Greenpeace Letter to the IAEA on possible Iran Security Council Referral

24 January 2006

Dear Ambassador

Re: Reviewing the known facts on Iran’s nuclear programme

Greenpeace unequivocally opposes nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Greenpeace campaigns against both, regardless of which country possesses them. Nuclear power is never peaceful and always suspect; every nuclear reactor is a potential bomb factory. We reject the claims of Iran and any other country that claims nuclear energy is a so-called “inalienable right.” It is inappropriate to dignify subsidising an industry, exposing citizens to routine releases of radiation and dumping radioactive waste on future generations by calling this dangerous, dirty expensive energy source a right. Greenpeace again calls on Iran and all countries that have nuclear reactors to reject nuclear energy and cease all activities and research on nuclear technology. Real prestige and scientific ingenuity is available to Iran and other countries through the development of long-term sustainable renewable energy sources: nuclear is neither.

While we join many others in strongly rejecting Iran’s claim to need or have a “right” to nuclear energy, Greenepeace is extremely concerned about the increase in tension and inflammatory press items and statements being made about Iran’s nuclear programme. In the coming days, we expect to see a marked increase in conveniently timed intelligence leaks, propaganda and hype around the Iran’s nuclear programme, unnecessarily inflaming an already tense situation in which diplomacy and trust building are the only sustainable long term solution.

This ‘hype’ can be read in three ways:

First, it could be seen as an appropriate use of diplomacy and the media to increase pressure on Iran to compromise negotiate and hand over information to IAEA that would verify there is no nuclear weapons programme.

Second, it might be read as an attempt to empower the Security Council in February to impose sanctions, “because we said we would”: an action that is not yet necessary and which will inevitably increase tensions, harden attitudes and proliferate reprisals.

Third, these ‘timely’ new revelations could be read as an attempt to undermine confidence in Iran’s disclosures, fuelling the fire and casting further doubts that Iran’s programme is “truly peaceful”. Such “revelations” also have an indirect negative effect upon the IAEA’s credibility, as these can be taken to show that the Agency was not aware of the information contained in the “revelations”. It is noteworthy that the flurry of “revelations” has increased in the run up to a Board meeting.

The “face saved” today could well result in the burial of thousands of faces tomorrow, and that is why, as the 2 February 2006 special Board Meeting approaches, the 35 Members of the IAEA each carry a grave burden of responsibility to weigh the facts against these brinkmanship tactics.

It would be unwise for the Board to report Iran to the Security Council without the benefit of the Director General’s Report, which will only arrive in time for the 6 March meeting. It would be counter-productive to report Iran to the Security Council if indeed the increased pressure on Iran to negotiate appears to be yielding results. It would be foolish of the Board to throw away efforts to date by abandoning its long-stated goal of negotiations, as it would be to report Iran to the Security Council on the basis of flimsy intelligence, or the sudden appearance of convenient “smoking guns”. Finally, it does not make sense to claim that Iran ending a voluntary and non-legally binding commitment is a sufficient “red line” trigger to report it to the Council.

An increasing number of States, civil society and to some extent, the media, understands the price paid for adventurism and unilateralism. The lesson learned from the mess accomplished in Iraq is that the careful consideration, research and judgment is required before intervention to stop a threat can succeed. It is so much easier for a single State, or a handful of countries, to get judgments wrong – at every stage - than for a broader group of countries who have had to persuade and agree with each other. Far from “doing nothing”, establishing legality and legitimacy have a real and practical impact both in deciding how much cooperation or resistance an intervention will encounter, and in ensuring the maximum international solidarity and steadiness in defending an appropriate action and maintaining the burden over time.

On Iran, the coercion, threats and linkages being exercised may not only have the effect of producing action that will increase tension between Iran and others, but may also cause a dangerous breakdown between powerful actors. If the international community truly wishes to enhance international peace and security, States should not abandon opportunities for negotiation on the basis of an arbitrary timetable, and nor should they throw away diplomatic opportunities to address today’s real problems because of historically rooted hatred and past events that have no foundation in the nuclear issue. The issues of today are being clouded by historically charged attitudes, which do not bring rational thought processes to the table.

The IAEA Board of Governors should continue to exercise caution in steering the Iran crisis to a peaceful conclusion through passing a resolution that would welcome the opportunity to appraise positive and negative developments, and to increase pressure for progress. The resolution should anticipate the 18 February Russia-Iran talks, and the Director General’s next report, and detail the progress that must be seen before and after the 6 March 2005 Board meeting. It could also anticipate a new and different way forward for the negotiations by encouraging countries in the region to commence negotiations on a nuclear free zone, covering all the countries in the region.

In conclusion, Greenpeace shares concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme, yet insists that any action taken be based on facts. The fact is that after all efforts, and three years of investigations by the best in the business, no one has proved that Iran has an historic or current weapons programme. The situation in the last two weeks has escalated on what basis? Benchmarks have been set with no technical, legal or political basis. Iran has not started to enrich uranium to a high level that is weapons usable. Based upon these facts, Security Council reporting is premature and unjustifiable. Progress is being made and can be made. Diplomacy takes time; it is painful, but less painful than shooting ourselves in the foot or the ultimate pain of conflict.

Please find following a facts sheet that details what is known, rather than suspected, on Iran’s nuclear programme.

