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Article VI

The United States is pleased to offer information on its policies and actions that contribute to the goals of Article VI. We believe that regular exchanges of information among NPT parties during the review process are a useful means to facilitate our discussions. This paper addresses both ongoing actions and offers clarification on certain issues.

A. U.S. COMMITMENT TO ARTICLE VI

1. The Moscow Treaty

On May 24, 2002, President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin signed the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Under this Treaty, the United States and Russia will reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to a level of 1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012. The United States Senate unanimously approved the Treaty on March 6, 2003.

The Moscow Treaty will require a two-thirds decrease in both countries' strategic nuclear warheads by 2012. This decrease will bring their nuclear arsenals to the lowest levels in decades.

In the U.S.-Russian Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, agreed upon at the same time as the Moscow Treaty, the United States and Russia agreed to "seek broad international support for a strategy of proactive non-proliferation, including by implementing and bolstering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ..." The Moscow Treaty represents an important contribution toward this goal.

Following the successful completion in 2001 of reductions under START from over 10,000 deployed strategic warheads to under 6,000, the Moscow Treaty represents another major step in U.S. fulfillment of its NPT Article VI obligations. In two decades, the United States and Russia will have eliminated or decommissioned more than three-quarters of their strategic nuclear warheads. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 57/68 of November 22, 2002, recognized that the agreed strategic reductions in the Moscow Treaty advance the NPT commitment of the United States and Russia.

The Moscow Treaty reflects a new era and a strengthened U.S.- Russian strategic partnership. Because of this partnership, it was not necessary to incorporate hundreds of

By any measure, this Treaty is a meaningful accomplishment. It does not require the destruction of nuclear warheads; but no arms control treaty has ever done that. Some warheads removed from operational service will be stored in active status, others will be stored but disabled and not available for quick redeployment, and some will be designated for retirement and dismantling.

The absence of treaty constraints on warhead disposition allows the United States and Russia to proceed with warhead elimination in a manner that is unhindered by artificial requirements. The Moscow Treaty's flexibility regarding warhead disposition recognizes that the United States and Russia have fundamentally different stockpile maintenance practices. Key to the difference is that Russia continues to produce new warheads while the United States currently has no capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons.

The Treaty does not preclude the redeployment of strategic warheads removed from operational service. However, the United States has no plans to do so. It does not seek to rearm. Barring unforeseen changes in the global security environment, there is no reason we would want to reverse these reductions. Still, there is a nuclear safety and reliability reason to maintain the right to redeploy. The United States has not manufactured a new nuclear weapon in more than a decade. If an operationally deployed warhead is found to be unsafe or unreliable, we must have the ability to replace it.

We have already begun reductions under the Moscow Treaty. Our 50 Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming are being retired. All 50 missiles should be deactivated within two years. As part of this process, the missiles will be disassembled. Two of a planned four Trident submarines have been removed from strategic service, with the next two scheduled for removal by October 2004. The entire B-1 bomber force is dedicated to conventional missions, and is no longer considered nuclear-capable.

These actions will leave the United States with approximately 1,100 fewer warheads in operationally deployed status by late 2007 than in May 2002. After 2007, we plan to reduce further by decreasing the number of warheads on ballistic missiles and reducing the number of operationally deployed weapons at heavy bomber bases. These plans will evolve over time.

fuel sources. The United States will assist in this replacement effort. Moreover, unprecedented monitoring activities have begun under the PPRA to provide confidence that Russia will not use any weapon-grade plutonium produced after 1994 in nuclear weapons.

The United States and Russia continue cooperation toward disposing of some 700 tons of fissile material declared in excess to defense needs, including material removed from nuclear weapons. Disposing of this highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium will advance critical nonproliferation and threat reduction goals, as well as contribute to the irreversibility of the nuclear arms reduction process.

More than 170 tons of Russian HEU has been converted to non-weapons grade material for use in the United States pursuant to the 1993 U.S.-Russian agreement on the conversion of 500 tons of Russian HEU. This material comes from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons and literally represents a conversion of once deadly weapons-grade material into a form usable in civilian applications. The United States has identified 174 tons of excess U.S. HEU and is unilaterally converting this material to peaceful uses. Thus far, approximately 30 tons have been converted with another 33 tons expected to be converted by 2007.

The conversion of plutonium to a non-weapons usable form is a much more difficult and expensive process. The United States is actively pursuing implementation of the 2000 U.S.-Russian agreement that calls for each side to dispose of 34 tons of weapons plutonium into forms no longer useable in nuclear weapons. Additional excess material can be placed under this agreement by either side as the material becomes available. Among current priorities is to establish financial arrangements and related organizational mechanisms for multilateral support of Russia's disposition program, to allow the U.S. and Russian programs to go forward roughly in parallel.

