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and Norway, complementary to the European
Union Common Position, for consideration in Main Committee I and
Subsidiary Body 1.
G-21
Statement, August 1998
Statement made by the Group of 21 calling for an ad hoc committee
and emphasizing the need for disarmament to be included in the FMCT,
not only non-proliferation.
Statement
from Munir Akram, Ambassador of Pakistan, August
1998
Pakistan's stand on the FMCT, existing stocks, the establishment
of an ad hoc committee, and the importance of nuclear disarmament.
NGO Resources on the
FMCT
RCW's Guide to the
CD (PDF) Updated January 2008. See p. 6 for FMCT information.
FMCT reports in the First
Committee Monitor:
2007:
Week
1, by Michael Spies, LCNP
Week
2, by Michael Spies, LCNP
Final
Edition, by Michael Spies, LCNP
2006:
Week
2, by Michael Spies, LCNP
Week
3, by Michael Spies, LCNP
Week
4, by Michael Spies, LCNP
Final
Edition, by Michael Spies, LCNP
2005:
Week
1, by John Burroughs and Michael Spies, LCNP
Final
Edition, by John Burroughs and Michael Spies, LCNP
The
Acronym Institute
August 1998: Breakthrough
on FMT, by Rebecca Johnson
First
Committee 2001: Resolution on Fissile Materials and Comment in
General Debate: Negotiating a Treaty Banning the Production of
Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive
Devices A summary of a resolution passed to emphasize the
need for a fissile materials treaty, highlighting State opinions
and providing excerpts of relevant statements
Arms
Control Association: fissile material news and information
Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (CEIP): info on fissile materials,
documents, and articles
Federation
of American Scientists: extensive chronology, documents and
news
Greenpeace
International
"Draft
Treaty: Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear
Weapons and other Nuclear Explosive Devices," April 2004
Greenpeace
Submission to the IAEA Group of Experts
Institute
for Science and International Security (ISIS): scorecard for
control of fissile material, articles
International
Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP):
bulletins and publications
International
Panel of Fissile Materials (IPFM): an independent group of arms-control
and nonproliferation experts from both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear
weapon states founded in January 2006 to analyze the technical basis
for practical and achievable policy initiatives to secure, consolidate,
and reduce stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.
Oxford
Research Group (ORG): The research group's FMCT Project, publications,
and resource page
Articles
and Publications (by date)
Global
Fissile Material Report, 2007. International Panel of Fissile
Materials, October 2007.
Global
Fissile Material Report, 2006. International Panel of Fissile
Materials, September 2006.
DuPreez, Jean. "The
Future of a Treaty Banning Fissile Material for Weapons Purposes:
Is it Still Relevant?" Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission,
Paper No.9
Fetter, Steve and Frank von Hippel. "Does
the United States Need a New Plutonium-Pit Facility?" Arms
Control Today, Vol. 34, No.4, May 2004.
Kimball, Daryl G. "Act
Now on Fissile Material Treaty." Arms Control Today,
Vol. 34. No. 3. April 2004.
Rydell, Randy. "Fissile
Nuclear Materials and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,"
paper presented at the Conference on Non-Proliferation, Center for
Policy Analysis and Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece.
Maerli,
Morten Bremer."A Pragmatic Approach for Negotiating a Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty." International Negotiation,
Vol. 6, Issue 1, pp. 105-132.
"Fissile Materials: Scope, Stocks and Verification."
Disarmament Forum, No. (1999). A publication of UNIDIR.
Muralidharan, Sukumar, "Breakthrough
or deja vu?" Frontline, Vol.15, No. 18, August
29-September 11, 1998.
"The
Plutonium Industry and the Consequences for a Comprehensive Fissile
Materials Cutoff." Paul Leventhal, President, Nuclear Control
Institute.
The Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists has several articles, including
"Little Orphan Fissban" by Rebecca Johnson of the Acronym
Institute.
Berkhout, Frans, Oleg Bukharin, Harold Feiveson
and Marvin Miller. "A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile Material."
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Winter, 1994-1995),
pp. 167-202.
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
This site was created by Kache Productions ©2008
| 
