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Nuclear Iran?
Background Information

Since December 2002, when the United States accused the Iran of “across-the-board pursuit of weapons of mass destruction” based on satellite images of nuclear reactor sites in Natanz (uranium enrichment plant) and Arak (heavy-water reactor), the government of Iran has under close scrutiny of key players in the international community. Iran agreed to allow inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which ran from February to November 2003, when IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei announced there was no evidence that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. The inspection team did find that Iran concealed the extent of its nuclear development, including uranium enrichment, which is in violation of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Iran agreed to sign the NPT's Additional Protocol, which grants the IAEA short-notice (snap) inspections of all Iranian nuclear sites.

By September 2004, the IAEA had ordered Iran to stop preparations for large-scale uranium enrichment. Meanwhile, the US called for the UN Security Council to impose sanctions, arguing that Iran’s true intention is to develop nuclear weapons. Iran reported it had resumed large-scale conversion of uranium ore into gas, but in November 2004 agreed to stop the enrichment process and engage in talks with the European Union (EU). The IAEA issued a report on 15 November 2004 that indicated “Iran had failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material had been processed and stored.” Then in April 2005, despite warnings from the European Union that “any resumption of conversion [the first step towards making enriched uranium] would end negotiations linked to trade and economic issues,” Iran announced plans to resume uranium enrichment if unsatisfied with EU proposals for resolving the crisis.

To complicate the situation further, in August 2005 hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became Iran's president, rejected the European proposals (which included a proposal to let Iran develop a civilian nuclear programme if it halted uranium enrichment activities), and pledged an “irreversible resumption of enrichment”. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom requested an emergency IAEA Board meeting, which resulted in a resolution urging Iran to suspend its nuclear fuel cycle activities once again.

Shortly after this, “an independent investigation found no evidence that Iran was working on a secret nuclear weapons programme. It concluded that traces of bomb-grade uranium in Iran’s nuclear facilities came from contaminated Pakistani equipment, not Iranian activities.” The US government dismissed the report.

Fast forward to 31 July 2006, when the Security Council passed Resolution 1696, demanding Iran suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities by August 31 or face economic and diplomatic sanctions. It also called on Iran to take the other confidence-building measures from the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors' Resolution (GOV/2006/14). The resolution takes action under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and calls on all states to prevent the transfer of any nuclear or missile-related items, materials, goods or technology to Iran. The resolution passed 14 to 1, with Qatar as the sole vote against.

Then on 23 December 2006, the Security Council passed Resolution 1737, imposing sanctions on Iran for failing to halt uranium enrichment.  The United States and Australia issued an explanation of vote.  The Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned the adoption of the resolution, and President Ahmadinejad vowed to continue with Iran’s enrichment programme.

Since then, the IAEA Director-General released a series of reports attempting to resolve outstanding issues but confirming that Iran has not diverted any of its nuclear material to weapons purposes. At the same time, the UN Security Council has continued passing resolutions calling on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment work. See the Government, UN, and IAEA documents section for details.

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