Iran News Archives

Part of RCW's Nuclear Iran? information and resource page

25 February 2008: The P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the US, the UK, and Germany) discussed the new International Atomic Energy Agency report on Iran's nuclear activities and the next steps to be taken.

22 February 2008: The text of the IAEA Director General's report on Iran has been posted on the ISIS website. See Mike Veiluva's comments on 22 February and 26 February at DisarmamentActivist.org.

14 February 2008: French President Nicolas Sarkozy and other senior French officials met in Paris with Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in an effort to "smooth over" differences between France and the Agency over Iran’s nuclear program. A statement issued by the Élysée Palace after Mr. Sarkozy’s meeting with Dr. ElBaradei said that the French president encouraged him to investigate Iran’s nuclear activities “at length and with determination.” Three French officials familiar with the meetings said that the conversations with Dr. ElBaradei were cordial. ElBaradei reportedly reiterated that Iran would never agree to suspend uranium enrichment and that the world powers must negotiate with Iran with no preconditions.

The New York Times reported, "Much to the frustration of his hosts, he had no specific proposal on how such negotiations could take place, the officials said." One should note that, as Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy says,

there have been various offers by Iran to negotiate directly with the United States on a variety of issues of mutual concern, and that the US government, after years of dismissing such offers out of hand, instead opted to engage in talks as part of the EU3+3 process, where it put nothing more concrete than spare aircraft parts on the table in exchange for verifiable suspension of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle program. And of course, the onus is on the parties to the dispute to set the time, place, and conditions for negotiations, not Dr. ElBaradei.

13 February 2008: A European diplomat told Reuters that the UN Security Council will probably not vote on a third sanctions resolution against Iran's nuclear programme until after the next IAEA report is released. The unidentified diplomat said "the vote is not specifically tied to the IAEA report, but it just so happens that by the time we get around to voting on it, it will most likely be after the report is out." According to the article, South Africa has been's Security Council delegation has been pressing the five permanent members to wait for the report: "South Africa and other members of the Non-Aligned Movement say the IAEA's investigation is relevant and want the Council to wait until it has as much information as possible."

A US official reportedly said the vote could come any day: "There is nothing holding this up other than trying to get agreement.... As soon as that happens, we will vote." Other diplomats repotedly indicated that "waiting for the IAEA report will help them by ensuring they get a 'yes' vote from South Africa." Diplomats said concerns from Libya and Viet Nam were also holding up the vote. Apparently, Libya, which until recently was the target of UN sanctions, opposes sanctions in general while Viet Nam is unwilling to interfere in other countries' affairs.

In other news, Russian Foreign Minister Segei Lavrov said it would be better for Iran to "to refrain from actions that raise tensions and create the impression Iran is ignoring the international community," referring to Iran's continued uranium enrichment and missile developments.

Meanwhile, unidentified diplomats told the Associated Press that Iran has begun processing minute quantities of gas in its new generation of advanced centrifuges. One diplomat said Iran had set up only 10 of the machines — far too few to make enriched uranium in the quantities needed for an industrial-scale energy or weapons program. One diplomat said that the centrifuges were set up on 20 January and began processing minute amounts of the uranium gas soon afterward to test the machines.

12 February 2008: David Albright and Jacqueline Shire of the Institute for Science and International Security wrote an article containing some basic background information about the P-2 (IR-2) centrifuges and a brief history of Iran’s research and development of them to date. They say that "Iran's decision to move ahead with installation of modified P-2 centrifuges at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant ... appears to reflect Iran’s commitment to expanding and improving its enrichment capabilities beyond those of the P-1 centrifuge, of which 3,000 are currently operating at the larger Natanz fuel enrichment plant."

Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy says the Iranian decision isn't really news, but

What's notable is that they are doing this at the same time the Security Council is talking about a new sanctions package. This tends to reveal a little bit of the Iranian calculus - that no conceivable sanctions can impose a high enough cost to compel them to reconsider their enrichment program. Of course, in the absence of any package, such as that offered to North Korea, Iran also has no incentive to discontinue the program either.

11 February 2008: The next IAEA report on Iran's nuclear programme, expected to be published on or around 20 February, may be delayed by a few days because of "disagreements between ElBaradei and his technical staff. ElBaradei is pushing for one thing, while the people who went on a technical visit to Iran during January disagree. It should now be published maybe one week later, so in the last week of February." The report will then be put to the IAEA Board of Govenors at its meeting on 3-7 March.

5 February 2008: Russian deputy foreign minister Sergei Kislyak said Iran should freeze enrichment activity until all of its nuclear program's "complicated points have been worked out."

4 February 2008: Mohammed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said Iran has made "good progress" in addressing outstanding issues surrounding its nuclear program. ElBaradei said his final report on the Iranian nuclear program will provide information on the development of centrifuges and enrichment activity at the Natanz nuclear facility. In an interview with Egyptian TV, he warned against military action against Iran, arguing a military strike to settle the Iranian nuclear issue would complicate the situation and send the Middle East region into a vicious cycle of violence. ElBaradei is expected to issue a report to the IAEA Board of Govenors around 20 February.

2 February 2008: Speaking on the sidelines of the African Union summit in Ethiopia, Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki urged the P5+1 to wait for a report from the IAEA before finalizing the decision on new sanctions against Iran.

30 January 2008: US ambassador to the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad, joined Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and Iranian presidential advisor Mojtaba Samare Hashemi in a debate during the World Economic Forum in Switzerland. The appearance was unscheduled - and unauthorized by the Bush administration. He reportedly "broke rules that permit Bush administration officials to discuss issues with Iranians only under limited circumstances and with advance approval." In response to questions about his participation in the debate, Khalilzad argued that while "the panel was not instigated by the State Department.... It was a multilateral setting - in which we mad our points and they made their points. There were no handshakes, no side meetings. We do it in [the UN General Assembly] and other multilateral settings. No change in policy." The debate has been posted on YouTube.

28 January 2008: The UK, US, and France began a campaign to persuade the 10 non-permanent members of the Security Council to agree to a third round of economic and trade sanctions against Iran. According to the Financial Times, "The western sponsors say they are seeking unanimity in the 15-member Security Council in order to persuade the Iranian public that the pursuit of an illicit nuclear programme is not worth the economic cost in terms of trade relations with the rest of the world."

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said his country would show "serious and logical" reaction if the UN Security Council adopts more sanctions against it. The top Iranian diplomat urged that the UN Security Council should wait until International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei presents his report to the Board of Governors in February.

Also on 28 January, Iran received the eighth and final shipment of nuclear fuel from Russia for its Bushehr power plant. The total consignment was 82 tonnes.

