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Iran Action Pack
This Action Pack is also available for download in PDF.
Recommended Actions:
There Is No Military
Solution To the Iranian Nuclear Situation
But there is a lot each one of us can do to build momentum
for a peaceful solution:
Educate yourself—use this information
packet, gather and use the resources listed here, follow the
news, and analyze the news you read.
Educate others—request additional
information packets to distribute, copy this packet, organize
a public program using the suggested speakers (list included),
write letters to your local paper (sample included), talk
to your friends and family and neighbours.
Speak up loud and clear—raise the
urgent need for a peaceful solution (suggested solutions included)
at every opportunity and public forum on the Middle East,
war and peace events, and especially at rallies and programs
calling for an end to the War against Iraq. We need to add
the call for a peaceful resolution to the Iran crisis to all
anti-war mobilizations.
Pressure your elected representatives—peace
movements around the world must build momentum for a peaceful
solution to this crisis if we are to avert another war. Tell
your elected officials to contact their foreign ministry or
state department and request better diplomatic efforts and
a stop to all talk of military action. Ask them if they will
introduce a resolution or letter from colleagues instructing
the foreign ministry to pursue every diplomatic channel available.
Write to your United Nations Mission calling
on your ambassador to stop escalating the the situation. Ask
them to work for a ban on fissile material production in the
Mid-East.
Timeline:
Major events in the evolving
Iranian nuclear situation
For more details, please see RCW's Iran
chronology.
2002
August: The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) discovered an undeclared and extensive nuclear program
in Iran going back nearly two decades.
September: Iran confirmed construction on
two newly constructed nuclear facilities (Arak and Natanz)
and invited the IAEA to visit them in December.
December: The United States again accused
Iran of developing weapons of mass destruction, which it has
been doing since the mid 1980s.
2003
February: The IAEA visited Iran, and began
extensive investigation into Iran's nuclear activities.
June 6: The IAEA published a report on the
implementation of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement. At its
June meeting, the IAEA Board of Governors, referring to this
report, urged Iran to resolve pending issues regarding its
nuclear program and not begin enriching uranium as a confidence
building measure.
October: Iran implemented a policy of “full
disclosure” and began cooperating with the IAEA on questions
of its nuclear program. France, Germany and the United Kingdom
began negotiating with Iran as an alternative diplomatic approach
to the hard line the United States was taking. The EU3, as
they became known, and Iran adopted the Tehran Agreed Statement
on October 21, 2003, outlining a process for a diplomatic
solution.
November: IAEA Director General El Baradei
announced there was no evidence Iran was pursuing a nuclear
weapons program. The inspection team did find that Iran had
concealed the extent of its nuclear development, including
uranium enrichment, which is in violation of its obligations
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA Safeguards
Agreement. Iran officially announced it would sign the NPT's
Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA more extensive monitoring
authority, and suspend all uranium enrichment activities.
December: Iran signed but did not ratify
the Additional Protocol.
2004
Throughout 2004:
The IAEA's investigation continued, uncovering various sensitive
aspects of the fuel cycle.
Iran and the EU3 negotiated, with the EU3 pushing for suspension
of uranium enrichment and Iran pushing for recognition of
its right to the fuel cycle.
The Iranian Parliament introduced various resolutions requiring
the government to continue with the nuclear fuel cycle despite
any international pressure.
November 15: Iran and the EU3 signed the
Paris Agreement, in which Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment
pending the outcome of negotiations, and the EU3 recognized
Iran's right to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
2005
March: The EU3 changed is negotiating position
to exclude Iranian uranium enrichment from any agreed solution.
This became the only “objective guarantee” that
Iran was not developing nuclear weapons when the United States
required it as a condition of backing the negotiations.
April: Iran announced plans to resume uranium
enrichment if unsatisfied with EU proposals for resolving
the crisis.
August: Iran elected hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
President. He rejected the European proposals and pledged
an "irreversible resumption of enrichment."
