Iran News Archives
November 2005–January 2011

Part of RCW's Nuclear Iran? information and resource page

13 January 2011: EU chief diplomat Catherine Ashton has insisted that the Istanbul talks will include discussion of the nuclear issue. "I'm very clear that we are coming to discuss the nuclear issue and that is what we will do," Ashton told reporters after meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. "Our purpose in meeting is to now look for tangible credible ways to make a move forward," she added. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called for Iran to agree talks to clear up "grey areas" in its contested programme at the Istanbul meeting. Delegates must agree a talks agenda that is "all-inclusive" and covers "the questions of eliminating grey areas in the Iranian nuclear programme," Lavrov said. (Source: Nicolas Cheviron, "EU to discuss nuclear issue despite Iran refusal," AFP, 13 January 2011.)

13 January 2011: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov hailed Iran's decision to invite foreign diplomats to visit its nuclear sites, but said the visits cannot substitute inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Lavrov also indicated that Russia will push for talks on Iran's nuclear program in Istanbul, but the agenda should also include ways to ensure Iran's security. (Svetlana Tikhomirova,"Russia: Only political solution to Iran nuclear issue," Press TV, 13 January 2011.)

12 January 2011: Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, said that time was running out for negotiations on some parts of his country’s nuclear program because of Tehran’s enhanced ability to enrich and manufacture atomic fuel. “After the installation of the first fuel rods, produced by Iran, in the core of the Tehran research reactor, Iran’s Parliament will probably never allow the government to negotiate dispatching uranium to Turkey or other countries,” Mr. Soltanieh said. (Alan Cowell, "Iran Says Time Running Out for Nuclear Deal," New York Times, 12 January 2011.)

12 January 2011: Ali Akbar Salehi indicated that it will not discuss its nuclear dossier with with the E3+3 at the Instabul talks. "The technical and legal aspects of any country's nuclear issues can be discussed only with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the agency, based on international rules and regulations, is the only authority to judge the member states' issues," Salehi added. "If we consider this as the principle... then discussing the issue, named (Iran) nuclear issue, from our point of view is a dossier fabricated by the West and discussing it with the five-plus-one about this is meaningless," said Salehi, who oversees Tehran's nuclear programme. (Siavosh Ghazi, "Iran says no talks on 'nuclear dossier' at Istanbul," AFP, 12 January 2011.

22 November 2010: EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton told reporters that stalled negotiations between world powers and Iran on Tehran's controversial nuclear programme will likely resume on December 5 in Geneva. She indicated that she had received "informal confirmations" from Iran about the date and location for the talks, "but I want a formal confirmation." The two sides diverge on what issues should be on the table. The world powers want the talks to focus on Iran's uranium enrichment programme but Tehran wants a wider discussion that includes regional security issues. "For me the core of the agenda is very clear: we need to talk about nuclear weapons capability and to have a full and frank discussion about that," Ashton said. "But in the course of our discussions, of course, opportunities to raise other issues should not be lost, that is why I want to spend time so that we can do that," she said, noting that she proposed two days of talks. ("Iran nuclear talks likely in Geneva next month: EU," AFP, 22 November 2010)

12 November 2010: European Union foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton has reportedly proposed to meet Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili on 5 December, most likely in Switzerland. ("Reports: EU's Ashton Offers To Meet Iran On December 5," Radio Free Europe, 12 November 2010)

11 November 2010: President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggested the International Atomic Energy Agency would pass information about Iran's nuclear programme to the United States if Iran signed the IAEA additional protocol. "The acceptance of the Additional Protocol would be tantamount to placing all of our nuclear activities under the supervision of the IAEA which would in turn pass our information to America," state broadcaster IRIB quoted Ahmadinejad as saying on its website. "We said we would not accept this protocol," Ahmadinejad added. ("Iran says IAEA would pass nuclear information to U.S.," Reuters, 11 November 2010)

10 November 2010: Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki says that the agenda of planned talks between Iran and 5+1 group (five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) will be set either before or at the time of talks. Mottaki indicated that while Iran’s Supreme National Security Council secretary Saeed Jalili has proposed meeting in Istanbul on either 23 November or 5 December, the Iranian's will be flexible regarding the date and venue of the talks. “There is no difference between the announced dates (by the two sides),” Mottaki noted, adding that Turkey, Geneva, and Vienna were proposed as possible venues of talks. ("Agenda of Iran-5+1 talks to be set before or during meeting, Mottaki says," Tehran Times, 11 November 2010)

9 November 2010: In an interview with South Korean media, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev aruged that North Korea's nuclear programme is more a threat than Iran's. “Despite the fact that Iran is often given special attention, I should note that Tehran, unlike Pyongyang, has not declared itself a nuclear power, has not tested a nuclear weapon and … has not threatened to use one,” he said. (Reuters, "Medvedev alarmed at North Korean nuclear activity," euronews, 9 November 2010)

9 November 2010: Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, proposed a meeting with the E3+3 on 23 November or 5 December in Istanbul in a letter to European Union foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton. The current plan is to hold talks lasting two or three days that would address regional security issues and Iran's nuclear programme. The Guardian reports: "Ashton had initially suggested a meeting next week in Vienna. She will now consult the six-nation group – the US, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany – before replying to Jalili. The group reportedly views Turkey as an insufficiently neutral venue. In recent months, Ankara has been more supportive of Tehran. The group may offer Switzerland as a compromise." (Julian Borger, "Iran offers dates for multilateral talks in Turkey," The Guardian, 9 November 2010)

9 November 2010: Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki suggested that talks between Iran and the E3+3 could commence as early as next week. Turkish President Abdullah Gul indicated that the talks would be held in his country, though Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that talks have yet to be formally scheduled. French Foreign Ministry spokesman Bernard Valero said that the Iranian government has provided "no confirmation" through diplomatic channels of the date or location of the potential meeting. In the meantime, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast drew a distinction between a potential exchange of Iranian uranium and the country's broader nuclear work. "We have said from the beginning that these two issues are independent from one another," he said. "The issue of [the] fuel swap is an independent issue and the issue of dialogue with [P-5+1] is another independent issue. If the complete independence of both these issues is not respected, then it will create obstacles in follow-ups." ("Iran Floats Date for Nuclear Meeting," Global Security Newswire, 9 November 2010)

8 November 2010: The Russian government urged Iran in the near future to join new discussions of its nuclear activities. "Russia sees no alternative to the politico-diplomatic settlement of Iran's nuclear program and looks forward to more active cooperation between Iran and the [International Atomic Energy Agency] and the strict implementation by Tehran of the requirements of the U.N. Security Council," Russian Ambassador to the United Nations Vitaly Churkin said. "We urge the Iranian side to respond constructively to the proposed resumption of negotiations with the six [world powers], and we hope that negotiations will begin soon." ("Russia expects Teheran to resume talks with Iran Six soon," RIA Novosti, 8 November 2010)

8 November 2010: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said that Iran has yet to provide evidence that its nuclear program is strictly nonmilitary in nature. "Iran has has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities," Amano told the U.N General Assembly, adding that Iran should fully meet IAEA and Security Council demands over its nuclear program. Iranian offials responded: "Claiming that 'Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation' is incorrect and misleading," Iranian Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Eshagh al-Habib said. He denounced the Security Council measures as illegal. The IAEA's past declaration of "so much details about Iran's peaceful nuclear activities proves that the agency has the full access to all nuclear materials in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Reuters quoted al-Habib as saying. "It seems that the recent reports of the agency have been prepared under pressure from the outside," he said. ("Iran nuclear cooperation insufficient: IAEA chief," AFP, 8 November 2010; "Iran slams U.N. nuclear chief, denies keeping secrets," Reuters, 8 November 2010)

1 November 2010: A spokesman from the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced that his government would favor opening nuclear talks with world powers. “If more countries join the talks, better results will be achieved as international issues, which concern different nations, will be discussed,” remarked Ramin Mehmanparast. ("Iran Agrees to Resume Negotiations on Nuclear Program After Yearlong Break," Bloomberg News, 1 November 2010)

26 October 2010: Iran began loading fuel into the core of its first atomic power plant. The Russian-built nuclear power plant in Bushehr has international approval and is supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency. ("Iran Injects Fuel into First Nuclear Reactor," CBS News, 26 October 2010)

12 October 2010: Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki urged European Union Foreign Affairs chief Catherine Ashton to be “more active” in pursuing dialogue. Mr. Mottaki said Tehran considered late October or early November as an appropriate time for a resumption of the talks, but a spokesman for Ashton said no date had been set. ("Iran blames EU's Ashton for nuclear talks deadlock," AFP, 12 October, 2010)

30 September 2010: Russia prohibited Iranian investment in any commercial activities regarding uranium production, use of nuclear material, and technology after an announcement by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The decree was issued to comply with the UN Security Council resolution 1929. ("Russia bans Iranian investments in nuclear industry," English.news.net, 30 September) “Clarification of outstanding questions regarding the Iranian nuclear program would meet not only the goals of strengthening the non-proliferation regime but quite obviously the interests of Iran as well,” said Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin during the General Assembly’s high-level debate. Russia urged Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and to show transparency to resolve issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme. Churkin said the sanctions against Iran are aimed to send signals to Iran about the need of full cooperation with the IAEA and to give motivation to the negotiation process. (“Russia urges Iran to cooperate with UN nuclear agency,” English.news.cn, 30 September 2010)

29 September 2010: “There are two options in the nuclear talks—either understanding or confrontation—and what [U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton] and the other foreign ministers have decided shows which option they prefer,” said Iranian foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki after the E3+3 turned down an Iranian proposal on convene a meeting during the sidelines of the General Assembly in New York. Mottaki said the Foreign Ministers had missed their golden opportunity. He also said that some diplomats were open to the proposals as a possible way to advance the dialogue. (“U.N. Powers Turned Down High-level Meeting, Iran Says,” Global Security Newswire, 29 September 2010)

27 September 2010: In a meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle underlined that all members of E3+3 have accepted Iran’s immutable right to use peaceful nuclear power. Westerwelle described the current conditions as ripe for carrying on the talks on Iran’s nuclear programme. Mottaki pointed out that inviting Iran to talks and simultaneously imposing strengthen sanctions on the country does not work in dealing with Tehran. (“German FM: All Members of 5+1 Acknowledge Iran's N. Rights,” Fars News Agency, 27 September 2010)

22 September 2010: “Our objective continues to be a comprehensive long-term negotiated solution which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program," said a statement released by China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States. Foreign ministers from the major powers told Iran they hope for early talks about Iran’s nuclear programme as well as talks about a possible nuclear swap. ("4 Big-powers seek early nuclear talks with Iran," Reuters, 22 September 2010)

21 September 2010: During a meeting with the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran still is ready to hold negotiations with the major powers based on the Tehran declaration. “The Tehran declaration was transparent and reasonable, and was intended to replace the spirit of confrontation with a sprit of agreement. But unfortunately, the 5+1 group (the United States, France, Britain, China, Russia, and Germany) made a wrong response to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s goodwill,” President Ahmadenijad said referring to the sanctions that the UN imposed on Iran for its nuclear programme. The UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said “mutually acceptable agreement” should be reached to resolve the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme. ("Iran still ready for talks with 5+1 group," Tehran Times, 21 September 2010)

20 September 2010: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad met UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon for talks on Iran’s nuclear program, during President Ahmadinejad's visit in New York during the General Assembly. Before the meeting President Ahmadinejad announced Iran plans to restore the relations with the Iran-six, involving Britain, China, Germany, France, United States, and Russia. (“Ahmadinejad, Ban Ki-moon Meet For Talks Over Iran's Nuclear Program,” Turkish Weekly, 20 September)

17 September 2010: “NAM notes with concern the possible implications of the continued departure from standard verification language in the summary of the report of the Director General,” said a statement by the Non-Aligned Movement criticizing the language used in the IAEA chief’s report on Iran's nuclear programme. The statement is critical of the Director General Yukiya Amano for accepting at face value Western intelligence information on Iran’s nuclear activities. (“India with NAM in slamming IAEA report on Iran,” Indian Express, 17 September 2010)

9 September 2010: "The demands and expectations in IAEA Director General Yukia Amano's latest report are beyond Iran's commitments and responsibilities in accordance with the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) agreement," said the Iranian ambassador to the agency, Ali-Asghar Soltaniyeh. He also criticized the technical aspects of the report saying it made it confusing for non-export readers and that it could lead to more tensions. (“IAEA demands beyond Iran's U.N. commitments, envoy,” English.news.cn, 9 September 2010)

6 September 2010: The IAEA Director General released his latest report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran.

30 August 2010: Days after Iran started to load fuel to its first atomic power plant Iran said it will start produce nuclear fuel needed for a medical reactor in Tehran. Reuters reported that the Iranian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi, in an interview with the TV station Al Alam, said, “We will produce all the fuel needed for the Tehran plant in one year from today." Salehi said that Tehran so far has produced 25 kg (55lb) of uranium to a level of 20 percent purity for the Tehran reactor. (“Iran to make medical reactor fuel in year – report,” Reuters, 30 August)

30 August 2010: "The Iranian nation does not need atomic bombs," Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said adding that Iran's "weapon of logic" is more powerful than any nuclear weapon. Iran has criticized the resolution adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC) on 9 June which imposes a fourth round of sanction against Iran over its nuclear program. According to the Fars News Agency, Mottaki claimed “They [Western countries] however, assert that Iran may have the intention of making nuclear weapons, and punished our nation based on the claim that Iran has such intentions." He noted that the sanctions illustrates a lack of logic in the currant international order. Iran argues that as a signatory to the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) it has the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. (“Sanctions reflect West's 'lack of logic',” presstv.com, 30 August 2010)

21 August 2010: "Despite all pressure, sanctions and hardships imposed by western nations, we are now witnessing the start-up of the largest symbol of Iran's peaceful nuclear activities," said Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's atomic energy organization, at the inauguration of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Salehi said it demonstrated that Iran's nuclear aims are entirely peaceful. (“Iran begins loading fuel at its Bushehr nuclear reactor,” The Guardian, 21 August 2010).

16 June 2010: A day after U.S imposed sanctions against Iran the European Union followed with what they called “inevitable” measures against Iran. The leaders of European Union indicated that the sanctions would go beyond the sanctions mandated by the United Nation Security Council. The European measures will imply forward sanctions on “key sectors of the gas and oil industry with prohibition of new investment, technical assistance and transfers of technologies” and new visa bans and freezes especially on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. The European Union declared that the new restrictive measures is “inevitable” because Iran has neglected the many opportunities offered to remove the concerns of the international community over Iran's nuclear program. (“U.S and Europe press tighter sanctions on Iran,” New York Times, 16 June 2010)

3 June 2010: Iran accused the IAEA for false reporting, saying inspectors probing a laboratory for suspected undeclared nuclear experiments found some equipment removed. According to the Guardian Ali Ashgar Soltanieh, Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, did not give a direct answer when asked if he was blaming the agency for a mistake or if he believed in any other reason for the asserted false finding. The remark considered a finding published in the IAEA's quarterly report on Iran's nuclear activity concerning experiments in pyroprocessing, a process which can be used to purify uranium metal used in nuclear weapons. Soltanieh said his country is going to ask for a formal correction. (“Iran accuses nuclear agency of false reporting,” The Guardian, 3 June 2010)

31 May 2010: The IAEA Director General released his latest report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran.

22 May 2010: Despite new sanctions Iran seem to go ahead with a deal reached with Brazil and Turkey. According to Iran's official news agency Iran will hand a official paper to the IAEA's chief to describe the details over the fuel swap agreement with Turkey and Brazil. Reuters writes that Brazilian and Turkish representatives of the IAEA will attend to the meeting with Iran and the IAEA. Last week agreement said the first bath of Iranian uranium would arrive to Turkey within a month. In return Iran will get fuel to keep a Tehran medical research reactor. Brazil, Turkey and Iran have urged the UN to stop the talk of further sanctions against Iran because of the deal, but according to Reuters western powers suspect it is Iran's tactic to turn away or delay sanctions. (“Iran to go ahead with Turkey atom fuel swap- report,” Reuters. 22 May 2010)

17 May 2010: Turkey says Iran has agreed on a nuclear fuel swap deal."Yes, it has been reached after almost 18 hours of negotiations," says the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu flew to Iran to join the Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva who has been negotiated with Iranian officials. Western and Russian authorities has seen the deal as the last chance for Iran to avoid new UN sanction. (“Turkey, Brazil seal deal on Iran nuclear fuel swap,” Reuters, 17 May 2010)

5 May 2010:According to Reuters the Iranian President Ahmadinejad has agreed in principal to Brazil's mediation over the nuclear fuel deal. The deal offered Iran in October was to ship 1200 kg LEU to France and Russia to make it into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. Iran rejected the proposal saying it would only swap its material within its own regional which the parties in the deal considered unacceptable. Some nonpermanent members of the Security Council, like Turkey and Brazil are trying to resume the stalled mediations to help Iran avoid further sanctions. (“Iran agrees “in principal” to Brazil's mediation,” Reuters, 5 May 2010)

1 May 2010: Hillary Clinton said the Obama administration is open for negotiation with Iran over its nuclear program and stressed there is no hard and fast deadline. Iran's foreign minister welcomed the idea and agreed that deadlines are meaningless. (“Iran welcomes Hillary Clinton comments on nuclear talks,” MENAFN Saudi Press Agency, 1 May 2010)

18 February 2010: The IAEA Director General released his latest report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran.

10 February 2010: Press TV quoted Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic energy Organization, as indicating that enrichment could still be suspended if the West accepted its terms for a contentious deal to swap Iran’s stockpile for imported fuel rods. “So the deal is still on the table. If they come forward and supply the fuel, then we will stop the 20-percent enrichment,” Mr. Salehi said. However, he said Tehran still insisted that the swap be made simultaneously and on Iranian soils, which many western officials think will be rejected by the United States. (Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, "U.S. Eyes New Sanctions Over Iran Nuclear Program," New York Times, 10 February 2010.) Also on Wednesday, US officials indicated that the United States would be willing to help Iran purchase medical isotopes on the international market to prevent Iran from enriching uranium to such levels. (Glen Kessler, "U.S. unveils offer to help Iran purchase medical isotopes," The Washington Post, 10 February 2010.)

9 February 2010: President Obama said in a news conference, “We have bent over backwards to say to the Islamic Republic of Iran that we are willing to have a constructive conversation about how they can align themselves with international norms and rules and re-enter as full members of the international community.” He also said that his administration is “developing a significant regime of sanctions that will indicate to them how isolated they are from the international community as a whole.” The sanctions reportedly focus on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran, publicly singling out the organization’s vast array of companies, banks, and other entities. In putting together a UN Security Council resolution that names specific companies and the wide web of assets owned by the Guards, which include even the Tehran airport, the administration says it hopes to substantially increase pressure on the organization, which one senior administration official described as a new “entitled class” in Iran. (Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, "U.S. Eyes New Sanctions Over Iran Nuclear Program," New York Times, 10 February 2010.)

4 February 2010: Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said that pressure for tighter sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program could block chances of a diplomatic settlement on the issue. He argued, “To talk about sanctions at the moment will complicate the situation and might stand in the way of finding a diplomatic solution.” “China firmly supports the international nuclear nonproliferation regime,” Mr. Yang said. “All countries, Iran included if they obey I.A.E.A. rules, have a right to a peaceful use of nuclear energy.” (Alan Cowell, "China Renews Opposition to Iran Sanctions," New York Times, 4 February 2010.)

3 February 2010: Ali Akbar Salehi, director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said that no deal has been struck to export uranium for enrichment abroad. He explained, "The discussions are still being conducted, and we will inform the nation of any final agreements." ("Iran's nuclear agency chief: No uranium export plan finalized," CNN, 3 February 2010.) The same day, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Iran faces the prospect of "severe sanctions" from the United States and other major powers over its suspect nuclear activities. He did not specify what financial or other penalties might be imposed on Tehran. The US Senate has called for imposing sanctions that would target its thirst for petrol imports, punishing non-Iranian firms that do business in Iran's energy sector or help the country produce or import refined oil products, though the Obama administration has reportedly so far resisted the proposal. ("Iran faces 'severe sanctions' over nuclear program: Gates," AFP, 3 February 2010.)

2 February 2010: Iranian President Ahmadinejad voiced support for the IAEA-brokered uranium enrichment deal. The deal, which Iran formally rejected weeks ago, would swap low-enriched uranium for fuel for a research reactor that produces medical isotopes. "If we allow them to take it, there is no problem," Ahmadinejad said on state TV. "We sign a contract to give 3.5 percent enriched uranium and receive 20 percent enriched ones after four or five months." US officials reacted cautiously to Ahmadinejad's remarks. White House spokesman Mike Hammer said, "If Mr. Ahmadinejad's comments reflect an updated Iranian position, we look forward to Iran informing the IAEA." (Thomas Erdbrink and Glenn Kessler, "Ahmadinejad backs deal to remove bulk of enriched uranium from Iran," The Washington Post, 3 February 2010.)

29 January 2010: The IAEA Director General said dialogue was continuing on a draft deal on enriched uranium between Iran and world powers even though the Iranian government seems to have turned down the deal. DG Yukiya Amano said the deal was still on the table and that dialogue is continuing. ("Dialogue on stalled Iran atom deal goes on: IAEA head," Reuters, 29 January 2010.)

28 January 2010: The US Senate voted in favour of new sanctions against Iran, targeting gasoline imports. The Senate bill, which passed by voice vote, must now be blended with a similar bill in the House of Representatives to forge a compromise measure for both sides to approve and send to President Barack Obama. ("US Senate votes to slap new sanctions on Iran," AFP, 28 January 2010.) Meanwhile, the Chinese government called for efforts to resume dialogue with Iran, arguing, "Iran's nuclear issue should be resolved through diplomatic efforts and negotiations." During an international conference on Afghanistan, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been working to garner international support for new sanctions against Iran, arguing that Iran had made no efforts to reach a compromise with the international community over its nuclear programme. But the Chinese have been pushing for resumption of dialogue and negotiations. ("China still leery on U.S. sanctions push for Iran," Reuters, 28 January 2010.)

20 January 2010: The Iranian government notified the IAEA in writing that it does not accept some of the draft deal to send most of its enriched uranium abroad. Diplomats said Iran's position on enriching uranium abroad was reflected in a memo sent to the IAEA. It repeated verbal calls for amendments that Western powers had dismissed as non-starters but said did not amount to a final response. US State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley described the response as "inadequate": "I am not sure that whatever they have done, perhaps today, is any different than what they have done previously." (Reuters, "Iran Spurns Nuclear Fuel Deal In Writing - Diplomats," New York Times, 20 January 2010.)

10 January 2010: Iranian news reports and US official sources said that that in early January, the Iranian foreign ministry returned a formal counter offer to swap low enriched uranium, or LEU, in exchange for nuclear fuel cells produced in the West. The originally offer from the IAEA, the Tehran Research Reactor proposal, or TRR, calls on Iran to immediately send 1,200 kg of its LEU to Russia, and France would in return supply Iran with nuclear fuel cells for medical use. The plan would have left Iran without enough fissile material to enrich for use in a nuclear weapon, putting time back on the clock for international negotiations on the nation’s nuclear program. Iran’s counter-offer also proposes sending the 1,200 kg abroad – probably to Turkey – but in batches, starting with a first shipment of 400 kg. ("Iran offers nuke fuel deal," Politico, 10 January 2010.)

6 January 2010: Zhang Yesui, the Chinese ambassador to the United Nations, argued that imposing tougher sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program is a poor idea while diplomatic negotiations remain possible. “Sanctions themselves are not an end,” Ambassador Zhang said at a news conference. He called for more time and patience, noting that senior political officials from the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany were expected to meet in the coming weeks to discuss the next steps. Ambassador Zhang said remarks by Iranian officials over the past few days indicated their interest in finding a diplomatic resolution. “This also represents that there is more to happen in the area of talks,” he said. (Neil McFarquhar, "Chinese Envoy Objects to More Penalties for Iran," New York Times, 6 January 2009.)

6 December 2009: In an interview the Washington Post, former IAEA Director General ElBaradei described the 27 November IAEA resolution on Iran's nuclear programme as an "act of frustration," emphasizing that it does not signal the end to the pursuit of a diplomatic solution. He explained, "The same people who sponsored the resolution continue to talk about the importance of reaching out to Iran. . . . What we saw from Iran after the resolution was like a tantrum. I hope the tantrum will subside and go away, and they will see their interest, which is clearly to engage on a basis of respect and goodwill. I also hope that the U.S. and its partners will see the need to be slightly more patient, and realize that we will have to go through this domestic hype by Iran and get back on the right track, which is engagement. I don't see any other way."

ElBaradei also argued that current efforts of US diplomacy are not naïve or misguided, noting, "The policy that was in place for the previous six years failed. In my view the problem could have been resolved four to five years ago if the previous policy was more pragmatic and based on realism, not ideology." (Joby Warrick, "A nuclear watchdog's parting shots," Washington Post, 6 December 2009.)

5 December 2009: Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, emphasized that Iran would not seek to pull out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Mr. Salehi sought to assure that Iran had no interest in pulling out of the treaty, and he implied that any other suggestion was an attempt by Western countries to force Iran into a corner. “I think the West is trying to force us out of the N.P.T.,” he was quoted as saying on the Press TV Web site. The speaker of Iran’s Parliament, Ali Larijani, also urged moderation, saying that the government should not be “pushed into hasty reactions,” the ISNA news agency quoted him as saying. “You should demand that authorities use all possible ways to serve national interests,” he said. Mr. Larijani characterized the United Nations nuclear agency’s resolution as a “light move” that had then brought an “initial reaction” by Iran. (Nazila Fathi, "Iran Will Not Quit Treaty, Its Nuclear Chief Asserts," New York Times, 5 December 2009.)