25 January 2008: The P5+1, negotiating a new Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran, revealed a package of measures described by a senior European diplomat as "another turn of the screw". The proposed measures would impose a travel ban and asset freeze on Iranians most closely involved with the nuclear programme. Member states would also be urged to monitor more closely the activities of all Iranian banks, including Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. Member states would be encouraged to inspect suspicious cargoes to and from Iran and avoid granting export credits that could be used to promote Iran's nuclear activities. It calls "upon states to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals involved in such trade." It also directs IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to report within 90 days whether Iran has fully suspended all sensitive nuclear fuel activities as demanded in previous council resolutions. See more elements of the resolution.

22 January 2008: The Foreign Ministers of the six states involved in negotiating new UN Security Council action against Iran are are to meet in Berlin today, but agreed they have "some way to go" before agreeing on a third sanctions resolution. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the political directors had been making progress, but noted there are "still some gaps to close." Germany's Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said he took Russia and China's involvement as a positive sign, but also noted, "I can't promise we will come out of this meeting with an agreement on how to proceed in the U.N Security Council, that we will agree on the text of a resolution and I can't tell you what new sanctions will look like."

Iran received the fifth shipment of nuclear fuel from Russia for its nuclear powerplant at Bushehr. The consignment contained 11 tons of enriched uranium, and the rest of the nuclear fuel will be received in three separate shipments in coming week. Iran has thus received 55 tons of fuel from Russia for Bushehr. It needs a total of 82 tons for its primary stages of commissioning.

20 January 2008: Iran received the fourth shipment of nuclear fuel from Russia for its nuclear powerplant at Bushehr.

18 January 2008: Iran received the third shipment of nuclear fuel from Russia for its nuclear powerplant at Bushehr.

16 January 2008: A spokesman for the German Foreign Ministry announced that Germany believes a new UN resolution imposing sanctions against Iran is necessary, and has invited the Foreign Ministers of the five permament members of the Security Council to a meeting next Tuesday in Berlin to discuss the matter. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier plans to meet with IAEA Director General ElBaradei tomorrow. The IAEA has confirmed the meeting; a senior IAEA representative said ElBaradei was likely to convey "his positive assessment" that Iran was helping resolve lingering issues.

14 January 2008: During talks between IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and Iranian government officials, Iran gave ElBaradei new information on Iran's "new generation of centrifuges," and agreed to answer questions about "secret nuclear activities" within one month. The IAEA reported that "Agreement was reached on the timeline for implementation of all remaining verification issues specified in the work plan. According to the agreed schedule, implementation ... should be completed in the next four weeks." IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming also said the two sides discussed the importance of the implementation of the Additional Protocol and other confidence-building measures called for by the Security Council.

11 January 2008: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei met with Iranian Vice President Gholam Reza Aghazadeh (also head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization) to discuss how the IAEA and the Iranian government can work together to accelerate the pace of our cooperation to clarify all outstanding issues before [the next IAEA] report in March." ElBaradei characterized the session as a "frank and open exchange of views," explaining, "I asked Mr. Aghazadeh to give us maximum transparency and provide assurances about all present nuclear activities about Iran. ... My mission here is to overcome the difficulties between IAEA and Iran." Tomorrow, ElBaradei is scheduled to meet with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, top nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. After the meeting, Aqazadeh said, "We have entered a new phase of cooperation with the IAEA in which grounds would be prepared for fully settling all outstanding issues regarding our nuclear program."

9 January 2008: US President Bush, at the start of his Middle East tour, denounced Iran as a threat to world peace. Meanwhile, IAEA Director General ElBaradei is headed to Iran to talk with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. He is expected to push for the resumption of UN inspections and for a rapid conclusion of the investigation into Iran's past activities.

7 January 2008: A confrontation between the United States and Iran occurred in the Strait of Hormuz, wherein three US warships nearly opened fire on up to five Iranian motor boats, which, according to the US, approached them "in a threatening manner," but according to Iran, simply asked the US ships to identify themselves. See DisarmamentActivist.org's posts on 8 January and 10 January for a good overview of the incident, and analysis of the Western and Iranian media reactions. See Kaveh L Afrasiabi's article from 15 January for some interesting legal perspectives on the incident. And check out the videos of the incident on the BBC website.

7 January 2008: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei will go to Iran at the end of the week for two days"with a view of resolving all remaining outstanding issues and enabling the agency to provide assurance about Iran's past and present activities." An IAEA spokeswomen said ElBaradei would meet some senior Iranian officials, but didn't give details.

28 December 2007: Russia delivered the second batch of nuclear fuel to Iran for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. Its weight was equal to that of the first batch, delivered on 17 December. A total of 82 tons of fuel is to be delivered.

21 December 2007: US Permament Representative to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad commented on Russia's supply of reactor fuel to Iran in response to a reporter's question of whether it will hamper movement towards further sanctions on Iran:

Well, I have said, you have heard me before that we have asked the Iranians to suspend their enrichment program because once they are able to enrich uranium in the name of their power reactor that they can enrich it for weapon purposes too because the same technology that enriches to - uranium to 5% can be used to enrich it to 70, 80, 90% which are usable and necessary and is two thirds of the way for a weapons program. What’s important about this issue is that if Iran suspended, we have said we understand the need for the fuel and there has to be a way to provide that fuel in a reliable way that doesn’t yet contribute to proliferation. So the Russian offer makes it unnecessary for Iran to have its own enrichment because the Russians have said they will provide the fuel that is needed for the power reactor. We were open minded in terms of other alternatives to discuss post suspension but at least the Russian offer undermines the logic that we need to have enrichment because we need fuel for our reactor and of course there is the back end which we will come to, what happens with the spent fuel of the reactor is an issue with regard to reprocessing the plutonium that will be in the spent fuel. That’s an issue that’s also critical for proliferation in terms of proliferation. Thank you.

20 December 2007: A spokeswoman for the Russian contractor Atomstroiexport announced that it would take at least a year (until the end of 2008) for the Bushehr power plant to become operational. Iranian officials have previously thought Bushehr could be partially operational within three months, and be completely online in six to nine months.

18 December 2007: In his statement to the Security Council, US Permament Representative to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad said Iran must:

1) Suspend its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities without delay, which would then allow negotiations within the framework of the P5+1; and

2) Give the IAEA its full cooperation in implementing the Work Plan.

The United States remains deeply troubled by Iran's noncompliance. The P5+1 continue their consultations in capitals, and we hope to have a text of a new sanctions resolution before the full Council as soon as possible.

In closing, Mr. President, let me say a few words about the recent announcement by the Russian Federation to send Iran enriched uranium for use in the nuclear power plant being constructed at Bushehr.

Resolution 1737, while prohibiting states from assisting Iran with sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, makes an exception for providing Iran with assistance and fuel for light water reactors such as Bushehr. As President Bush has noted, while he supports Russia's decision, Russia's arrangement to supply nuclear fuel for the entire period of Bushehr's operation demonstrates one thing: Iran does not need to pursue uranium enrichment and other sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle to have access to nuclear power.