Sincerely

Felicity Hill
Political Adviser on Nuclear & Disarmament Issues

What is known - rather than suspected - on Iran’s nuclear programme

FACT 1. Most key outstanding issues have been resolved. The IAEA Director General reported in November 2004 that, “...all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities. The Agency is, however, still not in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The process of drawing such a conclusion… is a time consuming process…” This conclusion was reiterated in the report of November 2005. The remaining issues can be resolved quickly with Iran’s pro-active cooperation; Greenpeace again calls on Iran to build trust by once and for all clearing the outstanding questions, which are: 1) the scope and chronology of Iran’s past work on P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, 2) the origins of nuclear contaminants found in Iran, 3) past experiments with plutonium and polonium and 4) the true nature of a variety of meetings between 1987 and the late-1990s as part of Iran’s attempt to purchase blueprints and other material and equipment that would assist them in the construction and operation of a full-scale uranium enrichment plant. There are also questions remaining about Iran’s procurement of so-called ‘dual-use’ equipment i.e. equipment which can be used for both conventional and nuclear purposes.

FACT 2: Other cases have taken longer to resolve. As the Director General has also reported, the broader conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities under the Additional Protocol, under normal circumstances, is a time consuming process. In view of Iran’s past undeclared nuclear activities, and its pattern of concealment, this conclusion can be expected to take longer than in normal circumstances. It might be recalled that the broader conclusion in the case of Japan took more than six years, more than five years in the case of Canada, and such a conclusion has yet to be drawn for EU countries. Additional protocols for two of the three nuclear-weapon States are still not in force, and 26 of the 71 States with significant nuclear activities also do not have Additional Protocol agreements in force.

FACT 3: Iran has been found to conceal facilities in the past of a nuclear nature, including undeclared activities under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. The key facilities were listed in the June 2003 Report of the IAEA to the Board (the Tehran Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL), the Esfahan Fuel Manufacturing (FMP), the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and the Arak Iran Nuclear Research reactor (IR-40)). These facilities are now under full Agency Safeguards, although the Agency cannot say with certainty whether or not there are any other nuclear facilities or activities. Iranian leaders should do themselves a favour and remove all suspicion in this regard by answering all the remaining outstanding questions of the Agency and the international community. Iran currently is abiding by all of its legal obligations under both the NPT and the Agency Safeguards and Additional Protocol, and in fact goes above and beyond that. In sum, Iran was found in non-compliance, but this non-compliance has been rectified through corrective measures and noted in the Director General’s reports and thus is historical and not current.

FACT 4. Iran did have contacts with the Khan network and received assistance and actively involved itself in the nuclear black market, as did many other countries. Significant revelations on these illicit activities were made in the November 2005 IAEA Board Report, that indicated that inspectors were shown (but not given copies of) blueprints that could assist in providing key components for a nuclear weapon, in particular details of how to turn uranium into a metal that can be machined to a high degree of accuracy and that could be used in a nuclear weapon. Iran is not providing the information that has been repeatedly requested regarding meetings, which took place from 1987 through to late-1990’s with the Khan network. The Agency admits, “Iran has been more forthcoming in providing access to additional documentation… and permitting interviews with individuals who had been involved… there still remain issues to be resolved…” Iran can only benefit from resolving these outstanding issues.

FACT 5. Western and other countries also need to come clean about the Khan network and the illegal black market in nuclear technology. What is required is an honest open accounting about what we do and don’t know by everyone and not just Iran. In the resolution passed at the March 2004 Board Meeting, States reiterated their call for “urgent, full and close cooperation” by “third countries” on outstanding questions concerning Iran’s programme. To date the level of cooperation by said third countries has been extremely limited, in providing access to Khan himself and his network. While Iran must come clean, there are other countries hiding information and protecting individuals who must also come clean.

FACT 6. In the last three years, Iran has not breached any of its legal obligations and there is no proof that Iran has broken its legal obligations, according to the IAEA. Since ElBaradei’s visit in 2003, Iran reminds us that it has given unprecedented access to the agency, pointing out that it has given more than 1,500 person days of inspections (on-site) to the IAEA inspectors, as well as access to military sites that it has no legal obligation under the safeguards agreement to allow access to. Iran has not helped the situation by delaying and impeding access to certain non-nuclear facilities, which are admittedly not part of safeguards agreements, but which could help clear residual doubts. However, it is appropriate to recognize that Iran has gone beyond its obligations in allowing this voluntary access.

FACT 7. If States are serious about all potential proliferators, then the Governors of the IAEA Board should govern with impartiality and an apolitical approach. Numerous other countries have more advanced enrichment programmes than Iran, also run by their military infrastructure. In Brazil, the military runs their nuclear programme, they are enriching uranium for civil purposes and still hope to obtain nuclear powered submarines that would most likely require weapons-grade uranium as fuel. Pakistan’s whole nuclear weapons programme relies on uranium enrichment, and the know-how was stolen by Khan from URENCO with little Western outrage. Furthermore, legitimate security concerns in the region do exist about Israel’s nuclear arsenal, and its nuclear programme, which do not only have to be recognized but addressed. This issue has been thus far inadequately acknowledged and dealt with as a matter of relevance for the Board. There has been and will continue to be a political pressure to start the process of achieving a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East. The Saudi Foreign Minister has reiterated this point recently in stating, “I think the West allowing Israel to establish nuclear capability has done the damage we are all suffering from now. There are other countries that are perhaps now pursuing the same role. We hope that Iran will resist temptation because they do not need these weapons. Where are they going to use these weapons – in Israel? If they hit Israel they are going to hit Palestinians and if they miss Israel they are going to hit Saudi Arabia.”

FACT 8. Doubts exist regarding Iran needing nuclear power as a prime energy source given the availability of natural resources. Greenpeace supports a massive uptake of market-ready renewable energy and energy efficiency to start the energy revolution, which is necessary to fight global climate change and help end the nuclear threat.

FACT 9. US and other intelligence agencies are of the opinion that Iran is at least 10 years away from developing a nuclear weapon .

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