2 December 2009: Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran would move to aim to enrich its uranium to 20% for medical applications. (David E. Sanger and Jack Healy, "Iran President Says Nuclear Enrichment Will Increase," New York Times, 2 December 2009.)

1 December 2009: The IAEA said that the Iranian government has not yet officially informed it the reported decision to build ten more uranium enrichment facilities. Agency spokeswoman Gill Tudor said, “The agency will be seeking clarification from Iran on its announcement.” ("IAEA says not informed of Iran's enrichment plans," AFP, 1 December 2009.)

29 November 2009: Iranian parliament announced through state media that it plans to build ten more uranium enrichment facilities.

27 November 2009: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 35-member Board of Governors passed a resolution with 25 in favour, 7 abstentions, and 3 against criticising Iran for constructing a second enrichment plant near the holy city of Qom without informing the IAEA of its actions. The resolution urges Iran to comply with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions on its nuclear programme, to engage with the IAEA on resolving all outstanding issues, to ratify the Additional Protocol and apply the modified Code 3.1, and to confirm that it has not taken a decision to construct any other nuclear facility that has not yet been declared to the IAEA.

20 November 2009: IAEA Director General ElBaradei urged Iran to accept an offer to process its enriched uranium abroad by the end of 2009 and advised Western powers not to impose further sanctions on Tehran. He said a plan brokered by the IAEA in which Iran would send low-enriched uranium to Russia and France for conversion into fuel for a Tehran medical reactor was a rare chance to defuse mistrust over its nuclear program. "I would hope definitely that we'll get an agreement before the end of the year," he told a news conference in Berlin. "I believe frankly the ball is very much in the Iranian court. I hope they will not miss this unique but fleeting opportunity." Noting that under Obama the United States had taken a "creative and pragmatic" approach to resolving the impasse over Tehran's nuclear program, ElBaradei used the news conference to send a message directly to the Iranian leadership: "You need to engage in creative diplomacy, you need to understand that this is the first time that you will have a genuine commitment from an American president to engage you fully, on the basis of respect, with no conditions. Don't lose that opportunity."

The P5 + 1 met in Brussels to discuss what to do about Iran's preliminary rejection of the nuclear fuel deal. Obama warned Tehran it would have to face "consequences," an allusion to broader international sanctions. ElBaradei said he was opposed to the imposition of more punitive sanctions if Tehran did finally reject the proposal. "Are sanctions going to resolve the issue? I don't think so. In my view sanctions are going to make things much worse," he said, adding that this would probably make Iran "more hawkish." (Dave Graham, "ElBaradei urges Iran to agree fuel deal by year end," Reuters, 20 November 2009.)

19 November 2009: President Obama says the US and its partners are discussing "a package of potential steps" they could take if Iran declines the international uranium enrichment deal. He said Iran needed to get a "clear message" that, if it failed to take advantage of such opportunities, it was "making itself less secure". He said Iran would not be given an unlimited amount of time, comparing the Iranian nuclear issue to the years of stop-and-start negotiations with North Korea about its nuclear ambitions. ("US considers response to Iran nuclear snub," BBC, 19 November 2009.)

18 November 2009: The Iranian government issued a tentative response to IAEA Director General ElBaradei, rejecting the international nuclear fuel deal. However, ElBaradei said the response was not written and does not reflect Iran's final position. "I do not consider that I have received a final answer," ElBaradei said. "What I got is an oral response, basically saying we need to keep all the material in Iran until we get the fuel. That to me is an extreme case of distrust." (Dave Graham, "ElBaradei urges Iran to agree fuel deal by year end," Reuters, 20 November 2009.)

16 November 2009: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei circulated his latest report on nuclear safeguards in Iran to the Agency's Board of Governors, the 35-member policymaking body, in advance of their meeting next week. The report notes that the IAEA continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. However, regarding the new enrichment plant at revealed in September 2009 near Qom, the report also argues that Iran’s failure to inform the Agency of the decision to construct a new facility as soon as such a decision is taken is inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. The report continues to urge Iran to implement the Additional Protocol and cooperate with the IAEA to resolve outstanding issues. It also urges those states that have provided documentation to the Agency to agree to share more of that documentation with Iran.

The reports outline developments since the Director General's report of 28 August 2009:

It notes that that the declared maximum enrichment level (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment) has not been exceeded at either the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz or the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. It also reports that there are no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at the Tehran Research Reactor and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility. The report notes that no UF6 has been produced at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan since 10 August 2009.

The report also details the IAEA's interactions with Iran over the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant at Qom, arguing that "even if, as stated by Iran, the decision to construct the new facility at the Fordow site was taken in the second half of 2007, Iran’s failure to notify the Agency of the new facility until September 2009 was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement."

Regarding Iran's heavy water reactor related projects, the IAEA reviewed the updated design information questionnaire for the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan. The report notes that the questionnaire did not contain information on the design features of the IR-40 fuel assembly. The Agency provided comments on the design information questionnaire to Iran on 5 November 2009, reiterating its request that Iran include the fuel assembly information. The Agency has concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at FMP as declared by Iran is consistent with the results of the IAEA's physical inventory verification carried out in August 2009. The report says the construction of the Arak IR-40 reactor was ongoing but the heavy water production plant seems not to have been operating since the last report.

Regarding the nuclear power plant Iran intends to build Darkhovin, the report explains that the IAEA has examined the design information provided by Iran on 22 September and has requested Iran to provide additional clarifications regarding, inter alia, the design of the fuel assemblies and the facility layout. The report also argues that as with the Qom facility, Iran’s failure to submit design information for the Darkhovin facility until September of this year was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.

The IAEA Board of Governors will discuss the report when it next convenes in Vienna on 26 November.

11 November 2009: President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared Iran's readiness for international nuclear cooperation, including on a global fuel bank. "One of the most important issues of today is definitely nuclear cooperation at the international level, whether in building a power station or reactor or whether it is about Iran's presence in the global fuel bank," Ahmadinejad said. (Ramin Mostafavi, Hossein Jaseb, Fredrik Dah, Andrew Dobbie, "Ahmadinejad suggests Iran role in atom fuel bank," Reuters, 11 November 2009.)

8 November 2009: Iran's chief negotiator in talks with Western powers over its atomic program said on Sunday he hoped a draft deal on nuclear fuel would be reached soon. "Tehran still welcomes the negotiations (with the six powers) on the basis of its package of proposals," state broadcaster IRIB quoted Saeed Jalili as saying. It said he hoped the talks "will be completed as quickly as possible." Iran says talks are needed on the nuclear deal and that wants to import atomic fuel rather than send its own uranium abroad for processing. (Reza Derakhshi, Andrew Hammond, Mark Trevelyan, "Iran atomic negotiator says wants speedy talks," Reuters, 8 November 2009.)

Meanwhile, the Obama administration reportedly told Iran’s leaders in back-channel messages through the IAEA that it is willing to allow the country to send its stockpile of enriched uranium to any of several nations, including Turkey, for temporary safekeeping, according to administration officials and diplomats involved in the exchanges. US officials reported that the Iranians suggested that international arms inspectors take custody of much of Iran’s fuel, but keep it on Kish, a Persian Gulf resort island that is part of Iran. A senior Obama administration official said that proposal had been rejected because leaving the nuclear material on Iranian territory would allow for the possibility that the Iranians could evict the international inspectors at any moment. The intermediary in the exchanges between Washington and Tehran has been Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the energy agency. He confirmed some of the proposals — including one to send Iran’s fuel to Turkey, which has nurtured close relations with Iran — in interviews in New York late last week. (David E. Sanger, "Iran Said to Ignore Effort to Salvage Nuclear Deal ," New York Times, 8 November 2009.)

7 November 2009: The IAEA carried out a design information verification at the IR-40 reactor at Arak. The Agency verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing. The Agency has continued using satellite imagery to monitor the status of the Heavy Water Production Plant, which seems not to have been operating since the last report.

6 November 2009: In a letter, the IAEA asked Iran to confirm that it had not taken a decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which had not been declared to the Agency.

2 November 2009: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei urged Iran to respond quickly to his nuclear fuel proposal while warning the world against using force. "I therefore urge Iran to be as forthcoming as possible in responding soon to my recent proposal based on the initiative of the United States, Russia and France which aimed to engage Iran in a series of measures that could build confidence and trust," ElBaradei told the U.N. General Assembly. Such measures, he said, could lead to a substantive dialogue between Iran and the international community. ("UN wants swift response from Iran on fuel proposal," Reuters, 2 November 2009.)

29 October 2009: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has received an initial response from the Iranian authorities to his proposal to use Iran´s low-enriched uranium for manufacturing fuel for the continued operation of the Tehran Research Reactor, which is devoted mainly to producing radioisotopes for medical purposes. According to the IAEA, the Director General is engaged in consultations with the government of Iran as well as all relevant parties, with the hope that agreement on his proposal can be reached soon. The response has not been made public, though the New York Times noted that it came as the Iranian president made his most positive comments to date on the effort, saying, “We welcome cooperation on nuclear fuel, power plants and technology, and we are ready to cooperate.”

The Washington Post reported that in a speech in the northeastern city of Mashhad, President Ahmadinejad defied harsh criticism from domestic opponents who accused him of giving away too much in the negotiations. He said the West has been forced to alter its confrontational stance toward Iran, state television reported.

28 October 2009: The Agency held a second meeting (the first was on 25 October) in Tehran to review the design information questionnaire on the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant at Qom and to discuss the chronology of the design and construction of the plant as well as its status and purpose. As agreed at the 25 October meeting, Iran submitted a revised design information questionnaire to the IAEA during this meeting.

In a letter to the IAEA, Iran confirmed its earlier explanation that the Fordow site had been allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the second half of 2007, and that that was when the construction of FFEP had started. The letter stated:

“As a result of the augmentation of the threats of military attacks against Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran decided to establish contingency centers for various organizations and activities …

“The Natanz Enrichment Plant was among the targets threatened with military attacks. Therefore, the Atomic Energy Organization requested the Passive Defence Organization to allocate one of those aforementioned centers for the purpose of [a] contingency enrichment plant, so that the enrichment activities shall not be suspended in the case of any military attack. In this respect, the Fordow site, being one of those constructed and prepared centers, [was] allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the second half of 2007. The construction of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant then started.
The construction is still ongoing. Thus the plant is not yet ready for operation and it is planned to be operational in 2011.”

However, during this and the 25 October meeting, the IAEA reportedly informed Iran that it had acquired commercially available satellite imagery of the site indicating that there had been construction at the site between 2002 and 2004, and that construction activities were resumed in 2006 and had continued to date. The Agency also referred to the extensive information given to the Agency by a number of Member States detailing the design of the facility, which was consistent with the design as verified by the Agency during the DIV. The Agency also informed Iran that these Member States alleged that design work on the facility had started in 2006.

The Agency further indicated that it still had questions about the purpose for which the facility had been intended and how it fit into Iran’s nuclear programme. The Agency also indicated that Iran’s declaration of the new facility reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities under construction and gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran which had not been declared to the Agency.

Iran stated that it did not have any other nuclear facilities that were currently under construction or in operation that had not yet been declared to the Agency. Iran also stated that any such future facilities would “be reported to the Agency according to Iran’s obligations to the Agency”.

27 October 2009: According to the BBC and Reuters, Iranian state-media, Al-Alam TV, has reported that Iran will accept the draft UN deal on its nuclear programme but wants major amendments. Citing an unnamed official, the satellite television station said Iran would present its response to the proposed agreement within 48 hours. It reported that Iran opposed the idea of sending most of its low-enriched uranium reserve abroad for processing all in one go.

26-27 October 2009: The IAEA carried out design information verification at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) at Qom. The Agency verified that FFEP was being built to contain sixteen cascades with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges. Iran indicated that it currently planned to install only IR-1 centrifuges at FFEP, but that the facility could be reconfigured to contain centrifuges of more advanced types should Iran take a decision to use such centrifuges in the future. Iran stated that some of the equipment located at FFEP had come from the Natanz site, and that the Natanz site would provide functional support to FFEP, such as centrifuge assembly and
decontamination of equipment. Iran also stated that no nuclear material had been introduced into FFEP.

According to the IAEA Report on 16 November 2009, the design information verification included a detailed visual examination of all areas of the plant, the taking of photographs of cascade piping and other process equipment, the taking of environmental samples and a detailed assessment of the design, configuration and capacity of the various plant components and systems. Iran provided access to all areas of the facility. The Agency confirmed that the plant corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the facility was at an advanced stage of construction, although no centrifuges had been introduced into the facility. Centrifuge mounting pads, header and sub-header pipes, water piping, electrical cables and cabinets had been put in place but were not yet connected; the passivation tanks, chemical traps, cold traps and cool boxes were also in place but had not been connected. In addition, a utilities building containing electricity transformers and water chillers had also been erected.

25 October 2009: The Agency held a meeting in Tehran to review the design information questionnaire (DIQ) on the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) at Qom and to discuss the chronology of the design and construction of the plant as well as its status and purpose. The IAEA provided comments on the preliminary DIQ submitted by Iran, and requested that a revised preliminary DIQ be submitted with additional information. Iran informed the Agency that it would provide further information required in the DIQ as the facility is developed. The Agency informed Iran that, in accordance with its Safeguards Agreement, FFEP will henceforth be subject to regular design information verification by the Agency. The next design information verification is scheduled for the end of November 2009.

Iran explained that the Fordow site had been allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in the second half of 2007, and that that was when the construction of FFEP had started.

The IAEA also carried out a design information verification at the Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan.

24 October 2009: The IAEA announced that its inspectors have left for Tehran to visit the Qom nuclear site.

23 October 2009: The United States, Russia and France indicated their positive response to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's proposal on a draft agreement to supply Iran with nuclear fuel for its research reactor, which amongst other things produces radioisotopes for medical purposes. Iran informed the Director General that it is considering the proposal in depth and in a favourable light, but it needs time until the middle of next week to provide a response.

22 October 2009: During talks between Iran, the Untied States, Russia, and France in Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei proposed an agreement that would transfer the bulk of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile out of the country. The deal, which must be affirmed by all four governments, would require Iran to rid itself of nearly 80 percent of its reported stockpile. Russia would convert Iran's enriched uranium into reactor fuel, while France would take that material and fashion it into the metal plates used for the reactor. International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei said, "I cross my fingers that by Friday we have an okay by all the parties concerned. I very much hope that people see the big picture -- that this agreement could pave the way for a complete normalization of relations between Iran and the international community." Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, said that the draft is "on the right track" but that it needs approval from Tehran. "We have to thoroughly study this text and also [need] further elaboration in capitals," Soltanieh told reporters.

19 October 2009: Nuclear talks between Iran and the United States, Russia, and France, began in Vienna.

18 October 2009: Under cover of a letter to the IAEA, Iran submitted a preliminary design information questionnaire for the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant at Qom.

4 October 2009: During a meeting with the IAEA Director General in Tehran, Iran agreed to provide the Agency with access to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant at Qom.

1 October 2009: US and Iranian officials held their first direct talks in 30 years on the margins of a meeting between the P5+1 (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany) and Iran in Geneva. The parties agreed to a second round of talks by the end of the month. The US government expressed its interest in “a process that leads to a resolution of the concerns that we have,” noting that “the process will take some time, and we’re not going to make a snap judgement ... As the President has said, at the end of the year, we will be in a position to evaluate any progress that has been made over the course of this period of time. And in that – then we’ll be in a better position to evaluate what we should do next.”

During the talks, Iran agreed to allow Iranian low-enriched uranium (LEU) to be sent to Russia for further enrichment, probably from about 5 percent to about 20 percent, and then transported to France to be fabricated into fuel rods to feed the Iranian research reactor, which is used to produce isotopes used for medical purposes. One commentator noted:

This had many dimensions. First, it reduced the Iranian LEU stock below the level required to produce a nuclear device. Second, it established the principle that Iranian enrichment could be conducted outside the country. But third, it promised to provide Iran with uranium enriched well above the level required for nuclear power reactors (but not yet at the level required for bomb-building). And lastly, it tacitly acknowledged Iran’s right to produce enriched uranium. Nothing in the reports we have seen to date indicate that the Western interlocutors insisted on the previous red line that Iran should abandon its enrichment program.

23 September 2009: The IAEA performed a design information verification at the Uranium Chemical Laboratory at Esfahan, and was able to confirm the decommissioned status of the facility (GOV/2009/55, para. 17).

22 September 2009: In a letter, Iran provided the IAEA with preliminary design information for the nuclear power plant to be built in Darkhovin. In the preliminary design information, the Darkhovin plant is described as a 360 MWe pressurized water reactor, the construction of which is scheduled to start in 2011, with commissioning to take place in 2015.

21 September 2009: The Iranian government revealed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) last week that it has been building a second uranium enrichment facility underground. The site is reportedly at a mountain site located on an Iranian military installation near the city of Qom and capable of housing up to 3000 centrifuges used to enrich uranium. The United States, United Kingdom, and France accused Iran of violating its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and have threatened tougher sanctions against the country.

However, the Iranian government argued that it is in compliance with its IAEA agreement, insisting that it no longer needs to provide early notification of the construction of nuclear facilities. The specific agreement in question, “modified Code 3.1,” was accepted by Iran in 2003 but not ratified by its parliament. In March 2007, Iran informed the IAEA that it had “suspended” implementation of the Code and would revert back to the implementation of its earlier, 1976 version. This original Code only requires the submission of design information for new facilities “normally not later than 180 days before the facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time.” However, the IAEA argues that the modified Code, which indicates that “countries must notify inspectors as soon as a decision is made to build a nuclear plant,” is still applicable to Iran. The Agency says that states who adopted the modified Code cannot unilaterally revert to the old Code.

The Iranian government has invited the IAEA to inspect the site. President Ahmadinejad reiterated Iran’s position that Iran is not interested in developing nuclear weapons.

20 September 2009: Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said, "The U.S. officials who claim that the Iranian missiles are dangerous or that we are seeking to produce atomic bombs know themselves that such statements are false. We fundamentally reject nuclear weapons and prohibit the use and production of nuclear weapons." Khamenei issued a fatwa, a religious edict, against nuclear weapons five years ago. (Washington Post, 20/09/09)

15 September 2009: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the Iranian nuclear programme would be at the top of the US agenda during the scheduled 1 October meeting, even though Iranian officials have said it is off the table. “Iran says it has a number of issues it wishes to discuss with us,” Mrs. Clinton told reporters. “But what we are concerned about is discussing with them the questions surrounding their nuclear program and ambitions.” (NYT, 15/09/09)

14 September 2009: European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana and Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili agreed to begin talks between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany) on 1 October. US Secretary of Energy Steven Chu said: "It's an important first step and we are hoping for the best."

13 September 2009: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that Iran is ready to discuss global issues with world powers, but that its nuclear programme was non-negotiable.

11 September 2009: The P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany) accepted Iran's offer of comprehensive talks, to test out if Iran was serious about negotiations. "The United States and five partner countries have decided to accept Iran's new offer to hold talks, even though Iran insists it will not negotiate over its disputed nuclear program," State Department spokesman PJ Crowley said at the State Department briefing. "The ball is in Iran’s court whether it is prepared to seriously engage in the nuclear issue, as well as others," Crowley said in a further statement by email. "We are following a two-track strategy along with our partners in the P5+1 process – engagement and pressure. Iran’s response will feed into the stock-taking that the President indicated we will make. If Iran refuses to engage seriously, we will take that into account."

Meanwhile, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin reiterated his country’s opposition to a military strike or new economic sanctions on Iran over the nuclear program. Spokesman Dmitry Peskov cited Putin as saying, there is no reason to believe the project has anything but peaceful ends.

9 September 2009: The Iranian government submitted a five-page proposal to the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany), in which it offers to hold "comprehensive, all-encompassing and constructive" negotiations on a range of security issues, including global nuclear disarmament. The document does not mention Iran's nuclear programme.

28 August 2009: The IAEA Director General released his latest report on the implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement and Security Council resolutionsin Iran. The report explains once again there is no diversion of highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes and that Iran is cooperating on verification of its fuel enrichment activities, even though it is not complying with UNSC resolutions demanding that it stop its enrichment programme altogether. It also notes that Iran is also refusing to implement the Additional Protocol that it informally abided by under the Paris Agreement until 2006 and that it is not cooperating on explaining legacy data which may relate to past military-related research.

25 August 2009: As the IAEA prepares to welcome a new Director General on 30 November of this year, there is mounting pressure for ElBaradei to release a secret document detailing all the IAEA knows about Iran’s nuclear programme. The US and other western states have been pushing for the IAEA to make the report available to the 35 board-member nations when it releases its latest report on Iran in two weeks. Up until this point, only a few top officials have had access.

Speaking to reporters last week, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Hassan Qashqavi, said "All our nuclear activities have been within the framework of the agency and the NPT,” adding, “...ElBaradei has always confirmed Iran's co-operation with the agency.” Mr. Qashqavi verified that IAEA inspectors were given access to the Iran’s Narak nuclear site last week and ensured that Iran is taking steps with the IAEA to improve monitoring at the Natanz nuclear enrichment plant and well as Iran’s newest heavy water reactor in Bushehr.

19 August 2009: On Thursday, Iranian state television reported that Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s envoy to the IAEA, had indicated Iran was prepared to “take part in any negotiations which are based on mutual respect…Talks without preconditions is Iran's main stance in negotiations on the nuclear issue." Ambassador Soltanieh has since said that the statements have been taken out of context and they only refer to a recent letter to IAEA requesting a meeting to approve an Iranian initiative to ban strikes on nuclear facilities. “The only issue that was raised,” he said, “was to ban threats and attacks on the world's nuclear installations, because it is an international issue.”

The possible ban was proposed by Iran Wednesday and would seek approval by 150 nations in September. The resolution would prohibit all armed attacks against nuclear installations around the world.

7 August 2009: A newly disclosed Congressional document detailing US Intelligence on Iran, reports that the Islamic Republic will not be able to produce weapons-grade nuclear material before 2013. The analysis by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research states that the assessment has been made based on current technological capabilities and is not an assessment of whether or not Iran will make “the political decision” to produce such weapons. The document was released to Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientist's Project on Government Secrecy and can be found on their website.

20 June 2009: According to Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki, Iran is preparing a set of new proposals in order to restart talks on the country's nuclear program with the United States and Europe. The European Union announced they were attempting to set up new talks, which would be the first since US President Barack Obama took office in January. Mr. Mottaki said of the development, “We do believe that this new proposed package would be a very good base for mutual cooperation on the international level.” Mr. Mottaki’s statement echoes those made by Iranian President Ahmadinejad in April in which he said, “conditions had changed” and indicated that the current international atmosphere was more conducive to the talks. In a statement made Wednesday, the Iranian government said it would welcome “constructive” discussion with other world powers, but would continue its uranium enrichment activities.

15 June 2009: During the opening of the Board of Governors meeting, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported on the Iranian situation:

You have before you my report on Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Regrettably, however, Iran has not implemented any of the measures called for by the Security Council and by the Agency´s Board of Governors. And there has been no movement by Iran on outstanding issues which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran´s nuclear programme. As I mentioned before, without implementation by Iran of the additional protocol and the required safeguards measures, as well as the clarification of outstanding issues, the Agency will not be able to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran.

I am encouraged, nonetheless, by the new initiative of the United States to engage the Islamic Republic of Iran in direct dialogue, without preconditions and on the basis of mutual respect. This gives reason for hope that a genuine dialogue may lead to a comprehensive settlement of many security, political and economic issues spanning over 50 years. A key element of such a settlement should be arrangements for Iran to exercise its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, while providing the necessary assurance to the international community about the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. I hope that Iran will respond to the US initiative with an equal gesture of goodwill and trust-building. This could include implementing again the Agency´s design information requirements and applying the provisions of the additional protocol. It is my hope that the dialogue will begin as soon as possible, perhaps with a "freeze-for-freeze" as a prelude.

10 June 2009: According to the head of Russia’s state-owned nuclear contractor, Atomstroiexport, the opening of Iran’s Bushehr power plant is being delayed due to financial problems. Atomstoiexport was contracted by the Tehran to help build Iran’s first nuclear power plant, which was slated to begin working this summer, however Russian banks are refusing to work with Iran and is causing its completion to be delayed. “The problems with financing exist because not all Russian banks are ready to work with Iran, and we have to find alternative options,” said Atomstroiexport head, Dan Belenky. Mr. Belenky could not say when Bushehr would open.

5 June 2009: The International Atomic Energy Agency released its latest Director General's report on Iran.

29 April 2009: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has called upon the United Nations Security Council to confine the probe into Iran’s nuclear program to the IAEA and leave the UNSC out of it. In the United States, Congress put forth a bipartisan proposal that would strengthen economic sanctions against foreign oil and shipping firms that do business with Iran. The Obama administration has indicated that it would not move to block the bills, which are likely to pass in both the House and Senate, giving extended executive powers to strengthen sanctions against Iran. Under the Senate proposal, firms under US jurisdiction, which could include Shell, BP, Reliance and Vitol, would be barred from doing business in the United States unless Iran made concessions in regards to its alleged nuclear program. "We need to give them a choice: you can do business with Iran's $250 billion economy or our $13 trillion economy, but not both," said Republican Senator, Jon Kyl of Arizona, one of the leading proponents of the bill.

