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"A Phoenix of Hope"
Front page article from the News in Review,
the daily NGO newsletter from the Seventh Review Conference of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Final Edition, 2005
The full PDF of this edition of
the News in Review can be found here.
F. Scott Fitzgerald once wrote, “The test of
a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas
in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.
One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless
and yet be determined to make them otherwise.”
After a month of the deplorable diplomacy, lack of leadership and
dominance of narrow national interests that crippled the Seventh
Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is
more difficult than ever to heed Fitzgerald’s advice. But,
as UNIDIR Director Patricia Lewis so eloquently stated, “It
is imperative that we remain optimistic. In times of despair, it
is easier to become cynical... but it is hope that will get us through
to the next stage, when the political climate is a bit more conducive
to progress on the disarmament and nonproliferation front.”
It will not be easy to retain our hope. The failure of this Review
Conference has shaken the world’s faith in the Treaty to an
unprecedented degree. The promise of the 1995 indefinite extension-
that of “permanence with accountability”- now seems
hollow. Many are wondering how, during such a crisis of nuclear
proliferation and a growing threat of actual use of nuclear weapons,
the Review Conference of the NPT could have failed.
And fail it did. While a few pieces of paper labeled “Final
Document” were produced and agreed upon, this document does
not contain an iota of substantive recommendations or actions to
strengthen the global disarmament and nonproliferation regime.
It failed due to the intransigence of a few States, which effectively
sabotaged the Conference and allowed it to be bogged down in procedural
quibbles. These States, namely Iran, Egypt and the United States,
allowed the Conference to fail- or perhaps, more accurately, willed
it to fail- precisely because they have lost their faith in the
Treaty to ensure their own security.
Let’s look at the Treaty for a minute, and remember why States
subscribe to it. The US favors the NPT because it is a legal instrument
to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by those which do
not already possess them. Egypt remains a party to it based on the
belief that it constitutes a norm by which it will be possible to
reign Israel in to the nonproliferation family, thus freeing the
Middle East from the nuclear weapons that currently plague it. Iran’s
reasons are probably similar to that of Egypt’s, though they
also hope to use the NPT as a way by which to obtain security assurances
against the use of nuclear weapons.
Under the NPT, as under any effective global mechanism, States
receive benefits and achieve certain objectives in exchange for
certain behaviors. All States, then, are accountable to others for
their actions. With such lamentable erosion of the Treaty, some
States are now thinking that they can achieve their same objectives
through other means, which may lack any of the accountability of
a multilateral treaty.
The US has been working hard these past few years to set up a system
of unverifiable, non-universal, plurilateral agreements and frameworks
which help to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, including the
Proliferation Security Initiative, Security Council resolution 1540,
and the G8 Partnership, among others. These initiatives may prove
themselves to be very effective tools in curbing the spread of nuclear
weapons- and all without the promise of nuclear disarmament in return.
Ten years after the 1995 Review Conference’s package of decisions
and resolution on the Middle East, Israel remains outside of the
NPT family, its nuclear weapons continually threatening its neighbors
in the region. Egypt sees no reason why it should accept stricter
controls on its nuclear energy program while the nuclear facilities
of Israel remain unchecked and unsafeguarded.
For Iran, it has been clear that the US- and the other Nuclear
Weapon States, for that matter- have no intention of providing binding
security assurances to the Non-Nuclear Weapon States parties to
the Treaty. The denial of Iran’s objectives are thus prompting
it to seek security elsewhere- perhaps through acquisition of its
own nuclear weapons, which the Nuclear Weapon States themselves
revere as the ultimate source of security.
The vast majority of States, however, still believe that the NPT
provides the best road to security. With over 50 working papers
put forth at this Conference, there are many issues which do enjoy
widespread support. The near-consensus in so many areas only exacerbates
the anger and resentment over the time, resources and opportunity
wasted at this Conference. Some States parties, including Malaysia,
Chile and New Zealand, utilized the last day of the Conference to
express their outrage and disappointment with the failed Conference.
