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Fissile Materials
Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
Background
to the FMCT
Since the signing of the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a significant issue for
the disarmament and arms control community has been the continued
production of fissile materials - the fuel for nuclear weapons.
Many states have long been calling for a ban on the production
of fissile materials, and the issue has been on the proposed
agenda of the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) for years.
In December 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus
a resolution recommending the negotiation of a non-discriminatory,
multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable
treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which became known
as a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
In 2008, for the ninth year in a row, the CD was unable to
agree on a programme of work and was thus unable to establish
a committee to begin negotiations on an FMCT. From 2006-2008,
the CD held informal discussions on the potential treaty,
including on its purpose; definitions and scope; the production
of fissile materials for non-explosive purposes and the role
of the International Atomic Energy Agency; transparency and
stockpiles of fissile materials; compliance and verification;
and other provisions including settlments of disputes, entry
into force, ratifications, depositaries, duration, and withdrawal.
Early on, the issue of existing stocks blocked consensus
on the negotiation of an FMCT. Some states, such as those
belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, believe that a cut-off
level should include fissile materials already produced and
stockpiled, requiring the nuclear weapon states to irreversibly
downblend existing stocks of weapons-grade fissile materials
so that they can never be used for nuclear weapons again.
Other states, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and
Japan, favour a future-production cut-off. Some states also
think an FMCT should include management of fissile material,
not only a ban on production.
Another contentious element to an FMCT is its scope. While
a treaty would ban the production of most fissionable materials,
it would not include tritium, an element used to amplify the
explosive power of a nuclear weapon. Tritium is a radioactive
isotope of hydrogen that has a half-life of 12 years. Were
it to be included in an FMCT, the decaying tritium in existing
stocks could not be replaced, in effect limiting the weapon's
destructive power. Other materials, such as depleted uranium,
neptunium, natural uranium, plutonium 240 and 242, americium,
curium and californium, though not fissile, are used in weapons
programs.
On 25 January 1994, the CD appointed a Special Coordinator,
Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, to seek the views of
member states on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate
the type of FMCT requested by the UN General Assembly. In
March 1995, the resulting “Shannon
Mandate” proposed that an ad hoc committee, charged
to pursue the negotiations, would settle the issue of existing
stocks and other issues. The committee did not get off the
ground, but many states refer to the Shannon Mandate as the
basis for future negotiations.
All of states parties to the NPT endorsed the immediate commencement
and early conclusion of FMCT negotiations at the 1995 and
2000 NPT Review Conferences, and the negotiation of an FMCT
was agreed as one of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament
at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
In 2003, Japan, a leader in the campaign for an FMCT, held
informal discussions both at home as well as in Geneva, and
produced a draft
text of a potential Treaty.
For years, China and Russia insisted that starting work on
the prevention
of an arms race in outer space be linked to starting work
on an FMCT in the CD. In August 2003, China and Russia broke
from this position, and agreed to go forth with FMCT negotiations
based on the Shannon Mandate.
The United States did not announce its position on an FMCT
until July 2004, when Ambassador Sanders declared
that while the US supported negotiations on an FMCT, they
did not believe that such a treaty would be verifiable. This
is contrary to the UN Disarmament Commission's 16
principles of verification published in 1988, as well
as a US National Academy of study in 2005, which indicated
that a verifiable FMCT would be expensive, but achievable.
This change in US policy appears more politically driven than
scientifically sound. The US also tabled a draft
treaty on 18 May 2006, which many delegations argue is
far removed from the original concept of a non-discriminatory,
verifiable treaty.
Many delegations have argued that specific references to
matters such as verification and existing stocks in the negotiation
mandate is crucial, worried that if negotiations begin “without
any preconditions,” as described in the CD's programme
of work proposed in 2007, these issues are sure to be rejected
during negotiations by key players such as the United States.
Pakistan in particular has argued this, pointing out that
if an FMCT does not include existing stocks or verification,
it will freeze or accentuate asymmetries between the nuclear
weapons possessors—especially between Pakistan and India—and
thus undermine regional “strategic balance” and
international security. The US-India
deal, which would allow India to import nuclear fuel from
the US for its energy reactors, freeing up its own indigenously-produced
materials for military purposes, further exacerbates Pakistan’s
concerns about an FMCT.
In 2007, the long-awaited start of negotiations on an FMCT
never seemed closer. At the end of its 2007 session, the CD
was near agreement on a package deal, L.1, which would have
enabled it to begin negotiations on an FMCT in 2008. Many
delegations expressed support for the package deal, including
those of Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia.