22 March 2009: Speaking to Voice of Russia, Russian Prime Minister’s Press Secretary, Dmitry Peskov, suggested the possibility of Russia working with Iran and Turkey to build nuclear power plants for energy hungry states. Mr. Peskov described Iran as the major power player in the Middle East despite sanctions, adding, "Those who strictly oppose to Washington and Tel Aviv's policies have pinned their hopes on Iran."

12 March 2009: In a letter to the UN Security Council, Iran's deputy ambassador to the United Nations, Eshaq Alehabib, refuted allegations regarding the nature of Iran’s nuclear energy program made by Britain, France and the United States. Asserting that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA has gone beyond its obligations under the NPT, Mr. Alehabib stated that any claims otherwise are “absolutely baseless.” Mr. Alehabib further declares further in the letter that, "The full settlement of the 6 outstanding issues on the one hand, and the undertaking of Iran's... nuclear activities within the IAEA framework on the other hand, have made it quite clear that there is no ambiguity in Iran's present and past activities."

10 March 2009: Iran’s Minister of Energy, Parviz Fattah announced in a news conference that Iran’s first nuclear power plant Bushehr will be operational by the end of Summer 2009. The plant is expected by the Ministry to generate 500 of the total 1,000 megawatts by August 22. Mr. Fattah stated that the plant should be fully operational by March 21, 2010.

26 February 2009: The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, announced in a joint press conference with the head of Russia's Federal Nuclear Agency, Sergei Kiriyenko, that Iran will install an additional 50,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium at its Natanz plant. Mr. Aqazadeh said the new centrifuges will be technologically more advanced than the current ones. Mr. Aqazadeh also called on the West to accept “living with a nuclear Iran” as he announced Iran’s intention to build its second nuclear power plant, Darkhoein, in the southern region of the country. Additionally, the officials announced that one-year from the inauguration of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Iran and Russia will establish a joint-nuclear power firm. Mr. Kiriyenko stated, "Anyone who thinks this project can be used for the proliferation of nuclear weapons can come here and see for themselves."

30 January 2009: Political directors from the UN Security Council permanent members - UK, China, France, Russia and the United States - plus Germany announced they will meet in in Germany on Wednesday, 4 February for their first meeting since US President Barack Obama took office.

26 January 2009: Thomas Steg, a spokesman for the German government, said Germany has drastically cut its export guarantees for companies trading with Iran in a bid to ratchet up pressure on Tehran over its nuclear programme. Berlin has asked German firms exporting to Iran to "voluntarily limit" their trade and "to recognise that it would be wise to support the diplomatic efforts of the international community."

15 December 2008: Ministers from the P5+1 met with those from Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and Gulf Cooperation Council states at the UN to discuss Iran's nuclear programme.

7 December 2008: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said the policy toward Iran so far has been a failure, explaining, "We haven't really moved one inch toward addressing the issues." ElBaradei pointed out that sanctions may have led to "more hardening of the position of Iran.... Many Iranians who even dislike the regime (are) gathering around the regime because they feel that country is under siege."

21 November 2008: European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana said he was "worried" by the IAEA's latest report, arguing the report indicates Iran is "not cooperating" with the IAEA investigation and that the figures quoted on the numebr of centrifuges - 3800, according to an unnamed diplomat, "are troublesome".

19 November 2008: The IAEA Director General released his latest report on the "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran." According to Mike Veiluva of Western States Legal Foundation,

Even though the latest IAEA report once again clears Iran of any diversion of nuclear material, and concludes that its ongoing enrichment program has produced only low level enrichment uranium of less than 5% (LEU), the reaction of the American press has been hysterical. Led by a Judith Miller-style hit piece in the New York Times last week by Sanger and Broad, the newspapers have been tip-tapping calculators to conclude that if Iran locked down its program and enriched all of its LEU to HEU levels, it would now have enough to make a single atomic bomb. Just what Iran would do with a single heavy Hiroshima-type uranium bomb (no missiles in Iran’s current inventory are capable of hefting such a 4000kg device) is left to the imagination.

Regarding the report, Veiluva explains, "There is nothing new here. The IAEA finds that there continues to be no diversion of nuclear material, all enrichment remains subject to inspection, and all at low levels. The report continues to harp on Iran’s non-cooperation over issues and documents brought up by the US in early 2008 concerning legacy military research and applications."

Iran's IAEA ambassador Ali Asghar Solnanieh reportedly said, "This report shows that Iran ... has fulfilled its legal obligation completely. Therefore having further expectation (from Iran) is illogical and can not be carried out." Soltanieh insisted that Iran has replied to the documents that accuse Iran of trying to develop a nuclear warhead, convert uranium, and test high explosives and a missile re-entry vehicle.

14 November 2008: The political directors from China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States and a representative for EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana met in Paris to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue. The French foreign ministry they "reaffirmed their dual-track approach of dialogue and sanctions with Tehran." The ministry's statement said, "The meeting allowed the participants to review the current situation and to discuss the way ahead on both tracks," adding that the six powers would continue their talks on the next steps in the coming weeks.

20 October 2008: Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said that Russia sees no political obstacles to the start-up of the first reactor at Iran's Russian-built nuclear plant at Bushehr, indicating, "Right now, the final stages of preparing the station for launch are under way. Among the [P5+1], there is a full understanding that the work at Bushehr has no proliferation risks."

19 October 2008: The managing director of Iran's Management and Construction of Nuclear Plants Company, Hamid Soltani, said some Western countries have declared their readiness to cooperate with Iran on its project for a second nuclear power reactor in Darkhovin, which is located in the southern province of Khuzestan. Iran plans to begin the construction of the 360-megawatt light-water nuclear reactor by 2012. Soltani reportedly said, "The main part of the project is being done by local experts, but we will of course also try to use international experience, and several Western countries have already declared their readiness to cooperate with us in this project." He did not disclose the names of the Western countries, but pointed out Russia would not be involved as the plant was being built to Western standards.

18 October 2008: The IAEO deputy chief said Iran expects Russia to honour its commitments to complete Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran based on the previously agreed timetable. Russia is scheduled to deliver the remaining one thousand ton of equipment within four months.

8 October 2008: A US official said that representatives from the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany will soon discuss "next steps in the UN Security Council" regarding Iran's nuclear programme, via telephone.

2 October 2008: Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, said Iran would consider suspending uranium enrichment if the country were guaranteed a supply of nuclear fuel for its power stations. According to The Guardian, "Western officials responded cautiously to the remarks, pointing out that Iran had already been offered a legally binding fuel supply in a multinational proposal put forward in 2006, and renewed in June. But the officials said the comments by Ali Asghar Soltanieh marked a break from Tehran's customary insistence that it would not negotiate its right to enrich uranium." Speaking at at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, Soltanieh said, "We are going to continue as long as there is no legally binding internationally recognised instrument for assurance of supply."

When journalists asked whether Iran would end its uranium enrichment programme if such a guarantee were in place, Soltanieh reportedly said it would first have to be shown to be effective: "It is not only the piece of paper, you have to practise... the plan. We had a contract with the US and they did not fulfill their obligations... Germany had a contract and they did not."

27 September 2008: The Security Council passed another resolution on Iran, 1835, calling on Iran to comply with the other resolutions it has passed.

22 September 2008: Addressing the IAEA 35-member board of governors, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General ElBaradei said, "The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran." However, he also noted, "the Agency has not been able to make substantive progress on the alleged studies and associated questions relevant to possible military dimensions to Iran´s nuclear programme." Explaining that Iran continues to state that the documentation alleging Iran's nuclear weapon development is fabricated and that Iran has reiterated its request to be provided with originals, or even copies, of the documentation, ElBaradei called upon Member States which provided the Agency with documentation related to the alleged studies to authorize the Agency to share it with Iran. He also called upon Iran to "clarify the extent to which the documentation is factually correct and where, as it asserts, such information may have been fabricated or relates to non-nuclear purposes."

ElBaradei also noted, "the Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it have information - apart from the uranium metal document - on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon." That said, he also urged Iran to show "full transparency and to implement all measures required to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme at the earliest possible date."

15 September 2008: In a six-page report distributed to the UN Security Council and its own 35-member Board of Govenors, the International Atomic Energy Agency reportedly complained it was making little headway in investigating allegations that Iran had, in the past, been involved in studies to make a nuclear warhead. A senior UN official said, "We've arrived at a gridlock," describing the document as "a progress report without progress." He indicated that "Iran so far has not been forthcoming in replying to our questions. We seem to be at a dead end there." Since its last report in May, "the agency ... has not been able to make any substantive progress," the IAEA report said, calling the impasse a matter of "serious concern." Ali-Ashgar Soltanieh, Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA, asserted there was nothing for the agency to investigate as far as weapons programs were concerned.

The report also said Iran was now either fully or partially operating nearly 4,000 centrifuges at its cavernous underground facility at Natanz. Beyond those machines, which spin uranium gas into enriched uranium, it was testing 12 more advanced prototypes at its above-ground experimental site at Natanz.

The report will be taken up by the IAEA board of governors at a meeting in Vienna next week. See the Iran Daily Opinion Service for an analysis of the report, which says, "As with the previous report, it is good news and bad news. Taking the good news first, the IAEA’s inspections, including unannounced visits to Iran’s enrichment facilities, has uncovered no diversion of nuclear material, and that the enriched uranium remains below 5%, far below bomb-grade. The bad news: the IAEA concludes that Iran is stonewalling in its substantive responses to the documentation on potential military activities presented to it early this year. There is still virtually no evidence that Iran has anything, other than a single “uranium metal document” to indicate it has undertaken the actual design or manufacture of nuclear weapons components."

11 September 2008: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, US Permanent Representative to the UN, delivered a statement on Iran Sanctions and the 1737 Committee in the Security Council. Stating, "the United States' objective remains a diplomatic resolution to this issue," Ambassador Khalilzad emphasized that the United States "encourage[s] all states to take actions that are complementary to those explicitly required by these resolutions to achieve the international community’s ultimate objective: persuading Iran to make a strategic decision to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability." He also called "special attention to the need to implement the provisions of the Council resolutions regarding Iran's financial institutions. The goals of these provisions are to ensure that Iran’s financial sector is not used to fund proscribed nuclear proliferation or missile programs." He highlighted the list of banks domiciled in Iran that the US, UK, and France distributed to the Security Council on 1 August 2008 and the briefing the US gave the Council on 10 September 2008 "about our own efforts to implement the provisions of the Iran sanctions resolutions related to financial institutions, in particular paragraph 10 of Resolution 1803."

2 September 2008: The Russian company building Iran's first nuclear power plant at Bushehr, Atomstroiexport, has renewed its commitment to complete the project.

28 August 2008: Iran's state news agency quoted deputy foreign minister Alireza Sheikh Attar as saying, "There are nearly 4,000 centrifuges working in the Natanz enrichment facility ... another 3,000 centrifuges are being installed."

26 August 2008: Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said that Iran is working with EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana for further talks on the country's nuclear program. Mottaki indicated that the main issue at present is how to initiate a fresh round of talks with the P5+1. Mottaki also said Iran's response to the West's proposals was not on the agenda at present.

25 August 2008: Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hassan Qashqavi said Iran will have continuous cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): "Iran continues its routine cooperation with the UN nuclear watchdog within the framework of the Modality (Action) Plan (an agreement between the IAEA and Iran) in a constructive atmosphere." He added that Iran remains ready to respond to IAEA questions about Tehran's nuclear activities based on the Modality.

24 August 2008: Mohammad Saeedi, deputy head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, said Iran has chosen the site for and started designing a new, 360-megawatt light-water reactor nuclear power plant in the southwest. Meanwhile, ISNA news agency reported that Russia's nuclear power chief, Sergei Kiriyenko, has plans to visit the nuclear fuel operation of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran. An unnamed nuclear official told ISNA that Sergei Kiriyenko is also scheduled to visit Tehran in the first week of September for talks with officials of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization.

22 August 2008: Tajikistan's first deputy secretary-general of People's Democratic Party Ali Dolatzadeh called on the international community to respect Iran's right to produce nuclear energy.

20 August 2008: Iran’s permanent envoy to the IAEA, Ali-Asghar Soltanieh, said the latest talks between Tehran and the IAEA were held in a “constructive, scientific, and technical climate”. Meanwhile, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Deputy Director, Mohammad Saeedi, said, “This round of talks was held over Iran’s current relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency… the talks will continue in future.” He said the new round of discussions will be held ahead of the Board of Governors’ next meeting in mid-September when IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei will put forward his latest report on Iran’s nuclear activities.

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) signed agreements with six local companies to search for locations to build new nuclear power plants. Ahmad Fayyazbakhsh, the AEOI deputy director, said the deal is in line with Iran’s plan to generate 20,000 megawatts of electricity to meet rising demand. “These six domestic companies have been given 13 months to find appropriate locations to build new atomic power plants. After finding the locations, construction of the power plants can begin."

18 August 2008: Olli Heinonen, deputy chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), arrived in Tehran for his second round of talks this month. State-run news agency IRNA reported that Mr Heinonen had "travelled to Tehran to continue previous talks about the trend of co-operation between Iran and the agency."

In other news, Turkey's energy minister announced plans to visit Tehran to discuss investment in gas fields and a pipeline project. Washington said a new energy deal between Iran and Turkey would send the wrong message while the West threatens economic sanctions against Tehran because of its refusal to halt uranium enrichment.

11 August 2008: Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeid Jalili and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana agreed by phone to resume talks on the dispute over Iran's nuclear programme.

8 August 2008: A senior British official said Britain, France, Germany and the United States are considering imposing additional sanctions on Iran over its nuclear work, possibly in the energy, reinsurance or financial sectors. "We are at a fairly early stage of this but ... there are areas of the Iranian economy that are vulnerable to targeted sanctions - whether they be in the LNG (liquefied natural gas) sector, investment in the oil and gas sector, imported refined products, reinsurance, other financial areas - which are areas we would look at if we are looking to increase the pressure on the Iranian leadership," the official said.

Meanwhile, the European Union tightened trade sanctions against Iran. The new EU restrictions go slightly beyond existing UN trade sanctions and are designed to deny public loans or export credits to companies trading with Iran. France, the current holder of the EU presidency, said European governments would also carefully watch financial groups doing business with Iranian banks and step up checks on ships and airplanes traveling to Iran. The EU called on member nations to "show restraint when granting new public loans for trade with Iran ... to also be vigilant on activities taken by financial institutions with banks based in Iran."

7 August 2008: Olli Heinonen, deputy head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, held a new round of talks with the deputy chief of Iran's atomic organisation, Mohammad Saeedi, and Iran's IAEA representative Ali Asghar Soltanieh.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice threatened Iran with more sanctions, saying, "Iran has a way out if they ever wish, but we will seriously pursue sanctions if they don't."

6 August 2008: According to the United States and the United Kingdom, the P5+1 agreed to consider new sanctions on Iran. US State Department spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos said, "Given the absence of a clear positive response from Iran and its failure to meet the deadline set by the UNSCR 1803, the P5+1 are discussing the nexts steps in the UNSC and beginning to consider the possible outlines of another sanction resolution." British junior foreign minister Kim Howells said the P5+1 "have agreed that, while informal contacts between Mr Solana and Mr (Iranian negotiator Saeed) Jalili will continue, we now have no choice but to pursue further sanctions against Iran, as part of our dual-track strategy."

Asked whether there was agreement among the six to proceed to the drafting of a new sanctions resolution, France's UN deputy ambassador Jean-Pierre Lacroix replied: "Our objective is not sanctions for the sake of sanctions. We have to resort to the Security Council (sanctions) if we don't see there's any possibility to enter into a dialogue," he noted. "But we are getting closer to the point where we will make that determination." German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said, "If Iran does not choose this path, the UN Security Council will be referred to once again."

The United States said the move enjoyed support from Moscow and Beijing, but China had no immediate reaction and Russia's UN ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, said he was unaware of such consensus: "It may well be that in the course of those discussions some members of the six raised the issue of the sanctions. But to the best of my knowledge there has been no firm agreement or understanding or concerted work in this regard."

While Gallegos called Tehran's reply to the package "a stalling tactic," Churkin said, "We would have preferred a clear yes. But it is more complicated than that. We certainly do not believe that it is a foregone conclusion that it (the dialogue) is not going to be successful. We think there is some potential to that dialogue." Churkin said that the G8 would discuss the issue of whether to seek further sanctions at a ministerial meeting next month.

5 August 2008: Iran issued a letter to EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, which was also circulated to the P5+1, that requested clarification on certain points in the "package of incentives."

4 August 2008: US State Department spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos told reporters that the P5+1 might seek additional sanctions against Iran, saying, "We agreed in the absence of a clear, positive response from Iran (that) we have no choice but to pursue further measures against Iran." He insisted Iran missed the two-week deadline set by the US for Iran to respond to its "package of incentives". A UK Foreign Office spokesperson said, "We will be disappointed if there (is) no response to the E3 proposals by tomorrow.... We will have no choice but to ask the UN to proceed with further sanctions." The French foreign ministry echoed that stance, saying the Islamic republic "will have to face new sanctions" if it does not respond positively by 5 August to the P5+1's sanctions freeze-for-enrichment freeze offer. The ministry "expressed its disappointment at the lack of a clear response from Iran" in a statement. In New York, France's deputy UN ambassador Jean-Pierre Lacroix told AFP: "If we don't get an encouraging response from the Iranians, we will have to show firmness, resort to sanctions as in the past."

Iran's top nuclear negotiator reportedly told the European Union's foreign policy head that Iran will respond on Tuesday, 5 August.

3 August 2008: Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni urged the international community to act quickly on new sanctions against Iran, saying that Tehran views any hesitation as weakness. Meanwhile, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told visiting Syrian president Bashar al-Assad that Tehran is serious about finding a practical solution to the nuclear crisis: "We are serious in talks and we want the talks to be based on the law so it will bear practical results. We hope that other sides are serious too."

1 August 2008: US State Department acting spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos said the US government expects a formal reply from Iran on the P5+1 "package of incentives" by the weekend. But an EU diplomat in Brussels said that the European Union is in no rush for a response from Iran: "There's no real limit," said the diplomat on condition of anonymity after Washington set the deadline. "We're in no rush" to have a response "in the next 24 hours."

31 July 2008: The US government seems to have not to imposed a strict deadline for Iran to give world powers a final answer to their incentives package. The day after the meeting between the P5+1 and Iran, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Iran had two weeks to give their official response to the package, but US State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said there is no indication of deadline. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki rejected any deadline, saying, "The language of deadline-setting is not understandable to us. We gave them our response within a month as we said we would, now they have to reply to us."

30 July 2008: During a high-level conference, the Non-Aligned Movement issued a declaration that "reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all states, to develop research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes," supporting Iran's development of nuclear technology for peaceful uses.

29 July 2008: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Tehran would continue talks with world powers aimed at resolving the crisis over its atomic drive provided these are "on equal footing." Welcoming US participation in the talks, Ahmadinejad said, "These kinds of talks should continue until we reach an agreement. Understanding and talks are a two-way matter but if one side puts forward conditions then it becomes unfair and it is natural that no nation will accept this. (They) should not put any illegal conditions on the talks since this will wreck the negotiation process. Iranians will not give up even an inch of their rights."

23 July 2008: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said the United States' participation in the latest round of nuclear talks is a step toward recognizing Tehran's right to acquire nuclear technology. Ahmadinejad told thousands of supporters gathered in the southern Iranian town of Yasouj that U.S. Undersecretary of State William Burns "spoke politely and in a dignified manner." He also indicated that Iran will continue its uranium enrichment programme, saying, "The Iranian people are steadfast and will not step back an inch against the oppressive powers."

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said negotiators were hearing "very diverse signals" from Iran on its intentions but that she still expects a diplomatic solution. "I am counting on that and nothing else," she told reporters. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said he wasn't surprised that Ahmadinejad "declared he won't budge" because the Iranian president has proved "quasi-unable to show political flexibility.... It's always disappointing to see how peace efforts are opposed by a tenacity ... that doesn't benefit the Iranian people." He said the slow beginning to the Geneva talks did not mean a diplomatic solution would not be found. "The Iranian (negotiators) we are sent are much more flexible than President Ahmadinejad," he told reporters.

21 July 2008: UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown warned he is determined to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, during a speech to the Israeli parliament, the Knesset: "Our country will continue to lead, with the US and our European partners in our determination to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons programme. We stand ready to lead in taking firmer sanctions and will ask the whole international community to join us." Mr. Brown stressed: "Iran has a clear choice to make: suspend its nuclear weapons programme and accept our offer of negotiations or face growing isolation and the collective response, not just of one nation, but of all nations round the world."

Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said the presence of a top US diplomat in recent nuclear talks in Geneva was a success for Iran and that "decisions made at the Geneva meeting were a step forward."

White House spokeswoman Dana Perino indicated the White House expects Iran to reject US-backed incentives package to end sensitive nuclear work and warned Tehran may therefore face additional sanctions. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice "agreed with the other members to allow Iran to have two more weeks but after that I think that Iran could be looking at, is possibly looking at, additional sanctions."

Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said Turkey would continue to try to ease tensions over Iran's nuclear programme in an informal "consolidation and facilitation role". Mr. Babacan indicated the request for Turkey to play this role came from all sides because of the "deep confidence gap" between the sides and said Turkey was trying "to rectify any misunderstandings and ensure that they better understand their mutual concerns."

19 July 2008: After talks with the P5+1 and Iran, European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana said, "there is always progress in these talks, but insufficient," adding the one-day meeting was "constructive." However, US spokesman Sean McCormack warned after the talks that Iran should either accept the incentives, or face "further isolation."

Detailing the proposals on the table, Solana said the P5+1 proposed that "we refrain from (further) Security Council resolutions and for Iran to refrain from nuclear activity including the installations of new centrifuges" for processing uranium. Solana said they are "looking forward to an answer from Iran in this question... in a couple of weeks." Russia's deputy foreign minister Sergei Kisliak said, "We hope that the two weeks we agreed on with the Iranians will help Iran to specify its stance on our proposals."

18 July 2008: President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev held their first telephone talks. Ahmadinejad reportedly said, "In the Geneva negotiations... we can examine ways to make decisions in different fields and help resolve the existing issues," while Medvedev urged Iran "to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to clarify questions remaining about the Iranian nuclear programme."

17 July 2008: Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said he hoped upcoming talks would produce "positive developments" and voiced satisfaction at US involvement, saying, "The presence of an American delegate in Geneva will help the United States be informed directly."

16 July 2008: Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said Iran was ready for negotiations over the nuclear crisis but warned it would not step over any "red lines" in the search for a deal. His comments came days ahead of a key meeting between Iran's top nuclear negotiator and the EU foreign policy chief, which will also be attended by a US envoy for the first time. William Burns, the third-ranking US diplomat, is due to meet Iran's nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili in Geneva on 19 July.

11 July 2008: UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment programme, saying "I have been calling on Iranian authorities to fully comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions and continue their negotiations with European Union and concerned parties."

A spokesman of Iran's National Security Council said that talks between the European Union and Iran would begin on 19 July in Geneva and will be led by chief nuclear negotiator Saeid Jalili and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana.

9 July 2008: The Chair's Summary from the G8 Summit in Hokkaido Toyako included text on Iran:

We expressed serious concern over Iran's failure to comply with its international obligations under successive UNSCRs, in particular to suspend all enrichment-related activities. We remain committed to a diplomatic solution to the issue through the dual track approach. We support the efforts of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States as well as the high-level dialogue by the Presidency with Iran. We call on Iran to respond to the updated incentives package in a constructive manner. We also urge Iran to act in a more responsible and constructive manner in the region, particularly in the context of the Middle East Peace Process and the stability of Iraq and Afghanistan.

8 July 2008: The US Department of the Treasury imposed new financial sanctions on Iranian individuals and companies suspected of involvement in the country's nuclear programme, including a senior defence ministry scientist and several companies thought to be linked to Iran's arms industry. The sanctions will ban US companies from trading with those on the list, who will also have US assets frozen.

Also, French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana will travel to Iran to hold talks over its nuclear programme, though he did not say when Mr. Solana will make the trip.

A Summit Document on political issues from the G8 Summit in Hokkaido Toyako included text on Iran:

59. We express our serious concern at the proliferation risks posed by Iran's nuclear programme and Iran's continued failure to meet its international obligations. We urge Iran to fully comply with UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803 without further delay, and in particular to suspend all enrichment-related activities. We also urge Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA, including by providing clarification of the issues contained in the latest report of the IAEA Director General. We firmly support and cooperate with the efforts by China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States supported by the High Representative of the EU to resolve the issue innovatively through negotiation, and urge Iran to respond positively to their offer delivered on 14 June 2008. We also commend the efforts by other G8 members, particularly the high-level dialogue by Japan, towards a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the issue. We welcome the work of the Financial Action Task Force to assist states in implementing their financial obligations under the relevant UNSCRs.

7 July 2008: US State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said Iran is sending mixed messages to a package of incentives from Germany and the P5: It appears that "from ...the varying public responses from various parts of the Iranian government that there is clearly a debate, or at least a discussion, going on within the Iranian government on how to respond." McCormack said that William Burns, a senior State Department official, would hold a conference call later Monday with his counterparts from the P5+1 to discuss "the current state of play" with Iran.

