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Looking ahead: Recommendations for the rest of the 2010 review cycle
Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will and Michael Spies,
Arms Control Reporter
Front page article from the News in Review,
the daily NGO newsletter from the second session of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference
Final Edition
Complete PDF of this
edition.
In the final plenary meeting of the PrepCom, Chair Yel’chenko
announced that his factual summary would not be annexed to
the Committee’s report, but would be turned into a working
paper, just as Chair Amano’s summary was last year. This announcement
was followed by the adoption of the report and closing statements,
when several delegations expressed both great appreciation
for Chair Yel’chenko and extreme displeasure with his factual
summary (see the News in Brief on page 3 for details).
While some delegations expressed support for the value of
a chair’s summary, Egypt’s representative suggested the Chair
should have taken a different approach to his paper, arguing
that the PrepCom needed to adopt a report that included substantive
items for discussion and that charted areas of convergence.
He said that the Chair’s draft, which included controversial
items and did not sufficiently identify action-oriented proposals,
represented a lost opportunity to develop a consensus document
upon which the next session of the PrepCom could build.
Over the course of this PrepCom session, several delegations
made substantial, concrete proposals on specific issues related
to strengthening and implementing the Treaty. Some of these
proposals have generated broad interest, momentum, and/ or
convergence, suggesting they are or could be ripe for action
by the 2010 Review Conference. Below, six of these areas are
identified, with recommendations for action provided.
Revitalizing the practical steps to nuclear disarmament
While most delegations welcomed the reductions that four of
the nuclear weapon states have undertaken, most also argued
that reductions are not occurring transparently, irreversibly,
or quickly enough—and many argued that there have been little
or no effective measures related to nuclear disarmament, as
called for in Article VI of the NPT.
The overwhelming majority of delegations argued that the
13 practical steps, unanimously adopted at the 2000 Review
Conference, still constitute the roadmap for implementing
Article VI. Many delegates reiterated the need for the steps
to be recommitted to, reported on, and implemented. Some suggested
the steps could be updated or “refreshed” to reflect the changes
in global security since 2000. Japan’s working paper on nuclear
disarmament, aspects of Germany’s “New NPT Implementation
Baseline,” and France’s “action plan” for nuclear disarmament
all reflect and build upon elements of the 13 steps. Some
delegations expressed interest in the UK’s work with Norway
and VERTIC on multilateral disarmament verification and in
the development of a verifiable post-START arrangement and
more substantial US-Russian bilateral reductions. On 30 April,
Switzerland’s Amb. Streuli suggested that bolder bilateral
reductions along with commitments by all nuclear weapon states
to a moratorium on the development of nuclear weapons would
go a long way. Many delegations called for nuclear weapon
states to reduce the operational status of their nuclear weapons
as an interim step to disarmament. Momentum around this particular
issue was generated at the 2007 UNGA First Committee, where
a resolution on de-alerting received overwhelming support
from UN member states.
Recommended action: The RevCon should seek to establish
a goal-oriented path toward implementation of Article VI,
perhaps through a review of the 13 practical steps that does
not forsake past commitments. To this end, the third session
of the PrepCom should call unambiguously on all states (with
an emphasis on the nuclear weapon states) to report specifically
on their implementation on each of the 13 practical steps
to the 2010 RevCon.
Increasing transparency through reporting
A number of delegations increased their calls for a standardized
reporting mechanism as a means to creating “an environment
more suitable for nuclear disarmament” by raising the level
of transparency, accountability, and trust among NPT states
parties. In WP.26, the New Agenda Coalition highlighted the
need for transparency and confidencebuilding, primarily through
a reporting mechanism for nuclear arsenals, future plans for
downsizing, and the reduction of reliance on nuclear weapons
in national, regional, and collective security doctrines.
On 2 May, Canada and Mexico called for increased official
reporting on these elements as well, and Japan’s WP.10 on
nuclear disarmament includes a non-exhaustive list of possible
categories for reporting. Project Ploughshares published a
report on reporting, Transparency and Accountability, which
both assesses the current level and quality of reporting by
both NWS and NNWS and makes suggestions for developing a standardized
reporting mechanism.
Recommended action: States parties should consider
these suggestions at the next PrepCom session and seek to
adopt a legally-binding reporting mechanism at the RevCon.
Implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East
To some states, establishment of a nuclear weapon free
zone in the Middle East constitutes a fourth pillar of the
NPT. This goal is at the heart of the bargain to extend the
Treaty indefinitely in 1995; it is bound to a related, identified
goal of states parties—achieving the Treaty’s universality;
and it has implications for global security concerns, including
the Middle East peace process.
In WP.20, which appeared to interest even some of the nuclear
weapon states, Egypt presented a non-exhaustive list of concrete
measures aimed at operationalizing the 1995 Middle East resolution.