The Netherlands and the European Union called for commencement
of negotiations without preconditions. Although the United
States prefers to proceed with the FMCT without discussion
of any other of the CD’s priority issues, the US delegation
explained a conscious decision had been made this year to
not block consensus on the P6 proposal.
Critical
issues of FMCT
The concept of a cut-off of the production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons has been discussed for a long time, and
the agreement on a mandate (known as the Shannon Mandate)
to begin negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD)
broke down in 1995. Since then, there has been very little
formal progress.
There are two draft treaty texts which have been presented
as documents of the Conference on Disarmament - one, a draft
treaty presented by the United States on 18 May 2006 and
the other is a model
treaty text presented by Greenpeace International . These
texts vary widely as they deal with the critical issues outlined
below.
An FMCT will require many technical issues to be resolved,
from actually defining fissile material to ensuring that the
treaty is effective by developing specific procedures for
verification. There are a number of different approaches to
these issues ranging from a simple approach to a more comprehensive
one.
Key players for FMCT
Whatever the scope of the eventual FMCT, most of the non-nuclear
weapons states that are parties to comprehensive safeguard
agreements associated with the NPT will already satisfy the
requirements of an eventual FMCT. These states have undertaken
not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, and to accept International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their nuclear material to
verify this.
The states that will be most affected by such a treaty are
the nuclear weapons states: the United States, Russian Federation,
China, France, and the United Kingdom, and the nuclear weapons
possessing states that are not parties to the NPT: India,
Pakistan, and Israel. Other states that also will be affected
by such a treaty are the states that produce the greatest
amount of fissile material for non-military purposes, like
Canada, Australia, and Japan.
The 35 member states of the Zangger
Committee (also known as the "NPT Exporters Committee")
also have a special interest in how the FMCT will look like,
since a comprehensive FMCT has the possibility of universalizing
export control. These states have different positions on the
critical issues that have prevented negotiations from starting.
These critical issues include: definitions, existing stocks
and verification.
Definitions
How fissile material is defined is important as it has direct
implications on the scope of the treaty. But it is not only
fissile material that has to be defined - production, civilian
use, and military use need clarification.
Official definitions from the International
Panel on Fissile Material:
Fissile material: Material that can sustain an explosive
fission chain reaction - notably highly enriched uranium or
plutonium of almost any isotopic composition.
Fissionable material: A heavy isotope with an atomic
nucleus that can undergo fission when struck by a neutron.
Uranium-238 is a fissionable isotope, in that it can be fissioned
by high-energy neutrons. Unlike uranium-235, which is fissile
as well as fissionable, [uranium-238] cannot sustain a fission
chain reaction.
Some argue that a treaty should only include those materials
most likely to be used in nuclear weapons; others have argued
that it should focus on wider range of weapons-grade materials.
"Weapon-grade" or "weapon-usable" are two different definitions
often used by states.
In its draft treaty, the United States defines fissile material
as "(a) Plutonium except plutonium whose isotopic composition
includes 80 percent or greater plutonium-238 (b) Uranium containing
a 20 percent or greater enrichment in the isotopes uranium-233
or uranium-235, separately or in combination or in (c) any
material that contains the material defined in (a) or (b)
above."
"Produce fissile material means (a) To separate any fissile
material from fission products in irradiated nuclear material;
(b) To enrich plutonium-239 in plutonium by any isotopic separation
process; or (c) to enrich uranium-233 or uranium-235 in uranium
to an enrichment of 20 percent or greater in those isotopes,
separately or in combination, by any isotopic separation process."
Russia calls it weapon-grade uranium and plutonium for
the purposes of nuclear weapons. Italy used the definition
"plutonium and/or highly enriched uranium enriched over
20 percent U235" in their working
paper. Japan used the definition from Article 20 of the
IAEA statue - plutonium 239, uranium 233 and uranium enriched
in the isotopes 235 or 233.
Greenpeace drafted a comprehensive treaty in April 2004, and
their definitions were slightly different than those in the
US draft treaty. Greenpeace defined fissile material as "an
isotope whose nucleus readily fissions after absorbing a slow
(thermal) neutron, emitting 2 or 3 neutrons, and includes
uranium-235, plutonium-239 and uranium-233". Their draft
treaty also had specific definitions for weapon-usable, weapons-usable
plutonium, weapons usable uranium, production, separation,
processing, enrichment plant, laser isotope separation, controlled
storage, and fuel elements.
Existing Stocks
Differences on the question about existing stocks were one
of the main reasons that negotiations were blocked in 1995.