Canada’s Ambassador Meyer, usually a perfect reflection of
Canada’s patient, bridge-building role, did not attempt to
hide his personal outrage and frustration in delivering Canada’s
closing statement, in which he summed up the failure of the Conference
thus: “We have let the pursuit of short-term, parochial interests
override the collective long-term interest in sustaining this Treaty’s
authority and integrity. We have seen precious time that might have
been devoted to exchanges on substance and the development of common
ground squandered by procedural brinkmanship… We have been
hampered, frankly, by a lack of imagination and will to break with
the status quo and adopt new ways of conducting our business.”
(see, “A Treaty Worth Fighting For,” page 10.)
The General Assembly (GA) Hall was dead silent as Iran prattled
off a list of eight examples demonstrating “the abysmal record,
achieved unilaterally by the United States in the short span of
five years (that) testifies to a mentality which seeks solutions
solely through demonstration of power.” The failure of the
Review Conference, said Iran, was clearly the fault of the US, which,
they insisted, “tried to create smokescreens in this Conference
to deflect attention from its abysmal record.”
(The US, interestingly enough, did not exercise its right of reply
in response to the Iranian statement. Failure to reply to such harsh
criticism is an unusual choice by a government at the United Nations,
especially when it allows such a statement to constitute the last
substantive words of a high-profile Conference.)
With each stalled day, the prospects of an effective outcome grew
more and more dim. NGOs struggled to retain their hope in the sea
of disappointment. On the penultimate day, refusing to be bogged
down in the cynicism and despair of this Conference, some NGOs had
decided to present to the delegates, as they entered the GA hall
to close the Conference, with a giant sunflower each, a symbolic
reminder of the global desire and will for nuclear abolition. (Due
to the security set-up of the GA, NGOs were prevented from actually
handing them to the delegates, and so we were left holding these
symbols of disarmament themselves. See “Sunflowers Instead
of Missiles”, page 11.)
Unfortunately, the UN Security decided there was no room in the
GA for such symbolic optimism. A squad of security guards burst
into the observer gallery, marching up and down the rows, and literally
ripped the sunflowers out of the hands, laps and briefcases of the
NGO representatives.
You can take the sunflowers out of the peace activists’ hands,
but you can’t wipe out all the seeds of hope that these flowers
symbolize. As Ambassador Meyer said, “If there is a silver
lining in the otherwise dark cloud of this Review Conference, it
lies in the hope that our leaders and citizens will be so concerned
by its failure that they mobilize behind prompt remedial action.”
NGOs and their governmental partners are wasting no time in strategizing
creative ways to tackle the core challenges of the nonproliferation
and disarmament regime. At an Abolition 2000 press conference on
May 26, Alyn Ware, the Coordinator of the Parliamentary Network
for Nuclear Disarmament, asserted that, “negotiations should
happen through the NPT or through the Conference on Disarmament.
They’re not. So now we’re consulting with governments
to look at alternative paths…” He continued to discuss
some of the successes of “alternative” processes, including
the 1996 International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion,
the strengthening of existing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and the
creation of new ones, and the slew of GA resolutions which consistently
call for the implementation of disarmament obligations through the
negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.
“We’re not giving up just because of the lack of progress
through the NPT,” Ware said. “We believe nuclear disarmament
is a political, moral and legal responsibility- and a practical
possibility- and we’re going to make sure that happens.”
As we watch the cinders of the failed NPT Review Conference smolder
out, a new hope is festering. Out of its ashes will rise a renewed
plan for eliminating the nuclear threat, propelled by the raw tenacity
and moral urgency of civil society. Even as the men with guns rip
the flowers from our hands, or as the men in suits push us, through
their inaction, ever more closer to the edge of annihilation, the
majority of the world’s people will continue the fight for
freedom from fear, inching all the more closer to reaching a critical
mass of political will for nuclear disarmament.
- Rhianna Tyson, WILPF
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
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