September: France, Germany, and the UK put
Iran’s nuclear program on the agenda of IAEA Board of
Governors' meeting. In an unusually split and contentious
decision (Board Resolutions are usually agreed to by consensus),
it passed a resolution noting that the situation was “within
the competence” of the Security Council and urged Iran
to suspend its nuclear fuel cycle activities.
2006
January: Iran resumed uranium enrichment
research.
February: The EU called an emergency meeting
of the IAEA Board of Governors, and the Board passed another
resolution with a split vote (27 in favor, 3 against, 5 abstained)
reporting Iran to the Security Council. The permanent five
members of the Security Council (P5: China, France, Russia,
United Kingdom, United States), who are also on the IAEA Board
of Governors, agreed the Council would not act on the situation
until after the regularly scheduled IAEA Board Meeting in
March.
March 6: Although there was no resolution
on Iran at the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, the Board
passed the entire Iran dossier to the UN Security Council
including the IAEA Director General's report.
March 13: The UN Security Council began
considering the Iranian nuclear program. The EU3 developed
a text for a Presidential Statement and circulated it to the
rest of the P5. They negotiated it for two weeks, with minimal
input from the other ten elected Security Council members.
March 29: The Security Council unanimously
agreed to a Presidential Statement on behalf of the Council,
expressing concern and requesting Iran to halt its nuclear
program as a way to build confidence that it does not have
ambitions to develop nuclear weapons.
March 30: Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki
delivered a statement to the Conference on Disarmament proposing
the establishment of a regional enrichment capability.
April 11: Iranian President Ahmadinejad
announced Iran had successfully enriched uranium.
April 28: The IAEA submitted its report
on the implementation of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement to
the Security Council. The Security Council is likely to consider
a resolution with similar language to the March Presidential
Statement.
June 6: The permanent five members of the
Security Council, with Germany, (P5+1) offered Iran a new
package deal. The United States would join the negotiations,
but Iran must suspend uranium enrichment before negotiationsl
begin.
July 12: The P5+1 agreed to bring Iran back
into the Security Council after Iran did not respond to the
most recent package deal by the July 12 deadline.
July 16: Iran said the package proposal
was an "acceptable basis" on which to begin negotiations.
July 20: Britain, France and Germany introduced a
draft text of a Security Council resolution telling Iran to
suspend uranium enrichment, endorsing the package proposal
and threatening further measures if Iran does not comply.
July 31: The Security Council passed Resolution
1696, demanding Iran suspend all enrichment and reprocessing
activities by August 31 or face economic and diplomatic sanctions.
August 31: The International Atomic Energy Agency's
Director General released his report,
"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic of Iran", in response to the July 31
Security Council Resolution 1696.
November 23: The IAEA announced that Iran will give
inspectors access to records and equipment from two of its
nuclear sites.
December 23: The UN Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution
1737, imposing sanctions on Iran for failing to halt uranium
enrichment.
2007
January 2: Iranian government Spokesman Gholam-Hussein
Elham said 3000 centrifuges are currently being installed
at the Iranian nuclear reactor in Natanz will be operational
by March of this year.
January 18: IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei called
for a resumption of negotiations with Iran. "Only applying
pressure, he suggested, could prompt the Islamic republic
to follow the path of North Korea, which kicked out U.N. inspectors,
pulled out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003
and then conducted its first-ever nuclear test last October.
. . . My priority is to keep Iran inside the system."
January 22: Iran barred 38 UN inspectors from the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), from entering the
country. The agency said the move was a “first step”
in limiting cooperation with the IAEA, in line with a demand
made by parliament after UN Sanctions were imposed on Iran
a month ago over its disputed nuclear program.
January 29: IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei proposed
a simultaneous "time-out" plan during the World
Economic Forum in Switzerland, in which it will hold off on
imposing sanctions if Tehran suspends uranium enrichment.
This proposal was rejected by the US.
February 19: ElBaradei argued Western powers need
to reassure Iran over its security rather than just ratchet
up sanctions if they want to resolve a nuclear standoff.
February 22: The IAEA reported that Iran is steadily
expanding its efforts to enrich uranium, stating that Iran
was now operating or about to switch on roughly 1,000 centrifuges
at its nuclear facility at Natanz.
