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The NPT Under Siege
Speaker: Rhianna Tyson, Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom
Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, and NGO colleagues,
This 2003 Preparatory Committee convenes at a harrowing moment
in history. Disarmament has been used as a pretext to go to war,
resulting in the overthrow of the regime in Iraq. The U.S. and North
Korea find themselves in yet another nuclear confrontation, which
has led to the first withdrawal of a State Party from the NPT. The
CTBT still has not entered into force, and the CD, despite a promising
proposed agenda set forth by Five Ambassadors, remains stagnant.
It is all too obvious that the Nuclear Weapons States have failed
to implement the practical, attainable 13 step nuclear disarmament
plan, agreed to unanimously at the conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review
Conference, in some cases blatantly casting aside or repudiating
its central elements.
The world’s first Nuclear Weapons State, the United States
is leading the backwards charge away from the unequivocal undertaking
to eliminate nuclear weapons. President George W. Bush has declared
that he will not resubmit the CTBT to the U.S. Senate during his
term. And the Bush Administration and House Republicans are calling
for the amount of time it would take to prepare for resumption of
full-scale underground nuclear testing to be cut in half from
36 months to 18 months, or even less. At the same time the U.S.
is actively considering a variety of modified or new nuclear weapons
for potential use in current and projected warfighting scenarios.
While research efforts at the U.S. laboratories are now officially
underway on a “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator,” five
times more powerful than the 15 kiloton atomic bomb that obliterated
Hiroshima[i], the Labs are also studying the effectiveness of so-called
“low yield” nuclear weapons, two-thirds the explosive
power of the Hiroshima bomb that killed over 200,000 people. And
a Bush Administration campaign is underway to repeal current restrictions
on development of even lower yield “mini-nukes,” considered
by some military planners to be “more useable.”
In a stunning repudiation of the principle of irreversibility,
the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory at Los Alamos just last week
announced that it has successfully manufactured the first nuclear
weapons pit (plutonium trigger) in 14 years that meets specifications
for the U.S. stockpile, thus reestablishing a nuclear weapons production
capability that ended in 1989. The newly made pit is for the W88
warhead, a 400 kiloton warhead carried on the Trident II D5 Submarine-Launched
Ballistic Missile, described in the Los Alamos press release as
“a cornerstone of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.”
Contrary to the 2000 NPT promise, the Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty (SORT) signed last year by Presidents Bush and Putin, terminated
the START II and START III arms reduction process instead of preserving
and strengthening their disarmament and verification procedures.
Moreover, SORT does not require the destruction of a single warhead
or delivery system, providing only for cuts in “deployed”
strategic weapons, which could be redeployed at any time. And, unless
it is extended, SORT will expire the same day it enters into force.
This should certainly not set a precedent for future treaties. In
addition, rather than preserving the ABM Treaty, the U.S. has unilaterally
terminated it in order to pursue the provocative folly of building
a Ballistic Missile Defense in its drive towards controlling and
dominating the military use of space.
As for the Step 6 pledge to diminish the role of nuclear weapons
in national security policies, all of the Nuclear Weapons States
continue to maintain a central role for nuclear weapons in their
national security strategies. Of gravest concern, in official policy
documents released at the highest level, the U.S. has lowered the
threshold for use of nuclear weapons by blurring the historical
distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, and by announcing
a policy of preventive self defense inherently contrary to
the United Nations Charter in which it reserves for itself
the right to use nuclear weapons in a preemptive attack on any country
or group it perceives to be seeking nuclear, chemical or biological
weapons capabilities.
What are the implications for the NPT in this precarious context?
Why, thirty- three years after it entered into force, does the threat
of nuclear weapons still haunt our existence? Why is the threat
of nuclear war now greater than at any time since the height of
the Cold War? Thirty- three years of asymmetrical compliance has
created unsustainable pressure on the Treaty, and today it faces
near collapse. If the world community allows the Nuclear Weapons
States to continue demonstrating their contempt for the Treaty,
the NPT will crumble and we will find ourselves in the deadly grip
of a new and uncontrollable global arms race.
IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei has acknowledged this
fundamental disparity in the Treaty regime: “The system of
security we have now is not working properly. You have a limited
number of nuclear weapon states and a nuclear umbrella under NATO,
but most of the other countries are left in the cold. I can understand
that as long as they perceive nuclear deterrence to be attractive,
they will try to emulate those who have it.”
In fact, it must be faced that the means for proliferation are
built into the NPT, most notably through Article IV, a provision
by which Non Nuclear Weapons States are promised assistance with
nuclear power technology and materials that can be converted wholesale
into the capability necessary for the development of nuclear weapons,
simply by withdrawing from the Treaty. The CTBT’s entry-into-force
provision, which requires all states with nuclear reactors to ratify
the Treaty, implicitly acknowledges that nuclear power capabilities
enable countries to develop nuclear weapons.
