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Nuclear Iran?
Recent
Developments
Also see DisarmamentActivist.org
for daily news and commentary.
23 April 2008: Mohamed ElBaradei, director
general of the IAEA, announced
that Iran has agreed to answer intelligence allegations that
it studied how to design nuclear bombs, which it has previously
denied the reports but declined to address them in detail.
ElBaradei said, "(This agreement) is a certain milestone
and hopefully by the end of May we'll be in position to get
the explanation and clarification from Iran as to these alleged
studies." ElBaradei's spokeswomansaid the deal was struck
during meetings in Tehran on Monday and Tuesday (21 and 22
April) between Iranian leaders and Olli Heinonen, the IAEA's
safeguards chief and top investigator.
13 April 2008: Iranian Foreign Ministry
spokesperson Mohammad Ali Husseini said
Iran is ready to resume talks with Europe on its nuclear programme,
adding that Iran considers the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to be the only authority that has the right
to examine Tehran’s nuclear dossier. Husseini also said
that the head of Iran’s nuclear energy organization,
Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, and his his deputy Mohammad Saeedi
will travel to Vienna on 14 April to carry on talks with the
IAEA chief Mohammad ElBaradei.
10 April 2008: Gregory Schulte, US ambassador
to the International Atomic Energy Agency, told
reporters they should take Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's
announcement on 8 April "with a grain of salt".
He called the speech, in which Ahmadinejad said Iran is installing
6000 new centrifuges to enrich uranium, a "political
stunt," arguing, "Ahmadinejad has a record of making
bold political announcements not necessarily supported by
technical facts."
9 April 2008: German Foreign Minister
Frank-Walter Steinmeier expressed
"deep concern" at Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's
announcement that of 8 April that Iran had started work to
install 6000 new centrifuges to enrich uranium. He said in
a statement, "Tehran's move is clearly against the demands
of the UN Security Council. Such a step would make the solution
to the conflict more difficult."
8 April 2008: Speaking at a plenary meeting
of the United
Nations Disarmament Commission's 2008 session on behalf
of the European Union, Ambassador Sanja Štiglic of Slovenia
said,
“Iran's nuclear programme poses a major challenge to
the non-proliferation regime,” asserting that Iran has
hidden “clandestine nuclear activities,” is pursuing
uranium enrichment and heavy water related activities, is
developing a ballistic missile programme, and “has cooperated
with the IAEA only when pressed, and in piecemeal fashion.”
Iran's representative to the Commission issued a right of
reply to this statement, arguing that it did not acknowledge
the information the IAEA has given about the non-divergence
of Iran's nuclear material to weapon programmes or that Iran's
cooperation with the IAEA has been “far beyond its Treaty
obligations.”
Outside of the UN, Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad announced
that Iran is installing 6000 new centrifuges at the Natanz
enrichment plant. Deputy Head of the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran for International Affairs, Mohammad Saeedi, said
the 6000 new centrifuges being installed are first generation
P1 centrifuges. Ahmadinejad also said
that testing of the new advanced centrifuges, which can enrich
uranium five times faster than the current machines, will
be finished in the next three months.
7 April 2008: Speaking at a plenary meeting
of the United
Nations Disarmament Commission's 2008 session, China's
Permament Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador
Hu Xiaodi, said
diplomatic negotiation is the best way to solve the issue
of Iran's nuclear programme, and called for all parties to
“intensify diplomatic efforts in reaching agreement
on possible ways to resume negotiations at an early date,
with a view to seeking a long-term, comprehensive and appropriate
solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.”
1 April 2008: Russia's ambassador to
the UN, Vitaly Churkin, urged
the Iranian government to engage in talk with the P5+1 (US,
UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) about its nuclear
programme. Iran has reportedly refused to enter talks with
the six countries, criticizing the third
sanctions resolution adopted against Iran on 3 March.