There are still great differences between positions on this
matter. The United States and the Russian Federation have
the largest stockpiles, and most other states are waiting
for these two to take the lead. The nuclear weapons states
have either stated or indicated that existing stocks will
not be an issue of the treaty. The United States made this
clear in their draft treaty "the term produce fissile material
does not include activities involving fissile material produced
prior to entry into force of the Treaty." Russia also stated
"the scope of the treaty should not cover existing stocks."
China has said, "Future FMCT negotiations should not involve
the issue of stockpiles" and the general position of France
is to ban just the production of fissile material for use
as nuclear weapons. The point of the treaty is, according
to those states, to quantitatively freeze the maximum level
of nuclear material around the world.
On the other side, Pakistan is strongly urging this treaty
to include existing stocks. Its delegation argues that it
is necessary to include past production of fissile materials,
otherwise the inequalities of power in the world will simply
be further enhanced.
There is enough existing fissile material in the world to
create new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. Many other
western countries and some developed countries share this
view. Some of these states choose not to call it Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty since this would imply only a halt in production,
a cut off. Instead they use FMT, a Fissile Material Treaty.
Countries that use this term include Pakistan, South Africa,
and Brazil.
A FMCT without existing stocks is seen by some as useless
and weak. The question is whether to go along with a streamlined
cut-off that at least is a cut-off or to have no treaty at
all. But even if the scope of stocks in a FMCT would be limited
to future production, there will still be issues with ensuring
that material produced in the future is not falsely declared
as earlier production. Therefore the issue of safeguarding
all civilian and military materials produced after entry into
force would be needed to be put under safeguards. This brings
us in to another critical issue of a FMCT, verification.
Verification
The non-nuclear weapon states that are parties of the NPT
have already agreed to accept comprehensive safeguards by
the IAEA. The nuclear weapon states and those non-parties
of the NPT are not legally obligated to accept these kinds
of safeguards.
There is considerable sentiment to use a cut-off verification
regime as a means to rectify this situation and impose a more
equal safeguards standard on the nuclear weapon states. These
states argue that comprehensive safeguarding would foster
greater transparency among the five nuclear weapon states,
lessen mutual suspicions among them, and enhance wider confidence
in their compliance. This also reflects a strong underlying
political interest in eliminating the current disparity in
safeguards between the nuclear 'haves' and 'have nots'.
The United States has stated that even with extensive verification
mechanisms there would still not be high confidence in the
ability to monitor compliance with an FMCT. They also said
that not only would negotiating verification provisions prolong
a difficult enough task; it would actually be dangerous by
providing a false sense of security.
Pakistan is of the opinion that a verifiable FMCT will be
able to control the spread of nuclear materials, enhance the
proportion of weapon usable material under international safeguards,
and strengthen nuclear export control and reduce the discrimination
in the present NPT regime.
Many states also argue that since one of the most common objectives
of an FMCT is to prevent terrorists from having access to
fissile material, a strong verification mechanism that includes
present and past production will plug such leakage.
India has mentioned that a treaty should incorporate a verification
mechanism in order to provide the assurance that all states
are complying with their obligations. China was more vague
when it stated, "its necessary to have the verification issue
carefully explored and prudently handled. Opinions of all
parties concerned, including the specific considerations of
those who advocate a FMCT without verification must be taken
on board."
How
to move forward
Since the P6 (the six presidents of the CD sessions) in 2006
decided to focus on each of the four core issues (nuclear
disarmament, FMCT, PAROS, and negative security assurances)
one at a time, an FMCT was discussed furing the first two
weeks of the second session. The discussions
about the FMCT were active and resulted in the CD meeting
more than the usual once a week, submission of several
working papers, and a draft
treaty from the US. The Conference also decided to invite
experts from the IAEA to talk to the conference later in the
third session, and indicated that this issue will be discussed
again. Many states clarified their positions on this issue,
and you can find this in our positions
matrix.
The FMCT has been called "ripe for negotiations" by many states,
but no one has opposed negotiations openly. An FMCT is sometime
seemed as the most likely next step of the CD. The Conference
on Disarmament is the negotiation forum for this kind of treaty,
but since they have not come to a consensus there could be
a possibility to create an Ad Hoc committee through the First
Committee in the General Assembly. The
Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission recommended that
the Conference of Disarmament abolish the consensus on procedure
in order to be able to start working.
There is nothing stopping members of the CD coming together
an negotiating in informal groups. The reason why they don't
do this is that it is essential for disarmament treaties to
include key states. States that have huge interests in an
issue wont sign a treaty unless they've been involved in negotiations.
We have seen that in the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, where the United
States wasn't involved in the negotiations and haven't signed
the treaty. However, the Mine Bine Treaty is one of the most
widely respected treaties in the world, and eleven years after
its entry into force, is thriving. States that are not parties
to the treaty respect many of its tenants. This shows the
non-conventional route is not impossible.