5 July 2008: Iranian government spokesman Gholamhossein Elham said, "Iran will not go back on its rights on the nuclear issue... Iran insists on negotiations (with world powers) while respecting its rights and avoiding any loss of international rights." The government offered to negotiate on its nuclear drive but without giving up uranium enrichment. White House spokeswoman Dana Perino said the United States would consult with the other P5+1 membersbefore commenting on Tehran's response to the package.

4 July 2008: Iran's top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili said his country submitted a "constructive and creative" response to the package of incentives from the P5+1 for it to halt the enrichment of uranium with "a focus on common ground," but he did not elaborate on the contents.

2 July 2008: White House spokeswoman Dana Perino said the US government is skeptical about Mottaki' comments welcoming a US-backed reward package aimed at ending the dispute over Tehran's nuclear program: "If they were serious about wanting to take us up on that offer, then that would be welcome. But I think we have every reason to be skeptical since we get mixed messages from them quite often."

1 July 2008: Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told US journalists that Tehran was "seriously and carefully examining" the incentives package and would respond formally in the next "couple of weeks". The Washington Post quoted him as saying, "We believe that talks are a good foundation for continuing our conversation in this field," calling the diplomatic efforts by six major powers a "constructive" approach. According to the state-run IRNA news agency, Mottaki told US reporters in New York that "a process is underway and it started with the package delivered by Iran.... This package presented tackled important questions and then on the other side the world powers offered their own package."

30 June 2008: In Iran's Supreme National Security Council, which looks after negotiations with the West in the nuclear crisis, the deputy head in charge of international affairs, Javad Vaeedi, has been replaced by Ali Bagheri, who was previously the foreign ministry's director general for North and Central European affairs. Vaeedi will become an advisor to the council's head Saeed Jalili, a close ally of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

27 June 2008: Foreign ministers from the Group of Eight nations, meeting to set their agenda for the annual G8 meeting scheduled for next month, suggested more talks to coax Iran into opening its nuclear program to inspectors. The ministers said, "We remain committed to a diplomatic solution to the issue through the dual-track approach and urge Iran to respond to the calls by the international community to engage in negotiations." They urged Iran to respond positively to the latest "package of incentives".

18 June 2008: International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said he will step down if major powers launch a military strike against Iran over its nuclear program. According to Al Ahram, in an interview with Al Arabiya television, the Director General, said, "A military invasion against Iran would pose great danger to the Middle East and the world."

Excerpts:

Mohamed ElBaradei: "If Iran wants to turn to the production of nuclear weapons, it must leave the NPT, expel the IAEA inspectors, and then it would need at least... Considering the number of centrifuges and the quantity of uranium Iran has..."

Interviewer: "How much time would it need?"

ElBaradei: "It would need at least six months to one year. Therefore, Iran will not be able to reach the point where we would wake up one morning to an Iran with a nuclear weapon."

Interviewer: "Excuse me, I would like to clarify this for our viewers. If Iran decides today to expel the IAEA from the country, it will need six months..."

ElBaradei: "Or one year, at least..."

Interviewer:"... to produce [nuclear] weapons?"

ElBaradei: "It would need this period to produce a weapon, and to obtain highly-enriched uranium in sufficient quantities for a single nuclear weapon."

[...]

ElBaradei: "In my view, a military strike would be the worst thing possible. It would turn the Middle East into a ball of fire."

Interviewer: "It would be worse than sanctions?"

ElBaradei: "Much worse, because a military strike would mean, first and foremost, that even if Iran does not produce nuclear weapons today, it would implement a so-called 'crash course,' or an accelerated plan to produce a nuclear weapon, with the agreement and blessing of all the Iranians - even the Iranians living in the West."

[...]

Interviewer: "Dr. ElBaradei, what do the Iranian officials tell you when you confront them about the need for more transparency?"

ElBaradei: "They say there will be more transparency, but at the end of the day, I'd rather wait to see this transparency.

[...]

"I always think of resigning in the event of a military strike."

Interviewer: "You will resign in the event that..."

ElBaradei: "If military force is used, I would conclude that there is no mechanism left for me to defend."

Interviewer: "This is a threat directed at the Americans - if you strike, I will resign."

ElBaradei: "I am not doing this for material profit. If I was working in the private sector, I would... I am doing this out of the conviction that I am defending shared values. If we deviate from these shared values..."

Interviewer: "So there is no justification for an attack..."

ElBaradei: "The day I believe that the international system has begun to collapse is the day I will resign."
[...]

Interviewer: "If the world reaches a consensus that there is no solution but to attack Iran, would you still resign? What if Europe, America, and the entire West agree that the only resolution is a military one?"

ElBaradei: "I don't think that what we are seeing today in Iran poses a clear, imminent, and immediate danger."

Interviewer: "But in a year or two, it could become..."

ElBaradei: "If this happens, it will be a different story, but if a military strike is launched against Iran now, in my opinion, I will have no choice but to..."

Interviewer: "So there is no justification for a strike against Iran today."

ElBaradei: "None whatsoever. There will be no point in my continuing my work if military force is used at present."

17 June 2008: Reports in the mass media alleged that Abdul Qadeer Khan of Pakistan may have shared blueprints for a miniature nuclear weapon with countries such as Iran and North Korea. The reports were based on a study by the Institute for Science and International Security's David Albright, a former inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency. He states that a Swiss family accused of working with Khan had the designs on their computers, and asks, "Why did these smugglers associated with the notorious Pakistani nuclear engineer A. Q. Khan have these designs, unless they had sold or intended to sell them for Khan?" The media also reports that US officials are "downplaying" this report, indicating the transfer would be hard to prove and arguing that bomb design is the easy part of acquiring nuclear weapons compared with acquiring or developing the fissile material. In an interview with the Associated Press, Khan rejected the allegations.

16 June 2008: EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana said that EU nations postponed a decision about imposing new sanctions on Iran, contradicting remarks from White House national security advisor Stephen Hadley. Reportedly, the EU decided to "wait a bit" to know Tehran's response to cooperation offer that Solana presented on Saturday in the Iranian capital.

14 June 2008: After talks with EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, during which Solana presented the 5+1 (China, France Russia, United States, United Kingdom, and Germany) "new package of incentives" to the Iranian government, Iran's foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki said he is waiting to "receive the precise points of view of the 5+1 world powers" on Iran's package that the government submitted to the international community about a month ago. Mottaki said, "The response of Iran to the package of the 5+1 world powers will be given taking into account a constructive and logical response of the world powers to Iran's own package."

13 June 2008: The US ambassador the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad, delivered a statement on Iran in the Security Council:

Mr. President,

Three months ago, this Council adopted Resolution to impose additional sanctions on Iran. These sanctions, as well as those adopted by the Council in Resolutions 1737 and 1747, are designed to discourage and halt Iran's pursuit of technologies that would provide it with a nuclear weapons capability. With that in mind, I would like to make five points.

First, we welcome the report of the Committee Chairman and are pleased to note the important activities being pursued by the Committee. We welcome the fact that many states have submitted the reports required by those resolutions and we encourage all states that have not yet done so to provide their reports to the Committee as soon as possible. We also reiterate this Council's call upon all states to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad.

Second, we note with great concern the 26 May 2008 report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning Iran's continuing non-compliance with Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803. Most disturbing is that Iran continues to defy the Security Council and has not suspended its uranium enrichment- and heavy water-related activities. Instead, Iran has expanded its installation and operation of new centrifuges and is testing advanced centrifuge designs using nuclear material. Iran has also continued the construction of a new IR-40 reactor.

Third, long-outstanding questions about Iran's past nuclear activities, including those that indicate Iran's effort to develop a nuclear warhead, remain unanswered. IAEA Director General El Baradei stated clearly that Iran must provide "substantive explanations" for these activities, and that it is essential that Iran provide all requested information, clarifications, and access outlined in the report without further delay.

Fourth, we expect Iran to comply with its international obligations concerning its nuclear activities, including the full and verifiable suspension of its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to implement the Additional Protocol. Only through all of these steps can Iran begin to establish confidence that the nature of its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.. Iran must provide to the IAEA full disclosure of any weapons-related work and allow the IAEA to verify that any such work has ceased.

Fifth, we affirm the dual track strategy on this issue, which is reinforced by the updated P5+1 package that will be delivered to Iran in the near term and reiterate our belief that a mutually satisfactory, negotiated solution remains open to Iran. At the same time, all Member States must implement robustly their obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803, as well as other pertinent resolutions. This Council should stand ready, in accordance with its stated intention in Resolution 1803, to supplement those sanctions with additional measures.

11 June 2008: US President George Bush warned that "all options are on the table" when dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. He expressed support for a European package of diplomatic and economic rewards -- put together by Berlin, London, and Paris -- if Iran's leaders halt uranium enrichment, but indicated diplomacy was not necessarily the only avenue. Responding to the EU package of proposals, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said, "We will not trade our dignity with anything ... If they want to give us something, then they should sell it and we will buy it."

EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana is to visit Tehran 14-15 June in an effort to convince Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities.

At the Security Council stakeout, the US ambassador the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad, responded to questions about Iran:

Well, we have put on the agenda with the agreement of our colleagues in the Council the issue of non-proliferation which is a substitute for Iran and as I said to you before we have got the IAEA which gave a very negative report. We have got the deadline of the last resolution, 90 days, that has passed and there is no cooperation, no compliance, with that resolution. We’ve had discussions of the kind that you are talking about taking place and also Mr. Solana’s visit to Iran and in the aftermath of all those, we’ll consult with colleagues as to the appropriate response. This is a very important issue, I don’t need to repeat that but I’ll say this is a very important issue, again I am speak for the United States, for the future of that critical region of the world and therefore for the future of the world and for the credibility of the Council because the Council has expressed itself so clearly and repeatedly. And I also want to emphasize that there is no – let us not be confused by the Iranian propaganda that this is denying Iran the right to have a peaceful nuclear program. We recognize Iran’s right to have a civil nuclear program, reactors, to have fuel for those reactors and we have said once Iran suspends its enrichment program, suspends its enrichment program, we’ll be willing to sit down and deal with the issue – the legitimate issues of fuel security and peaceful nuclear program. So a nuclear weapons program or the capability to produce nuclear weapons by access to fissile material - that’s something different and given this regime’s record, policies, affiliations , statements, the world is obviously particularly concerned.

When a reporter asked, "President Bush obviously spoke of isolation of Iran and of specific measures against Iran including sanctions and so forth. Are those sanctions going to be only unilateral or U.S. with the EU and so forth but not at the Security Council? Is the Security Council track on this dead?" Khalilzad responded:

We do not believe so. We don’t consider these things to be mutually exclusive, that there is unilateral measures that member states want to take, a group of states such as EU, or the U.S. coming to some agreement with the EU, at the same time multilateral through the Security Council. So all those things are on the menu that we look at and we support and so I believe it is perfectly appropriate and we believe the Council needs to take another look because decisions have been ignored and the Council cannot remain indifferent to the defiance.

10 June 2008: During his final tour of Europe as President, mass media reported that George Bush launched a "final push to stop Iran from enriching uranium by joining European leaders to threaten more sanctions against Teheran." He secured agreement on a joint European Union-American declaration, which says, "We expect Iran to comply with its international obligations concerning its nuclear activities, including the full and verifiable suspension of enrichment" and pledged to "fully and effectively implement" existing sanctions imposed by three Security Council Resolutions. The declaration also "paved the way for future penalties," noting, "We are ready to supplement those sanctions with additional measures.... We will continue to work together, including through the Financial Action Task Force, to take steps to ensure Iranian banks cannot abuse the international banking system to support proliferation and terrorism."

Aljazeera.net reported, "It remains unclear how far the Europeans, who rarely echo Bush's harsh rhetoric against Iran and have sometimes been reluctant to get tougher, would be willing to go. Washington has been pressing the EU to deny some Iranian banks access to the world financial system. Speaking at the summit, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European external relations commissioner, said: 'We want to indeed show to Iranians that we mean it very seriously... [We are] particularly thinking of asset freezes.'"

5 June 2008: South Africa's ambassador to the IAEA, Abdul Samad Minty, said, "As a country, that remains committed to elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, South Africa does not wish to see a nuclear weaponised Iran. At the same time, we don't want to see denial of the right of any State party to the NPT to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." He added that a refusal to allow any signatory to the NPT to develop atomic energy for civilian use would mean a negation of the pact's fundamental principle. ''The call on Iran to suspend its enrichment activities is related to the issue of building confidence, and may therefore under no circumstances become a goal in itself. If we allow this to happen, we will unravel the very basis of the fundamental bargain of the NPT."

4 June 2008: Media reports on the current IAEA Board of Govenors meeting in Vienna primarily highlight criticisms of Iran by western countries "for failing to answer allegations that it had been trying to build a nuclear bomb until a few years ago." The Board of Governors is unlikely to take any action on the Iran situation - it hasn't passed a resolution on the subject since it was transferred to the UN Security Council. Thus, the political posturing demonstrated in government statements is largely for media consumption.

According to Reuters, "The United States, European and other Western nations bemoaned what they saw as Iranian evasions and lined up behind IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei's call for "full disclosure" to resolve what aides have called consistent intelligence reports." Gregory L. Schulte, the chief US delegate to the IAEA, demanded Iran "abandon forever the pursuit of nuclear weapons," arguing,"The questions that remain unanswered strongly suggest that Iran has undertaken a significant state-sponsored effort to develop nuclear weapons, an effort that agency inspectors are not in a position to verify has halted."

Schulte's comments do not address the subject under consideration at the board meeting, which is the IAEA Director General's most recent report, which covers Iran's past activities not any potential future endeavours. Nor are they consistent with the report of US intelligence agencies released December 2007, which proclaimed that Iran is not currently seeking nuclear weapons, nor will it be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon until at least 2010. The report "concludes that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and that the program remains on hold, contradicting an assessment two years ago that Tehran was working inexorably toward building a bomb." (For more information about this report, see the entry for 4 December 2007.)

The European Union told the board that Iran's rejection of evidence it tried to make such arms as faked "is neither credible nor acceptable, given the quality of and quantity of the documents presented by the agency to Iran" - without mentioning as the IAEA Director General's most recent report does that Iran has not be shown many of these documents.

Most media coverage insists that the 35-member Board of Govenors is more unified than ever before on the Iran issue, demonstrating a "rare sign of convergence." Yet the Russian delegation insisted that "objective and verified information" should be used in IAEA investigations of Iran and argued that Iran must have the chance to "carefully analyze the information" accusing it of a weaponization programme.

On behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, Cuban representative Norma Goicochea-Estenoz said, "In dealing with issues related to the 'alleged studies' (nuclear weaponization), there could be concerns that this is not a core competency of the agency.... But NAM believes that in clarifying the 'alleged studies', including issues such as high-explosive testing and a missile re-entry vehicle, the agency would act in accordance with its statute."

2 June 2008: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said there is no need to review its cooperation with the IAEA, adding that parliament's "warning was an appropriate one. The Majles (parliament) is standing firmly on the defence of the nation's right."

Meanwhile, at the opening of the IAEA Board of Govenors meeting in Vienna, Director General ElBaradei said, "it is regrettable that we have not made the progress we had hoped for with respect to the one remaining major issue, namely clarification of the cluster of allegations and Secretariat questions relevant to possible military dimensions to Iran´s nuclear programme. The so-called alleged [weaponization] studies remain a matter of serious concern." He then stated that over the last half-decade of verification activities, substantial progress has been made, but also called on Iran to "demonstrate the necessary transparency and provide full disclosure" to allow the IAEA to reach a conclusion on the nature of the Iranian programme as soon as possible.

1 June 2008: Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman suggested Iran might have to limit its cooperation with the IAEA, criticising a report released by the agency last week. Last week, Iran's new parliament speaker Ali Larijani, the country's former chief nuclear negotiator, said the current levels of cooperation with the IAEA were in jeopardy if major powers continued to "kick around" Iran's disputed nuclear case.

26 May 2008: The IAEA Director General released a new report on the implementation of NPT safeguards and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008) in Iran. The report provides an update on progress made in resolving outstanding questions related to Iran’s past nuclear activities and alleged weaponization work, in addition to providing an overview of Iran's current enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water-related activities. As in past reports, the IAEA continues to certify that there has been no diversion of nuclear materials to weapons. Iran, however, continues to operate its uranium enrichment and heavy water-related facilities, in contravention of UN Security Council resolutions, and continues to deploy and test two new types of centrifuges (dubbed IR-2 and IR-3) at its pilot-scale enrichment facility.

The IAEA reports that it has been unable to make much progress in resolving outstanding issues. In its report, it greatly elaborates on the information that other states have provided about Iran's nuclear programme. It also outlines the specific questions it feels Iran must answer for it to have a full understanding of Iran's past nuclear program, including: resolving questions related to the alleged studies; provide more information on the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document; clarify procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related; and clarify the production of nuclear equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries.

Michael Spies of the Arms Control Reporter outlines the report's updates on issues and evidence. He notes that past weaponization allegations continue to center around four issues:

a) Uranium metal document: In paragraph 24, the IAEA notes it has been shown an identical document in Pakistan, thus providing support for Iran's claim that it was supplied by the Khan network. The IAEA has previously noted there is no evidence Iran has pursued any of the steps provided in the document. Iran claimed the document was provided at the initiative of the Khan network.
b) Missile reentry vehicle modifications: The IAEA now states with more confidence that the studies relating to this issue involved modifying a Shahab-3 to fit a nuclear warhead. The annex lists 13 documents said to have originated in Iran regarding these studies. Iran continues to deny the authenticity of these reports. It should also be noted that the IAEA has not been able to provide Iran with all the documents it has seen regarding this, making it unclear how Iran is supposed to respond to information it cannot review.
c) Green salt project: Iran continues to deny the existence of this project, pointing to its operational full-scale uranium conversion facility.
d) High explosive testing: Iran claims that some of these documents relate to conventional military applications and that they do not have any connection to Iran (one of the three related documents provided by the IAEA to Iran is in English only).

Assessing the report, Spies argues that there are two different but interrelated axes that need to be understood in order to assess the meaning of the report. In its investigation, it can be argued that the IAEA is operating beyond both its legal mandate and technical competence. Given the highly political nature of the debate around Iran, these legal and technical points take on a special significance, especially in the context of maintaining international confidence in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.

1. Legal: The IAEA states the purpose of its investigation is to be able to provide assurances regarding Iran's nuclear program. However, as the IAEA continues to certify the lack of diversion of nuclear materials, these assurances seem unconnected to Iran's safeguards obligations or the Additional Protocol. Under the NPT, the IAEA is tasked with ensuring nuclear materials are not diverted to use in weapons. Problematic for cases of suspected compliance, however, the NPT does not provide for any international inspection of possible weaponization activities, some of which need not have any direct nuclear connection (e.g. modification of a missile reentry vehicle). While the satisfactory resolution of these issues may naturally lead to greater international confidence in Iran’s nuclear activities, it has not been made clear what would be required of Iran for the IAEA to be able provide such assurances. This could entail conclusion of the investigation, or the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions, or something else altogether. Additionally, it is not clear what the legal significance or practical effect of these assurances would be, as Iran is presently in compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations and in light of the fact that the matter of sanctions and negotiations are primarily linked to issue of Iran’s uranium enrichment program.

2. Competence: Following from the IAEA’s mandate under the NPT and related to its ability to provide assurances, it is unclear to what extent the IAEA has technical expertise to assess weaponization issues. This is highly relevant in the present situation, because the IAEA must draw a very general conclusion on whether or not Iran has pursued nuclear weapons, based on fragments of information. While there seems to be a strong circumstantial case for past Iranian nuclear weapons-related activities—mostly limited to component design studies— as the IAEA notes in paragraph 24 of the report, it has not seen evidence of other activities that would be required for the design and construction of a nuclear weapon. Many of these activities may not involve any direct nexus nuclear materials, and thus fall outside the technical capacity of the Agency. As such, it is unlikely the IAEA would ever be able to provide a truly full picture on weaponization issues. This ultimately poses a problem, as any weight the IAEA gives to circumstantial evidence, without the technical ability to provide a balanced and comprehensive portrait, serves as a cause for heightening international escalation on the Iran issue.

According to most mainstream media coverage of the report, including from Agence France-Presse, the IAEA used “far stronger language than the past,” expressing “'serious concern' that Iran is still hiding information about alleged studies into making nuclear warheads and defying UN demands to suspend uranium enrichment.” The media also quoted several “non-proliferation experts,” including Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, who said there was no “'sugar-coated suggestion that Iran has been forthcoming' in addressing the outstanding issues. Instead, the report 'clearly refutes Iran's claims that it has done everything it needs to do with regard to the action plan.'”

However, Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali-Asghar Soltanieh, said the report was an acknowledgement of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. According to the Tehran Times, he argued that the report emphasized that the remaining issues have been investigated and solved and that the alleged studies are not among the remaining issues, adding “that documents related to the subject were not put at Iran’s disposal on time.” He went on to explain, “The documents on which the Americans spoke were not offered to the IAEA in the right manner and the director general too has for the first time expressed regret over the failure.” The report does note, in paragraph 16, that much of the information related to the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing, and the missile re-entry vehicle project provided to the IAEA “by several Member States” was sent to the Agency “only in electronic form” and that the IAEA “was not authorized to provide copies to Iran.”

20 May 2008: Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said the government has agreed to a visit by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana to submit an upgraded package of incentives aimed at coaxing the country into halting uranium enrichment.

19 May 2008: Iran's Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hosseini said recent talks between the IAEA and Iran were "held within the framework of reciprocal cooperation.The IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei will present a report ahead of the next session of the agency's Board of Governors on the outcome of the talks."

17 May 2008: A Russian foreign ministry official said his country is reviewing the package of incentives proposed by Iran.

16 May 2008: Iran submitted its package of proposals to Chinese foreign ministry officials by Iran's Ambassador to China Javad Mansouri.

14 May 2008: Iran submitted its own package of proposals, which covers "broad suggestions ... to settle security, political and economic concerns in the world as well as Iran's nuclear issue" to the UN Secretary General and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana. It will also be submitted to several foreign ministries. The package reportedly includes a proposal for an international consortium to enrich uranium in Iran. An Iranian official told Reuters the aim of Iran's proposal was to kick start negotiations with world powers rather than offering a specific solution to the nuclear dispute. One Iranian official said the Iranian package could potentially be mixed with the EU3+3 package, as long as the EU3+3 drop their precondition of Iran halting uranium enrichment. On 19 May, Iran's Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hosseini emphasized that Iran did not raise the issue of security guarantees in its package.

US State Department Spokesman McCormack said Washington expects little from Iran's proposals, arguing that the Iranians "know what the requirements are". In response, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad-Ali Hosseini said the United States has "jumped to conclusions" about its proposals, and "advised the United States not to consider the Iranian proposal only on its own merits, stressing that the proposals were prepared after consultation with different countries."

2 May 2008: The EU3+3 (United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Russia, and the United States) met in London to offer an updated "package of incentives" to Iran. The package reportedly contains "promises of trade, technology, and even peaceful nuclear cooperation." Iran rejected the 2006 version of the package Reportedly, the United States opted not to send a delegate along with other delegates of the five nations to Tehran to hand deliver the package, and refused to include firm security guarantees as part of the package.

29 April 2008: Iranian President Ahmadinejad visited the Natanz fuel enrichment plant, which resulted in the release of 48 photographs of the new P-2 centrifuges, providing the first significant look into the plant.

28 April 2008: Iranian and Russian officials discussed the outlines of a package of proposals developed by Iran aimed at assuring the international community that Tehran's nuclear program is peaceful. Top Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili said the proposals address "what to do to reduce threats resulting from the nuclear issue to the minimum." Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said the proposals are "not addressed to one specific country. It is a comprehensive plan with broad proposals. The spirit of the plan is that Iran is prepared to cooperate with all its capacity to resolve the remaining issues."

28 April 2008: The deputy chief of the IAEA arrived in Tehran to discuss Iran's nuclear programme.

23 April 2008: Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the IAEA, announced that Iran has agreed to answer intelligence allegations that it studied how to design nuclear bombs, which it has previously denied the reports but declined to address them in detail. ElBaradei said, "(This agreement) is a certain milestone and hopefully by the end of May we'll be in position to get the explanation and clarification from Iran as to these alleged studies." ElBaradei's spokeswomansaid the deal was struck during meetings in Tehran on Monday and Tuesday (21 and 22 April) between Iranian leaders and Olli Heinonen, the IAEA's safeguards chief and top investigator.

13 April 2008: Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mohammad Ali Husseini said Iran is ready to resume talks with Europe on its nuclear programme, adding that Iran considers the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to be the only authority that has the right to examine Tehran’s nuclear dossier. Husseini also said that the head of Iran’s nuclear energy organization, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, and his his deputy Mohammad Saeedi will travel to Vienna on 14 April to carry on talks with the IAEA chief Mohammad ElBaradei.

10 April 2008: Gregory Schulte, US ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, told reporters they should take Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's announcement on 8 April "with a grain of salt". He called the speech, in which Ahmadinejad said Iran is installing 6000 new centrifuges to enrich uranium, a "political stunt," arguing, "Ahmadinejad has a record of making bold political announcements not necessarily supported by technical facts."

9 April 2008: German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier expressed "deep concern" at Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's announcement that of 8 April that Iran had started work to install 6000 new centrifuges to enrich uranium. He said in a statement, "Tehran's move is clearly against the demands of the UN Security Council. Such a step would make the solution to the conflict more difficult."