Iran says it will deal only with the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad
Ali Hosseini called the Security Council's demand "worthless
and unacceptable" and said it was "based on political
motivations." Churkin reportedly argued that talks with
the six countries are the only way to resolve the standoff,
saying, "We expect negotiations between the six and Iran,
and their statements of a negative nature toward the negotiations
are certainly not helpful and not constructive."
11 March 2008: The Washington Post
reported
that documents from "two countries other than the United
States" provided to the IAEA recently "partly match
information" from a stolen Iranian laptop given to the
IAEA by the United States. The United States recently briefed
the IAEA about "evidence" on Iran's alleged pre-2003
nuclear weapons programme gathered from the so-called "laptop
of death" (see 2 March entry). According
to the Post, "IAEA officials say these documents
identify [Iranian nuclear engineer Mohsen] Fakhrizadeh and
other civilian scientists as central figures in a secret nuclear
research program that operated as recently as 2003."
The documents also
purport to show advanced research into a variety of nuclear-related
technologies, including uranium ore processing, warhead
modification and the precision-firing of high explosives
of the type used to detonate a nuclear device. Other documents
point to attempts by civilian scientists to purchase sensitive
equipment of the kind Iran would eventually use in its uranium
enrichment plants.
The article notes that none of the documents "specifically
include the word 'nuclear,' and IAEA officials say there is
no evidence that any of the plans advanced beyond the paper
stage."
Michael Spies of the Lawyers'
Committee on Nuclear Policy emphasizes that all of this
"in itself does not demonstrate a determined effort to
acquire and deploy nuclear weapons." He points out,
even if we were to accept all this "evidence"
as true, the IAEA Secretariat has clearly stated that Iran
does not appear to have ever undertaken any work using nuclear
material on the basis of the documents or laptop. On its
face, it is troubling if Iran is pursuing secret studies
to build knowledge on nuclear weapons, as this might suggest
it intends to develop them in the future. But the scale
and scope of the "evidence" that has been released
so far still doesn't seem to reflect a major, serious, and
concerted attempt to acquire and deploy nuclear weapons.
A handful of scientists conducting paper studies over a
period of a decade doesn't seem to fit very well with efforts
to acquire nuclear weapons in other states, most of which
did not have IAEA inspectors roving around their territories
trying to piece all aspects of their past nuclear work together.
The IAEA has been careful to caution that this sort of evidence
has more to do with judging Iran's intentions, rather than
determining the state of Iran's compliance with its non-proliferation
obligations. The Weapons
of Mass Destruction Commission noted in its final
report,
As it is very difficult to prove a negative, it is unlikely
that the IAEA would ever be able to conclude with absolute
certainty that Iran - or at least key elements within its
governing system - have not had the intention to use an
enrichment capability for weapon purposes. In any case,
even if such intentions never existed, there could be a
change of mind once Iran's enrichment technology was fully
operational. Accordingly, the question of intention is not
decisive.
Spies says, "Following from this, one can conclude that
the conversation about intentions is a distraction from what
some of the real issues are: the role of the US and Iran in
the greater Middle East and bilateral relations."
10 March 2008: Iranian Foreign Ministry
spokesman Mohammad-Ali Hosseini told
Press TV that Iran would continue its cooperation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Hosseini said Iran
"will continue to work with the IAEA and to conduct its
nuclear activities within the framework of the Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) and international regulations." He also
expressed Iran's readiness to hold talks with the P5+1 on
issues agreed to by both sides.
The European Union's foreign policy chief, Javier
Solana, said
the EU wants "to continue on the negotiating track."
Solana said he has not been approached by Iran's top nuclear
negotiator, Saeed Jalili, to resume talks.
9 March 2008: Iran's Foreign Minister
Manouchehr Mottaki said
his country is ready to negotiate with the European Union
if there could be "meaningful and effective" results.
He said,
"We are still supporters of negotiations that have a
precise objective, a defined programme and are assured of
providing us with results."
