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"The Substantive Issue"
Front page article from the News in
Review, the daily NGO newsletter from the Preparatory Committee
for the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty
Tuesday, 8 May 2007
For the full edition of the News in Review,
click here.
It is past time for governments to get on with it. To set
a positive example, we are publishing our preliminary substantive
analysis of interesting working papers here*. Discussion is
arranged by theme throughout the issue, and interspersed with
articles. For those concerned about the status of procedural
wrangling, please see NIR issue 5, “Today's Menu”,
as those options and positions have largely remained the same.
In the two five-minute-long sessions today, there was no agreement
on the new South African proposal from Friday afternoon (see
NIR issue 6, “Actively Waiting”). We hope governments
are arriving this morning ready, willing, and able to do what
we are doing now.
*We have only included analysis of working papers that have
either been distributed by the secretariat or handed directly
to us.
Nuclear Disarmament
To date, three working papers address nuclear disarmament
in-depth: the New Agenda Coalition's working paper (NPT/ CONF.2010/
PC.I/WP.15), the Non-Aligned Movement's “Nuclear Disarmament”
working paper (WP.8), and Japan's “comprehensive”
working paper. The New Agenda Coalition, which brought us
the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament in 2000,
also lays out the task for this review cycle: “to identify
and address particular aspects on which incremental progress
is necessary, and should be made, with a view to advancing
towards the objective of a nuclear weapon free world.”
The NAC insists that transparency, verification and irreversibility
be applied to all disarmament measures. Japan and the NAM
call for irreversibility and increased transparency in nuclear
weapons reductions and disarmament.
All three working papers recognize the importance of the
2000 Review Conference's disarmament measures, which the NAC
says set out “the agreed process for systematic and
progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament.” Even
though nuclear weapon states might not like the commitments
they made in 2000, trying to ignore them undermines all future
work to implement the Treaty’s disarmament and non-proliferation
objectives. For if states cannot trust that the agreements
they make today will be upheld tomorrow, then one wonders
what we are all doing here. Japan calls for governments “to
faithfully make progress in implementing” the 2000 disarmament
measures, while the NAC calls their implementation “imperative.”
The NAM reiterated its call for “a full implementation
of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon
States at the 2000 Review Conference.” The NAM further
specifies that this “should be demonstrated without
delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through
the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance
systematically and progressively towards a nuclear weapon
free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference.”
Japan and the NAC both call for the nuclear weapon states
to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon. The NAC
says nuclear weapon states must “remove the launch-on-warning
option from their security doctrines by agreeing on reciprocal
steps to take their nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert.”
We agree that although this is no substitute for irreversible
disarmament, it would certainly help us breathe a bit easier
in the short term.
All three working papers also discuss nuclear doctrines and
threshold for use. The NAC says states “must not adopt
doctrines or systems that blur the distinction between nuclear
and conventional weapons, or lower the nuclear threshold.”
Japan says “[t]he threshold for use of nuclear weapons
must be kept as high as possible.” Japan also reaffirmed
“the necessity of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons
in security policies”, while the NAM says that “lack
of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in
security policies further undermine[s] disarmament commitments.”
Nuclear doctrines are central to nuclear disarmament. Nuclear
weapon states should implement the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission’s recommendation to begin planning for security
without nuclear weapons.
The NAM and the NAC also criticize the development of new
nuclear weapons. According to the NAC, “[s]tates should
not develop new nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons with new
military capabilities or for new missions, or the replacement
or modernization of their nuclear-weapon systems.” All
the nuclear weapon states are currently developing new nuclear
weapons and/or systems, or modernizing current systems. Some
are doing so faster and more comprehensively than others.
The NAC calls on the US and Russia “to show leadership
in the nuclear disarmament process by extending START, upgrading
SORT to include verification and negotiating further reductions
including destruction of warheads and to include tactical
nuclear weapons in future negotiations.” Japan encourages
the US and Russia to “fully implement” SORT “and
to undertake nuclear weapons reductions beyond those provided
for by the Treaty.” The NAM notes that reductions in
deployments cannot replace irreversible cuts and the total
elimination of nuclear weapons. Japan also encourages the
other nuclear weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals,
without waiting for the US and Russia.
Costa Rica submitted a working paper containing a model nuclear
weapons convention, discussed in another article. The NAC
notes that “a nuclear weapon free world will ultimately
require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally
negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing
mutually reinforcing sets of instruments.” The NAM reiterates
its call for “[t]he negotiation of a phased programme
for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified
time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention.”
Institution Building
Contrary to the seventh Review Cycle of the NPT, few working
papers have been distributed thus far that relate to strengthening
the institutional capacity for the NPT. Perhaps in the fifteen
or so additional working papers that have been submitted but
not yet distributed, these issues will be raised more significantly.
In the papers that have been circulated, there have been a
number of references to better reporting (as called for in
Step 12 of the 13 Practical Steps agreed in the 2000 Final
Document), the Conference on Disarmament, and significant
institutional suggestions in the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention.
The Non Aligned Movement (NAM) paper on “procedural
and other arrangements” (NPT/CONF.2010/ PC.I/WP.6) recommends
that the current policies and intentions of the nuclear weapons
states should be included in addition to the "specific
and complete" reporting on issues and principles called
for in the 13 steps. Japan's comprehensive working paper also
calls for States parties to submit reports on their disarmament
obligations that are "as detailed as possible".
Egypt's working paper (WP.14) also suggests that states develop
reporting mechanisms "in accordance with guidelines to
be agreed between member states" that would allow "effective
scrutiny of measures taken by each state to secure its full
compliance with all treaty articles and steps taken by each
to achieve treaty universality". Japan's comprehensive
working paper also calls for more detailed reports by states
parties.
The NAM also suggests that new institutions of the Treaty
would further strengthen or enhance the review process, though
they do not detail what these new institutions could or should
be. It is possible that they are referring to the Canada's
2005 review cycle proposal on creating a standing body for
the NPT (NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.1).
In the working paper submitted by Costa Rica on a Model Nuclear
Weapons Convention (WP.17), there are numerous references
to building relevant and needed institutions during the process
of agreeing to either a nuclear weapons or a framework convention,
either in a single convention or a package of agreements.
The MNWC envisages an agency, comprised of a Conference of
States Parties, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat.
The responsibilities would include verification, ensuring
compliance, and decision-making. The working paper also includes
suggestions on financing such an agency, as well as processes
related to dispute settlement that incorporate the International
Court of Justice.
As noted by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, the
NPT has the weakest institutional capacity for implementation
of all the disarmament treaties, even though it is the most
important. Governments need to strengthen this capacity during
this review cycle.
- The Reaching Critical Will Team
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
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