8 April 2008: Speaking at a plenary meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission's 2008 session on behalf of the European Union, Ambassador Sanja Štiglic of Slovenia said, “Iran's nuclear programme poses a major challenge to the non-proliferation regime,” asserting that Iran has hidden “clandestine nuclear activities,” is pursuing uranium enrichment and heavy water related activities, is developing a ballistic missile programme, and “has cooperated with the IAEA only when pressed, and in piecemeal fashion.” Iran's representative to the Commission issued a right of reply to this statement, arguing that it did not acknowledge the information the IAEA has given about the non-divergence of Iran's nuclear material to weapon programmes or that Iran's cooperation with the IAEA has been “far beyond its Treaty obligations.”

Outside of the UN, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran is installing 6000 new centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment plant. Deputy Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran for International Affairs, Mohammad Saeedi, said the 6000 new centrifuges being installed are first generation P1 centrifuges. Ahmadinejad also said that testing of the new advanced centrifuges, which can enrich uranium five times faster than the current machines, will be finished in the next three months.

7 April 2008: Speaking at a plenary meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission's 2008 session, China's Permament Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, said diplomatic negotiation is the best way to solve the issue of Iran's nuclear programme, and called for all parties to “intensify diplomatic efforts in reaching agreement on possible ways to resume negotiations at an early date, with a view to seeking a long-term, comprehensive and appropriate solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.”

4 April 2008: Paragraph 41 of a communique released by NATO at its Bucharest Summit stated:

We remain deeply concerned about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. We call on Iran to fully comply with UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803. ... Allies reaffirm their support for existing multi-lateral non-proliferation agreements, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and call for universal compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and universal adherence to the Additional Protocol to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreement and full compliance with UNSCR 1540. Allies agree to redouble their efforts to fully implement the non-proliferation agreements and relevant UNSCRs to which Allies reaffirm their support and by which they are bound.

1 April 2008: Russia's ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, urged the Iranian government to engage in talk with the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) about its nuclear programme. Iran has reportedly refused to enter talks with the six countries, criticizing the third sanctions resolution adopted against Iran on 3 March. Iran says it will deal only with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini called the Security Council's demand "worthless and unacceptable" and said it was "based on political motivations." Churkin reportedly argued that talks with the six countries are the only way to resolve the standoff, saying, "We expect negotiations between the six and Iran, and their statements of a negative nature toward the negotiations are certainly not helpful and not constructive."

11 March 2008: The Washington Post reported that documents from "two countries other than the United States" provided to the IAEA recently "partly match information" from a stolen Iranian laptop given to the IAEA by the United States. The United States recently briefed the IAEA about "evidence" on Iran's alleged pre-2003 nuclear weapons programme gathered from the so-called "laptop of death" (see 2 March entry). According to the Post, "IAEA officials say these documents identify [Iranian nuclear engineer Mohsen] Fakhrizadeh and other civilian scientists as central figures in a secret nuclear research program that operated as recently as 2003." The documents also

purport to show advanced research into a variety of nuclear-related technologies, including uranium ore processing, warhead modification and the precision-firing of high explosives of the type used to detonate a nuclear device. Other documents point to attempts by civilian scientists to purchase sensitive equipment of the kind Iran would eventually use in its uranium enrichment plants.

The article notes that none of the documents "specifically include the word 'nuclear,' and IAEA officials say there is no evidence that any of the plans advanced beyond the paper stage."

Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy emphasizes that all of this "in itself does not demonstrate a determined effort to acquire and deploy nuclear weapons." He points out,

even if we were to accept all this "evidence" as true, the IAEA Secretariat has clearly stated that Iran does not appear to have ever undertaken any work using nuclear material on the basis of the documents or laptop. On its face, it is troubling if Iran is pursuing secret studies to build knowledge on nuclear weapons, as this might suggest it intends to develop them in the future. But the scale and scope of the "evidence" that has been released so far still doesn't seem to reflect a major, serious, and concerted attempt to acquire and deploy nuclear weapons. A handful of scientists conducting paper studies over a period of a decade doesn't seem to fit very well with efforts to acquire nuclear weapons in other states, most of which did not have IAEA inspectors roving around their territories trying to piece all aspects of their past nuclear work together.

The IAEA has been careful to caution that this sort of evidence has more to do with judging Iran's intentions, rather than determining the state of Iran's compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission noted in its final report,

As it is very difficult to prove a negative, it is unlikely that the IAEA would ever be able to conclude with absolute certainty that Iran - or at least key elements within its governing system - have not had the intention to use an enrichment capability for weapon purposes. In any case, even if such intentions never existed, there could be a change of mind once Iran's enrichment technology was fully operational. Accordingly, the question of intention is not decisive.

Spies says, "Following from this, one can conclude that the conversation about intentions is a distraction from what some of the real issues are: the role of the US and Iran in the greater Middle East and bilateral relations."

10 March 2008: Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad-Ali Hosseini told Press TV that Iran would continue its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Hosseini said Iran "will continue to work with the IAEA and to conduct its nuclear activities within the framework of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and international regulations." He also expressed Iran's readiness to hold talks with the P5+1 on issues agreed to by both sides.

The European Union's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, said the EU wants "to continue on the negotiating track." Solana said he has not been approached by Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, to resume talks.

9 March 2008: Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said his country is ready to negotiate with the European Union if there could be "meaningful and effective" results. He said, "We are still supporters of negotiations that have a precise objective, a defined programme and are assured of providing us with results."

7 March 2008: During a media briefing in Cape Town, South African Foreign Affairs Chief Director of the UN Xolisa Mabhongo explained why South Africa voted in favour of the new sanctions resolution against Iran on 3 March. He said South Africa managed to make interventions in the resolution and introduced amendments which helped to address some of its concerns. He said some of the interventions included:

• The specific recognition of the latest report by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); South Africa wanted the resolution to acknowledge an IAEA report stating that some progress had been made in Iranian cooperation with the nuclear watchdog.
• The understanding that once Iran had established the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities, there would be no discrimination against it and that it should be treated as any other member of the non-proliferation treaty.

Two other factors reportedly played a part in "swaying" South Africa:

• The call by Libya for the need to establish a Nuclear Free Zone in the Middle East, which was included in the resolution.
• A call by Vietnam for recognition of International Law and Civil Aviation Law, which was included in resolution.

Mr. Mabhongo argued that South Africa was not persuaded by the major powers or the visit by French President Nicolas Sarkozy last week.

3 March 2008: The UN Security Council voted 14-0 (with one abstention, Indonesia) in favour of a new sanctions resolution against Iran's nuclear programme, Resolution 1803 (2008). Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter - regarding binding measures not involving armed force - the Council affirmed its earlier decision that Iran should, without delay, suspend its uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related projects, as previously stipulated in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747 (2007).

For the resolution text and summary of statements, please see the UN Press Release.

The IAEA Board of Govenors met in Vienna ahead of the Security Council vote. According to AP, "depending on what was decided there, the IAEA's board was considering tabling a resolution of its own, pressing Tehran to come clean on its disputed nuclear activities." A diplomat said, "a resolution by the IAEA board -- the first in two years -- would make it very clear that the Iranian nuclear dossier was far from being closed." US envoy to the IAEA, Gregory Schulte, said, "despite some progress in addressing past issues, troubling questions remain about Iranian activities that strongly suggest a clandestine weapons-related programme. I anticipate that the board will be supporting the Security Council in calling for Iran to suspend its enrichment-related activities."

However, AP also reported that the Russian delegation to the Security Council "set conditions" for its approval of new sanctions against Iran, which were for European nations to drop plans for an IAEA resolution. Anonymous diplomats said Russia was upset that it was not told earlier about such plans, while Grigory Berdennikov, chief Russian delegate to the IAEA, told the AP that he was not happy about the planned resolution.

2 March 2008: Jeffrey Lewis posted some information on ArmsControlWonk.com on the briefing that the United States gave the IAEA about "evidence" on alleged Iran's pre-2003 nuclear weapons programme from the so-called "laptop of death", pointing out that the details available in various media reports indicate that nothing new was presented - that the details were first reported in 2005.

29 February 2008: US National Security Council spokesperson Gordon Johndroe said the United States expects the UN Security Council will vote on more sanctions against Iran "relatively soon." He argued, "I think that everyone's in agreement that Iran should not be enriching uranium, so let's let the vote take place." Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said another sanctions resolution will not stop Iran from enriching uranium.

28 February 2008: The UK and France introduced a draft resolution against Iran's uranium enrichment at the Security Council. Non-permanent members South Africa, Indonesia, Libya and Vietnam expressed reservations about the proposed resolution. South Africa's ambassador to the IAEA, Abdul Minty, said the new IAEA report showed "increasing confidence" that Iran did not intend to use its nuclear program for military purposes and that Iran was cooperating with the IAEA.

According to the Reuters article, Minty "conceded that declassified Western intelligence indicating Iran conducted high-explosives tests and design work on a missile warhead as part of a covert nuclear arms program was a serious concern that needed to be addressed by Tehran." Mike Veiluva of DisarmamentActivist.org pointed out on 26 February,

The “one remaining issue” relevant to the programme is “the alleged studies (by Iran) on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle.” (”Green salt” is an alleged uranium conversion process.) The report references discussions in late January; however, Iran was only given access to US information pertinent to these matters in February. The timing is not explained; Iran was given literally days to address this purported new evidence. The UK is now contending that this evidence indicates Iran was conducting weapons work after 2003, but the larger question is why we are only hearing of this now - perhaps the proximity of a new UN Security Council meeting has something to do about it.

25 February 2008: The P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the US, the UK, and Germany) discussed the new International Atomic Energy Agency report on Iran's nuclear activities and the next steps to be taken.

22 February 2008: The text of the IAEA Director General's report on Iran has been posted on the ISIS website. See Mike Veiluva's comments on 22 February and 26 February at DisarmamentActivist.org.

14 February 2008: French President Nicolas Sarkozy and other senior French officials met in Paris with Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in an effort to "smooth over" differences between France and the Agency over Iran’s nuclear program. A statement issued by the Élysée Palace after Mr. Sarkozy’s meeting with Dr. ElBaradei said that the French president encouraged him to investigate Iran’s nuclear activities “at length and with determination.” Three French officials familiar with the meetings said that the conversations with Dr. ElBaradei were cordial. ElBaradei reportedly reiterated that Iran would never agree to suspend uranium enrichment and that the world powers must negotiate with Iran with no preconditions.

The New York Times reported, "Much to the frustration of his hosts, he had no specific proposal on how such negotiations could take place, the officials said." One should note that, as Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy says,

there have been various offers by Iran to negotiate directly with the United States on a variety of issues of mutual concern, and that the US government, after years of dismissing such offers out of hand, instead opted to engage in talks as part of the EU3+3 process, where it put nothing more concrete than spare aircraft parts on the table in exchange for verifiable suspension of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle program. And of course, the onus is on the parties to the dispute to set the time, place, and conditions for negotiations, not Dr. ElBaradei.

13 February 2008: A European diplomat told Reuters that the UN Security Council will probably not vote on a third sanctions resolution against Iran's nuclear programme until after the next IAEA report is released. The unidentified diplomat said "the vote is not specifically tied to the IAEA report, but it just so happens that by the time we get around to voting on it, it will most likely be after the report is out." According to the article, South Africa has been's Security Council delegation has been pressing the five permanent members to wait for the report: "South Africa and other members of the Non-Aligned Movement say the IAEA's investigation is relevant and want the Council to wait until it has as much information as possible."

A US official reportedly said the vote could come any day: "There is nothing holding this up other than trying to get agreement.... As soon as that happens, we will vote." Other diplomats repotedly indicated that "waiting for the IAEA report will help them by ensuring they get a 'yes' vote from South Africa." Diplomats said concerns from Libya and Viet Nam were also holding up the vote. Apparently, Libya, which until recently was the target of UN sanctions, opposes sanctions in general while Viet Nam is unwilling to interfere in other countries' affairs.

In other news, Russian Foreign Minister Segei Lavrov said it would be better for Iran to "to refrain from actions that raise tensions and create the impression Iran is ignoring the international community," referring to Iran's continued uranium enrichment and missile developments.

Meanwhile, unidentified diplomats told the Associated Press that Iran has begun processing minute quantities of gas in its new generation of advanced centrifuges. One diplomat said Iran had set up only 10 of the machines — far too few to make enriched uranium in the quantities needed for an industrial-scale energy or weapons program. One diplomat said that the centrifuges were set up on 20 January and began processing minute amounts of the uranium gas soon afterward to test the machines.

12 February 2008: David Albright and Jacqueline Shire of the Institute for Science and International Security wrote an article containing some basic background information about the P-2 (IR-2) centrifuges and a brief history of Iran’s research and development of them to date. They say that "Iran's decision to move ahead with installation of modified P-2 centrifuges at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant ... appears to reflect Iran’s commitment to expanding and improving its enrichment capabilities beyond those of the P-1 centrifuge, of which 3,000 are currently operating at the larger Natanz fuel enrichment plant."

Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy says the Iranian decision isn't really news, but

What's notable is that they are doing this at the same time the Security Council is talking about a new sanctions package. This tends to reveal a little bit of the Iranian calculus - that no conceivable sanctions can impose a high enough cost to compel them to reconsider their enrichment program. Of course, in the absence of any package, such as that offered to North Korea, Iran also has no incentive to discontinue the program either.

11 February 2008: The next IAEA report on Iran's nuclear programme, expected to be published on or around 20 February, may be delayed by a few days because of "disagreements between ElBaradei and his technical staff. ElBaradei is pushing for one thing, while the people who went on a technical visit to Iran during January disagree. It should now be published maybe one week later, so in the last week of February." The report will then be put to the IAEA Board of Govenors at its meeting on 3-7 March.

5 February 2008: Russian deputy foreign minister Sergei Kislyak said Iran should freeze enrichment activity until all of its nuclear program's "complicated points have been worked out."

4 February 2008: Mohammed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said Iran has made "good progress" in addressing outstanding issues surrounding its nuclear program. ElBaradei said his final report on the Iranian nuclear program will provide information on the development of centrifuges and enrichment activity at the Natanz nuclear facility. In an interview with Egyptian TV, he warned against military action against Iran, arguing a military strike to settle the Iranian nuclear issue would complicate the situation and send the Middle East region into a vicious cycle of violence. ElBaradei is expected to issue a report to the IAEA Board of Govenors around 20 February.

2 February 2008: Speaking on the sidelines of the African Union summit in Ethiopia, Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki urged the P5+1 to wait for a report from the IAEA before finalizing the decision on new sanctions against Iran.

30 January 2008: US ambassador to the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad, joined Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and Iranian presidential advisor Mojtaba Samare Hashemi in a debate during the World Economic Forum in Switzerland. The appearance was unscheduled - and unauthorized by the Bush administration. He reportedly "broke rules that permit Bush administration officials to discuss issues with Iranians only under limited circumstances and with advance approval." In response to questions about his participation in the debate, Khalilzad argued that while "the panel was not instigated by the State Department.... It was a multilateral setting - in which we mad our points and they made their points. There were no handshakes, no side meetings. We do it in [the UN General Assembly] and other multilateral settings. No change in policy." The debate has been posted on YouTube.

28 January 2008: The UK, US, and France began a campaign to persuade the 10 non-permanent members of the Security Council to agree to a third round of economic and trade sanctions against Iran. According to the Financial Times, "The western sponsors say they are seeking unanimity in the 15-member Security Council in order to persuade the Iranian public that the pursuit of an illicit nuclear programme is not worth the economic cost in terms of trade relations with the rest of the world."

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said his country would show "serious and logical" reaction if the UN Security Council adopts more sanctions against it. The top Iranian diplomat urged that the UN Security Council should wait until International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei presents his report to the Board of Governors in February.

Also on 28 January, Iran received the eighth and final shipment of nuclear fuel from Russia for its Bushehr power plant. The total consignment was 82 tonnes.

25 January 2008: The P5+1, negotiating a new Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran, revealed a package of measures described by a senior European diplomat as "another turn of the screw". The proposed measures would impose a travel ban and asset freeze on Iranians most closely involved with the nuclear programme. Member states would also be urged to monitor more closely the activities of all Iranian banks, including Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. Member states would be encouraged to inspect suspicious cargoes to and from Iran and avoid granting export credits that could be used to promote Iran's nuclear activities. It calls "upon states to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals involved in such trade." It also directs IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to report within 90 days whether Iran has fully suspended all sensitive nuclear fuel activities as demanded in previous council resolutions. See more elements of the resolution.

22 January 2008: The Foreign Ministers of the six states involved in negotiating new UN Security Council action against Iran are are to meet in Berlin today, but agreed they have "some way to go" before agreeing on a third sanctions resolution. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the political directors had been making progress, but noted there are "still some gaps to close." Germany's Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said he took Russia and China's involvement as a positive sign, but also noted, "I can't promise we will come out of this meeting with an agreement on how to proceed in the U.N Security Council, that we will agree on the text of a resolution and I can't tell you what new sanctions will look like."

Iran received the fifth shipment of nuclear fuel from Russia for its nuclear powerplant at Bushehr. The consignment contained 11 tons of enriched uranium, and the rest of the nuclear fuel will be received in three separate shipments in coming week. Iran has thus received 55 tons of fuel from Russia for Bushehr. It needs a total of 82 tons for its primary stages of commissioning.

20 January 2008: Iran received the fourth shipment of nuclear fuel from Russia for its nuclear powerplant at Bushehr.

18 January 2008: Iran received the third shipment of nuclear fuel from Russia for its nuclear powerplant at Bushehr.

16 January 2008: A spokesman for the German Foreign Ministry announced that Germany believes a new UN resolution imposing sanctions against Iran is necessary, and has invited the Foreign Ministers of the five permament members of the Security Council to a meeting next Tuesday in Berlin to discuss the matter. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier plans to meet with IAEA Director General ElBaradei tomorrow. The IAEA has confirmed the meeting; a senior IAEA representative said ElBaradei was likely to convey "his positive assessment" that Iran was helping resolve lingering issues.

14 January 2008: During talks between IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and Iranian government officials, Iran gave ElBaradei new information on Iran's "new generation of centrifuges," and agreed to answer questions about "secret nuclear activities" within one month. The IAEA reported that "Agreement was reached on the timeline for implementation of all remaining verification issues specified in the work plan. According to the agreed schedule, implementation ... should be completed in the next four weeks." IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming also said the two sides discussed the importance of the implementation of the Additional Protocol and other confidence-building measures called for by the Security Council.

11 January 2008: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei met with Iranian Vice President Gholam Reza Aghazadeh (also head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization) to discuss how the IAEA and the Iranian government can work together to accelerate the pace of our cooperation to clarify all outstanding issues before [the next IAEA] report in March." ElBaradei characterized the session as a "frank and open exchange of views," explaining, "I asked Mr. Aghazadeh to give us maximum transparency and provide assurances about all present nuclear activities about Iran. ... My mission here is to overcome the difficulties between IAEA and Iran." Tomorrow, ElBaradei is scheduled to meet with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. After the meeting, Aqazadeh said, "We have entered a new phase of cooperation with the IAEA in which grounds would be prepared for fully settling all outstanding issues regarding our nuclear program."

9 January 2008: US President Bush, at the start of his Middle East tour, denounced Iran as a threat to world peace. Meanwhile, IAEA Director General ElBaradei is headed to Iran to talk with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. He is expected to push for the resumption of UN inspections and for a rapid conclusion of the investigation into Iran's past activities.

7 January 2008: A confrontation between the United States and Iran occurred in the Strait of Hormuz, wherein three US warships nearly opened fire on up to five Iranian motor boats, which, according to the US, approached them "in a threatening manner," but according to Iran, simply asked the US ships to identify themselves. See DisarmamentActivist.org's posts on 8 January and 10 January for a good overview of the incident, and analysis of the Western and Iranian media reactions. See Kaveh L Afrasiabi's article from 15 January for some interesting legal perspectives on the incident. And check out the videos of the incident on the BBC website.

7 January 2008: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei will go to Iran at the end of the week for two days"with a view of resolving all remaining outstanding issues and enabling the agency to provide assurance about Iran's past and present activities." An IAEA spokeswomen said ElBaradei would meet some senior Iranian officials, but didn't give details.

28 December 2007: Russia delivered the second batch of nuclear fuel to Iran for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Its weight was equal to that of the first batch, delivered on 17 December. A total of 82 tons of fuel is to be delivered.

21 December 2007: US Permament Representative to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad commented on Russia's supply of reactor fuel to Iran in response to a reporter's question of whether it will hamper movement towards further sanctions on Iran:

Well, I have said, you have heard me before that we have asked the Iranians to suspend their enrichment program because once they are able to enrich uranium in the name of their power reactor that they can enrich it for weapon purposes too because the same technology that enriches to - uranium to 5% can be used to enrich it to 70, 80, 90% which are usable and necessary and is two thirds of the way for a weapons program. What’s important about this issue is that if Iran suspended, we have said we understand the need for the fuel and there has to be a way to provide that fuel in a reliable way that doesn’t yet contribute to proliferation. So the Russian offer makes it unnecessary for Iran to have its own enrichment because the Russians have said they will provide the fuel that is needed for the power reactor. We were open minded in terms of other alternatives to discuss post suspension but at least the Russian offer undermines the logic that we need to have enrichment because we need fuel for our reactor and of course there is the back end which we will come to, what happens with the spent fuel of the reactor is an issue with regard to reprocessing the plutonium that will be in the spent fuel. That’s an issue that’s also critical for proliferation in terms of proliferation. Thank you.

20 December 2007: A spokeswoman for the Russian contractor Atomstroiexport announced that it would take at least a year (until the end of 2008) for the Bushehr power plant to become operational. Iranian officials have previously thought Bushehr could be partially operational within three months, and be completely online in six to nine months.

18 December 2007: In his statement to the Security Council, US Permament Representative to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad said Iran must:

1) Suspend its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities without delay, which would then allow negotiations within the framework of the P5+1; and

2) Give the IAEA its full cooperation in implementing the Work Plan.

The United States remains deeply troubled by Iran's noncompliance. The P5+1 continue their consultations in capitals, and we hope to have a text of a new sanctions resolution before the full Council as soon as possible.

In closing, Mr. President, let me say a few words about the recent announcement by the Russian Federation to send Iran enriched uranium for use in the nuclear power plant being constructed at Bushehr.

Resolution 1737, while prohibiting states from assisting Iran with sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, makes an exception for providing Iran with assistance and fuel for light water reactors such as Bushehr. As President Bush has noted, while he supports Russia's decision, Russia's arrangement to supply nuclear fuel for the entire period of Bushehr's operation demonstrates one thing: Iran does not need to pursue uranium enrichment and other sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle to have access to nuclear power.

We have joined Russia and other members of the P5+1 in offering Iran, if it complies with the requirements of the Council, cooperation in the development of a civil nuclear power program. This includes active international support in building state-of-the art light water power reactors and reliable access to fuel cycle, to nuclear fuel. If Iran is, in fact, serious about using nuclear power to meet its energy needs, the best way for it to proceed is to suspend its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and accept the P5+1 offer. We await Iran's answer.

17 December 2007: Russia delivered its first nuclear fuel shipment to the Iranian nuclear plant at Bushehr. The Russian foreign ministry said in a statement that Tehran had given assurances the 80 tonnes of fuel would not be used for other purposes, and that the fuel was delivered under the control and guarantees of the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has approved the shipments.

Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, the Iranian vice-president and head of Iran's nuclear programme, told Iran's state news agency that the plant would begin generating electricity within the next six months.

16 December 2007: Russia and Iran have agreed to a timeframe to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran, according to Atomstroyexport, the Russian contractor building the plant.

13 December 2007: China's Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, urged for a "two-track approach in trying to resolve the dispute with Iran over its nuclear program - a revitalized diplomatic initiative along with a new U.N. resolution on sanctions." Wang explained the NIE report "changed China's views on a new sanction resolution." He also reported that the political directors of the P5+1 agreed to either meet or talk by telephone after the new year. However, US Ambassador Khalilzad continued to insist "there was a proposal for a new discussion among the political directors in the coming days and the possibility of higher level talks at a donors conference for Palestinians in Paris on Monday."

According to the AP, US officials in Washington "said that a preliminary sanctions plan drafted by France would punish the Quds Force, part of Iran's powerful Revolutionary Guard Corps, for exporting banned weapons, and Bank Melli, one of Iran's largest banks, which the United States included in its own sweeping sanctions program in October."

12 December 2007: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, US Permanent Representative to the UN, explained to reporters outside of the Security Council, "The NIE wasn’t helpful, has not been helpful in speeding us to get to a resolution – agreement on a resolution but we are talking with Germany and other P5 members, it’s still discussions that are being held at the political directors level and there was, as you heard, a discussion yesterday and there will be additional discussion. I don’t expect at the present time for action to be transferred, the negotiations to be transferred to me - or to us here in the UN Security Council for some days still." When a reporter asked if the Security Council will discuss the issue in December, Khalilzad said, "That’s our expectations but it’s contingent on agreement among the political directors and there is another engagement planned – another conversation among the political directors."

However, British Ambassador John Sawers said he feels it is unlikely that the P5+1 government officials will be able to reach enough agreement in their talks on a new Iran sanctions resolution by the end of the year to start taking action at the United Nations. Before the issue can be taken up by the Security Council, political directors in capitals negotiate the outline of the resolution; these directors have not yet been able to agree on final elements of the resolution. Sawers argued, "I think there's still wide differences between, on the one hand, Britain, France, Germany and the United States, on the other Russia and China."