We have joined Russia and other members of the P5+1 in offering Iran, if it complies with the requirements of the Council, cooperation in the development of a civil nuclear power program. This includes active international support in building state-of-the art light water power reactors and reliable access to fuel cycle, to nuclear fuel. If Iran is, in fact, serious about using nuclear power to meet its energy needs, the best way for it to proceed is to suspend its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and accept the P5+1 offer. We await Iran's answer.

17 December 2007: Russia delivered its first nuclear fuel shipment to the Iranian nuclear plant at Bushehr. The Russian foreign ministry said in a statement that Tehran had given assurances the 80 tonnes of fuel would not be used for other purposes, and that the fuel was delivered under the control and guarantees of the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has approved the shipments.

Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, the Iranian vice-president and head of Iran's nuclear programme, told Iran's state news agency that the plant would begin generating electricity within the next six months.

16 December 2007: Russia and Iran have agreed to a timeframe to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran, according to Atomstroyexport, the Russian contractor building the plant.

13 December 2007: China's Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, urged for a "two-track approach in trying to resolve the dispute with Iran over its nuclear program - a revitalized diplomatic initiative along with a new U.N. resolution on sanctions." Wang explained the NIE report "changed China's views on a new sanction resolution." He also reported that the political directors of the P5+1 agreed to either meet or talk by telephone after the new year. However, US Ambassador Khalilzad continued to insist "there was a proposal for a new discussion among the political directors in the coming days and the possibility of higher level talks at a donors conference for Palestinians in Paris on Monday."

According to the AP, US officials in Washington "said that a preliminary sanctions plan drafted by France would punish the Quds Force, part of Iran's powerful Revolutionary Guard Corps, for exporting banned weapons, and Bank Melli, one of Iran's largest banks, which the United States included in its own sweeping sanctions program in October."

12 December 2007: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, US Permanent Representative to the UN, explained to reporters outside of the Security Council, "The NIE wasn’t helpful, has not been helpful in speeding us to get to a resolution – agreement on a resolution but we are talking with Germany and other P5 members, it’s still discussions that are being held at the political directors level and there was, as you heard, a discussion yesterday and there will be additional discussion. I don’t expect at the present time for action to be transferred, the negotiations to be transferred to me - or to us here in the UN Security Council for some days still." When a reporter asked if the Security Council will discuss the issue in December, Khalilzad said, "That’s our expectations but it’s contingent on agreement among the political directors and there is another engagement planned – another conversation among the political directors."

However, British Ambassador John Sawers said he feels it is unlikely that the P5+1 government officials will be able to reach enough agreement in their talks on a new Iran sanctions resolution by the end of the year to start taking action at the United Nations. Before the issue can be taken up by the Security Council, political directors in capitals negotiate the outline of the resolution; these directors have not yet been able to agree on final elements of the resolution. Sawers argued, "I think there's still wide differences between, on the one hand, Britain, France, Germany and the United States, on the other Russia and China."

12 December 2007: The chief American official in talks on Iran’s nuclear program, Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns, has been in discussion with the rest of the P5+1 about a third sanctions resolution against Iran, though US administration officials have said a vote on new sanctions, originally scheduled for this month, would most likely be deferred until next year. The New York Times reported that one official said "the new sanctions might include economic strictures and a ban on foreign travel by senior Iranian officials involved in the nuclear program or suspected of supporting terrorism. Such sanctions would be somewhat similar to those the United States unilaterally imposed on the Quds division of Iran’s Republican Guard Corps, although apparently they would not go nearly as far." Meanwhile, Scott McCormack, the State Department's spokesperson, said the administration would like to have a final Security Council resolution that can be voted on in the coming weeks, adding, "what is very interesting about this is that we’re not talking about whether or not there’s going to be a resolution, but we’re talking about what are the elements to a new Security Council resolution."

8 December 2007: Gulf Arab countries vocally disagreed with Defense Secretary Robert Gates on US policies toward Iran and Israel. During his speech at a regional security conference in Bahrain, Gates stressed the danger of Iran's nuclear program and urged the Gulf states to force Tehran to stop uranium enrichment. Several Gulf state delegates said the US was hypocritical for supporting Israeli nuclear weapons, and questioned Washington's refusal to meet with Iran to discuss the Islamic state's nuclear activities. Bahraini Minister of Labor Majeed al-Alawi asked whether Gates thought that Israeli nuclear weapons are a threat to the region. Gates said no - and that he does not perceive that as being a double-standard.

6 December 2007: The Tehran Times pointed out several problems with the NIE report released on 3 December, arguing that despite positive responses by some Iranian officials, the report is actually not something to celebrate:

While the nuclear watchdog states that it has not observed any non-peaceful nuclear activities, the U.S. intelligence agencies have evaluated Iran’s nuclear program to be of a military nature, so that, unlike a technical approach, this political evaluation would influence public opinion.

[The report states:] “The halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure…”

In this way they are trying to justify their decision to pressure Iran and implying that the country is not committed to the agreements.

[The report states:] “Until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.”

This big lie is not mentioned in any of the IAEA reports and is only an allegation made by the United States.

[The report states:] “Since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications”; “Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing”; “Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015”; and “Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.”

These sentences suggest that the pressure that was put on Iran, under the leadership of the U.S. government, has been successful in halting the country’s efforts to produce nuclear weapons and thus should be continued.

The article goes on to argue, "China, Russia, and even other permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany have made it very clear to the United States that they adamantly believe that only diplomatic methods should be used in the nuclear standoff. However, it is also important to examine their definition of diplomacy. We suppose that diplomacy means interaction through dialogue in order to reach an understanding, but in the conception of diplomacy of some members of the 5+1 group, any tool can be utilized to exert pressure except Article 42 of the United Nations Charter and the military option."

5 December 2007: Recovering from the intelligence report that seemed to undermine the US administration's push for further sanctions against Iran, and undeterred in its push to escalate international pressure on Iran, President Bush said the report shows Iran still has many questions to answer about its past nuclear work, arguing that Iran had to come clean on the work it had done on its nuclear program prior to 2003 and suspend uranium enrichment, or risk international isolation. This statement avoids admitting that the IAEA and Iran have been correctly asserting that Iran has no nuclear weapons programme, and disregards the work plan developed by the IAEA and Iran to settle all outstanding issues related to the IAEA investigation into Iran's past nuclear activities. Furthermore, as Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy adds, it "deliberately distorts the historical-political context and makes clear that Iran's nuclear programme is not the issue that is driving [the US'] policies" toward Iran.