7 March 2008: During a media briefing
in Cape Town, South African Foreign Affairs Chief Director
of the UN Xolisa Mabhongo explained
why South Africa voted in favour of the new sanctions resolution
against Iran on 3 March. He said South Africa managed to make
interventions in the resolution and introduced amendments
which helped to address some of its concerns. He said some
of the interventions included:
- The specific recognition of the latest report by the Director-General
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); South
Africa wanted the resolution to acknowledge an IAEA report
stating that some progress had been made in Iranian cooperation
with the nuclear watchdog.
- The understanding that once Iran had established the peaceful
nature of its nuclear activities, there would be no discrimination
against it and that it should be treated as any other member
of the non-proliferation treaty.
Two other factors reportedly played a part in "swaying"
South Africa:
- The call by Libya for the need to establish a Nuclear
Free Zone in the Middle East, which was included in the
resolution.
- A call by Vietnam for recognition of International Law
and Civil Aviation Law, which was included in resolution.
Mr. Mabhongo argued that South Africa was not persuaded by
the major powers or the visit by French President Nicolas
Sarkozy last week.
3 March 2008: The UN Security Council
voted
14-0 (with one abstention, Indonesia) in favour of a new sanctions
resolution against Iran's nuclear programme, Resolution
1803 (2008). Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter - regarding binding measures not
involving armed force - the Council affirmed its earlier decision
that Iran should, without delay, suspend its uranium enrichment
and heavy-water-related projects, as previously stipulated
in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747 (2007).
For the resolution text and summary of statements,
please see the UN
Press Release.
The IAEA Board of Govenors met
in Vienna ahead of the Security Council vote. According to
AP, "depending on what was decided there, the IAEA's
board was considering tabling a resolution of its own, pressing
Tehran to come clean on its disputed nuclear activities."
A diplomat said, "a resolution by the IAEA board -- the
first in two years -- would make it very clear that the Iranian
nuclear dossier was far from being closed." US envoy
to the IAEA, Gregory Schulte, said, "despite some progress
in addressing past issues, troubling questions remain about
Iranian activities that strongly suggest a clandestine weapons-related
programme. I anticipate that the board will be supporting
the Security Council in calling for Iran to suspend its enrichment-related
activities."
However, AP also reported
that the Russian delegation to the Security Council "set
conditions" for its approval of new sanctions against
Iran, which were for European nations to drop plans for an
IAEA resolution. Anonymous diplomats said Russia was upset
that it was not told earlier about such plans, while Grigory
Berdennikov, chief Russian delegate to the IAEA, told the
AP that he was not happy about the planned resolution.
2 March 2008: Jeffrey
Lewis posted
some information on ArmsControlWonk.com
on the briefing that the United States gave the IAEA about
"evidence" on alleged Iran's pre-2003 nuclear weapons
programme from the so-called "laptop of death",
pointing out that the details available in various media reports
indicate that nothing new was presented - that the details
were first reported in 2005.
29 February 2008: US National Security
Council spokesperson Gordon Johndroe said
the United States expects the UN Security Council will vote
on more sanctions against Iran "relatively soon."
He argued, "I think that everyone's in agreement that
Iran should not be enriching uranium, so let's let the vote
take place." Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said
another sanctions resolution will not stop Iran from enriching
uranium.
28 February 2008: The UK and France introduced
a draft resolution against Iran's uranium enrichment at the
Security Council. Non-permanent members South Africa, Indonesia,
Libya and Vietnam expressed reservations about the proposed
resolution. South Africa's ambassador to the IAEA, Abdul Minty,
said
the new
IAEA report showed "increasing confidence" that
Iran did not intend to use its nuclear program for military
purposes and that Iran was cooperating with the IAEA.