12 December 2007: The chief American official in talks on Iran’s nuclear program, Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns, has been in discussion with the rest of the P5+1 about a third sanctions resolution against Iran, though US administration officials have said a vote on new sanctions, originally scheduled for this month, would most likely be deferred until next year. The New York Times reported that one official said "the new sanctions might include economic strictures and a ban on foreign travel by senior Iranian officials involved in the nuclear program or suspected of supporting terrorism. Such sanctions would be somewhat similar to those the United States unilaterally imposed on the Quds division of Iran’s Republican Guard Corps, although apparently they would not go nearly as far." Meanwhile, Scott McCormack, the State Department's spokesperson, said the administration would like to have a final Security Council resolution that can be voted on in the coming weeks, adding, "what is very interesting about this is that we’re not talking about whether or not there’s going to be a resolution, but we’re talking about what are the elements to a new Security Council resolution."

8 December 2007: Gulf Arab countries vocally disagreed with Defense Secretary Robert Gates on US policies toward Iran and Israel. During his speech at a regional security conference in Bahrain, Gates stressed the danger of Iran's nuclear program and urged the Gulf states to force Tehran to stop uranium enrichment. Several Gulf state delegates said the US was hypocritical for supporting Israeli nuclear weapons, and questioned Washington's refusal to meet with Iran to discuss the Islamic state's nuclear activities. Bahraini Minister of Labor Majeed al-Alawi asked whether Gates thought that Israeli nuclear weapons are a threat to the region. Gates said no - and that he does not perceive that as being a double-standard.

6 December 2007: The Tehran Times pointed out several problems with the NIE report released on 3 December, arguing that despite positive responses by some Iranian officials, the report is actually not something to celebrate:

While the nuclear watchdog states that it has not observed any non-peaceful nuclear activities, the U.S. intelligence agencies have evaluated Iran’s nuclear program to be of a military nature, so that, unlike a technical approach, this political evaluation would influence public opinion.

[The report states:] “The halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure…”

In this way they are trying to justify their decision to pressure Iran and implying that the country is not committed to the agreements.

[The report states:] “Until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.”

This big lie is not mentioned in any of the IAEA reports and is only an allegation made by the United States.

[The report states:] “Since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications”; “Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing”; “Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015”; and “Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.”

These sentences suggest that the pressure that was put on Iran, under the leadership of the U.S. government, has been successful in halting the country’s efforts to produce nuclear weapons and thus should be continued.

The article goes on to argue, "China, Russia, and even other permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany have made it very clear to the United States that they adamantly believe that only diplomatic methods should be used in the nuclear standoff. However, it is also important to examine their definition of diplomacy. We suppose that diplomacy means interaction through dialogue in order to reach an understanding, but in the conception of diplomacy of some members of the 5+1 group, any tool can be utilized to exert pressure except Article 42 of the United Nations Charter and the military option."

5 December 2007: Recovering from the intelligence report that seemed to undermine the US administration's push for further sanctions against Iran, and undeterred in its push to escalate international pressure on Iran, President Bush said the report shows Iran still has many questions to answer about its past nuclear work, arguing that Iran had to come clean on the work it had done on its nuclear program prior to 2003 and suspend uranium enrichment, or risk international isolation. This statement avoids admitting that the IAEA and Iran have been correctly asserting that Iran has no nuclear weapons programme, and disregards the work plan developed by the IAEA and Iran to settle all outstanding issues related to the IAEA investigation into Iran's past nuclear activities. Furthermore, as Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy adds, it "deliberately distorts the historical-political context and makes clear that Iran's nuclear programme is not the issue that is driving [the US'] policies" toward Iran.

However, French Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert indicated that the Security Council would be moving forward with another set of sanctions against Iran, saying "there was 'growing consensus' among world powers including China and Russia on moving talks on Iran's nuclear program to New York," because "Iran was still in defiance of two Security Council resolutions demanding it halt uranium enrichment." The Reuters article further points out that "Washington has said it will continue pressing for a third round of sanctions unless Iran halts uranium enrichment."

Al Jazeera, on the other hand, argued that now that the NIE report has been released, there will be international pressure against a pre-emptive strike and opposition in the Security Council against further sanctions. Marwan Bishara, Al Jazeera's senior political analyst, also believes the report "might pave the way to bilateral negotiations between the US and Iran without stiff preconditions in order to relax the tensions in the Gulf with the participation of Iran's Arab neighbours, as well as its European allies," and that "Washington will find it ever more necessary and ever more enticing to talk to Iran about a 'helpful' and perhaps beneficial role for itself and Iraq in the Gulf."

4 December 2007: Al Jazeera noted that despite the report, the White House has urged global powers to "turn up the pressure" on Iran. Stephen Hadley, the national security adviser, argued, "The intelligence ... tells us that the risk of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon remains a very serious problem," and insisted, "The bottom line is this: for that strategy to succeed, the international community has to turn up the pressure on Iran - with diplomatic isolation, United Nations sanctions, and with other financial pressure - and Iran has to decide it wants to negotiate a solution." Al Jazeera also noted that the UK government seems to favour "increasing the pressure on Iran over its nuclear programme despite the latest NIE report," quoting a British foreign ministry spokesperson saying, "The report's conclusions justify the action already taken by the international community to get to the bottom of Iran's nuclear programme and to increase pressure on the regime to stop its enrichment and reprocessing activities." Meanwhile, US President Bush said the report was a "warning signal" and his view that a nuclear Iran would be a danger "hasn't changed," adding: "Iran was dangerous, Iran is dangerous and Iran will be dangerous if they have the know-how to make a nuclear weapon."

The report has further confused EU officials, who are "struggling to understand why the United States chose to issue the report just two days after the six powers involved in negotiating with Iran — the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany — had decided to press ahead with a new Security Council resolution." One diplomat reportedly said, “Officially, we will study the document carefully; unofficially, our efforts to build up momentum for another resolution are gone.” Meanwhile, Vitaly Churkin, the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, praised the report, arguing, “We have always been saying there is no proof they are pursuing nuclear weapons.” He explained he wasn't sure what impact the report would have on the new initiative for more sanctions. A senior official at the IAEA said, “Despite repeated smear campaigns, the I.A.E.A. has stood its ground and concluded time and again that since 2002 there was no evidence of an undeclared nuclear weapons program in Iran,” adding that “[i]t also validates the assessment of the director general that what the I.A.E.A. inspectors have seen in Iran represented no imminent danger.”

Meanwhile, in remarks to reporters outside the Security Council, US Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, said, "the NIE says that there was a covert military dedicated nuclear weapons program."

However, this assertion of the report should not be accepted without investigation. As Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy points out, "Scant evidence exists in the public domain to back up the administration's assertion that Iran had a nuclear weapons program." Iran's nuclear-related activities prior to 2003 do not indisputably indicate a "covert military dedicated nuclear weapons program". For example, Spies says, "Iranian opposition groups have made a number of claims, mostly discredited, regarding clandestine military nuclear sites in Iran, including the Parchin Military Complex and the Lavizan-Shian Technical Research Center. IAEA samples of the soil found no evidence of nuclear materials at either site, consistent with Iran's declarations." Furthermore, "[i]n 2006, the IAEA continued to investigate the import of dual use equipment by PHRC [Physics Research Center, located at the Lavizan-Shian site], which could be used in uranium enrichment and conversion activities. The IAEA detected particles of natural and highly enriched uranium on some equipment and materials related to the center," not to military activities. In regards to the 15-page document given to Iran by the A.Q. Khan network that described "the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal in small quantities, and for the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to fabrication of nuclear weapons components," Iran turned this document over to the IAEA in 2006. Spies explains, the IAEA "noted the document did not contain specification or dimensions for machined components. Iran claimed the document was provided at the initiative of the network. The IAEA noted that Iran had not made use of the procedures described in the document."

Spies further argues, "The important question that doesn't get asked isn't so much whether Iran had a nuclear weapon program but what does the NIE mean by Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Obviously we aren't taking about the Manhattan project here. The bottom line is that there's no evidence in the public domain to suggest much beyond paper studies in Iran related to possible weaponization of nuclear materials."

Ambassador Khalilzad went on to argue that the NIE report says Iran stopped its "covert military dedicated nuclear weapons program" in 2003 "because of international pressure, because of revelations about the program that did not come as a result of Iran producing that information, but otherwise in the context of U.S. activities in the region, including developments in Iraq at that time."

However, sanctions were not applied against Iran in 2003. The US pushed for the IAEA to report Iran to the UN Security Council in 2003, but instead, three EU states - France, Germany, and the UK - offered Iran technical cooperation with its nuclear program in exchange for full transparency. Talks between Iran and the EU3 and the IAEA continued on-and-off August 2005; the matter was not referred to the Security Council until February 2006.

Mike Veiluva writing for DisarmamentActivist.org argues, "while sanctions were not responsible for terminating Iran’s alleged weapons research activities, they certainly could induce the Iranian government to reconsider its suspension. We already have the example of 2006 when the US push for new sanctions drove Iran to terminate the Paris Agreement and resume uranium enrichment."

3 December 2007: A new National Intelligence Estimate, representing the consensus view of all 16 US spy agencies, says that Iran is not currently seeking nuclear weapons, nor will it be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon until at least 2010. The report "concludes that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and that the program remains on hold, contradicting an assessment two years ago that Tehran was working inexorably toward building a bomb." Mainstream media has either presented this report as undermining neoconservative arguments for war with Iran, or, as Fox News spun it, "The intelligence community has high confidence that Iran had a covert nuclear weapons program that it never acknowledged and continues to deny, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley said Monday, but the program is currently halted although perhaps not indefinitely." Some also insinuated or pointed out that the report's contradictions to the 2005 NIE report, as well as the NIE's errors about Iraq's posession of WMD, render this new report meaningless. Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy argues the report adds nothing new or substantive to the debate.

30 November 2007: EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana said he is disappointed after talks with Iran on its nuclear programme, but top Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili said the discussions were positive and more would be held. Solana was reportedly "looking for signs that the Iranians were prepared to suspend uranium enrichment work," while Jalili argued "it was unacceptable to pressure Iran into abandoning uranium enrichment, as it was allowed to do so under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."

25 November 2007: Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman reported that Iran is working on the "completion of a new idea" for settling the dispute over its nuclear programme. "The new idea is currently discussed and to be completed and presented at the next round of talks with (European Union foreign policy chief Javier) Solana," Mohammad-Ali Hosseini told reporters at a press conference. He did not disclose the contents of the new idea, but confirmed that chief nuclear negotiator Saeid Jalili would meet Solana in London on November 30.

25 November 2007: Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mohammad-Ali Hosseini, said Iranian officials will resume talks with their counterparts from the UN nuclear watchdog over outstanding issues on Iran's peaceful nuclear activities on December 11. The remaining issues include the Polonium 210, source of the contamination, and Gachin mine.

24 November 2007: The European Union's foreign policy chief Javier Solana suggested the discussion of establishing international enrichment centres under multilateral supervision should be enhanced as an effort to defuse tensions over Iran's nuclear enrichment programme. However, Iran's response to previous suggestions of relying on an international fuel supply rather than a domestic supply has not been favourable. Iranian media said on Wednesday Solana would meet Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili in London on 30 November. Solana said he would "probably" meet Jalili on that date.

22 November 2007: Disregarding the IAEA Director General's recent report, the US, the UK, France, and Germany told the IAEA Board of Governors that "a wait-and-see approach is not an option." They argued that Iran had not done enough to win their trust, and the UN should now consider tougher sanctions: "We recognize Iran has taken some steps in the right direction but we are disappointed that cooperation is of a partial and reactive nature ... all in all, the results are not encouraging." US envoy Gregory Schulte agreed, saying, "Iran's consistent policy of selective cooperation and delay tactics suggest that Iran means only to distract the world" from their nuclear weapon ambitions. Meanwhile, Russia and China agree Iran's cooperation with the IAEA is a positive step forward, and neither seems ready to intensify sanctions. The Non-Aligned Movement emphasized Iran's substantive cooperation, and warned against "undue interference" with the process.

21 November 2007: Iran's deputy chief nuclear negotiator Javad Vaeidi announced that preliminary nuclear talks between Iran and the European Union are to be held "within the next few days," after the initial schedule had to be postponed for "technical reasons." Vaeidi said that after technical evaluation of the Iranian nuclear programme by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Tehran was also ready to discuss with the EU the political aspects of the issue.

19 November 2007: UN Ambassador Wang Guangya of China said his government is ready for six-nation talks to begin in early December to try to resolve the dispute over Iran's nuclear programme, but expressed caution about the possibility of new sanctions. He said the United States "should not forget" that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the UN nuclear "watchdog," and when the six nations decided on the two sanctions resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council, "it [was] to reinforce the role of IAEA." Ambassador Wang also denied that the cancellation of its attendance at the most recent P5+1 meeting was a move to block further sanctions, arguing that the Chinese delegation faced scheduling problems.

19 November 2007: Iranian lawyer and Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi called on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program, arguing it is not worth war. She explained, "Using nuclear energy is every nation's right, but we have obvious other rights including security, peace and welfare." She also urged the United States to work within international law when addressing the Iranian nuclear programme: "What we want is that the two sides should respect international law," Ebadi said during her interview with Radio Farda. "The United States cannot have the right to deal with Iran outside the framework of international law, and Iran cannot build a wall around itself and say, ‘I have nothing to do with international law,’ and pay no attention to Security Council resolutions."

15 November 2007: The IAEA Director General released a new report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant Security Council provisions in Iran. Media spin on the issue undermines several key points of the report. As noted by Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, "the charge that Iran's cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive could be interpreted as a criticism of the IAEA itself, which after all agreed to the formula contained in the work plan. In addition, the IAEA's 'diminishing' knowledge of Iran's nuclear program requires a lot of qualification - under the Safeguards, the IAEA is obligated only to verify that information declared to it by governments matches physical inventories. So in normal circumstances when safeguards are applied, the IAEA doesn't compile "knowledge" about a state's nuclear program - it makes findings regarding the accuracy of a state's declarations. Of course, these two points are easily taken out of context in order to show Iran has not been cooperating, in spite of the very clear conclusion of the report to the contrary." He further points out several items in the report worth noting, including "the expanded chronology of Iran's acquisition of nuclear fuel cycle technology, placing the development of Iran's nuclear program in the context of the program started by the Shah," and, more importantly, "the revised history of the 1987 offer from the Khan network and the civilian origin of the decision to pursue uranium enrichment in paras 10 and 11 (emphasis mine):

10. According to Iran, the decision to acquire centrifuge technology was taken by the President of the AEOI and endorsed by the Prime Minister of Iran. In response to its enquiries about possible additional documentation relevant to the 1987 offer, the Agency was provided on 8 November 2007 with a copy of a confidential communication from the President of the AEOI to the Prime Minister, dated 28 February 1987, which also carried the Prime Minister's endorsement, dated 5 March 1987. In his communication, the AEOI President indicated that the activities "should be treated fully confidentially." In response to the Agency's enquiry as to whether there was any military involvement in the programme, Iran has stated that no institution other than the AEOI was involved in the decision-making process or in the implementation of the centrifuge enrichment programme.

11. Based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network, limited documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected through the Agency's independent investigations, the Agency has concluded that Iran's statements are consistent with other information available to the Agency concerning Iran's acquisition of declared P-1 centrifuge enrichment technology in 1987.

Also important, Iran's explanation for the development (or lack thereof) of the P-2 centrifuge also seems to check out, and as always, 'The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.'"

The P5+1 have been waiting for the release of this report, the first one since the IAEA and Iran developed a work plan to settle their outstanding issues, to decide whether or not to press further sanctions against Iran (see 21 August entry for more details).

After the release of the report, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, US Permanent Representative to the UN, argued that "it is clear that Iran has not fully cooperated," and pressed for "another resolution in the Security Council under Chapter 7 to impose additional sanctions on Iran." He further said, "only a strong resolution with new and biting sanctions will give diplomacy a chance to succeed ... I think it’s in everyone’s interest for this world defining issue to be resolved diplomatically and for diplomacy to work, for diplomacy to succeed it needs widely supported broad and biting sanctions to effect the calculations of the regime in Iran." He also hinted that China's "dragging feet" on the issue would be responsible for the failure of diplomacy "by not cooperating with the effort at additional sanctions."

Khalilzad also insisted this is one of the most important issues the international community faces, "because Iran is seeking regional hegemony, because Iran has ties terrorist organizations, because Iran’s support for insurgent groups in Iraq and in Afghanistan, because of the rhetoric of the Iranian leaders. Given all that, it is a defining issue and therefore the international community as a state, the international community as a whole as a state in doing all that we can diplomatically to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability."

October 2007: The "Iran issue" at the General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security

Extracted from the Nuclear Proliferation reports written by Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy in the First Committee Monitor:

Week 1: 8-12 October 2007
Contrary to exhortations of unity of the international community on the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, the discussion in the General Debate revealed a high degree of divergence.

Divergences were readily apparent in the approach of the P5 on the issue of Iran, despite the 28 September P5+2 statement in which the major powers agreed to seek a third sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council unless reports from the IAEA and the EU High Representative show progress in November. The United States again adopted the hardest line against Iran and called outright for the UN Security Council to “move forward as soon as possible to adopt a third resolution under Chapter VII imposing additional sanctions measures.”

Although the EU's delegation called upon Iran to “respond positively and swiftly to the demands of the international community … in particular by suspending its enrichment related and reprocessing activities,” and endorsed the 28 September P5+2 statement, it more positively expressed hope “that the discussions between the IAEA and Iran on outstanding issues will, at least by November, meet the targets laid down by the 'work plan'.” The EU made no reference to an additional sanctions resolution, however, it expressed “resolve not to allow Iran to acquire military nuclear capabilities and to see to all consequences of its nuclear programme, in terms of proliferation, resolved,” without further specification as to what such “resolution” might entail.

The Russian Federation and China's delegations both placed emphasis on diplomatic and political solutions to addressing the Iran nuclear situation, without reference to the imposition of additional sanctions or the 28 September P5+2 statement, perhaps an indication of lukewarm support for continued escalation of the situation. Russia's Ambassador Antonov called for a “comprehensive approach … to the situation around the Iranian nuclear program.” He further called for a “comprehensive political and diplomatic solution” and “for intensifying contacts between the Six Parties and Iran in order to elaborate the models that would allow to launch such purpose-oriented full-scale negotiations process.” China's Ambassador Cheng Jingye implored all parties to “show flexibility, exercise patience and stick to the course of peaceful resolution in seeking a comprehensive, long-term and appropriate solution” to the Iran situation.

Other Western delegations that spoke out on Iran tended to take an approach closer to that of the EU. Canada and New Zealand emphasized a need for Iran to comply fully with UN Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), a reference to Iran’s refusal to suspend its uranium enrichment programme. Delegations affiliated with the Non-Aligned Movement, of which Iran is a member, universally adopted a softer tone, welcoming the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve outstanding issues. Additionally, without direct reference to Iran, Non-Aligned delegates generally called for balanced and comprehensive pursuit of non-proliferation objectives and reaffirmed the right expressed in Article IV of the NPT to peaceful development and use of nuclear energy. Ambassador Aziz of Egypt observed the international community was witnessing “efforts aimed at preventing the non-nuclear-weapon-States from their inalienable right in the peaceful applications of nuclear technology.” Indonesia’s Ambassador Asmady stated, “We believe that the international community should not be skeptical of the activities of certain states—which are parties—in building peaceful nuclear programs as long as they will not be diverted into military purposes.”

Week 2: 15-19 October 2007
The dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme was again the near-exclusive focus of discussion over matters concerning nuclear proliferation in the second week of First Committee. Despite the large amount of floor time devoted to the issue, delegations generally failed to add any points of substance to the discussion beyond those covered already in the General Debate (see Nuclear Proliferation week one). In the Thematic Debate, the European Union statement did little more than expand on its position on Iran incorporated in its general statement. Japan and Australia both expressed approval of the work plan between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve outstanding issues, but also called on Iran to fully comply with relevant IAEA Board and UN Security Council resolutions without delay, including the suspension of uranium enrichment.

Given the active engagement and ownership of this issue by some major powers, who are also permanent members of the Security Council, the role of the General Assembly on this matter is certain to remain limited to repeated reassertion of national positions in prepared remarks during the general and themed discussions. The only, very minor, exception to this might be if some states continue to raise objections to the annual resolution sponsored by the League of Arab States, A/C.1/62/L.2, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.” Despite its title the resolution exclusively singles out Israel without reference to other concerns relevant to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (i.e. Iran), which has led some delegations to question its balance.

First Committee also heard both the Iranian and Israeli viewpoints on this issue in their general remarks. Reiterating familiar rhetorical points, Iranian Ambassador Khazaee defended Iran’s nuclear programme as peaceful, touted the 21 August work plan to resolve all outstanding issues with the IAEA, which the ambassador noted had been well received by the international community, and denounced UN Security Council resolutions adopted on the nuclear issue as “unwarranted … unlawful, unnecessary and unjustifiable.” Israeli Ambassador Ziv, also delivering general remarks from the viewpoint of her country’s unique perspective on matters of global security, urged states to regard Iran “as a threat well beyond the geographical limits of the Middle East” and also as “a threat not just to the regional stability but also to the global strategic situation.” Ambassador Ziv’s statements were in part based on her argument that weapons of mass destruction “in the hands of reckless and irresponsible actors” is singularly the problem. These hyperbolic statements are particularly notable because Israel possesses the only nuclear arsenal in the region. Such positions were flatly rejected by the Hans Blix-led Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, which pointedly discarded the notion that nuclear weapons in the hands of some are safe, but in the hands of others place the world in mortal jeopardy.

Taking a large step back from the narrow and overtly self-interested views expressed by the regional antagonists, Ambassador Khan of Pakistan observed that in the context of Iran’s nuclear programme, “resort[ing] to further coercion or worse, the use of force, will be counter-productive and lead to further and grave instability and insecurity in the Middle East and beyond. It could also jeopardize the bright economic prospects of the entire region.” He emphasized the need to “safeguard the security and independence” of all states in the region, noting that “[a]symmetry, imbalance and discrimination will ultimately propel proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this region,” rather than facilitating the goal of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East.

24 September 2007: In an interview with 60 Minutes, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is in New York to address the UN General Assembly on Tuesday, denied Iran has an interest in acquiring a nuclear weapon. "If it (a nuclear bomb) was useful, it would have prevented the downfall of the Soviet Union," he said. "If it was useful, it would resolved the problem the Americans have in Iraq. The time of the bomb is passed."

20 September 2007: The Middle Powers Initiative issued an appeal for a diplomatic and peaceful resolution of the Iran crisis. In a statement widely released to governments around the world, MPI appealed for their help in influencing the United States not to launch a military attack on Iran.

14 September 2007: Germany suggested a delay in pressing for new sanctions against Iran, announced foreign ministry spokes-person Martin Jaeger at a news conference. Although Jaeger stated, "Germany is ready, if necessary, to take the necessary steps against Iran," he added, "As a member of the IAEA, we are also dealing with the so-called open questions and giving Iran a chance to recover the international community's lost confidence in its nuclear program… If Iran is ready to do this ... then I think we can spare ourselves future sanctions debates." Germany would now like to await the release of a regular IAEA report on Iran in November, which would provide an update on the progress of the work plan, before proceeding with any further discussion of sanctions. The announcement represented a shift in the unity of the EU-3 as France and the UK reportedly remain ready to push for new sanctions.

13 September 2007: The Isreali Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, said that the UN Security Council should impose tougher sanctions against Iran, and that private businesses should stop doing businesss with Tehran despite financial losses that might result. US diplomats are expected to press for stronger sanctions at meetings to be held next week.

12 September 2007: Iran will not stop uranium enrichment, chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani said on Wednesday, despite a call by the European Union and U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to halt sensitive nuclear work. The European Union said earlier that the failure to include a provision for Iran to halt uranium enrichment in a transparency deal Tehran agreed in August with the IAEA was unacceptable.

12 September 2007: Iran warned that a new round of UN sanctions could "destroy" its willingness to cooperate with investigations into its past nuclear activities. The US said it would still push for penalties if Iran did not suspend its uranium enrichment program that at projected rates could produce enough material for a bomb in one year.

11 September 2007: The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) strongly backed the IAEA-Iran work plan at an IAEA Board of Govenors meeting, countering criticism of the deal by Western states. Ambassador Norma Goicochea Estenoz of Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said the bloc "strongly rejects any undue pressure or interference in the agency's activities ... which could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility," in a diplomatic rebuke to Western states that have expressed skepticism about the work plan. NAM further stated it "believes this work plan is a significant step forward, as (ElBaradei) said himself," further adding that "NAM believes it will facilitate negotiations between Iran and other concerned parties toward a peaceful settlement of Iran's nuclear issues. NAM also expects all concerned parties to avoid taking any measures which put at risk the recent constructive process between Iran and the Agency." The EU statement to the Board "took note" of the work plan, but stopped short of endorsing it or expressing approval. Diplomats reported that IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei walked out of the meeting following the EU statement.

10 September 2007: UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said that Iran must cooperate with all UN Security Council demands including the suspension of uranium enrichment. "In addition to what IAEA has been negotiating and discussing with the Iranian government, the Iranian government should fully comply with the Security Council resolutions -- that is the core," Ban said.

4 September 2007: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's statement that Iran has 3,000 centrifuges running is not backed up by evidence, diplomats familiar with U.N. inspections said. 2,000 have been operating, but well below capacity, with another several hundred in various stages of installation and testing.