However, French Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert indicated that the Security Council would be moving forward with another set of sanctions against Iran, saying "there was 'growing consensus' among world powers including China and Russia on moving talks on Iran's nuclear program to New York," because "Iran was still in defiance of two Security Council resolutions demanding it halt uranium enrichment." The Reuters article further points out that "Washington has said it will continue pressing for a third round of sanctions unless Iran halts uranium enrichment."

Al Jazeera, on the other hand, argued that now that the NIE report has been released, there will be international pressure against a pre-emptive strike and opposition in the Security Council against further sanctions. Marwan Bishara, Al Jazeera's senior political analyst, also believes the report "might pave the way to bilateral negotiations between the US and Iran without stiff preconditions in order to relax the tensions in the Gulf with the participation of Iran's Arab neighbours, as well as its European allies," and that "Washington will find it ever more necessary and ever more enticing to talk to Iran about a 'helpful' and perhaps beneficial role for itself and Iraq in the Gulf."

4 December 2007: Al Jazeera noted that despite the report, the White House has urged global powers to "turn up the pressure" on Iran. Stephen Hadley, the national security adviser, argued, "The intelligence ... tells us that the risk of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon remains a very serious problem," and insisted, "The bottom line is this: for that strategy to succeed, the international community has to turn up the pressure on Iran - with diplomatic isolation, United Nations sanctions, and with other financial pressure - and Iran has to decide it wants to negotiate a solution." Al Jazeera also noted that the UK government seems to favour "increasing the pressure on Iran over its nuclear programme despite the latest NIE report," quoting a British foreign ministry spokesperson saying, "The report's conclusions justify the action already taken by the international community to get to the bottom of Iran's nuclear programme and to increase pressure on the regime to stop its enrichment and reprocessing activities." Meanwhile, US President Bush said the report was a "warning signal" and his view that a nuclear Iran would be a danger "hasn't changed," adding: "Iran was dangerous, Iran is dangerous and Iran will be dangerous if they have the know-how to make a nuclear weapon."

The report has further confused EU officials, who are "struggling to understand why the United States chose to issue the report just two days after the six powers involved in negotiating with Iran — the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany — had decided to press ahead with a new Security Council resolution." One diplomat reportedly said, “Officially, we will study the document carefully; unofficially, our efforts to build up momentum for another resolution are gone.” Meanwhile, Vitaly Churkin, the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, praised the report, arguing, “We have always been saying there is no proof they are pursuing nuclear weapons.” He explained he wasn't sure what impact the report would have on the new initiative for more sanctions. A senior official at the IAEA said, “Despite repeated smear campaigns, the I.A.E.A. has stood its ground and concluded time and again that since 2002 there was no evidence of an undeclared nuclear weapons program in Iran,” adding that “[i]t also validates the assessment of the director general that what the I.A.E.A. inspectors have seen in Iran represented no imminent danger.”

Meanwhile, in remarks to reporters outside the Security Council, US Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, said, "the NIE says that there was a covert military dedicated nuclear weapons program."

However, this assertion of the report should not be accepted without investigation.As Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy points out, "Scant evidence exists in the public domain to back up the administration's assertion that Iran had a nuclear weapons program." Iran's nuclear-related activities prior to 2003 do not indisputably indicate a "covert military dedicated nuclear weapons program". For example, Spies says, "Iranian opposition groups have made a number of claims, mostly discredited, regarding clandestine military nuclear sites in Iran, including the Parchin Military Complex and the Lavizan-Shian Technical Research Center. IAEA samples of the soil found no evidence of nuclear materials at either site, consistent with Iran's declarations." Furthermore, "[i]n 2006, the IAEA continued to investigate the import of dual use equipment by PHRC [Physics Research Center, located at the Lavizan-Shian site], which could be used in uranium enrichment and conversion activities. The IAEA detected particles of natural and highly enriched uranium on some equipment and materials related to the center," not to military activities. In regards to the 15-page document given to Iran by the A.Q. Khan network that described "the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal in small quantities, and for the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to fabrication of nuclear weapons components," Iran turned this document over to the IAEA in 2006. Spies explains, the IAEA "noted the document did not contain specification or dimensions for machined components. Iran claimed the document was provided at the initiative of the network. The IAEA noted that Iran had not made use of the procedures described in the document."

Spies further argues, "The important question that doesn't get asked isn't so much whether Iran had a nuclear weapon program but what does the NIE mean by Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Obviously we aren't taking about the Manhattan project here. The bottom line is that there's no evidence in the public domain to suggest much beyond paper studies in Iran related to possible weaponization of nuclear materials."

Ambassador Khalilzad went on to argue that the NIE report says Iran stopped its "covert military dedicated nuclear weapons program" in 2003 "because of international pressure, because of revelations about the program that did not come as a result of Iran producing that information, but otherwise in the context of U.S. activities in the region, including developments in Iraq at that time."

However, sanctions were not applied against Iran in 2003. The US pushed for the IAEA to report Iran to the UN Security Council in 2003, but instead, three EU states - France, Germany, and the UK - offered Iran technical cooperation with its nuclear program in exchange for full transparency. Talks between Iran and the EU3 and the IAEA continued on-and-off August 2005; the matter was not referred to the Security Council until February 2006.

Mike Veiluva writing for DisarmamentActivist.org argues, "while sanctions were not responsible for terminating Iran’s alleged weapons research activities, they certainly could induce the Iranian government to reconsider its suspension. We already have the example of 2006 when the US push for new sanctions drove Iran to terminate the Paris Agreement and resume uranium enrichment."

3 December 2007: A new National Intelligence Estimate, representing the consensus view of all 16 US spy agencies, says that Iran is not currently seeking nuclear weapons, nor will it be capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon until at least 2010. The report "concludes that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and that the program remains on hold, contradicting an assessment two years ago that Tehran was working inexorably toward building a bomb." Mainstream media has either presented this report as undermining neoconservative arguments for war with Iran, or, as Fox News spun it, "The intelligence community has high confidence that Iran had a covert nuclear weapons program that it never acknowledged and continues to deny, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley said Monday, but the program is currently halted although perhaps not indefinitely." Some also insinuated or pointed out that the report's contradictions to the 2005 NIE report, as well as the NIE's errors about Iraq's posession of WMD, render this new report meaningless. Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy argues the report adds nothing new or substantive to the debate.

30 November 2007: EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana said he is disappointed after talks with Iran on its nuclear programme, but top Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili said the discussions were positive and more would be held. Solana was reportedly "looking for signs that the Iranians were prepared to suspend uranium enrichment work," while Jalili argued "it was unacceptable to pressure Iran into abandoning uranium enrichment, as it was allowed to do so under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."

25 November 2007: Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman reported that Iran is working on the "completion of a new idea" for settling the dispute over its nuclear programme. "The new idea is currently discussed and to be completed and presented at the next round of talks with (European Union foreign policy chief Javier) Solana," Mohammad-Ali Hosseini told reporters at a press conference. He did not disclose the contents of the new idea, but confirmed that chief nuclear negotiator Saeid Jalili would meet Solana in London on November 30.