February 26: The P5+1 agreed to begin work on a new
UN Security Council resolution on Iran.
March 8: The IAEA approved a 40% cut in its technical
assistance to Iran, in line with Security Council sanctions.
None of the aid programs that were cut directly applied to
Iran's uranium enrichment program. Iran's foreign minister
warned that the move could affect Tehran's cooperation with
the agency.
March 24: The UN Security Council unanimously voted
in favour of Resolution
1747 for further sanctions against Iran. The P5+1 also
released a Joint
Statement on the resolution.
March 25: Iran responded to Resolution 1747, saying
the country would partially suspend cooperation with the International
Atomic Energy Agency and called the sanctions illegal.
March 29: The United States and key allies began pressing
the International Atomic Energy Agency to find Iran in violation
of its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
over Tehran's refusal to allow remote monitoring of its underground
uranium enrichment plant. However, IAEA officials are withholding
judgment, pending examination of Iran's agreements to see
if its refusal to allow installation of extra cameras giving
a full overview of its Natanz operations is a violation of
the treaty.
May 23: The IAEA Director General's report
on the implementation of safeguards in Iran was released.
July 9: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported
that Iran has slowed down the expansion of its uranium enrichment
program.
July 12: Iran and the IAEA agreed to the modalities
for resolving all outstanding issues related to the agency's
investigation of iran's past nuclear activities. The draft
plan entitled, "Understandings
of The Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities
of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues," consists
of a 60-day work plan and schedule for Iran and the IAEA to
resolve all outstanding issues.
July 30: inspectors visited the heavy water nuclear
reactor under construction at Arak for a routine design information
verification inspection. The IAEA noted that construction
of the reactor was ongoing. Additionally, the IAEA further
noted that according to satellite imagery, operation of the
adjacent heavy water plant was also ongoing. It is the first
such visit since Iran in April blocked access to the plant.
August 21: The IAEA and Iran finalized a work plan
to resolve all outstanding issues, after further meetings
between Iranian and IAEA officials in Vienna on 24 July and
in Tehran 20-21 August.
August 22: The US ambassador to the IAEA accused Iran
of manipulating the IAEA in response to the 21 August work
plan for resolving outstanding issues related to Iran's past
nuclear activities.
August 30: The IAEA Director General described the
21 August work plan as a significant step forward, in a report
on the implementation of safeguards in Iran submitted to the
IAEA Board. The report also indicated that "Iran has
not suspended its enrichment related activities" and
"is also continuing with its construction of the IR-40
reactor and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant"
contrary to the decisions of the UN Security Council. IAEA
Deputy Director general of safeguards Olli Heinonen underlined
the importance of the work plan, emphasizing, "When you
read the plan you see this is not an open-ended timeline:
there are certain linkages in this approach, but it's important
that it is not open-ended…. The key now is that Iran
adheres to this timeline, provides us with the information
that we need and access to the information." He further
noted that "All these measures which you see there for
resolving our outstanding issues go beyond the requirements
of the Additional Protocol." Regarding concerns that
Iran was manipulating the IAEA investigation and that the
deal rules out further inquiries, Heinonen stated, "If
the answers are not satisfactory, we are making new questions
until we are satisfied with the answers and we can conclude
technically that the matter is resolved—it is for us
to judge when we think we have enough information. Once the
matter is resolved, then the file is closed."
November 15: The IAEA Director General released a
new report on the implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant Security Council
provisions in Iran. Media spin on the issue undermines several
key points of the report. However, there are several items
in the report worth noting, including the expanded chronology
of Iran's acquisition of nuclear fuel cycle technology, placing
the development of Iran's nuclear program in the context of
the program started by the Shah, and, more importantly, the
revised history of the 1987 offer from the Khan network and
the civilian origin of the decision to pursue uranium enrichment
in paragraphs 10 and 11. Also important is Iran's explanation
for the development (or lack thereof) of the P-2 centrifuge
also seems to check out, and as always, the Agency has been
able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material
in Iran. Despite all of this, the US is intent on imposing
stricter sanctions, arguing "only a strong resolution
with new and biting sanctions will give diplomacy a chance
to succeed."