30 August 2007: IAEA Deputy Director general of safeguards Olli Heinonen underlined the importance of the work plan, recently agreed to between Iran and the IAEA "to resolve the outstanding issues that triggered all the Security Council procedures sometime ago." He emphasized, "When you read the plan you see this is not an open-ended timeline: there are certain linkages in this approach, but it's important that it is not open-ended…. The key now is that Iran adheres to this timeline, provides us with the information that we need and access to the information." He further noted that "All these measures which you see there for resolving our outstanding issues go beyond the requirements of the Additional Protocol." Regarding concerns that Iran was manipulating the IAEA investigation and that the deal rules out further inquiries, Heinonen stated, "If the answers are not satisfactory, we are making new questions until we are satisfied with the answers and we can conclude technically that the matter is resolved—it is for us to judge when we think we have enough information. Once the matter is resolved, then the file is closed."

30 August 2007: The IAEA Director General described the 21 August work plan as a significant step forward, in a report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran submitted to the IAEA Board. The report also indicated that "Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities" and "is also continuing with its construction of the IR-40 reactor and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant" contrary to the decisions of the UN Security Council. As of 19 August, Iran was simultaneously operating 12 164-machine cascades with uranium feedstock at its Fuel Enrichment Plant, with one cascade operating without uranium, one operating under vacuum, and two more under construction. Despite Iran's claims that it has enriched up to 4.8 percent U-235, the IAEA reported a maximum enrichment level of 3.7%. The IAEA noted, "Since February 2007, Iran has fed approximately 690 kg of UF6 into the cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), which is well below the expected quantity for a facility of this design."

22 August 2007: The US ambassador to the IAEA accused Iran of manipulating the IAEA in response to the 21 August work plan for resolving outstanding issues related to Iran's past nuclear activities. The US ambassador, Gregory Schulte, described the package as containing "real limitations," further stating that "Cooperation that is partial, conditional, and only promised in the future is not enough. Cooperation that allows Iran to proceed developing the capacity to build nuclear weapons is also not enough. If Iran's leaders truly want the world's trust, they would stop trying to manipulate the IAEA, start to cooperate fully and unconditionally, and suspend activities of concern."

21 August 2007: The IAEA and Iran finalized a work plan to resolve all outstanding issues, after further meetings between Iranian and IAEA officials in Vienna on 24 July and in Tehran 20-21 August. The document entitled, "Understandings of The Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues," was prepared following a series of discussions in Tehran by IAEA and Iranian officials starting on 12 July and contains a schedule for resolving all outstanding issues related to the IAEA investigation into Iran's past nuclear activities. According to the document, the issue of Iran's past plutonium experiments was satisfactorily resolved on 20 August. The document further states Iran's understanding that once all presently identified issues have been resolved, there will be no further remaining issues or ambiguities pertaining to Iran's nuclear program. Under the plan, the IAEA will provide its remaining questions to Iran regarding the origin of the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programs by 31 August, and schedules a series of meetings intended to close the matter by November 2007. Two weeks following the closure of the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge issue, Iran and the IAEA will work to resolve the remaining uranium contamination issues. Iran agreed on 12 July 2007 to cooperation with the IAEA in examination of a document found in Iran describing the casting of uranium metal into hemispheric shapes. Two weeks following the resolution of the uranium metal and contamination issues, Iran agreed to provide explanation to the IAEA's questions regarding Iran's PO-210 experiments, to be provided in writing to Iran by 15 September 2007. The IAEA agreed to provide Iran will all documentation it possesses pertaining to the alleged Green Salt Project, the existence of which Iran denies, which involves alleged studies pertaining to conversion of uranium to UF4, high explosives, and missile reentry vehicles. Iran agreed to review this evidence as a sign of cooperation. Diplomats from Western states criticized the deal for failing to secure Iran's adherence to the Additional Protocol and as for seemingly precluding the IAEA from making further inquiries to Iran on nuclear issues.

20 August 2007: IAEA and Iranian officials met in Tehran to discuss the 12 July work plan to resolve all out-standing issues, and "which includes understandings between the Secretariat and Iran on the modalities, procedures and timelines for resolving these matters."

6 August 2007: IAEA officials, led by Michiro Hosaya, arrived in Iran today, and will meet with a group headed by Mohammad Saeedi, deputy head of Iran's atomic energy organization. Plans for future inspections of Iran's uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz will be discussed.

30 July 2007: International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors visited the heavy water nuclear reactor under construction at Arak for a routine design information verification inspection. The IAEA noted that construction of the reactor was ongoing. Additionally, the IAEA further noted that according to satellite imagery, operation of the adjacent heavy water plant was also ongoing. It is the first such visit since Iran in April blocked access to the plant. Meanwhile, Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and European Union negotiator Javier Solana are to continue talks on Iran's nuclear program this week.

25 July 2007: Iran and the IAEA wrapped up talks and agreed to meet again on August 20th in Tehran. In the meantime, an IAEA team will head to Tehran next week to inspect the Iranian heavy water reactor in the city of Arak. In addition, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said Iranian officials would meet with representative of the Group 5+1 in the near future after fixing an exact date for the event.

24 July 2007: IAEA and Iranian officials met to further discuss the work plan for resolving all outstanding issues. IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards Olli Heinonen and Iran's Undersecretary of the Supreme National Security Council for International Affairs, Javad Vaeedi, met in Vienna to follow up on the 12 July meeting in which both sides agreed to a draft plan to resolve all outstanding issues.

23 July 2007: It was reported that on Tuesday, July 24th, Iran and the IAEA would hold a second round of talks in Vienna on Iran’s nuclear program. Also on Tuesday, Iran is expected to engage in bilateral meetings with the United States, in Baghdad. The topic of the Baghdad meetings is expected to be the situation in Iraq, not Iran’s nuclear program.

23 July 2007: British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said he would not rule out military action against Iran, but believed a policy of sanctions could still persuade Tehran to drop its disputed nuclear program.

22 July 2007: British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is expected to meet with President Bush and discuss the “looming crisis” over Iran’s nuclear program.  The US is said to be pushing for a third sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council; support from the UK and opposition from China and Russia are expected.

19 July 2007: IAEA Director General ElBaradei said Iran still has to clarify some outstanding issues before the IAEA can confirm its nuclear programme is only for peaceful purposes. Iran has agreed to discuss these issues with the IAEA.

12 July 2007: Iran and the IAEA agreed to the modalities for resolving all outstanding issues related to the agency's investigation of iran's past nuclear activities. The draft plan entitled, "Understandings of The Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues," consists of a 60-day work plan and schedule for Iran and the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues.

11 July 2007: IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards Olli Heinonen arrived in Tehran to prepare a "modality plan" for resolving all outstanding issues. Heinonen and his team met with Iran's Undersecretary of the Supreme National Security Council for International Affairs, Javad Vaeedi, who stated the purpose of devising the plan at the present time is to "resolve the issue in Vienna instead of New York."

9 July 2007: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported that Iran has slowed down the expansion of its uranium enrichment program. ElBaradei said IAEA agency inspectors who just revisited Iran's vast underground enrichment plant at Natanz also noticed a "fairly slow" pace of feeding uranium into the centrifuges for enrichment. "We saw a slowing in the process of commissioning new cascades," he told reporters, referring to interlinked networks of centrifuges that spin at high speeds to refine uranium into nuclear fuel. "It is not a full-size freeze, but it is a fairly marked slowdown... I hope at this delicate stage Iran will even freeze what they have (running)," he said after an IAEA meeting. He said the slowdown was a step in the right direction and he likened it to an Iranian pledge to him last month to start producing answers to IAEA investigations meant to verify whether its program is wholly peaceful or military in nature. "I welcome this since Iran at this stage needs to do everything to cool things down", ElBaradei added. This could be cause for restraint in the Security Council, he suggested.

The US, however, is not convinced that the slow down is a diplomatic decision, and has suggested that perhaps technical difficulties are the real reason behind this latest change.

On 23 May 2007, the IAEA Director General's report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran was released. Jeffrey Lewis and Paul Kerr respond.

On 9 April 2007, Reuters reported that Iran announced it has begun industrial-scale nuclear fuel production, marking a shift from experimental atomic fuel work involving a few hundred centrifuges used for enriching uranium to a process that will involve thousands of machines. However, Dr. Jeffrey Lewis of Harvard University argues that while Iran has installed additional 164-machine cascades—maybe more than 1,000 centrifuges in total—at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, there are many technical aspects that will prevent this "shift" from being as immediate as the media is making it out to be.

On 8 April 2007, Iran said it would not discuss its obvious right to master the nuclear fuel cycle but was open to talks that could reassure the West that its atomic plans were not aimed at producing bombs.

On 4 April 2007, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that his government would release the detained 15 British sailors and marines as an "Easter gift" to the British people.

On 3 April 2007, Iran suggested a diplomatic resolution to the ongoing 'hostage' crisis is possible, providing the UK admits it entered into Iranian waters.  UKPrime Minister Tony Blair said the next two days will be "fairly critical" to resolving the dispute.

On 2 April 2007, ABC News reported that "Iran has more than tripled its ability to produce enriched uranium in the last three months, adding some 1,000 centrifuges which are used to separate radioactive particles from the raw material. The development means Iran could have enough material for a nuclear bomb by 2009..." Dr. Jeffrey Lewis of Harvard University responded with a calculation showing how this proclaimation could be very misleading.

On 29 March 2007, the United States and key allies began pressing the International Atomic Energy Agency to find Iran in violation of its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty over Tehran's refusal to allow remote monitoring of its underground uranium enrichment plant. However, IAEA officials are withholding judgment, pending examination of Iran's agreements to see if its refusal to allow installation of extra cameras giving a full overview of its Natanz operations is a violation of the treaty.

On 25 March 2007, Iran responded to Resolution 1747, saying the country would partially suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and called the sanctions illegal. Ahmadinejad also said Iran would continue its nuclear program.

On 24 March 2007, the UN Security Council unanimously voted in favour of Resolution 1747 for further sanctions against Iran. The P5+1 also released a Joint Statement on the resolution.

On 23 March 2007, the top UK diplomat at the UN said a new Security Council resolution on Iran has been agreed upon and is expected to go to a vote on Saturday. However, Qatar, Indonesia and South Africa, members of the Security Council, have concerns. Qatar and Indonesia want the resolution to call for a nuclear-free Middle East - meaning Israel should get rid of its nuclear weapons. South Africa has called for major changes, most of which have been rejected.

Meanwhile, Iranian authorities arrested 15 British sailors and Marines, accusing them of trespassing in Iranian waters.  The British government and the crew claim they were inside Iraq waters.

On 20 March 2007, South Africa surprised major powers by proposing a softening of the document's wording. South Africa, the current chair of the Security Council, has called for all key sanctions proposed by major powers, including an arms embargo and financial bans on an Iranian state bank and the Revolutionary Guard, to be dropped. Although the original draft could probably be adopted by the Security Council without South Africa's backing, the major powers had wanted it to be passed unanimously. Diplomats at the Security Council now say they do not expect a vote on the draft resolution on Iran until next week. Adoption requires a minimum of nine votes on the 15-member council and no veto. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad plans to address the council on the day of the vote.

On 19 March 2007, the US approved a visa for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to address the UN Security Council when it votes on extra sanctions against Iran. The Security Council is to meet on Wednesday to discuss the sanctions.

On 16 March 2007, the Security Council circulated a draft resolution on Iran.

On 15 March 2007, the P5+Germany agreed on a sanctions package against Iran.  The proposal still has to be approved by their governments, then it is to be presented to the rest of the Security Council and voted on. It is considered unlikely that the proposal would meet strong opposition from the other 10 members on the Security Council.

On 13 March 2007, the P5+Germany moved closer to agreement over a sanctions package against Iran. The Security Council may vote on the proposed sanctions by the end of the week. The negotiating parties have ruled out a ban on international travel by Iranian officials involved in nuclear and missile development. They also are unlikely to ban arms imports or export credit guarantees for companies doing business in Iran.  But diplomats say the new sanctions resolution is expected to include an embargo on arms exports, a ban on government loans to Iran, and an asset freeze on more individuals and companies linked to Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs. Iran shrugged offthe threat of further UN sanctions over its nuclear program, saying that more punitive action would hurt neither the development of the nuclear fuel process nor the country's economy. Meanwhile, the president of the UN Security Council, South African Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo, complained that other council members were not informed of negotiations on the draft. "It's been 10 days and the feeling is that, whether they have agreed or not, we need to see what they were talking about," Kumalo said. "In the end it's about the whole council that will decide." 

On 11 March 2007, government spokesman Gholam Hossein Elham said President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wants to address the UN Security Council to defend his country's controversial nuclear programme. Ahmadinejad has not yet made a formal request to the Security Council. Meanwhile, the P5+Germany failed to agree on new sanctions against Iran.

On 9 March 2007, Iran's foreign minister warned that the latest punitive move by the IAEA - the suspension of 22 nuclear aid programs - could affect Tehran's cooperation with the agency. None of the aid programs that were cut directly applied to Iran's uranium enrichment program. Instead, the projects are meant to support the peaceful use of nuclear energy in medicine, agriculture, waste management, management training or power generation. They are provided to dozens of countries, mostly developing nations.

On 8 March 2007, the IAEA approved a 40% cut in its technical assistance to Iran, in line with Security Council sanctions. Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, criticised the decision and said it would not affect its uranium enrichment work: "None of these projects are related to the enrichment programme. The enrichment programme will continue as planned." Meanwhile, the six powers (P5+Germany) negotiating further sanctions against Iran continue struggling to reach agreement.  Under discussion is a mandatory travel ban on Iraqi officials connected with the nuclear program, an arms embargo, restrictions on export credits and an expansion of an earlier list of Iranian officials, groups and companies whose assets would be frozen.

On 6 March 2007, Iran's foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki denied IAEA Director General ElBaradie's remark that his country has temporarily slowed its nuclear program, insisting that Iran's enrichment of uranium was continuing unabated. Mottaki also recommended the IAEA Board of Governors defend the agency's findings on Iran's nuclear program, arguing that Iran is committed to criteria of the IAEA and Iranian nuclear program should be examined by the specialized agency of the United Nations rather than the Security Council.

On 5 March 2007, the EU announced it will back further sanctions against Iran, though disagreement between the major powers remains on certain issues. Meanwhile, board member nations of the IAEA gathered for a session on approving the suspension of dozens of technical aid programs to Iran as part of Security Council sanctions meant to punish Tehran for its nuclear defiance. IAEA Director General ElBaradei commented that Iran's failure to clear up concerns about its nuclear activities after concealing them for almost 20 years sets it apart from all other nations: "We have not seen concrete proof of diversion of nuclear material, nor the industrial capacity to produce weapons-usable nuclear material, which is an important consideration in assessing the risk," said ElBaradei. "But quite a few uncertainties remain about experiments, procurements and other activities ... This renders the agency unable to provide the required assurance about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme." He also said that Iran appeared to have at least temporarily paused on the development of its uranium enrichment program.

On 2 March 2007, the US reported progress in talks with major powers on imposing further sanctions against Iran over its refusal to halt uranium enrichment. US state department officials said most of the issues had been resolved during a conference call between the US, UK, Germany, China, Russia and France. Ambassadors plan to start drafting a new UN resolution next week.

On 27 February 2007, Iran's foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki reiterated that his country will never again suspend uranium enrichment, dismissing the threat of further United Nations sanctions. "Demands that Iran halt enrichment are illegal and illegitimate and based on an incorrect political strategy. This (suspension) will never materialize," the official Islamic Republic News Agency quoted Mottaki as saying. Mottaki added, however, that Iran is prepared to negotiate about its nuclear program "without any preconditions." Meanwhile, China said that a new United Nations Security Council resolution against Iran over its nuclear programme must be conducive towards diplomatic and peaceful negotiations. Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said sanctions were not the ultimate purpose.

On 26 February 2007, the United States, France, Russia, China, the UK, and Germany agreed to begin work on a new UN Security Council resolution on Iran over its nuclear programme. "We had a productive first discussion of the next steps ... We began work on a new Security Council Resolution," said John Sawers, political director of Britain's Foreign Office. "We also considered how best to re-engage with Iran. We are all committed to seeking a negotiated solution," he said in a statement. In Washington, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said"I would expect the nature of the resolution to be incremental . . . This is designed to proportionally increase pressure on Tehran." Pparticipants are expected to consider trimming export credits for companies that trade with Iran and restricting arms exports to Iran. Meanwhile, during a conference on international security, Hans Blix, the former head of the IAEA, said the world's approach to Iran's nuclear ambitions humiliated Tehran by insisting it stop research without giving any security guarantees: "We haven't heard anything about offers on guarantees for security in case they will go along with a renunciation of enrichment. It's the United States that can deliver assurances about security. It's U.S. that can deliver recognition or normalization of relations."

On 25 February 2007, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran would proceed with its disputed nuclear program, comparing its nuclear drive to a train that has no reverse gear or brakes. Ahmadinejad also repeated his call for negotiations, saying the time for ''bullying'' had expired.  US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice responded by saying that Iran doesn't need a reverse gear but a stop button, and calling on Iran to halt weapons-related activities. Rice has said, "I am prepared to meet my counterpart or the Iranian representative at any time, if Iran will suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities."

On 22 February 2007, the IAEA reported that Iran is steadily expanding its efforts to enrich uranium. In a mild surprise to outside experts, the nuclear agency reported that Iran was now operating or about to switch on roughly 1,000 centrifuges, the high-speed devices that enrich uranium, at its nuclear facility at Natanz. In response, the Bush administration immediately pressed for more severe sanctions against the country. Permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany will meet in London on Monday to discuss further sanctions against Iran.

On 21 February 2007, the UN deadline for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities passed with Ahmadinejad declaring Iran will try to achieve nuclear capabilities as quickly as possible. The IAEA is scheduled to report to the Security Council by the end of this week on whether Iran is complying with demands to stop producing nuclear fuel.

On 20 February 2007, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran wants to resume negotiations over its nuclear programme but rejected demands that Tehran suspend its uranium enrichment programme first. He announced that Iran would only halt its uranium enrichment program and return to negotiations if other Western nations do the same.

The UN security council has set tomorrow as a deadline for Iran to avoid further economic sanctions by ceasing its work on enrichment.

On 12 February 2007, Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani announced that Iran’s nuclear program is not a threat to Israel and that Iran is prepared to settle all outstanding issues with the International Atomic Energy Agency within three weeks. Meanwhile, the Belgian official who has overseen IAEA inspections in Iran has been removed from his post nine months after Tehran banned him from entering the country.

On 9 February 2007, Tehran's chief nuclear negotiator and the head of the IAEA have planned to meet, just hours before the agency is scheduled to issue recommendations on withdrawing technical aid for some nuclear projects run by Iran.

On 3 February 2007, a group of ambassadors from the Non-Aligned Movement, Group of 77 and League of Arab States, and IAEA representatives from Algeria, Cuba, Egypt and Malaysia (none of whom were official inspectors), were taken on a tour of the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility in central Iran with nearly 100 reporters, on what is being billed as a transparency visit. It is the first such trip since the UN imposed limited sanctions on Iran in December.  Reporters on Saturday passed the Natanz enrichment facility but were not permitted to tour the site, where Iran recently said it was installing 3,000 centrifuges.

On 2 February 2007, diplmats revealed that Iran has been setting up piping, control panels and electric cables for Tehran's underground uranium enrichment plant - the final step before installing equipment that countries fear could be used to make nuclear arms. The move marks an escalation of the confrontation between Tehran and the world's major powers over the Islamic republic's nuclear program and will likely spur U.S. efforts to sharpen existing U.N. sanctions slapped on Iran for its defiance of a Security Council demand that it freeze enrichment efforts.  A top Iranian nuclear official said U.N. inspectors have set up cameras in Natanz to monitor the activity. The official, speaking on condition anonymity because he was not authorized to give statements to media, said the cameras were put in place over the past few days, ending Thursday.

On 30 January 2007, the US ambassador to the UN rejected ElBaradei's proposal of a "timeout" in the sanctions against Iran, arguing the sanctions already being applied against Iran are not open to reinterpretation.  In addition, President Bush said the United States "will respond firmly" if Iran escalates military action in Iraq and endangers American forces. But he also emphasized he has no intention of invading Iran. Meanwhile, European governments are resisting Bush administration demands that they curtail support for exports to Iran and that they block transactions and freeze assets of some Iranian companies, officials on both sides say. The resistance threatens to open a new rift between Europe and the United States over Iran.

On 29 January 2007, IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei proposed a simultaneous "time-out" plan during the World Economic Forum in Switzerland, in which it will hold off on imposing sanctions if Tehran suspends uranium enrichment. ElBaradei said, "I still believe that the only solution to the Iranian issue - which is in our hands right now - is dialogue, is negotiation, is engagement by the neighbors and by all the relevant parties," he said. "The Arab countries have to be engaged, the US has to be engaged. We need to try that. We need to invest in peace because the alternative is not there, and the alternatives could be 10 times worse."

On 26 January 2007, Iran demanded the removal of Belgian Chris Charlier, the UN official overseeing nuclear inspections in the country.  Iran accused Charlier of breach of trust, and barred all inspectors from nations behind the sanctions recently imposed on Iran. Iran's official news agency IRNA quoted an unnamed Iranian diplomat as saying "both Iran and the (IAEA) are informed that this inspector has passed confidential Iranian nuclear information, which was supposed to be kept between Iran and the IAEA, to inappropriate countries and their media."

On 25 January 2007, Washington and Iran continued their "diplomatic jousting", with the US accusing Iran of interfering with Iraq while Iran downplayed its rejection of IAEA inspectors on Monday, calling on the media not to be "oversensitive on the issue." The US has also sent a second aircraft carrier strike group to the Persian Gulf, which is "Washington's way of warning Iran to back down in its attempts to dominate the region."

On 24 January 2007, newspapers began reporting that European defense officials have said North Korea is sharing its nuclear data on last year's test explosion with Iran. Meanwhile, speculation over the possibility of a US or Israeli attack against Iran heats up.

On 23 January 2007, US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns urged Iran to return to negotiations or face harsher sanctions, reminding Iran that "a package of incentives offered by world powers to Iran in June in return for suspending uranium enrichment remained on the table." Meanwhile, Russia "completed in full the delivery of Tor M-1 missiles to Iran," fulfilling their $700 million contract. Russian officials say that the missiles are purely defensive weapons with a limited range and argue that the Tor-M1 deal, involving conventional weapons, does not violate any international agreements. In other news, the US introduced a resolution at the UN General Assembly to condemn Holocaust denial, largely seen as aimed at increasing Iran's diplomatic isolation.

On 22 January 2007, Iran barred 38 UN inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), from entering the country. The agency said the move was a “first step” in limiting cooperation with the IAEA, in line with a demand made by parliament after UN Sanctions were imposed on Iran a month ago over its disputed nuclear program. Meanwhile, Iran's Revolutionary Guards launched war-games in central Iran on Monday and said they would test two models of home-made missiles. The war-games have been seen by military experts as muscle flexing, aimed at showing off Iran's capabilities in the face of pressure from the United States.

On 21 January 2007, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini said Iran is "ready to talk" about regional issues if the US makes a formal request for negotiations; however, he reiterated that a suspension of uranium enrichment is "not acceptable."

On 18 January 2007, IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei called for a resumption of negotiations with Iran. "Only applying pressure, he suggested, could prompt the Islamic republic to follow the path of North Korea, which kicked out U.N. inspectors, pulled out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003 and then conducted its first-ever nuclear test last October. . . . My priority is to keep Iran inside the system." He continued, "any effort by anybody to get the Iranians and the Europeans — and the Americans in particular — engaged would be something I welcome." Meanwhile, the IAEA halted some of its technical aid to Iran following United Nations' sanctions guidelines.  Confusion over the US Administration's intentions toward Iran continues.

On 17 January 2007, Russia's defense minister said Moscow has sold air defense missiles to Iran, the first high-level confirmation that their delivery took place despite U.S. complaints.

On 16 January 2007, both conservatives and reformists in Iran are openly challenging President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's hard-line nuclear diplomacy, an unusual agreement across Iran's political spectrum, with many saying his provocative remarks have increasingly isolated their country. Meanwhile, Iranian officials reported that Iran is pressing on with nuclear enrichment.

On 12 January 2007, speculation arose regarding Bush's intentions to go to war with Iran and/or Syria based on his address to the nation two days earlier. Some sources wondered aloud if Bush had issued an executive order to commence military action against Iran and Syria. However, White House spokesman Tony Snow stated that Bush has no preperations underway to go to war against Iran or Syria: "I want to address kind of a rumor and urban legend that is going around, and it comes from language in the President's Wednesday night address to the nation; that in talking about Iran and Syria, that he was trying to prepare the way for war with either country, and that there were war preparations under way. There are not."

Meanwhile, talk of staging a special IAEA meeting in January, two months ahead of the next scheduled session, to increase pressure on Iran has abated because of Iran's moderate response to new UN sanctions.  The IAEA also recognized that such a meeting could wreck the board's current cohesion.

On 11 January 2007, two IAEA inspectors arrived in Iran to conduct routine inspections of the country's nuclear facilities in Isfahan and Natanz.  The inspectors will also review the trend of cooperation with Iranian nuclear officials.  Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said she was "prepared to reverse 27 years of policy" and meet "any time, anywhere" with Iran's leadership if it suspended its enrichment of uranium.

On 4 January 2007, Iran's top nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani went to China to engage in talks. During talks with Larijani, Chinese President Hu Jintao expressed the hope that Iran would make a "serious response" to Resolution 1737.

On 3 January 2007, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vowed Iran will step up its atomic programme despite UN sanctions, predicting Tehran would soon produce nuclear fuel for industrial uses. 