Many NGOs believe that the NPT tradeoff to provide nuclear power
to Non Nuclear Weapons States must be addressed by setting up a
procedure for members of the NPT to phase out their commitment to
nuclear energy with an obligation to support the establishment of
an International Sustainable Energy Agency to promote the use of
safe, clean, sources of energy that do not provide the means and
materials to make nuclear weapons.
Distinguished delegates;
We must embrace the promise of the NPT, acknowledge its flaws and
work to overcome them. A renewed commitment to the 13 point action
plan as a tool for strengthening the Treaty is one important way
to begin to address its shortcomings. And although some of these
steps may be dead letters, we should not throw up our hands in despair
and throw away this valuable roadmap to nuclear disarmament. For
example, instead of mourning the now defunct ABM Treaty, we must
work even harder to prevent the militarization of space.
This year Cuba joined the NPT, ratified the IAEA safeguards and
additional protocol, and also ratified the Treaty of Tlateloco,
thereby completing the world’s first nuclear weapons free
zone. This accomplishment should be held up as a shining example
for other troubled regions including Northeast Asia, South Asia
and the Middle East.
The vital importance of Step 9 increased transparency by
the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities
and implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI - was reaffirmed
in the Iraqi crisis, by an unexpected source. According to a report
issued by the U.S. White House[ii]
“The world knows what successful cooperative disarmament
looks like. When a county decides to disarm, and to provide to the
world verifiable evidence that it has disarmed, there are three
common elements to its behavior:
- The decision to disarm is made at the highest political level;
- The regime puts in place national initiatives to dismantle weapons
and infrastructure; and
- The regime fully cooperates with international efforts to implement
and verify disarmament; its behavior is transparent, not secretive.”
Distinguished delegates;
Another timely and critical issue that should be discussed at this
meeting is the codification of Negative Security Assurances (NSAs).
Potentially disastrous consequences, such as the DPRK’s withdrawal
from the NPT, could be avoided through the adoption of a legal framework
for NSAs, as Non Nuclear Weapons States are being increasingly threatened
with the possibility of nuclear attack by the United States in its
Nuclear Posture Review and White House policy documents.
The crisis the world finds itself in today has brought the issue
of nuclear disarmament to the fore of international relations, domestic
political discourse, and grassroots mobilization. The renewed prominence
of disarmament should in and of itself be viewed as an irreversible
phenomenon, and as representatives of governments, you must capitalize
on this moment. With disarmament being discussed at kitchen tables
around the world, it is imperative that we highlight the urgency,
necessity, and demand for the universal elimination of nuclear weapons.
In light of the current assault on the very foundations of the
NPT, bold new strategies are required. We urge you to enroll your
governments to support Secretary General Kofi Annan’s Millenium
Conference call, issued just before the 2000 NPT Review Conference,
to hold a special global conference to eliminate nuclear dangers.
Annan said:
“This month’s review conference on the Non Proliferation
treaty [April 2000] is likely to be a depressing affair unless there
are clear signals that all parties, including the nuclear weapons
states, are ready for a real effort. I am suggesting that a broader
based international conference, to identify ways of eliminating
nuclear dangers of all kinds, should now be seriously considered.”
Annan’s proposal is worthy of global support. It would enable
a meeting with all states, including non parties to the NPT. Billed
as a conference to “eliminate nuclear dangers of all kinds,”
it would be an opportunity to address the flawed NPT promise to
make civilian nuclear technology available to non nuclear weapons
states in effect, handing over the keys to the bomb factory,
as we have seen with India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Most
importantly, the negotiation of a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons
can be placed on the special conference agenda.
Distinguished delegates;
The world’s people have been begging to be rid of these genocidal,
ecocidal, and suicidal nuclear weapons for more than fifty years.
The NPT has more member states than any other arms limitation agreement,
a testament to the Treaty’s significance. Although some Non
Nuclear Weapons States seem to be working towards proliferation,
those which desire nuclear disarmament are the vast majority. The
moral high ground is yours for the taking: together, you must reiterate
your pledge never to use these weapons, never to unleash the indiscriminate,
unimaginable horrors of nuclear explosions on any people. You must
stand up and refuse to be threatened with such atrocity. Any state
that believes in the viability and justification for such use can
be isolated, if the majority of you, together with the burgeoning
new global peace movement, can muster the common political will
to do so.
You have the power. The time is now.
Convened by:
Rhianna Tyson, Reaching Critical Will
Alice Slater, GRACE, Abolition 2000
Jacqueline Cabasso, Western States Legal Foundation
[i] Walter Pincus, “Pentagon
Pursues Nuclear Earth Penetrator,” The Washington Post, March
7, 2003. As reported last week, federal officials have signed documents
to launch a preliminary design contest between the Lawrence Livermore
and Los Alamos National Laboratories. “The weapon known
as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator would be a full-power
hydrogen bomb that would throw up enormous clouds of radioactive
dust while wreaking large-scale damage and death if used in an urban
area.” Dan Stober, “Nuclear ‘bunker busters’
sought; Move Signals Big Shift in U.S. Weapon Strategy,” San
Jose Mercury News, April 23, 2003.
[ii] “What Does Disarmament Look Like?” The White
House, January 2003
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
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