November 22: Disregarding the IAEA Director General's
recent report, the US, the UK,
France, and Germany told
the IAEA Board of Governors that "a wait-and-see approach
is not an option." They argued that Iran had not done
enough to win their trust, and the UN should now consider
tougher sanctions: "We recognize Iran has taken some
steps in the right direction but we are disappointed that
cooperation is of a partial and reactive nature ... all in
all, the results are not encouraging."
December 3: A new National
Intelligence Estimate, representing the consensus view
of all 16 US spy agencies, reported
that Iran is not currently seeking nuclear weapons, nor will
it be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium
for a nuclear weapon until at least 2010. The report "concludes
that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and that
the program remains on hold, contradicting an assessment two
years ago that Tehran was working inexorably toward building
a bomb." (For analysis and reaction, see the Iran
Archive, 3-6 December 2007.)
2008
January 7: A confrontation between the United States
and Iran occurred in the Strait of Hormuz, wherein three US
warships nearly opened fire on up to five Iranian motor boats,
which, according to the US, approached them "in a threatening
manner," but according to Iran, simply asked the US ships
to identify themselves. See DisarmamentActivist.org's posts
on 8
January and 10
January for a good overview of the incident, and analysis
of the Western and Iranian media reactions. See Kaveh L Afrasiabi's
article
from 15 January for some interesting legal perspectives
on the incident. And check out the videos of the incident
on the BBC website.
January 11-12: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei
met
with Iranian Vice President Gholam Reza Aghazadeh (also head
of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization), President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
to discuss how the IAEA and the Iranian government can work
together to clarify all outstanding issues before the next
IAEA report in March.
January 25: The P5+1 revealed
a package of measures for a new UN Security Council resolution
against Iran.
February 22: The text of the IAEA
Director General's report on Iran was released. See Mike
Veiluva's comments on 22
February and 26
February at DisarmamentActivist.org.
February 28: The UK and France introduced
a draft resolution against Iran at the Security Council.
March 3: The UN Security Council voted
14-0 (with one abstention, Indonesia) in favour of a new sanctions
resolution against Iran's nuclear programme, Resolution
1803 (2008). Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter - regarding binding measures not
involving armed force - the Council affirmed its earlier decision
that Iran should, without delay, suspend its uranium enrichment
and heavy-water-related projects, as previously stipulated
in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747 (2007).
For the resolution text and summary of statements, please
see the UN
Press Release.
Talking
Points:
There is no
military solution. Military action is unwarranted, will have
disastrous consequences, and will be counter-productive.
Military action is unwarranted:
To date, the IAEA has not uncovered substantial
evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program.
Non-compliance under the Safeguards Agreement requires a
finding of diversion, or uncertainty regarding diversion,
of nuclear materials toward military use. The IAEA concluded
in November 2004 that no diversion had occurred, but it
is not yet in a position to determine the presence or absence
of additional undeclared nuclear materials or activities.
Iran remains five to ten years from possessing
a nuclear warhead. This leaves ample time to seek
a diplomatic solution; the situation has been needlessly
and artificially elevated into a crisis. There is no imminent
threat.
The International Atomic Energy Agency must verify
the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program,
and the international community is right to work to ensure
Iran abandons any nuclear weapons ambitions. However, all
actions in this situation must be peaceful, diplomatic,
fair and international. There is time for the IAEA to conclude
its investigation and they should be given the opportunity
and support to do so.
Military action would have disastrous consequences:
Military action would further destabilize the already
tense region, exacerbating the existing conflicts
in Iraq and Palestine.
Bombing nuclear facilities is particularly dangerous,
as it has the potential to disperse radioactive materials
into the environment. Any attack on nuclear facilities
would violate Protocol I to the Geneva Convention that
states “nuclear electrical generating stations, shall
not be made the object of attack, even where these objects
are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release
of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the
civilian population.”1
Military action would be counter-productive:
Any military action would strengthen the position
of hard liners in Iran and unite the population behind them.
