The DPRK Withdrawal from the NPT and a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

Speaker: Hiro Umebayashi, Peace Depot

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Delegates and Friends,

It is painfully regrettable that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) has apparently left the NPT system. This marks the first time in the NPT's history that a nation has effectively withdrawn from the treaty. The NPT serves as an indispensable foundation for nuclear disarmament as it obliges all parties to "bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects," as was advised by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1996. We sincerely urge the DPRK to reconsider its withdrawal and rejoin human endeavors to achieve a nuclear weapon free world by undertaking steps in compliance with the NPT. At the same time, we also urge the United States to reconsider its current hostile policy toward the DPRK which contributed to the breakdown in the 1994 Agreed Framework. Looking closely at recent developments leading to the DPRK's withdrawal reminds us how fragile an international instrument is unless good faith prevails in the international community.

The DPRK's statement of withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003 reads that the nation's "sovereignty and (its) security are being seriously violated … due to the U.S. vicious hostile policy towards the DPRK," and that, "after the appearance of the Bush administration, the United States listed the DPRK as part of an 'axis of evil', adopting it as a national policy to oppose its system…."

Whether or not one agrees with this statement, it clearly indicates that the NPT is not only relevant to a given nation's nuclear policy, but it is linked to, and a part of, the overall international security context in which a given nation is situated. Let us recall the joint statement between the DPRK and the United States just 15 months before the now famous 'axis of evil' speech of the US President. In that joint communiqué, dated October 12, 2000, the two countries seemed almost euphoric, proclaiming that, "neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity." The only significant public event relative to the US-DPRK situation in those ensuing 15 months was a change in US Administration.

The subsequent deterioration of the US-DPRK relationship must cause us to reaffirm that the very minimum condition for any credible international relationship is that it be based upon the principle of continuity of agreements among sovereign nations unless they agree otherwise. Notwithstanding its withdrawal statement from the NPT, the DPRK has officially committed to remaining a non-nuclear weapon state, at least "at this stage." Despite charges and countercharges, the official policy of the DPRK remains, at this time, that it is not a nuclear weapons state. In the DPRK's statement regarding its withdrawal from the NPT, it reaffirms, "Though we pull out of the NPT, we have no intention to produce nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes." Under such circumstances, while we continue to call for the DPRK to rejoin the NPT, it is all the more urgent in Northeast Asia to establish a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) in order to check any nuclear instability in the region. We should recall that the Tlatelolco Treaty had been ensuring a nuclear free Latin America before Brazil, which was a major regional power with nuclear technology, joined the NPT in 1998. In fact, a NWFZ has much more important implications to the Northeast Asia regional security.

Distinguished Delegates,

I want to remind you that Northeast Asia is a special region where several hundred thousand Japanese and a hundred thousand Koreans were bombed with atomic weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Many of the Korean victims had been forcibly brought to Japan under Japanese colonial rule. Naturally, people in the region know what a nuclear weapon is through witnessing devastated cities and the terrible suffering of survivors and their children for more than 57 years. We have to point out that the emergence of nuclear proliferation in this region, with its unique nuclear history, would lead us to conclude that the security policies and practices in the region have been completely unsuccessful. In spite of the history of atomic-bombing, governments have failed to establish a regional norm which embraces the fundamental inhumanity of nuclear weapons. Rather, they are threatening one another with those very weapons. In this respect, as a citizen of Japan, I cannot but refer to the responsibility of my own government.

How can the people of Japan explain to the people of the world the reason for Japan's dependence on the US nuclear weapons' umbrella in spite of its knowledge of the human consequences in Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Is Japan trying to ensure its own security by threatening Pyongyang with the prospect of its becoming another Hiroshima or Nagasaki? The most salient message by hibakusha, the atomic-bomb survivors, has been "No More Hibakusha." We welcome the UNGA resolution initiated by Japan, entitled "A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons." We also agree that we need a step-by-step approach to their total elimination.

Then, I do wish that the Government of Japan would demonstrate how Japan is going to get rid of the US nuclear deterrent from its security policy, consistent with one of the 13 steps to which Japan committed in the 2000 NPT Review Conference: "A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination." We believe that a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) can be a genuine step to this goal.