25 November 2007: Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mohammad-Ali Hosseini, said Iranian officials will resume talks with their counterparts from the UN nuclear watchdog over outstanding issues on Iran's peaceful nuclear activities on December 11. The remaining issues include the Polonium 210, source of the contamination, and Gachin mine.

24 November 2007: The European Union's foreign policy chief Javier Solana suggested the discussion of establishing international enrichment centres under multilateral supervision should be enhanced as an effort to defuse tensions over Iran's nuclear enrichment programme. However, Iran's response to previous suggestions of relying on an international fuel supply rather than a domestic supply has not been favourable. Iranian media said on Wednesday Solana would meet Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili in London on 30 November. Solana said he would "probably" meet Jalili on that date.

22 November 2007: Disregarding the IAEA Director General's recent report, the US, the UK, France, and Germany told the IAEA Board of Governors that "a wait-and-see approach is not an option." They argued that Iran had not done enough to win their trust, and the UN should now consider tougher sanctions: "We recognize Iran has taken some steps in the right direction but we are disappointed that cooperation is of a partial and reactive nature ... all in all, the results are not encouraging." US envoy Gregory Schulte agreed, saying, "Iran's consistent policy of selective cooperation and delay tactics suggest that Iran means only to distract the world" from their nuclear weapon ambitions. Meanwhile, Russia and China agree Iran's cooperation with the IAEA is a positive step forward, and neither seems ready to intensify sanctions. The Non-Aligned Movement emphasized Iran's substantive cooperation, and warned against "undue interference" with the process.

21 November 2007: Iran's deputy chief nuclear negotiator Javad Vaeidi announced that preliminary nuclear talks between Iran and the European Union are to be held "within the next few days," after the initial schedule had to be postponed for "technical reasons." Vaeidi said that after technical evaluation of the Iranian nuclear programme by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Tehran was also ready to discuss with the EU the political aspects of the issue.

19 November 2007: UN Ambassador Wang Guangya of China said his government is ready for six-nation talks to begin in early December to try to resolve the dispute over Iran's nuclear programme, but expressed caution about the possibility of new sanctions. He said the United States "should not forget" that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the UN nuclear "watchdog," and when the six nations decided on the two sanctions resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council, "it [was] to reinforce the role of IAEA." Ambassador Wang also denied that the cancellation of its attendance at the most recent P5+1 meeting was a move to block further sanctions, arguing that the Chinese delegation faced scheduling problems.

19 November 2007: Iranian lawyer and Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi called on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program, arguing it is not worth war. She explained, "Using nuclear energy is every nation's right, but we have obvious other rights including security, peace and welfare." She also urged the United States to work within international law when addressing the Iranian nuclear programme: "What we want is that the two sides should respect international law," Ebadi said during her interview with Radio Farda. "The United States cannot have the right to deal with Iran outside the framework of international law, and Iran cannot build a wall around itself and say, ‘I have nothing to do with international law,’ and pay no attention to Security Council resolutions."

15 November 2007: The IAEA Director General released a new report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant Security Council provisions in Iran. Media spin on the issue undermines several key points of the report. As noted by Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, "the charge that Iran's cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive could be interpreted as a criticism of the IAEA itself, which after all agreed to the formula contained in the work plan. In addition, the IAEA's 'diminishing' knowledge of Iran's nuclear program requires a lot of qualification - under the Safeguards, the IAEA is obligated only to verify that information declared to it by governments matches physical inventories. So in normal circumstances when safeguards are applied, the IAEA doesn't compile "knowledge" about a state's nuclear program - it makes findings regarding the accuracy of a state's declarations. Of course, these two points are easily taken out of context in order to show Iran has not been cooperating, in spite of the very clear conclusion of the report to the contrary." He further points out several items in the report worth noting, including "the expanded chronology of Iran's acquisition of nuclear fuel cycle technology, placing the development of Iran's nuclear program in the context of the program started by the Shah," and, more importantly, "the revised history of the 1987 offer from the Khan network and the civilian origin of the decision to pursue uranium enrichment in paras 10 and 11 (emphasis mine):

10. According to Iran, the decision to acquire centrifuge technology was taken by the President of the AEOI and endorsed by the Prime Minister of Iran. In response to its enquiries about possible additional documentation relevant to the 1987 offer, the Agency was provided on 8 November 2007 with a copy of a confidential communication from the President of the AEOI to the Prime Minister, dated 28 February 1987, which also carried the Prime Minister's endorsement, dated 5 March 1987. In his communication, the AEOI President indicated that the activities "should be treated fully confidentially." In response to the Agency's enquiry as to whether there was any military involvement in the programme, Iran has stated that no institution other than the AEOI was involved in the decision-making process or in the implementation of the centrifuge enrichment programme.

11. Based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network, limited documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected through the Agency's independent investigations, the Agency has concluded that Iran's statements are consistent with other information available to the Agency concerning Iran's acquisition of declared P-1 centrifuge enrichment technology in 1987.

Also important, Iran's explanation for the development (or lack thereof) of the P-2 centrifuge also seems to check out, and as always, 'The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.'"

The P5+1 have been waiting for the release of this report, the first one since the IAEA and Iran developed a work plan to settle their outstanding issues, to decide whether or not to press further sanctions against Iran (see 21 August entry for more details).

After the release of the report, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, US Permanent Representative to the UN, argued that "it is clear that Iran has not fully cooperated," and pressed for "another resolution in the Security Council under Chapter 7 to impose additional sanctions on Iran." He further said, "only a strong resolution with new and biting sanctions will give diplomacy a chance to succeed ... I think it’s in everyone’s interest for this world defining issue to be resolved diplomatically and for diplomacy to work, for diplomacy to succeed it needs widely supported broad and biting sanctions to effect the calculations of the regime in Iran." He also hinted that China's "dragging feet" on the issue would be responsible for the failure of diplomacy "by not cooperating with the effort at additional sanctions."

Khalilzad also insisted this is one of the most important issues the international community faces, "because Iran is seeking regional hegemony, because Iran has ties terrorist organizations, because Iran’s support for insurgent groups in Iraq and in Afghanistan, because of the rhetoric of the Iranian leaders. Given all that, it is a defining issue and therefore the international community as a state, the international community as a whole as a state in doing all that we can diplomatically to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability."

October 2007: The "Iran issue" at the General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security

Extracted from the Nuclear Proliferation reports written by Michael Spies of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy in the First Committee Monitor:

Week 1: 8-12 October 2007
Contrary to exhortations of unity of the international community on the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, the discussion in the General Debate revealed a high degree of divergence.