The vast majority of the 700 tons of excess fissile material is subject to verification or to transparency measures pursuant to U.S.- Russian negotiated arrangements. Both sides have also worked with the IAEA to develop practical measures for IAEA verification of excess material. This 1996 Trilateral Initiative addresses novel techniques for verifying materials still in classified or sensitive forms. It also includes the development of a model verification agreement. The United States, Russia and the IAEA concluded last year that they had fulfilled the initial tasks established under this initiative.

Other recent activities include the removal of HEU fuel from Serbia and the destruction of missiles in Bulgaria. We are also helping some 30 countries to establish effective export controls and border security. These programs offer training and detection and enforcement equipment. Program advisers serve overseas and directly engage foreign officials on these matters.

Since September 11, there has been a new sense of urgency in nonproliferation as nations around the world recognize the huge risk presented by weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists or their state sponsors. Last June at Kananaskis, Canada, President Bush and other G-8 leaders launched the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to address this risk. They pledged to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years for nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety projects, initially in Russia.

Since the June Summit, the G-8 have devoted much time and attention to implement the initiative. We expect significant progress to be reported at the Evian Summit in June 2003. Other countries have been invited to participate through contributions to projects under the scope of the Partnership. Several countries have expressed strong interest and we hope others will do so. The Global Partnership builds upon the decade-long U.S. CTR program.

In the Global Partnership statement, G-8 leaders also endorsed six nonproliferation principles to prevent terrorist access to WMD. Principle six invites states to manage and dispose of excess fissile material, to eliminate chemical weapons, and to minimize stocks of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins. Fulfillment of this principle will help to reduce the threat of terrorist acquisition of these items.

B. INTERACTION

Based on concerns raised by others, we offer the following views on a few issues related to Article VI. We believe this information is responsive to those delegations that commented last year on the need for more interaction among delegations on key questions.

1. Thirteen Steps

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's transmittal letter to the Congress last year for the Nuclear Posture Review makes clear that this "New Triad" will reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons for deterrence through modernization of conventional forces, the addition of missile defenses, and other measures. This approach means that the United States will no longer be as heavily dependent on nuclear forces for deterrence as it was during the Cold War.

This represents a very significant change. It is based on the realization that the Cold War is over and the international security environment is very different than it was before the breakup of the Soviet Union. New threats today, particularly from state sponsors of terrorism, require new approaches. Some of these threats may not be deterred by our traditional Cold War posture -- and thus the need for a new range of capabilities.

The Department of Defense has not identified any requirements for new nuclear weapons. We have not produced a nuclear warhead in over a decade. Certainly, cost and feasibility studies related to possible nuclear modernization are undertaken. Such studies, however, in no way represent a decision to proceed with development of a new warhead.

Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell have stated publicly that there has been no change in U.S. nuclear declaratory policy and that the United States has not lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons use. Indeed, by strengthening non-nuclear forces, specifically in the area of high-accuracy and precision strike, we will be able to hold targets at risk with an advanced conventional system that heretofore required a nuclear weapon. The result is an increase in the threshold for nuclear use. There has been no change in U.S. negative security assurance policy. In addition, the United States does not target any country on a day-to-day basis.

While the United States will not pursue ratification of the CTBT, we continue to support the current moratorium on nuclear testing. The United States has not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992. We also support the establishment of the International Monitoring System for detecting nuclear tests.

Proposals exist to decrease the time that it would take to resume nuclear testing, were that ever to be necessary. But that fact says nothing about the likelihood of a nuclear test. Nor does it relate to the development of a new nuclear weapon.

use, i.e. for conventional and nuclear roles, which makes it very difficult to have confidence that they have been retired from a nuclear role.

The United States is committed, however, to the pursuit of transparency related to NSNW. The issue has been raised with Russia in the bilateral consultative group established at last year's Moscow summit. The NATO-Russia Council is also discussing confidence-building measures related to NSNW.

CONCLUSION

The preamble of the Moscow Treaty notes that the United States and Russia are "mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968." President Bush's signature on this Treaty provides a clear demonstration at the highest level of the commitment of the United States to its Article VI undertakings.

This paper has provided some details of U.S. actions that implement Article VI. Moreover, we have tried to clarify some issues where there is a potential for misunderstanding of U.S. policy. It is clear from the foregoing that the United States is prepared not only to take measures that reduce reliance on its own nuclear weapons, but also to assist others in concrete efforts to move toward Article VI goals. We continue to expend enormous resources and effort to reduce the risk to all nations from weapons of mass destruction. The totality of these efforts represents a solid record of achievement in implementation of Article VI.