Creating an ad hoc committee through the General Assembly
is possible and has benefits. The CD is limited to only 65
member states and since the General Assembly is open for all
states, its possible to use this to build momentum and generate
political will to put more pressure on other states. The General
Assembly can also vote on their decision and does not need
to struggle to achieve consensus.
Six Nation Initiative
In the first week of the 2005 UN
General Assembly First Committee meetings, Brazil, Canada,
Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden introduced a non-paper,
with an explanatory
note outlining elements of a draft resolution that would
establish four open-ended ad hoc committees on the four priority
issues of the Five Ambassadors (A5) proposal for a programme
of work in the CD. These committees would meet in Geneva with
resources from within the regular CD budget, and be open to
the 65 CD member states as well as any interested UN member
state. The initiative was squased by the United States, which
circulated a memo
to member states' capitals calling the proposal a "divisive
proposal" that would "likely spell the end of the CD."
Although it was not introduced, the initiative did have several
positive impacts. First, it put the CD on notice that if it
cannot agree on a programme of work, the First Committee is
willing to step in and initiate discussions following the
broadly supported programme of work developed by the Five
Ambassadors for the CD. Second, it reignited discussions on
the relationship between and among different pieces of international
disarmament machinery. Third, it got member states and civil
society thinking creatively about how to work together to
address the current impasse in the disarmament and non-proliferation
regime.
Canadian
initiative
In 2007, the Canadian delegation to the General Assembly
attempted to garner support for “a strictly procedural
draft decision that would have added the issue of the prohibition
of the production of fissile material to next year’s
First Committee agenda." However, it was unable to reach
consensus in prelimintary consultations and withdrew the draft
decision. In 2006, for the same reason, Canada had to withdraw
its minimalist draft resolution that simply called on the
CD “to commence immediately negotiations on a treaty
banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons,”
without prejudice to any issue any delegation might want to
raise in the course of negotiations. The failure to adopt
the decision in the General Assembly has no direct bearing
on the struggle to adopt a programme of work in the CD, but
further signifies lack of consensus on the issue.
Model Nuclear
Inventory
In 2005,
and again in 2007,
Reaching Critical Will published the Model Nuclear Inventory:
Accountability is Democracy, Transparency is Security,
a comprehensive database of all nuclear materials, both military
and civilian, in order to produce a model for governments
to use to enhance transparency on issues of fissile material
stocks, production, and policies.
Statements,
resolutions, and other governmental materials
General Assembly:
General
Assembly resolution 48/75L of 16 December 1993: "Prohibition
of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices"
General Assembly First Committee: Statements
referencing fissile materials
2007 Government Statements
2005 Government Statements
2004 Government Statements
- United
States, Norway,
Australia,
Turkey,
Sweden
(on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition), China,
Republic
of Korea, Pakistan,
Ghana,
Nepal,
Nigeria,
Canada
Conference on Disarmament
2007
Statements
on an FMCT in the 2007 session
Working
Paper: An FMCT Scope-Verification Agreement. Submitted
by Canada.
2006:
White
Paper: White Paper on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
Submitted by the United States
Draft
Treaty: Draft Mandate for negotiating a Fissile Materials
Cut-off Treaty and Draft Text of a Fissile Materials Cut-off
Treaty. Submitted by the United States
Working
Paper: Suggestions for progressing the Fissile Material
Cut-Off Treaty. Submitted by Australia
Working
Paper: FMCT: A Contribution to Contructive Discussions
(CD/1774) Submitted by Japan
Working
Paper: FMCT's Entry Into Force: Possible Options (CD/1773)
Submitted by Italy
Working
Paper: Banning the Production of Fissile Material to Prevent
Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism (CD/1772) Submitted by Italy
Working
Paper: A Pragmatic Approach to the Verification of a FMCT
(CD/1771) Submitted by Switzerland
Working
Paper: Elements of an Approach to Dealing With Stocks
of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear
Explosive Devices. (CD/1770) Submitted by Canada
August 1998: Geneva CD decides to establish the Ad Hoc committee
in CD/1547
Working
paper and draft treaty submitted by Japan
Working
paper submitted by South Africa (CD/1671)
Statements
on an FMCT in the 2006 CD session
Statements
on an FMCT in the 2005 CD session
Statements
on an FMCT in the 2004 CD session
Statements
on an FMCT in the 2003 CD session
March
1995: The Shannon Report and Mandate (CD/1299)
A report from Ambassador Gerald Shannon on finding the most
efficient means to"negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral
and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices." The mandate establishes
the Ad Hoc Committee and its terms, and was agreed upon through
consensus by the Member States.