Divergences were readily apparent in the approach of the P5 on the issue of Iran, despite the 28 September P5+2 statement in which the major powers agreed to seek a third sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council unless reports from the IAEA and the EU High Representative show progress in November. The United States again adopted the hardest line against Iran and called outright for the UN Security Council to “move forward as soon as possible to adopt a third resolution under Chapter VII imposing additional sanctions measures.”

Although the EU's delegation called upon Iran to “respond positively and swiftly to the demands of the international community … in particular by suspending its enrichment related and reprocessing activities,” and endorsed the 28 September P5+2 statement, it more positively expressed hope “that the discussions between the IAEA and Iran on outstanding issues will, at least by November, meet the targets laid down by the 'work plan'.” The EU made no reference to an additional sanctions resolution, however, it expressed “resolve not to allow Iran to acquire military nuclear capabilities and to see to all consequences of its nuclear programme, in terms of proliferation, resolved,” without further specification as to what such “resolution” might entail.

The Russian Federation and China's delegations both placed emphasis on diplomatic and political solutions to addressing the Iran nuclear situation, without reference to the imposition of additional sanctions or the 28 September P5+2 statement, perhaps an indication of lukewarm support for continued escalation of the situation. Russia's Ambassador Antonov called for a “comprehensive approach … to the situation around the Iranian nuclear program.” He further called for a “comprehensive political and diplomatic solution” and “for intensifying contacts between the Six Parties and Iran in order to elaborate the models that would allow to launch such purpose-oriented full-scale negotiations process.” China's Ambassador Cheng Jingye implored all parties to “show flexibility, exercise patience and stick to the course of peaceful resolution in seeking a comprehensive, long-term and appropriate solution” to the Iran situation.

Other Western delegations that spoke out on Iran tended to take an approach closer to that of the EU. Canada and New Zealand emphasized a need for Iran to comply fully with UN Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), a reference to Iran’s refusal to suspend its uranium enrichment programme. Delegations affiliated with the Non-Aligned Movement, of which Iran is a member, universally adopted a softer tone, welcoming the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve outstanding issues. Additionally, without direct reference to Iran, Non-Aligned delegates generally called for balanced and comprehensive pursuit of non-proliferation objectives and reaffirmed the right expressed in Article IV of the NPT to peaceful development and use of nuclear energy. Ambassador Aziz of Egypt observed the international community was witnessing “efforts aimed at preventing the non-nuclear-weapon-States from their inalienable right in the peaceful applications of nuclear technology.” Indonesia’s Ambassador Asmady stated, “We believe that the international community should not be skeptical of the activities of certain states—which are parties—in building peaceful nuclear programs as long as they will not be diverted into military purposes.”

Week 2: 15-19 October 2007
The dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme was again the near-exclusive focus of discussion over matters concerning nuclear proliferation in the second week of First Committee. Despite the large amount of floor time devoted to the issue, delegations generally failed to add any points of substance to the discussion beyond those covered already in the General Debate (see Nuclear Proliferation week one). In the Thematic Debate, the European Union statement did little more than expand on its position on Iran incorporated in its general statement. Japan and Australia both expressed approval of the work plan between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve outstanding issues, but also called on Iran to fully comply with relevant IAEA Board and UN Security Council resolutions without delay, including the suspension of uranium enrichment.

Given the active engagement and ownership of this issue by some major powers, who are also permanent members of the Security Council, the role of the General Assembly on this matter is certain to remain limited to repeated reassertion of national positions in prepared remarks during the general and themed discussions. The only, very minor, exception to this might be if some states continue to raise objections to the annual resolution sponsored by the League of Arab States, A/C.1/62/L.2, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.” Despite its title the resolution exclusively singles out Israel without reference to other concerns relevant to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (i.e. Iran), which has led some delegations to question its balance.

First Committee also heard both the Iranian and Israeli viewpoints on this issue in their general remarks. Reiterating familiar rhetorical points, Iranian Ambassador Khazaee defended Iran’s nuclear programme as peaceful, touted the 21 August work plan to resolve all outstanding issues with the IAEA, which the ambassador noted had been well received by the international community, and denounced UN Security Council resolutions adopted on the nuclear issue as “unwarranted … unlawful, unnecessary and unjustifiable.” Israeli Ambassador Ziv, also delivering general remarks from the viewpoint of her country’s unique perspective on matters of global security, urged states to regard Iran “as a threat well beyond the geographical limits of the Middle East” and also as “a threat not just to the regional stability but also to the global strategic situation.” Ambassador Ziv’s statements were in part based on her argument that weapons of mass destruction “in the hands of reckless and irresponsible actors” is singularly the problem. These hyperbolic statements are particularly notable because Israel possesses the only nuclear arsenal in the region. Such positions were flatly rejected by the Hans Blix-led Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, which pointedly discarded the notion that nuclear weapons in the hands of some are safe, but in the hands of others place the world in mortal jeopardy.

Taking a large step back from the narrow and overtly self-interested views expressed by the regional antagonists, Ambassador Khan of Pakistan observed that in the context of Iran’s nuclear programme, “resort[ing] to further coercion or worse, the use of force, will be counter-productive and lead to further and grave instability and insecurity in the Middle East and beyond. It could also jeopardize the bright economic prospects of the entire region.” He emphasized the need to “safeguard the security and independence” of all states in the region, noting that “[a]symmetry, imbalance and discrimination will ultimately propel proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this region,” rather than facilitating the goal of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East.

24 September 2007: In an interview with 60 Minutes, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is in New York to address the UN General Assembly on Tuesday, denied Iran has an interest in acquiring a nuclear weapon. "If it (a nuclear bomb) was useful, it would have prevented the downfall of the Soviet Union," he said. "If it was useful, it would resolved the problem the Americans have in Iraq. The time of the bomb is passed."

20 September 2007: The Middle Powers Initiative issued an appeal for a diplomatic and peaceful resolution of the Iran crisis. In a statement widely released to governments around the world, MPI appealed for their help in influencing the United States not to launch a military attack on Iran.

14 September 2007: Germany suggested a delay in pressing for new sanctions against Iran, announced foreign ministry spokes-person Martin Jaeger at a news conference. Although Jaeger stated, "Germany is ready, if necessary, to take the necessary steps against Iran," he added, "As a member of the IAEA, we are also dealing with the so-called open questions and giving Iran a chance to recover the international community's lost confidence in its nuclear program… If Iran is ready to do this ... then I think we can spare ourselves future sanctions debates." Germany would now like to await the release of a regular IAEA report on Iran in November, which would provide an update on the progress of the work plan, before proceeding with any further discussion of sanctions. The announcement represented a shift in the unity of the EU-3 as France and the UK reportedly remain ready to push for new sanctions.

13 September 2007: The Isreali Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, said that the UN Security Council should impose tougher sanctions against Iran, and that private businesses should stop doing businesss with Tehran despite financial losses that might result. US diplomats are expected to press for stronger sanctions at meetings to be held next week.