Nuclear energy is an issue of national pride in Iran. Threatening
and particularly using force would only increase their determination
to pursue a nuclear program.
Military action would most likely drive any nuclear
program underground rather than destroy it, like
we saw when Israel bombed the nuclear facilities at Osirak
in Iraq in 1981. This simply increased the funding for an
underground program in the 1980s, which was verifiably dismantled
under UN supervision long before the 2003 United States
attack.
Issues and Context:
Iran, the Security Council and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty
Iran and the UN Security Council:
- A UN Security Council resolution under Chapter
VII could be used to legitimate war now or in the distant
future. Chapter VII resolutions provide a legal
basis for the use of force.
- In Iraq, a decade old resolution was used to justify
the use of force in 2003.
The way the UN Security Council handles this situation
can affect its credibility.
- The UN Security Council must not act in a discriminatory
manner. The Council did not act when North Korea
was referred in 1994 and again in 2003 after it withdrew
from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran has not
withdrawn from the Treaty nor has it been found to be in
non-compliance with the Treaty.
- However, the UN Security Council also must not
appear ineffective or unable to handle proliferation
accusations. It must work with the UN system and the international
community to find a viable solution.
Iran and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT):
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty contains two
central bargains:
- Non Nuclear Weapon States agree to never acquire
nuclear weapons, and in exchange are guaranteed access to
civilian nuclear energy; and
- Nuclear Weapon States agree to eliminate their
arsenals.
Civilian nuclear energy is legally guaranteed under
Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
but has serious proliferation risks.
- Iran’s pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities
has been the focus of U.S. and EU efforts because the same
technology used for energy can be used for weapons.
- The five nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia,
United Kingdom, United States), Pakistan and Israel used
nuclear reactors to create the materials for their nuclear
weapons. India and North Korea acquired nuclear weapons
through so-called peaceful civilian nuclear programs.
- Nuclear power is never peaceful due to the devastating
health and environmental impact. There is no safe way to
dispose of the waste produced by nuclear power.
There is an inextricable link between non-proliferation
and disarmament.
- Lackluster progress on nuclear disarmament, especially
in the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) undermines support for nonproliferation and stopping
the spread of nuclear weapons.
- The breakdown of the last NPT Review Conference signals
that the non-nuclear weapon states are increasingly unwilling
to accept the concessions demanded of them regarding the
development of nuclear technology without similarly demonstrated
progress on the total elimination of nuclear arsenals.
- The exclusion of nonproliferation and disarmament from
the 2005 United Nations World Summit illustrates that nonproliferation
efforts will be stymied without the nuclear weapon states
implementing commitments already made.
Alternative
Solutions:
The Security Council should support the International
Atomic Energy Agency’s work to successfully verify compliance
with safeguards. The Security Council should respect
the work plan that has been developed between Iran and the
IAEA to settle the questions of Iran's past activities, and,
with the advice of the IAEA, should set a timeline for the
conclusion of the investigation into the verification of current
activities.
Continue to explore diplomatic resolutions.
Enlarge the negotiation partners to include a Non-Aligned
representative and the United States, similar to the group
of states negotiating with North Korea in the six Party Talks.
The United States should negotiate with Iran. Investigate
the proposal for a regional enrichment capability.
Address the root causes of security concerns in the
whole region. Restart the peace processes in the
Middle East. Put political weight and drive behind establishing
a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. The Security
Council supported such a zone in a 1981 resolution (487),
states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty agreed
to it in a Resolution at the 1995 Review Conference, and the
General Assembly unanimously adopts a resolution supporting
the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle
East every year (A/RES/60/52 this year).
Declare a regional moratorium on fissile material
production as a first confidence building step toward
a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. Stopping the
production of nuclear weapons materials would address the
security concerns of everyone in the region, and by broadening
the prohibition would also provide a face saving measure for
Iran.
Make a global commitment to sustainable energy, and
a global moratorium on nuclear energy. We urge Iran
not to pursue the capacity to produce nuclear fuel. All governments
should commit resources for energy efficiency and faster development
of renewable sources of energy. The international community
should create an International Sustainable Energy Agency and
move resources from military spending to renewable energy.