January 1995: Canada's Working Paper with Regard to an Ad
Hoc Committee on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (CD/1485)
Governmental Statements in other fora:
NPT
2007 Preparatory Committee Official statements, NGO statements,
working papers, Chairmen's summaries, NGO Analysis and News
NPT
2005 Review Conference Official statements, NGO statements,
working papers, Chairmen's summaries, NGO Analysis and News
NPT
2000 Review Conference working paper submitted by Belgium,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway, complementary
to the European Union Common Position, for consideration in
Main Committee I and Subsidiary Body 1.
G-21
Statement, August 1998
Statement made by the Group of 21 calling for an ad hoc committee
and emphasizing the need for disarmament to be included in
the FMCT, not only non-proliferation.
Statement
from Munir Akram, Ambassador of Pakistan, August
1998
Pakistan's stand on the FMCT, existing stocks, the establishment
of an ad hoc committee, and the importance of nuclear disarmament.
NGO Resources on
the FMCT
RCW's Guide
to the CD (PDF) Updated January 2008. See p. 6
for FMCT information.
FMCT reports in the First
Committee Monitor:
2007:
Week
1, by Michael Spies, LCNP
Week
2, by Michael Spies, LCNP
Final
Edition, by Michael Spies, LCNP
2006:
Week
2, by Michael Spies, LCNP
Week
3, by Michael Spies, LCNP
Week
4, by Michael Spies, LCNP
Final
Edition, by Michael Spies, LCNP
2005:
Week
1, by John Burroughs and Michael Spies, LCNP
Final
Edition, by John Burroughs and Michael Spies, LCNP
The
Acronym Institute
August 1998: Breakthrough
on FMT, by Rebecca Johnson
First
Committee 2001: Resolution on Fissile Materials and Comment
in General Debate: Negotiating a Treaty Banning the Production
of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear
Explosive Devices A summary of a resolution passed to
emphasize the need for a fissile materials treaty, highlighting
State opinions and providing excerpts of relevant statements
Arms
Control Association: fissile material news and information
Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (CEIP): info on fissile
materials, documents, and articles
Federation
of American Scientists: extensive chronology, documents
and news
Greenpeace
International
"Draft
Treaty: Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for
Nuclear Weapons and other Nuclear Explosive Devices,"
April 2004
Greenpeace
Submission to the IAEA Group of Experts
Institute
for Science and International Security (ISIS): scorecard
for control of fissile material, articles
International
Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation
(INESAP): bulletins and publications
International
Panel of Fissile Materials (IPFM): an independent group
of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from both nuclear
weapon and non-nuclear weapon states founded in January 2006
to analyze the technical basis for practical and achievable
policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles
of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.
Oxford
Research Group (ORG): The research group's FMCT Project,
publications, and resource page
Articles
and Publications (by date)
Global
Fissile Material Report, 2007. International Panel
of Fissile Materials, October 2007.
Global
Fissile Material Report, 2006. International Panel
of Fissile Materials, September 2006.
DuPreez, Jean. "The
Future of a Treaty Banning Fissile Material for Weapons Purposes:
Is it Still Relevant?" Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission, Paper No.9
Fetter, Steve and Frank von Hippel. "Does
the United States Need a New Plutonium-Pit Facility?"
Arms Control Today, Vol. 34, No.4, May 2004.
Kimball, Daryl G. "Act
Now on Fissile Material Treaty." Arms Control
Today, Vol. 34. No. 3. April 2004.
Rydell, Randy. "Fissile
Nuclear Materials and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation," paper presented at the Conference
on Non-Proliferation, Center for Policy Analysis and Planning,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece.
Maerli,
Morten Bremer."A Pragmatic Approach for Negotiating a
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty." International Negotiation,
Vol. 6, Issue 1, pp. 105-132.
"Fissile Materials: Scope, Stocks and
Verification." Disarmament Forum, No. (1999).
A publication of UNIDIR.
Muralidharan, Sukumar, "Breakthrough
or deja vu?" Frontline, Vol.15, No. 18,
August 29-September 11, 1998.
"The
Plutonium Industry and the Consequences for a Comprehensive
Fissile Materials Cutoff." Paul Leventhal, President,
Nuclear Control Institute.
The Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists has several articles, including
"Little Orphan Fissban" by Rebecca Johnson of the
Acronym Institute.
Berkhout, Frans, Oleg Bukharin, Harold Feiveson
and Marvin Miller. "A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile
Material." International Security, Vol. 19, No.
3. (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 167-202.
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