News in Brief from the News in Review, the daily NGO newsletter from the second session of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
Monday, 5 May 2008

Complete PDF of this edition.

Summary of the Interactive Discussion on Cluster 1 Issues:

• Germany initiated an interactive discussion, clarifying misunderstanding on its proposed “New Implementation Baseline,” which it described as a brainstorming paper.
• New Zealand commended Germany and its paper, and affirmed that changes in the security environment since 2000 have not detracted from the pertinence of the 1995 and 2000 outcomes.
• South Africa spoke on a number of themes from the perspective of the global south, including: advocated for the issue of military expenditures and development to become part of the discussion; called for Europe to begin its own process toward establishing a NWFZ, in light of European states’ calls for such zones elsewhere; and challenged developed states to demonstrate where developing states were failing to implement non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, in light of some states holding disarmament hostage to further “progress” on non-proliferation.
• Iran demanded a report from the NWS on measures it has taken to implement the 13 steps.
• Norway expressed appreciation for South Africa’s comments, but nonetheless stated there was room for improvement in the non-proliferation regime. Norway advocated for progress to be made in all three pillars of the Treaty independently with linkages, instead of matching progress step for step.
• Japan emphasized the importance of prioritizing disarmament education.
• Germany agreed with Japan on education, adding that education should encompass more than just youth. Germany also noted its interaction with youth attending the PrepCom and stated delegates needed pressure from youth to improve global security.

Highlights from the Discussion on Nuclear Disarmament and Security Assurances:

Nuclear Disarmament

• New Zealand countered the US argument that the security environment is not appropriate for disarmament, stating we don’t have 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world due to NWS concern about proliferation in NNWS, but because of concern of NWS with NWS. New Zealand also asked the NWS to address specific questions regarding use doctrines and safety in the context of operational readiness. Although the chair encouraged the NWS to address the questions, none responded.
• Egypt also argued against the position that disarmament requires an “appropriate security environment,” contingent upon implementation of an open-ended list of non-proliferation goals and compliance with the other provisions of the Treaty.

Security Assurances

• Seven delegations, including the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), reiterated calls for conclusion of a NPT protocol granting legally-binding security assurances. The NAM called for establishment of a subsidiary body to negotiate such a protocol. In this context
• South Africa highlighted a 2003 New Agenda Coalition working paper on the issue and New Zealand referred to a draft protocol it had prepared during the past review cycle.
• The nuclear weapons states differed on the matter of security assurances: Russia said it supported discussion only in the context of the CD; China said it would consider a protocol to the NPT.
• Iran called for decision on a protocol declaring threat or use of nuclear weapons illegal and granting negative security assurances.

Transparency

• Japan outlined proposed categories that the NWS should report on toward implementation of Article VI: aggregate number of warheads; plans for reductions and dismantling; years in which fissile material production ceased; and the amount of fissile material declared excess of military stocks.
• New Zealand said transparency should play a role in this review process, affirming the importance of Canada’s proposal for a standardized reporting mechanism and acknowledging Japan’s proposed reporting categories.
• Mexico called for a legally-binding mechanism for transparency and accountability that would include requirements for NWS to report on their holdings and future plans.
• Canada called for reporting on operational status of nuclear weapons.

Highlights from the Cluster 2 Discussion:

Iran’s nuclear program

• Four delegations, including the European Union, called on Iran to comply with the decisions of the UN Security Council.
• China called for a peaceful settlement through negotiation.
• France and Australia stated Iran’s fuel cycle programs have no legitimate civilian applications.

Syria’s alleged secret reactor program

• Australia stated the United States has provided evidence that North Korea had provided Syria with assistance in constructing a clandestine nuclear reactor. Australia urged Syria to cooperate with the IAEA in its investigation.
• Without direct reference to Syria, the European Union (EU) expressed concern over reports of clandestine reactor program and called on the IAEA to investigate.
• In a right of reply, Syria said the accusations were manufactured to create further tension. Syria reminded delegates of Australia's role in the invasion of Iraq and accused the invaders of committing crimes against humanity through the use of depleted uranium and white phosphorus weapons. Syria criticized its accusers for failing to also mention Israel and urged others not to follow the path of the “mad” US regime.
• In a response to Syria, Iraq called for delegates to refrain from equating the situation leading to Iraq with the Syrian issues, noting that “everyone is aware” of the record of the previous Iraqi regime on WMD and other issues.

Article III: Strengthening Safeguards

• Four delegations, including the EU, called for the Additional Protocol to become the standard of compliance or a condition of supply.
• Australia called for NPT parties to unequivocally declare that the Additional Protocol is now the verification standard required under Article III.1.
• The NAM stated it is fundamental to make distinctions between voluntary and mandatory measures, and to not impose voluntary measures, in response to calls for the Additional Protocol to become the verification standard.
• Egypt reiterated its opposition to reinterpretation of Article IV and imposition of heightened safeguard standards and conditions of supply.

Article III: Compliance Procedures

• Canada stated the IAEA must continue to have recourse to the UN Security Council to reinforce the integrity and credibility of the NPT.
• The NAM suggested a number of guidelines to ensure that the IAEA remains technical, non-political and impartial, such as requiring non-compliance to be reported first from agency inspectors.

Article IV: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

• Russia said there was a need for an alternative to provision of sensitive nuclear technologies and a mechanism for the supply of nuclear fuel. It defended its international uranium enrichment center as consistent with Article IV.
• France expressed support for a criteria-based approach to the supply of nuclear technology and material.

Article X: Withdrawal from the Treaty

• France said any state that withdraws from the NPT should dismantle or return any third party equipment acquired while party to the treaty. It referred delegates to the EU working paper on the issue.

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