Nuclear weapon states must take the lead in non-proliferation
by totally, irreversibly and verifiably disarming their nuclear
weapons arsenals and production capabilities, living
up to their end of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty bargain.
There is no moral high ground in either proliferation or nuclear
weapons possession, but states with nuclear weapons will have
more credibility in their non-proliferation efforts while
they are permanently disarming their own arsenals.
Sample
Letter to Parliamentarians on the Iran Situation:
Dear Representative,
As one of your constituents, I'm writing to insist that you
take any and all action available to you to prevent a military
response to the current Iranian nuclear situation. There is
no military solution to this situation and military action
will only make things worse. Please direct the [Foreign Ministry/State
Department/Diplomatic Service] to pursue good faith negotiations
that will prevent the escalation of this situation, and to
examine and undertake all other possibilities, such as establishing
a nuclear weapon free zone in the region.
As a short term, face saving measure, I fully support the
idea of a regional moratorium on the production of materials
related to nuclear weapons. This could take the shape of a
politically binding agreement, by all states in the region,
to stop the enrichment or production of fissile materials
(plutonium and uranium). This could also pave the way for
the implementation of numerous UN General Assembly resolutions
calling for a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East,
a much more sustainable and just solution than any military
action.
In 2003, the war on Iraq was justified by the supposed threat
of weapons of mass destruction. That war continues to this
day, and has further destabilized the already volatile Middle
East. The 2003 threat proved to be false, but the destruction
caused by the war cannot be undone. Any actions that would
provoke a similar response to the Iranian situation will also
be devastating to the region.
I look forward to your positive response to this letter,
and to hearing from you what steps you have taken to prevent
military intervention in Iran.
Sincerely,
[Your Name Here]
Sample Letter to
the Editor on the Iran Situation:
To The Editor:
Iran is much in the news because of its dispute with western
countries over its nuclear ambitions. As the United Nations
Security Council deliberates how to proceed, the course of
action is being controlled by the five permanent members.
Those five countries (USA, UK, France, China, and Russia)
are also the only countries recognized as Nuclear Weapon States
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They are
defensive when it comes to their obligation to disarm under
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, yet are unyielding in
the face of the Iranian claims that their program is for peaceful
purposes allowed under that same treaty.
The world does not need another nuclear state. However, diplomatic
brinksmanship and threats of military strikes take us closer
to that precipice. Governmental leaders need to work toward
a regional solution that addresses wider security concerns,
such as a regional nuclear weapon free zone. A voluntary ban
on the production of fissile materials (plutonium and enriched
uranium) needed to make a bomb would be a confidence building
measure benefiting all.
It is well past time for all governments to renew their commitments
to rid the world of nuclear weapons. It is only by working
together that this goal can be achieved. There is no military
solution to the Iranian crisis.
Sincerely,
[Your Name Here]
Resources
for More Information:
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom's Disarmament
Project, Reaching Critical Will, has a website containing
recent developments, background information, and links
to other information resources on Iran:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/iran.html
The website also contains information about the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/nptindex1.html
As well as information on link with Nuclear Energy:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/factsheets/energy.html
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy website with excellent
legal analysis of the situation and information
on the Security Council:
http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/iran/index.htm
Greenpeace's Preventive Peace Strategy and
a Google Earth map of US of Military Plans:
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/news/don-t-nuke-iran
Center for Nonproliferation Studies has an extensive timeline
of political developments:
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1825_4968.html
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a Timeline and
an Iran Index with all IAEA reports and resolutions:
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml
Center for Nonproliferation Studies also has a Chronology
of Iran's IAEA Safeguards:
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060120.htm
Arms Control Association has key documents including the IAEA
reports and expert NGO analysis of the evolving
situation:
http://www.armscontrol.org/country/iran/
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has longer,
more in depth articles:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/regions/
Institute for Science and International Security has in-depth
analysis for the technically-minded:
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/index.html
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
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