12 September 2007: Iran will not stop uranium enrichment, chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani said on Wednesday, despite a call by the European Union and U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to halt sensitive nuclear work. The European Union said earlier that the failure to include a provision for Iran to halt uranium enrichment in a transparency deal Tehran agreed in August with the IAEA was unacceptable.

12 September 2007: Iran warned that a new round of UN sanctions could "destroy" its willingness to cooperate with investigations into its past nuclear activities. The US said it would still push for penalties if Iran did not suspend its uranium enrichment program that at projected rates could produce enough material for a bomb in one year.

11 September 2007: The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) strongly backed the IAEA-Iran work plan at an IAEA Board of Govenors meeting, countering criticism of the deal by Western states. Ambassador Norma Goicochea Estenoz of Cuba, speaking on behalf of NAM, said the bloc "strongly rejects any undue pressure or interference in the agency's activities ... which could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility," in a diplomatic rebuke to Western states that have expressed skepticism about the work plan. NAM further stated it "believes this work plan is a significant step forward, as (ElBaradei) said himself," further adding that "NAM believes it will facilitate negotiations between Iran and other concerned parties toward a peaceful settlement of Iran's nuclear issues. NAM also expects all concerned parties to avoid taking any measures which put at risk the recent constructive process between Iran and the Agency." The EU statement to the Board "took note" of the work plan, but stopped short of endorsing it or expressing approval. Diplomats reported that IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei walked out of the meeting following the EU statement.

10 September 2007: UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said that Iran must cooperate with all UN Security Council demands including the suspension of uranium enrichment. "In addition to what IAEA has been negotiating and discussing with the Iranian government, the Iranian government should fully comply with the Security Council resolutions -- that is the core," Ban said.

4 September 2007: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's statement that Iran has 3,000 centrifuges running is not backed up by evidence, diplomats familiar with U.N. inspections said. 2,000 have been operating, but well below capacity, with another several hundred in various stages of installation and testing.

30 August 2007: IAEA Deputy Director general of safeguards Olli Heinonen underlined the importance of the work plan, recently agreed to between Iran and the IAEA "to resolve the outstanding issues that triggered all the Security Council procedures sometime ago." He emphasized, "When you read the plan you see this is not an open-ended timeline: there are certain linkages in this approach, but it's important that it is not open-ended…. The key now is that Iran adheres to this timeline, provides us with the information that we need and access to the information." He further noted that "All these measures which you see there for resolving our outstanding issues go beyond the requirements of the Additional Protocol." Regarding concerns that Iran was manipulating the IAEA investigation and that the deal rules out further inquiries, Heinonen stated, "If the answers are not satisfactory, we are making new questions until we are satisfied with the answers and we can conclude technically that the matter is resolved—it is for us to judge when we think we have enough information. Once the matter is resolved, then the file is closed."

30 August 2007: The IAEA Director General described the 21 August work plan as a significant step forward, in a report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran submitted to the IAEA Board. The report also indicated that "Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities" and "is also continuing with its construction of the IR-40 reactor and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant" contrary to the decisions of the UN Security Council. As of 19 August, Iran was simultaneously operating 12 164-machine cascades with uranium feedstock at its Fuel Enrichment Plant, with one cascade operating without uranium, one operating under vacuum, and two more under construction. Despite Iran's claims that it has enriched up to 4.8 percent U-235, the IAEA reported a maximum enrichment level of 3.7%. The IAEA noted, "Since February 2007, Iran has fed approximately 690 kg of UF6 into the cascades at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), which is well below the expected quantity for a facility of this design."

22 August 2007: The US ambassador to the IAEA accused Iran of manipulating the IAEA in response to the 21 August work plan for resolving outstanding issues related to Iran's past nuclear activities. The US ambassador, Gregory Schulte, described the package as containing "real limitations," further stating that "Cooperation that is partial, conditional, and only promised in the future is not enough. Cooperation that allows Iran to proceed developing the capacity to build nuclear weapons is also not enough. If Iran's leaders truly want the world's trust, they would stop trying to manipulate the IAEA, start to cooperate fully and unconditionally, and suspend activities of concern."

21 August 2007: The IAEA and Iran finalized a work plan to resolve all outstanding issues, after further meetings between Iranian and IAEA officials in Vienna on 24 July and in Tehran 20-21 August. The document entitled, "Understandings of The Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues," was prepared following a series of discussions in Tehran by IAEA and Iranian officials starting on 12 July and contains a schedule for resolving all outstanding issues related to the IAEA investigation into Iran's past nuclear activities. According to the document, the issue of Iran's past plutonium experiments was satisfactorily resolved on 20 August. The document further states Iran's understanding that once all presently identified issues have been resolved, there will be no further remaining issues or ambiguities pertaining to Iran's nuclear program. Under the plan, the IAEA will provide its remaining questions to Iran regarding the origin of the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programs by 31 August, and schedules a series of meetings intended to close the matter by November 2007. Two weeks following the closure of the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge issue, Iran and the IAEA will work to resolve the remaining uranium contamination issues. Iran agreed on 12 July 2007 to cooperation with the IAEA in examination of a document found in Iran describing the casting of uranium metal into hemispheric shapes. Two weeks following the resolution of the uranium metal and contamination issues, Iran agreed to provide explanation to the IAEA's questions regarding Iran's PO-210 experiments, to be provided in writing to Iran by 15 September 2007. The IAEA agreed to provide Iran will all documentation it possesses pertaining to the alleged Green Salt Project, the existence of which Iran denies, which involves alleged studies pertaining to conversion of uranium to UF4, high explosives, and missile reentry vehicles. Iran agreed to review this evidence as a sign of cooperation. Diplomats from Western states criticized the deal for failing to secure Iran's adherence to the Additional Protocol and as for seemingly precluding the IAEA from making further inquiries to Iran on nuclear issues.

20 August 2007: IAEA and Iranian officials met in Tehran to discuss the 12 July work plan to resolve all out-standing issues, and "which includes understandings between the Secretariat and Iran on the modalities, procedures and timelines for resolving these matters."

6 August 2007: IAEA officials, led by Michiro Hosaya, arrived in Iran today, and will meet with a group headed by Mohammad Saeedi, deputy head of Iran's atomic energy organization. Plans for future inspections of Iran's uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz will be discussed.

30 July 2007: International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors visited the heavy water nuclear reactor under construction at Arak for a routine design information verification inspection. The IAEA noted that construction of the reactor was ongoing. Additionally, the IAEA further noted that according to satellite imagery, operation of the adjacent heavy water plant was also ongoing. It is the first such visit since Iran in April blocked access to the plant. Meanwhile, Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and European Union negotiator Javier Solana are to continue talks on Iran's nuclear program this week.