Distinguished Delegates,

The current regional security structure in Northeast Asia is quite simple. The nations are divided into two blocs depending on whether or not they are allied militarily with an outside superpower, the United States. The forward presence of 100,000 US forces in the region has always been a key factor in the security equation of the region. It has forced any security consideration to be addressed in military terms from the very outset. The most recent example is the missile and missile defense escalation in this region caused by the US missile defense program. We have to renounce and overcome such practices of the culture of arms that are in contradiction to the culture of peace. People and governments in the region have to return to the fundamental principle that it is the people of the region who are responsible for building peace through their own cooperative mechanisms. A NEA-NWFZ can be a viable step in this direction. We propose a realistic scenario for a NEA-NWFZ that is based upon already declared policies of the states concerned. It involves three non-nuclear weapon states, namely the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), the DPRK and Japan, as core constituents, and three nuclear weapon states, namely China, Russia and the US, as supporting constituents. Such a three-plus-three arrangement can be built upon the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between the two Koreas and the long-standing three non-nuclear principles of Japan. According to these policies, the three states would agree to provisions of a NWFZ to refrain from testing, manufacture, possession and deployment of nuclear weapons within the Zone. It is essential to involve the three states in a single verification scheme stipulated by the NEA-NWFZ treaty because people in both North and South Koreas would be cautious about the Peninsula's denuclearization in the face of Japan's huge plutonium stockpile. In this respect, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula will have to be bolstered by extending its scope to a regional arrangement and incorporating Japan into a single system. In the three-plus-three scenario, the three nuclear weapon states would be requested to provide legally binding security assurances against using or threatening to use nuclear weapons in the NWFZ. Such assurance is not contrary to the declared policies of these states, including those of UNSC resolution 984 in 1995. China has a more stringent policy of 'unconditional assurance' in this respect. Also it is to be recalled that Ambassador Norman Wulf, Head of US Delegation to the NPT PrepCom in 1998, as well as in 2002, strongly argued for security assurances in 1998, saying "We believe that a regional approach involving nuclear weapon free zones offers the best opportunity to make progress in this area (of legally binding Negative Security Assurances)." In addition, the United States signed the 1994 Agreed Framework that includes a provision that, "The US will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US," on the condition that other provisions of the Framework are fulfilled. The Agreed Framework proves to be irrelevant at this moment, but such a recent precedent is significant because it indicates that the US is prepared to commit to such security assurances to the DPRK under certain conditions. It is also to be noted that legally binding security assurances by China and Russia would relieve Japan of alleged nuclear threats and thus, of its dependence upon the US nuclear deterrent.

Distinguished Delegates,

Two years after the historic inter-Korean summit of June 2000, when the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula was reconfirmed, another historic summit took place in the region. In September 2002, Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan, and Kim Jong-Il, Chairman of the DPRK National Defense Commission, signed the Pyongyang Declaration. In this declaration, "(Both sides) shared the recognition that it is important to have a framework in place in order for these regional countries to promote confidence-building..." We believe the negotiation of a NEA-NWFZ among these three states can be a realistic step to consolidate the foundation that was forged by these recent summit talks. In conclusion, I will close my presentation with the following recommendations to this Preparatory Committee,

1) to encourage the Northeast Asian states, the ROK, the DPRK and Japan, to initiate talks to establish a NWFZ with provisions for legally binding security assurances by nuclear weapon states, as a means to resolve regional security issues, including nuclear problems, while at the same time, encouraging the DPRK to rejoin the NPT, and

2) to call upon ASEAN leaders to make best use of the upcoming ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the sole Asia-Pacific regional multilateral forum devoted exclusively to security issues, to be held in Cambodia on June 18, in order that it may play a mediating role to advance constructive talks among Northeast Asian states and other concerned states including China, Russia and the United States, which are all member states of the ARF. 3) To call upon the United States to abandon its dangerous nuclear policy that targets certain designated states, including North Korea, with preemptive nuclear strikes. It is posing a great threat to international peace and security by increasing unnecessary tensions and suspicions as well as undermining security assurances given under NPT.

Thank you for your attention.

Convenor: Hiro Umebayashi, Peace Depot

777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
This site was created by Kache Productions ©2008