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Discussions on Article X and institutional
reform:
Crisis of confidence or ripe
for consensus?
Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will and Michael Spies,
Arms Control Reporter
Front page article from the News in Review,
the daily NGO newsletter from the second session of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference
Thursday, 8 May 2008
Complete PDF of this
edition.
On Wednesday morning, the US delegation said that instead
of debating all Treaty-related issues, NPT states parties
should focus on “developing consensus in those key areas
that seem 'ripe' enough to offer the prospect of agreement
in 2010.”
This begs the question, what areas are ripe for agreement?
In his statement, Dr. Christopher Ford argued that one of
the “ripe” areas relates to the issue of deterring
and responding to withdrawal from the NPT, specifically by
Treaty violators—in particular, holding Treaty violators
accountable for their violations even after they have withdrawn
from the Treaty. Dr. Ford indicated his delegation has been
in consultation with others “about how best to articulate
some general principles in this regard,” but he did
not provide a sense of how much “consensus” on
this issue his delegation has found or been able to generate.
Based on Wednesday's statements and the interactive discussion
related to Treaty withdrawal, there does not appear to be
much consensus on this issue at all. There was, for example,
concern about who would assess a party's non-compliance: South
Africa's representative emphasized that violators should be
identified by an objective body, not unilaterally by other
states parties. There were also major disagreements about
appropriate responses to withdrawal. Many states argued that
any nuclear equipment, material, and facilities that a withdrawn
state has imported or acquired while party to the NPT would
have to be returned to the supplier state or “neutralized”.
During the interactive discussion, Indonesia's representative
asked who would make that decision and how would it be made—we
also ask, how would it be operationalized?
Several delegations indicated that the UN Security Council
should convene to consider any withdrawal from the NPT and
that it should, as Australia's delegate said, “respond
appropriately in accordance with the UN Charter.” However,
Indonesia's delegation identified two problems with this approach,
arguing in its official statement that the decision-making
dynamic in the UNSC, “which is limited in membership
and consists of permanent members who have veto rights,”
would result in a biased response. In an interactive response,
the Indonesian delegation further argued that withdrawal from
the NPT would not necessarily constitute a threat to international
peace and security—the decision to withdraw could be
taken for a variety of reasons, including because the state
party has assessed that the Treaty is no longer beneficial
to their interests. The speaker suggested that arrangements
such as the US-India nuclear deal, from which a non-NPT state
party would receive more benefits than many NPT states parties,
could undermine the NPT's usefulness. Other delegations, including
Indonesia, felt that an emergency meeting of NPT states parties
would be the better way to deal with a case of withdrawal.
Turning to another issue under consideration on Wednesday,
institutional reform of the NPT, again NPT states face a lack
of consensus. Several delegations, including Canada, Switzerland,
and New Zealand, spoke in favour of a standing secretariat
to coordinate and manage the NPT's meetings and processes.
A secretariat would provide consistency throughout review
cycles, as it would be able to focus year round on implementing
the Treaty's provisions, keeping track of, standardizing,
and assessing proposals and reports, and could provide outreach
to member states and increase transparency and balance of
the implementation all three pillars. It could, in essence,
actually become a framework for achieving the objectives of
the NPT.
The US delegation, not surprisingly, insisted that this sort
of NPT institutional reform is not useful, arguing it would
only add more layers of bureaucracy and provide new arenas
for procedural squabbles. Dr. Ford argued that the existing
institutional structures can deal with the problems of the
NPT. However, if an emergency meeting of NPT states parties
was called in response to a withdrawal, who would facilitate
and service it? Would the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs
drop whatever it happened to be working on, pull funds together,
and set up a conference wherever it could find space? In its
argument in favour of a standing secretariat, Canada made
this obvious connection between dealing with the matter of
withdrawal and need for a sufficient institutional structure.
Yet the idea of focusing on specific areas in the hopes of
making small steps toward progress is welcome. Over the last
two weeks, many other delegations have supported the idea
of focusing, with a result-oriented attitude, on issues where
progress might be possible and/or where it is most desperately
needed in order to preserve (or revive) the NPT's credibility.
They have outlined what they see as concrete, pragmatic steps
towards these ends. Unfortunately, there is no apparent consensus
on any of these steps.
Switzerland's Amb. Streuli remarked, it seems that the 2010
Review Conference will have mixed results, as so many states
parties are dissatisfied with the gaps in implementing the
Treaty and conditions are not yet ripe for fundamental changes.
He suggested that in dealing with the issue of withdrawal,
it is important to encourage states parties to remain committed
to the Treaty by taking a more constructive approach to realizing
the objectives of the Treaty. He argued that nuclear weapon
states need to respect their obligations under Article VI
of the Treaty, as it is the crucial motivation for non-nuclear
weapon states to remain committed to the Treaty. During this
PrepCom, virtually every delegation except for the United
States' has emphasized its commitment to all three pillars
of the Treaty. This is one small, concrete, focused step the
United States could take during this review cycle in order
to restore confidence in the NPT.
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