According to the Reuters
article, Minty "conceded that declassified Western
intelligence indicating Iran conducted high-explosives tests
and design work on a missile warhead as part of a covert nuclear
arms program was a serious concern that needed to be addressed
by Tehran." Mike Veiluva of DisarmamentActivist.org
pointed out on 26
February,
The “one remaining issue” relevant
to the programme is “the alleged studies (by Iran)
on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the
missile re-entry vehicle.” (”Green salt”
is an alleged uranium conversion process.) The report
references discussions in late January; however, Iran was
only given access to US information pertinent to these matters
in February. The timing is not explained; Iran was given
literally days to address this purported new evidence. The
UK is now contending that this evidence indicates Iran was
conducting weapons work after
2003, but the larger question is why we are only
hearing of this now - perhaps the proximity of a new UN
Security Council meeting has something to do about it.
For developments from November 2005
- February 2008, please see our Archived
News.
Government
and UN Documents
IAEA Board Members
Security Council Resolution
1803, 3 March 2008
IAEA
Director General's Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, GOV/2008/4, 22 February 2008.
US
National Intelligence Estimate, released 3 December 2007.
IAEA Director General's
Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, GOV/2007/58, 15 November 2007.
IAEA
Director General's Report: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2007/48,
30 August 2007.
IAEA
Director General's Report: Implemenation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 23 May 2007.
Security
Council Resolution 1747,
24 March 2007.
Joint
Statement on UN Security Council Resolution 1747 by the
P5+1, 24 March 2007.
Remarks
by Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, the Permanent US Representative
to the United Nations on Iran at The United Nations, New York,
20 March 2007.
Report
on Iran Safeguards Sent to IAEA Board, Security Council,
22 February 2007
Security
Council Resolution 1737, 23 December 2006.
Explanation
of Vote by Ambassador Alejandro Wolff, Acting US Permanent
Representative, on Iran and the adoption of UNSC resolution
1737, 23 December 2006.
Explanation
of Vote by Hon. Alexander Downer, MP, Australian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, on the adoption of UNSC resolution 1737,
23 December 2006.
Security Council Resolution
1696, 31 July 2006.
European Union draft
resolution on Iran, 20 July 2006.
Ahmadinejad's letter
to Bush (also see LCNP's comments
on the letter)
British/French draft
resolution on Iran, 3 May 2006. (Also see LCNP's comments
on this draft)
Security Council Presidential
Statement on Iran, 29 March 2006.
IAEA Report
on Iran by the Director General, 27 February 2006.
IAEA Adopted
Resolution, GOV/2006/14, 4 February 2006.
Mohamed ElBaradei, Nobel
Lecture (Oslo: Nobel Foundation, 10 December 2005)
Mohamed ElBaradei, "Reflections
on Nuclear Challenges Today," Statement of the Director
General (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Alistair Buchan Lecture, 6 December 2005)
"UN
atomic watchdog calls on Iran to show its nuclear activities
are peaceful," UN Press Release, 25 November 2005.
IAEA
Director General's Statement, 24 November 2005
Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, IAEA Board Report, 18 November 2005.
"Iran
Nuclear Issue Requires International Cooperation, Says US,"
Washington File Press Briefing (Washington, DC: Bureau of
International Information Programs, US Department of State,
18 November 2005)
Communication
from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the IAEA, 17 November 2005.
Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (eds.), Getting
Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, October 2005)
Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Resolution, 24 September 2005.
Communication
from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the IAEA, Iranian Nuclear Policy & Activities,
12 September 2005.
Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, IAEA Board Report by the Director General, 2 September
2005.
Working
paper submitted by Iran to Main Committee I, 2005 NPT
Review Conference, 19 May 2005.
“Peaceful
uses of nuclear technology,” Working paper submitted
to Main Committee III, 2005 NPT Review Conference, 17 May
2005.
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, "Nuclear
Proliferation and the Potential Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,"
8 November 2004.
For a complete list of reports and documents pertaining to
the IAEA and Iran, please see In
Focus: IAEA and Iran.
Background documents:
1974: Iran
Safeguards Agreement (formally titled Agreement between
Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application
of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons)
1968: Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) (also available in pdf)
Websites:
Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Iranian Presidency (in Arabic
and English)
Iran
Nuclear Research Center (NRC)
Permanent
Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
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