The paper calls on the 2010 Review Conference to consider:
calling on the NWS to convene a conference of all Middle East
states to conclude a legallybinding and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty establishing a NWFZ in the Middle
East, further inviting the NWS to undertake multilateral and
bilateral consultations to define the modalities of this conference;
calling on all states parties to require as a precondition
that Israel accept IAEA fullscope safeguards and legally-binding
commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons before entering
into supply arrangements; calling on the IAEA to reduce the
level of technical cooperation with Israel until it accedes
to the NPT as a NNWS; further requesting all states parties
take practical measures to bring about Israel’s accession
to the Treaty as a NNWS; issuing a statement of support for
establishment of a Middle East NWFZ within a declared time
frame; and calling on states parties to submit reports to
each Preparatory Committee meeting and Review Conference on
their efforts toward implementation of the 1995 resolution.
Recommended action: These steps should be carefully
considered at the next PrepCom, with a view to establishing
a subsidiary body dealing with specific and substantive proposals
at the 2010 RevCon and seeking consensus on next steps through
informal and formal discussions on the issue at the UNGA and
in other fora.
Establishing a standing NPT secretariat
During this PrepCom, several delegations, including Canada,
Switzerland, and New Zealand, spoke in favour of a standing
secretariat to coordinate and manage the NPT’s meetings and
processes. A secretariat would provide consistency throughout
review cycles: it would be able to focus year round on implementing
the Treaty’s provisions; keeping track of, standardizing,
and assessing proposals and reports; providing outreach to
member states; and increasing transparency and balance of
the implementation all three pillars. It could, in essence,
actually become a framework for achieving the objectives of
the NPT. One delegation insisted that a standing secretariat
would not be useful, but the majority appear willing to consider
an institutional framework for the NPT.
Recommended action: The 2010 Review Conference would
be the perfect time to give the NPT the structural support
it needs and deserves. States parties should use the rest
of this review cycle to discuss and devise a standing NPT
secretariat, recognizing the valuable contribution that the
BWC Implementation Support Unit and the OPCW have played in
implementing those WMD conventions.
Disarmament and non-proliferation education
Nineteen delegations joined Japan this year to emphasize
the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education
as a tool to working toward creating the conditions for a
nuclear weapon free world. They argued that education will
nurture new thinking by both governments and citizens, which
will in turn “empower individuals to make their contribution,
as national and world citizens, to disarmament and non-proliferation.”
In WP.9, Japan elucidated the value of disarmament and non-proliferation
in the NPT context and suggested that the recommendations
in UN Secretary-General report A/57/124 on how to promote
disarmament and nonproliferation education should be reaffirmed
and followed. In order to implement the recommendations, the
paper suggests that efforts on education in the NPT context
should include “deepening discussions among security and disarmament
experts on the security benefits of and challenges to the
NPT regime, and providing knowledge on these issues to the
public.” It recommends that experiences in education efforts
should be shared among member states, international organizations,
and civil society.
Recommended action: This review cycle should emphasize
education and call for states parties to implement the recommendations
contained in A/57/124 as a means to strengthening the NPT
regime through enhancing transparency and awareness, leading
to democratic engagement of the people on issues of security
and disarmament.
Fissile materials treaty
In 2007, the Conference on Disarmament came closer than
ever to beginning negotiations on a fissile materials cutoff
treaty (FMCT). Some states maintain reservations about starting
negotiations without a clear mandate guided by the principles
of verification and non-discrimination, which the vast majority
of states agree should be included in the treaty, along with
restrictions on fissile material stocks. The International
Panel of Fissile Materials (IPFM), an independent group of
arms control and non-proliferation experts from both nuclear
weapon and non-nuclear weapon states, has engaged in and will
soon publish extensive research on the verification of a future
fissile material treaty.
In the interest in regaining momentum towards negotiation
of such a treaty, Germany, in WP.21, suggested that first
steps could include fissile material-producing countries committing
to: a political declaration containing a fissile material
cut-off; adopting the necessary measures for security, control,
and accounting of weapon-usable materials; and to enter without
preconditions into negotiations on a non-discriminatory, legally-binding
FMCT. WP.21 also suggests an alternative approach toward an
FMCT, calling for a “framework treaty” and charting the course
for a gradual implementation process. Under this approach,
states parties would separately conclude additional implementation
protocols, developing an effective verification system and
broadening the scope of the treaty. In parallel to this approach,
the paper also suggests the establishment within the CD of
a Group of Scientific Experts to examine technical aspects
of an FMCT and the commencement of a “Fissile Material Control
Initiative” as a voluntary arrangement to be pursued along
with or independently of an FMCT.
Recommended action: Initiatives parallel to negotiation
of a fissile materials treaty, such as Germany’s proposal
of a control initiative, should be discussed during this review
cycle, with an aim to engaging the majority of UN member states—as
opposed to just the 65 CD members—and independent initiatives
such as IPFM in order to generate support for immediate commencement
of negotiations for a fissile materials treaty in the CD.
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