On 2 January 2007, Iranian government Spokesman Gholam-Hussein Elham said 3000 centrifuges currently being installed at the Iranian nuclear reactor in Natanz will be operational by March of this year. Meanwhile, Israel will test an underground installation in the Negev desert designed to monitor any attempt by Iran to test nuclear devices.

On 1 January 2007, the US and its European allies, believing UN sanctions against Iran to be too weak, began planning to use the language of the resolution to help persuade foreign governments and financial institutions to cut ties with Iranian businesses, individuals in its nuclear and missile programs and, by extension, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

On 24 December 2006, President Ahmadinejad rejected UN Security Council sanctions against Iran, insisting his country would press ahead with its nuclear programme. The Iranian Foreign Ministry released a statement condeming the adoption of the resolution.

On 23 December 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1737, imposing sanctions on Iran for failing to halt uranium enrichment.  The United States issued an explanation of vote.

On 8 December 2006, Europeans gave a revised draft resolution aimed at curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions to Russia and China and intend to circulate it to the full U.N. Security Council on Friday in hopes of a vote next week.

On 6 December 2006, France's foreign ministry said six-nations talks on a UN resolution to punish Iran for its nuclear programme have failed to reach an agreement. The diplomats said they would move their negotiations back to the United Nations headquarters in New York in a bid to reach a deal.

On 14 November 2006, President Ahmadinejad said Iran would soon complete its nuclear fuel program.

On 7 November 2006, the meeting of six states (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) at the United Nations working on a resolution to curb Iran’s suspected nuclear ambitions broke up, with the ambassadors reporting widening disagreements and lessening prospects of a swift accord.

On 2 November 2006, Iran fired several missiles with a range of more than 1,000 miles during a military maneuver, apparently to send a message to the United States and several of its allies in the Persian Gulf after they conducted naval exercises in the same area this week.

On 26 October 2006, Iran announced it has installed a second centrifuge cascade for uranium enrichment. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution imposing sanctions on Iran.

On 13 October 2006, Iran vowed to continue to defy international demands to stop its nuclear activities and refused to condemn North Korea for its reported test of small nuclear device.

On 6 October 2006 the United States said it had "won" agreement from the other four permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany to seek sanctions against Iran over its refusal to shut down its nuclear enrichment programme.

On 5 October 2006 European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana said Iran has not agreed to suspend its most sensitive nuclear activities, despite four months of intensive talks.

On 3 October 2006 a senior US official said the United States will give European negotiators until the end of the week to convince Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program, and then pursue sanctions if Tehran fails to comply.  Britain and France are also prepared to call for sanctions.

On 26 September 2006 Russian announced it will ship fuel to a controversial atomic power plant it is building in Iran by March under an agreement signed Tuesday.

On 24 September 2006 France announced that EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and Iran had weeks rather than months to agree an agenda for talks on Tehran's nuclear program before world powers unite against Iran.

On 31 August 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency's Director General released its report, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran", in response to the July 31 Security Council Resolution 1696 requ

On 27 August 2006, US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton said the US may try another route to sanctions if it is unable to get agreement on a follow-up Security Council resolution.

On 27 August 2006, Iran said it would not stop enriching uranium, one of the key aspects of the P5+1 package proposal.

On 22 August 2006, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ari Larijani, delivered Iran's response to the P5+1 package proposal. Details are not public, but some of the detailed response is discussed in this article.

On 31 July 2006, the Security Council passed Resolution 1696, demanding Iran suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities by August 31 or face economic and diplomatic sanctions. It also calls on Iran to take the other confidence-building measures from the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors' Resolution (GOV/2006/14). The resolution takes action under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and calls on all states to prevent the transfer of any nuclear or missile-related items, materials, goods or technology to Iran. The resolution passed 14 to 1, with Qatar as the sole vote against.

On 20 July 2006, the EU3 (Britain, France and Germany) introduced a draft text of a Security Council resolution telling Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, endorsing the package proposal and threatening further measures if Iran does not comply. Russia has proposed amendments to tone down the draft, which currently acts under Articles 39 and 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

On 16 July 2006, Iran said the package proposal was an "acceptable basis" on which to begin negotiations. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said Iran and Europe should begin negotiating.

On 13 July 2006, Iranian President Ahmadinejad threatened to leave the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

On 12 July 2006, the permanent five members of the Security Council, with Germany, (P5+1) agreed to bring Iran back into the Security Council after Iran did not respond to the most recent package deal by the July 12 deadline, which followed already passed July 5 and June 29th deadlines. Iran has said it will reply by August 6 (negotiator Ari Larijani) and August 22 (President Ahmadinejad).

On 11 July 2006, the European Union met with Iran to discuss the package proposal but they did not agree on anything.

On 3 July 2006, the US navy said it would ensure oil's safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, responding to concerns that Iran might block such passage and disrupt international oil trade.

On 27 June 2006, Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said there was "no use" negotiating with the United States unless the US recognizes its inalienable right to nuclear technology. If the US did recognize Iran's right to nuclear power, Iran would be willing to negotiate over "controls, inspections and international guarantees."

On 27 June 2006 Mohammad Mehdi Zahedi, Iran's minister of science, research and technology told Indonesia's vice president that nuclear weapons are against Islamic law, therefore Iran has no intention of developing them.

On 25 June 2006, Iran's oil minister said Iran would use oil as a weapon in the confrontation over its nuclear program, followed by a statement the next day that it would only do so as a last resort.

On 23 June 2006, the Guardian newspaper quotes Iran's chief negotiator, Ari Larijani, saying US is using the nuclear disagreement as a pretext to change the Iranian goverment.

On 15 June 2006, the United States Senate voted 99-0 to support multilateral negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program in an amendment to the fiscal 2007 defense authorization bill. Earlier it rejected a bill to strengthen sanctions against Iran.

On 8 June 2006, the IAEA Director General's report to the Board of Governors was released.

From 6-8 June 2006, the new Nobel Women's Initiative, formed by Nobel Laureates Jody Williams, Shirin Ebadi, Wangari Mathai and Betty Williams, met in Vienna to oppose conflict between Iran and the United States. Read the statement, "We Two Women," urging the US and Iran to renounce violence and focus on ensuring human rights and security, by Iranian Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi and American Nobel Prize winner Jody Williams.

On 6 June 2006, the permanent five members of the Security Council, with Germany, (P5+1) offered Iran a new package deal. The United States would join the negotiations, but Iran must suspend uranium enrichment before negotiationsl begin. The offer includes a light water reactor.

On 30 May 2006, the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement released a statement on Iran supporting a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East and resolution through diplomacy and dialogue.

On 23 May 2006, Iran tested a Shihab-3 missile with a range of between 900 and 1,200 miles.

On 10 May 2006, Indonesian President Yudhoyono proposed establishing a larger negotiating group, including Indonesia, under UN coordination to resolve the Iranian issue. Indonesia has coordinated the Non-Aligned Movement Disarmament Working Group for the last 12 years, and has good relations with Iran and the West. It is also the most populous Muslim nation.

On 9 May 2006, the permanent five members (P5) of the Security Council, plus Germany, decided to offer Iran a package of incentives and consequences for suspending uranium enrichment. They plan to take a few weeks to negotiate the specifics of the package among them, but have agreed in theory on a package hinged on no more uranium enrichment.

On 9 May 2006, Chief Iranian negotiator Ari Larijani said Iran has no intention of withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

On 8 May 2006, President Ahmadinejad said he would not hesitate to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Iranian Parliament threatened to withdraw its signiture from the Additional Protocol (which allows intrusive and short-notice inspections, signed by Iran in December 2004) and to consider withdrawal from the Treaty in a letter to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan read on state television.

On 4 May 2006, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for the United States to negotiate directly with Iran, and offer something in return for any re-suspension of uranium enrichment, such as technology or security assurances. "It would also be good if the U.S. were to be at the table with the Europeans, the Iranians, the Russians, to try and work this out," Annan said on "The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer" on PBS.

On 3 May 2006, the Security Council met and discussed a draft resolution on Iran. The current form of the resolution is acting under Chapter VII, which includes the possibility of sanctions and the use of force. See an initial reaction to the draft here and more productive solutions to the problem here and in more detail here.

On 2 May 2006, the Permanent Five (P5) Members of the Security Council and Germany met in Paris to discuss the most recent International Atomic Energy Agency report on Iran and a draft resolution on the matter.

On 28 April 2006, Dr. ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, sent his report on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Security Council. This report was a response to the March 29 Security Council Presidential Statement's request for such a report.

On 26 April 2006, US Congressional Rep Peter DeFazio (D-OR) introduced a resolution (H. Con. Res. 391) in the House of Representatives declaring that the House, with the Senate concurring, "strongly and unequivocally believes that seeking congressional authority prior to taking military action against Iran is not discretionary, but is a legal and constitutional requirement." DeFazio and 61 members of the House also wrote to President Bush to say the same.

On 23 April 2006, government officials in Iran announced that its nuclear programme is irreversible. Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi also stated that suspension of unranium enrichment and nuclear research are not on Iran's agenda.

On 18 April 2006, Mikhail Kamynin of Russia's foreign ministry said that Russia had ruled out sanctions against Iran unless there was concrete proof that Iran's nuclear programme was not peaceful. While there isn't any concrete evidence that shows whether or not Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, Mr. Kamynin noted that "sanctions can be discussed only when there are concrete facts showing that Tehran's nuclear activity is not exclusively peaceful."

On 17 April 2006, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, said that demands to stop uranium enrichment were "irrational." Larijani also stated that US demands for stronger UN action were not new and would neither affect Iran's determination nor deter it from continuing efforts to develop nuclear energy. Despite being out of line with Bush administration policy, US Senator Richard Lugar, Republican chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, called for direct talks between Washington and Tehran. Senator Luger also urged caution in pressing for sanctions despite Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice already outlining sanctions during the week of 10 April. The Security Council is scheduled to discuss Iran on 28 April, the deadline given to Iran to address the SC's concerns.

On 16 April 2006, during his Easter message, Pope Benedict XVI called upon all parties involved to find a peaceful, diplomatic solution to conflict over Iran's nuclear programme. The Pope stated: "May an honourable solution be found for all parties, through honest and serious negotiations." He also called upon international leaders and organizations to find greater will to "achieve peaceful co-existence among different races, cultures and religions."

On 11 April 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had "joined the nations with nuclear technology," by successfully enriching low grade uranium. Although Iran continues to claim that its nuclear programme is solely for peaceful purposes, the United States is urging Iran to halt enrichment. Russia has also joined the the call of the US by calling the enrichment "a step in the wrong direction." Responding to these criticisms, President Ahmadinejad urged the West to respect Iran's right to develop peaceful atomic technology, and called on scientists to push ahead with full scale industrial enrichment. Despite concerns that Iran plans on developing nuclear weapons, Iran has informed the IAEA of its plans to install more centrifuges and IAEA Director General ElBaradei will visit Tehran on 12 April.

On 30 March 2006 foreign ministers from the Security Council permanent member countries and Germany met in Berlin to discuss solutions to the Iran nuclear question. The leaders warned that if Iran does not return to the negotiation table it will face isolation and possible sanctions.

On 29 March 2006, the Security Council released a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to implement confidence building measures, particularly stopping uranium enrichment, with regard to its nuclear program.

On 20 March 2006 the permanent members of the UN Security Council along with Germany met to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue. Britain, France and the United States backed a statement calling for full suspensing of all Iranian nuclear activities. The statement would require the IAEA to report back on Iran's compliance within a few weeks. China and Russia, however, are concerned that the deadline for IAEA reporting was too soon, and are believed to be concerned that Security Council action regarding Iran's nuclear programme will overshadow the role of the IAEA.

On 13 March 2006 British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, appealed to Iranian people saying they deserve better than their current government. Mr. Straw called upon international agencies to publish more reports in Farsi in order to make the internet more accessible to Iranians. Although the Iranian issue has been referred to the Security Council, Straw said military action is inconceivable.

On 12 March 2006 Iranian officials announced that Russia's compromise proposal was "off the agenda" after Iran was reported to the UN Security Council. Foreign Ministry spokeman Hamid Reza Asefi said that circumstances have changed and Iran will wait for Security Council action before proceeding with further negotiations on a compromise deal. Mr. Asefi also noted that Iran is still open to a joint enrichment deal as long as Iran's right to conduct nuclear fuel research on its own soil is recognized.

On 8 March 2006 the IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council, which has the power to impose sanctions. The IAEA report said that it could not "conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran". With the Iran issue now in the hands of the Security Council, France, the UK and the USA are trying to muster support for sanctions. However, China, with a US$100 billion energy deal in negotiations with Iran, is reluctant to impose sanctions. Russia is also reluctant to see sanctions applied.

On 4 March 2006 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the Iran issue and upcoming IAEA Board meeting over the phone. During the conversation initiated by India, Prime Minsiter Singh praised Russian efforts to address the issue through direct dialogue and consultations with Iran. In light of the recent accord between the US and India in which India agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities, Preseident Putin and Prime Minister Singh also discussed the potential for cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy.

On 27 February 2006 in a meeting of EU foreign ministers, France, Britain, and Germany dismissed Iran's claims that it had reached a basic agreement with Russia on joint uranium enrichment. Both the French and German foreign ministers claimed that the agreement between Iran and Russia is merely technical and will fail to meet international concerns over Iran's nuclear activities.

On 26 February 2006 Iran agreed "in principle" to a joint venture with Russia to enrich uranium. According to the head of Iran's nuclear agency, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, more talks are needed to agree upon the details of a potential agreement, but the proposed Russian compromise would move enrichment activites that could lead to development of nuclear weapons to Russian soil in order to allay Western concerns about an Iranian nuclear programme. While the Russian proposal is seen as a last chance for Iran to compromise with the IAEA, Mr. Aghazadeh claimed that such a compromise would have to be part of a larger package that would allow Iran to to keep its nuclear research programme.

On 13 February 2006 Iran resumed uranium enrichment. After the IAEA Board of Governors concluded its emergency meeting with the adoption of a resolution referring Iran to the UN Security Council, Iran's government announced the end of its voluntary freeze on uranium enrichment and permanently suspended talks with Russia over a joint-enrichment programme that were scheduled for Thursday, 16 February 2006. IAEA inspectors are scheduled to visit Iran's nuclear facilities later in the week, but with Iran vowing to stop all UN inspections of its sites and threatening to withdraw from the NPT, the situation is tenuous.

On 4 February 2006 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution entitled "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran" asking that IAEA Director General El Baradei to report to the UN Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to the implementation of safeguards in Iran. The Resolution was adopted by vote of 27 in favour, 3 against and 5 abstentions. Although previously hesitant about referring Iran to the Security Council, Russia and China voted for the resolution with the understanding that their votes provided no warrant for possible sanctions. As one of the group of 6 nations calling for the emergency IAEA Board meeting and Security Council referral, the United States, in a statement given to the IAEA Board, noted that it was pleased to join "an overwhelming majority" in signaling to Iran that it "must meet its nonproliferation obligations." Although the Security Council will not decide on a course of action against Iran until March 6, when Director General El Baradei will issue his official report on Iran, because the Security Council has the authority to impose sanctions, their is great potential for escalation.

On 2 February 2006 the IAEA Board of Governors held an emergency meeting to discuss a possible referral of Iran to the Security Council. Regarding the emergency meeting, Iran's top nuclear negotiator Dr. Ali Larijani issued a statement to the IAEA Board, pointing out that a referral to the Security Council has no technical or legal basis and that Iran's peaceful nuclear activties are within the IAEA legal framework.

On 1 February 2006 Iran's President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, stated in a television broadcast that Iran would not submit to bullying over its nuclear programme and that Iran will never give up its "right" to development of peaceful nuclear energy. President Ahmadinejad's speech came in response to harsh criticisms of Iran's "nuclear amibitions" by both US President George W. Bush and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. In addition, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, said that Iran will likely strike back and use its influence in the Middle East if the P5 and EU member states continue to exert pressure on Iran to halt development of its nuclear programme.

On 31 January 2006 the IAEA released a preliminary report to member countries suggesting it has evidence linking Iran's ostensibly peaceful uranium enrichment programme and its military work on high explosives and missiles. The four page report, based paritally on US intelligence, refers to a secretive Iranian entity called the Green Salt Project, which worked on uranium processing, high explosives and a missile warhead design. If the nuclear-military links illustrated in the report are true, they would refute Iran's claims that its nuclear programme is solely aimed at producing nuclear energy. The report will be debated during an emergency meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on February 2.

On 30 January 2006 the United States, EU3, China and Russia met in London and agreed that the IAEA should report Iran to the UN Security Council. However, the foreign ministers from the Security Council permanent member states settled on waiting to take up the Iran issue until the IAEA releases its formal report on Iran's nuclear programme in March. In their statement, representatives from the six nations and the High Representative of the European Union emphasized their commitment to non-proliferation and expressed serious concerns over Irans' nuclear programme, but confirmed their resolve to settle the Iran issue diplomatically.

On 25 January 2006 Dr. Hans Blix, former head of the IAEA and the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), addressed the Arms Control Association indicating that an IAEA Board referral of Iran to the UN Security Council would not be the most productive course of action in dealing with Iran's nuclear programme. In his speech, Dr. Blix noted that regardless of the forum, a better offer is needed to induce Iran to drop its uranium enrichment program. Lacking thus far, he stressed, have been security guarantees of the kind offered to North Korea. For further information please see LCNP's analysis and the full transcript of the Dr. Blix's speech.

On 23 January 2006 Iran threatened that it would immediately begin a full-scale uranium enrichment programme if referred to the UN Security Council.

On 12 January 2006 the EU3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) issued a statement saying that negotiations with Iran are dead and called for Iran's referral to the UN Security Council. US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice issued a statement in support of the EU3. Russia and China were hesitant about a Security Coucil referral.

On 10 January 2006 Iran began removal of seals from its facilities under IAEA supervision, and resumed research and development in Natanz, Pars Trash, and Farayand Technique. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei expressed serious concern about Iran´s decision to resume enrichment-related activities before the IAEA Board of Governors has clarified the nature of Iran´s nuclear programme.

On 7-8 January 2006 Russia and Iran conducted three rounds of talks on joint Russian-Iranian uranium enrichment. Under the Russian proposal uranium enrichment would take place in Russia, making it more difficult for Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Iranian officials called the progress of the bilateral talks "satisfactory and suitable." Russia and Iran are still discussing a compromise proposal to jointly enrich unranium he next round of negotiations between the two countries is scheduled to take place 16 February 2006.

On 3 January 2006 the Iranian government sent a letter to the IAEA board stating that it planned to resume "nuclear research and requested that the IAEA remove seals on its equipment.

On 11 December 2005, The Sunday Times reported that Sharon has ordered Israeli armed forces "to be ready by the end of March for possible strikes on secret uranium enrichment sites in Iran." According to this report, "defence sources in Israel believe the end of March to be the 'point of no return' after which Iran will have the technical expertise to enrich uranium in sufficient quantities to build a nuclear warhead in two to four years." However, many sources have reported that Amos Gilad, chief of strategic and security planning in the Israeli Defence Ministry, along with Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom and others in Sharon's office, deny that a plan to attack Iran is in place, though they say a military option against Iran could eventually be considered.

On 10 December 2005, the Globe and Mail reported that Gholamreza Aghazadeh, head of the Atomic Organization of Iran, declared that Iran will produce nuclear fuel domestically, regardless of the international community's attempt to stop it. Aghazadeh "also described a European offer to shift Iran's contentious nuclear enrichment program to Russia as 'flawed,' adding that Moscow has not even approached Tehran about the idea. Talks with Europe are currently scheduled to resume 21 December 2005.

On 5 December 2005, Director General ElBaradei suggested "that the main hope of resuming EU negotiations lay with comprise proposals, which is offering to allow Iran to develop uranium conversion at Isfahan but for enrichment outside its territory at a jointly owned plant." Meanwhile, the BBC reported that Iran is planning to build a second nuclear power plant.

From 1-6 December 2005, aggressive rhetoric between Iran and Israel erupted. Haaretz.com reported Netanyahu's declaration "that Israel should take 'bold and daring' action to thwart Iran's plans for nuclear armament, citing Israel's 1981 air strike on the Iraqi nuclear facility." In response, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Assefi "reiterated its warning from the day before that Israel would pay a heavy price for any attempt to wipe out its nuclear program," saying, "the Zionist regime is well aware that if it made such a grave mistake, the Iranian reaction would be devastating." Meanwhile, "Israeli security experts warn that Israel and Iran are engaged in an unprecedented arms race on a defensive level, Yedioth Ahronoth, a well-known Israeli newspaper, said on Sunday, citing experts, who've been closely following military development schemes in both states. With Israel's recent test launch of the Arrow missile, and Iran's latest deal with Russia to buy anti-ballistic missiles, experts say that the two states are in an armament face off" (Islam Online). Iranian President Ahmadinejad has inflamed the situation further by hinting at Holocaust denial and suggesting Israel should be moved to Europe.

On 3 December 2005, "Iran’s hard-line constitutional watchdog approved a bill Saturday blocking international inspections of atomic facilities if the nation is referred to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions . . . The ratification by the Guardian Council means the bill - overwhelmingly approved by parliament last month - now needs just a presidential signature to become law. It was not clear when that would take place. The bill will strengthen the government’s hand in resisting international pressure to permanently abandon uranium enrichment, a process that can produce fuel for either nuclear reactors or atomic bombs" (Associated Press).

On 2 December 2005, Russia agreed to sell "more than $1 billion worth of missiles and other defense systems to Iran," Guardian Unlimited reported. "While the conventional weapons deal would not violate international agreements, it was likely to elicit an adverse reaction from the United States." The New York Times reported that "the missiles, known by the NATO designation SA-15 Gauntlet, are deployed on tracked vehicles and designed to strike aircraft or cruise missiles flying at altitudes of an estimated 30 to 20,000 feet at a range of 7 miles, according to the Federation of American Scientists Web site."

On 1 December 2005, Iran Mania reported that the EU and Iran are having difficulty arranging their next series of talks, "as the two sides are bickering over substance and form." While the talks had been tentatively scheduled for the week of December 5th, it now appears that they will not be held until later in December or early January. The two sides appear to have different agendas for the upcoming meetings - while the EU wants to "talk about talks," Iran would like to see some respect from the EU in high-level meetings. Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment continues, though they are engaged in the conversion process.

On 28 November 2005, Iran rejected the Russian-European proposal that it move its enrichment facilities to Russia. Iran Focus reported that Hossein Entezami, the spokesman for Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), told the state news agency IRNA that the "entire process of uranium enrichment must be conducted inside Iran". Iranian
Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki asserted that Iran's nuclear programme was solely to produce energy, not arms: "We are against producing and storing nuclear weapons. Atomic weapons in the whole world should be destroyed."

On 27 November 2005 the European Union dropped its precondition (suspension of Iran's uranium conversion activities) for resumption of talks with Tehran over its suspected nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vowed to continue the nuclear programme, and Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi set new terms for the resumption of talks with the EU, saying that the issue for discussion during a meeting in December must focus on "the creation of nuclear fuel on Iranian soil," must "not create any special rules for Iran and must not act in a discriminatory way."

On 24 November 2005 the IAEA Board met to review the Iran case. As anticipated, Iran was not referred to the Security Council. Please see Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei's introductory statement to the Board and his statement to the press, as well as the Board's report for more information.

On 21 November 2005, the Associated Press reported that “Washington and its European allies will forgo pushing for Iran's referral to the UN Security Council later this week, giving Russia more time to persuade Tehran to give up technology that could make nuclear arms, diplomats and officials told The Associated Press on Monday.” The move is intended to garner support for the West’s desire to refer to refer Iran to the Security Council: “If the Russians fail to win over the Iranians, Washington and the Europeans hope Moscow and other key board members of the International Atomic Energy Agency now opposed to Security Council referral will alter their opposition.” Europe is also hoping the decision will give Iran more time to resume negotiations with the E3 (France, Germany, UK).

On 20 November 2005, days before the IAEA Board Meeting was scheduled to decide if Iran would be referred to the Security Council, the Associated Press reported that “Iran's parliament approved a bill Sunday requiring the government to block international inspections of its nuclear facilities if the nation is referred to the Security Council for possible sanctions. . . . When the bill becomes law, as is expected, it will strengthen the government's hand in resisting international pressure to abandon uranium enrichment, a process that can be used to produce fuel for nuclear reactors or an atomic bomb.”

On 19 November 2005, the Guardian reported “International suspicion of Iran's nuclear programme heightened yesterday when it was revealed that Tehran had obtained a blueprint showing how to build the core of a nuclear warhead. . . . Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told diplomats that his inspectors had recently obtained documents from Tehran showing that the Iranians had been given various instructions on processing uranium hexafluoride gas and casting and enriching uranium. These had been obtained via the black market in nuclear technology headed by the disgraced Pakistani scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan.” Iran, voluntarily submitting the blueprints to the IAEA, insisted it did not ask for the designs but were given them anyway. The IAEA is still investigating this claim.

On 18 November 2005, the New York Times reported that by the plan proposed by Russia and endorsed by the E3, “Tehran would be permitted to continue to convert raw uranium into a gas form, called UF6. That gas can be enriched if poured into high-speed centrifuges . . .” However, while Iran would retain its right to enrichment and reprocessing, an enrichment facility would be built in Russia, “in which Iran would have management and financial interest, but not a technical interest. In other words, Iran would have no control over the level to which the uranium is enriched, preventing it from making bomb fuel.

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