25 July 2007: Iran and the IAEA wrapped up talks and agreed to meet again on August 20th in Tehran. In the meantime, an IAEA team will head to Tehran next week to inspect the Iranian heavy water reactor in the city of Arak. In addition, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said Iranian officials would meet with representative of the Group 5+1 in the near future after fixing an exact date for the event.

24 July 2007: IAEA and Iranian officials met to further discuss the work plan for resolving all outstanding issues. IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards Olli Heinonen and Iran's Undersecretary of the Supreme National Security Council for International Affairs, Javad Vaeedi, met in Vienna to follow up on the 12 July meeting in which both sides agreed to a draft plan to resolve all outstanding issues.

23 July 2007: It was reported that on Tuesday, July 24th, Iran and the IAEA would hold a second round of talks in Vienna on Iran’s nuclear program. Also on Tuesday, Iran is expected to engage in bilateral meetings with the United States, in Baghdad. The topic of the Baghdad meetings is expected to be the situation in Iraq, not Iran’s nuclear program.

23 July 2007: British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said he would not rule out military action against Iran, but believed a policy of sanctions could still persuade Tehran to drop its disputed nuclear program.

22 July 2007: British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is expected to meet with President Bush and discuss the “looming crisis” over Iran’s nuclear program.  The US is said to be pushing for a third sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council; support from the UK and opposition from China and Russia are expected.

19 July 2007: IAEA Director General ElBaradei said Iran still has to clarify some outstanding issues before the IAEA can confirm its nuclear programme is only for peaceful purposes. Iran has agreed to discuss these issues with the IAEA.

12 July 2007: Iran and the IAEA agreed to the modalities for resolving all outstanding issues related to the agency's investigation of iran's past nuclear activities. The draft plan entitled, "Understandings of The Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues," consists of a 60-day work plan and schedule for Iran and the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues.

11 July 2007: IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards Olli Heinonen arrived in Tehran to prepare a "modality plan" for resolving all outstanding issues. Heinonen and his team met with Iran's Undersecretary of the Supreme National Security Council for International Affairs, Javad Vaeedi, who stated the purpose of devising the plan at the present time is to "resolve the issue in Vienna instead of New York."

9 July 2007: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported that Iran has slowed down the expansion of its uranium enrichment program. ElBaradei said IAEA agency inspectors who just revisited Iran's vast underground enrichment plant at Natanz also noticed a "fairly slow" pace of feeding uranium into the centrifuges for enrichment. "We saw a slowing in the process of commissioning new cascades," he told reporters, referring to interlinked networks of centrifuges that spin at high speeds to refine uranium into nuclear fuel. "It is not a full-size freeze, but it is a fairly marked slowdown... I hope at this delicate stage Iran will even freeze what they have (running)," he said after an IAEA meeting. He said the slowdown was a step in the right direction and he likened it to an Iranian pledge to him last month to start producing answers to IAEA investigations meant to verify whether its program is wholly peaceful or military in nature. "I welcome this since Iran at this stage needs to do everything to cool things down", ElBaradei added. This could be cause for restraint in the Security Council, he suggested.

The US, however, is not convinced that the slow down is a diplomatic decision, and has suggested that perhaps technical difficulties are the real reason behind this latest change.

On 23 May 2007, the IAEA Director General's report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran was released. Jeffrey Lewis and Paul Kerr respond.

On 9 April 2007, Reuters reported that Iran announced it has begun industrial-scale nuclear fuel production, marking a shift from experimental atomic fuel work involving a few hundred centrifuges used for enriching uranium to a process that will involve thousands of machines. However, Dr. Jeffrey Lewis of Harvard University argues that while Iran has installed additional 164-machine cascades—maybe more than 1,000 centrifuges in total—at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, there are many technical aspects that will prevent this "shift" from being as immediate as the media is making it out to be.

On 8 April 2007, Iran said it would not discuss its obvious right to master the nuclear fuel cycle but was open to talks that could reassure the West that its atomic plans were not aimed at producing bombs.

On 4 April 2007, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that his government would release the detained 15 British sailors and marines as an "Easter gift" to the British people.

On 3 April 2007, Iran suggested a diplomatic resolution to the ongoing 'hostage' crisis is possible, providing the UK admits it entered into Iranian waters.  UKPrime Minister Tony Blair said the next two days will be "fairly critical" to resolving the dispute.

On 2 April 2007, ABC News reported that "Iran has more than tripled its ability to produce enriched uranium in the last three months, adding some 1,000 centrifuges which are used to separate radioactive particles from the raw material. The development means Iran could have enough material for a nuclear bomb by 2009..." Dr. Jeffrey Lewis of Harvard University responded with a calculation showing how this proclaimation could be very misleading.

On 29 March 2007, the United States and key allies began pressing the International Atomic Energy Agency to find Iran in violation of its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty over Tehran's refusal to allow remote monitoring of its underground uranium enrichment plant. However, IAEA officials are withholding judgment, pending examination of Iran's agreements to see if its refusal to allow installation of extra cameras giving a full overview of its Natanz operations is a violation of the treaty.

On 25 March 2007, Iran responded to Resolution 1747, saying the country would partially suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and called the sanctions illegal. Ahmadinejad also said Iran would continue its nuclear program.

On 24 March 2007, the UN Security Council unanimously voted in favour of Resolution 1747 for further sanctions against Iran. The P5+1 also released a Joint Statement on the resolution.

On 23 March 2007, the top UK diplomat at the UN said a new Security Council resolution on Iran has been agreed upon and is expected to go to a vote on Saturday. However, Qatar, Indonesia and South Africa, members of the Security Council, have concerns. Qatar and Indonesia want the resolution to call for a nuclear-free Middle East - meaning Israel should get rid of its nuclear weapons. South Africa has called for major changes, most of which have been rejected.

Meanwhile, Iranian authorities arrested 15 British sailors and Marines, accusing them of trespassing in Iranian waters.  The British government and the crew claim they were inside Iraq waters.

On 20 March 2007, South Africa surprised major powers by proposing a softening of the document's wording. South Africa, the current chair of the Security Council, has called for all key sanctions proposed by major powers, including an arms embargo and financial bans on an Iranian state bank and the Revolutionary Guard, to be dropped. Although the original draft could probably be adopted by the Security Council without South Africa's backing, the major powers had wanted it to be passed unanimously. Diplomats at the Security Council now say they do not expect a vote on the draft resolution on Iran until next week. Adoption requires a minimum of nine votes on the 15-member council and no veto. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad plans to address the council on the day of the vote.

On 19 March 2007, the US approved a visa for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to address the UN Security Council when it votes on extra sanctions against Iran. The Security Council is to meet on Wednesday to discuss the sanctions.

On