News in Brief Michael Spies | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF
News in Brief section from the NPT News
in Review, the daily NGO newsletter from the third session
of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference Friday, 8 May 2009
Highlights from the Discussion on Disarmament and Security
Assurances
Security Assurances
• The focused discussion on security assurances did
not break any new ground as views remained split along well-worn
lines.
• Several delegations emphasized or expressed support
for additional assurances only in the context of NWFZ treaties,
including Japan, the ROK, and Norway.
• A large number of states, however, continued to express
support for negotiation of a legally-binding instrument, including
the NAM, Russia, Ukraine, Cuba, Brazil, and Nigeria. In this
context, Ukraine recalled its proposal to the second PrepCom
for states to convene an international conference on the topic.
• In addition, a few delegation called for establishment
of security assurances in the NPT context, where it could
take the form of a Protocol to the Treaty. These calls came
from South Africa, Iran, and Algeria. South Africa recalled
the draft Protocol submitted by the New Agenda Coalition to
the 2003 PrepCom. Iran reiterated its proposal for an ad hoc
committee to the 2010 RevCon to negotiate a decision declaring
illegal the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
• Ukraine called for the P5 to sign a legally-binding
instrument granting it security assurances in connection with
the expiration of START, calling the Budapest Memorandum no
longer sufficient.
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education
• Japan again read a joint statement, signed by 29 countries,
reiterating their call for implementation of the recommendations
of the 2002 UN study on disarmament and non-proliferation
education.
Highlights from the Cluster 2 Discussion
Proliferation
• The EU proposed a proliferation action plan for adoption
by the RevCon. Elements related to dealing with proliferation
generally included responding resolutely to crises; criminalizing
acts of proliferation in national laws; combating proliferation
financing; creating alternatives to national development of
fuel cycle capabilities; determining consequences for non-compliance
and for withdrawal by treaty violators; and developing proliferation-resistant
technologies.
• The NAM, Indonesia, and Malaysia reiterated their
view that the IAEA is the sole competent authority for assessing
compliance with the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty.
This formulation is typically used as an argument against
shifting authority for compliance assessment to the Security
Council or to states.
Iran
• The EU described Iran’s nuclear and ballistic
missile programmes as a substantial threat and called on it
to comply with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The
EU, however, recognized Iran’s right to nuclear energy
in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty.
• The United States noted Iran had broken the rules
of the NPT, but otherwise refrained from commenting on the
case directly or indirectly.
• The UK urged Iran to implement relevant Security Council
resolutions, describing its “flouting” as unacceptable.
The UK urged Iran to engage in negotiations rather than face
further isolation.
• France described Iran’s nuclear and ballistic
missile programmes as sources of concern. France called on
Iran to resume suspension of its nuclear fuel cycle programmes
and resume negotiations.
• China urged the United States and Iran to engage in
direct negotiations and urged the P5+1 to take advantage of
recent opportunities to reach a diplomatic solution.
• Russia did not address the issue of Iran in its cluster
two statement.
DPRK
• Together with Iran, the UK urged the DPRK to implement
relevant Security Council resolutions, describing its “flouting”
as unacceptable. • The UK urged DPRK to engage in negotiations
rather than face further isolation.
• France characterized recent developments in the DPRK
as a concern, calling on it to implement Security Council
resolution 1718 and to verifiably dismantle its nuclear programme
and return to the Six Party Talks.
• Japan did not comment on the case of the DPRK in its
cluster 2 statement.
• China continued to advocate for a peaceful solution
and again appealed for calm and restraint in seeking a return
to the Six Party Talks.
• The ROK characterized the DPRK as a threat to peace
and security on the Korean Peninsula and to the international
community. The ROK urged the DPRK to fully comply with the
NPT, Security Council resolution 1718, and the 2005 Joint
Statement.
Strengthening Safeguards
• The EU in its proliferation action plan called for
the RevCon to universalize the IAEA comprehensive safeguards
and Additional Protocol.
• Brazil countered arguments that NPT safeguards are
not effective enough, noting the problems in implementation
of the Treaty derive from individual actors not from the global
environment.
• Australia suggested ensuring the enhanced effectiveness
of safeguards; expanding the application of safeguards; and
recognizing of the evolutionary development of safeguards.
• Egypt argued comprehensive safeguards remain the only
legal requirement and urged efforts to universalize the Additional
Protocol to stress its voluntary nature.
• The NAM suggested the RevCon call for the universalization
of the Additional Protocol—in contrast with proposals
to declare it the verification standard. The NAM also suggested
the RevCon should call for the universalization of safeguards
and request the nuclear weapon states to place all their nuclear
facilities under safeguards.
Export Controls
• The EU recommended the RevCon adopt Zangger Committee
Memoranda A and B as minimal export control requirements.
As part of its proliferation action plan, the EU also called
for the RevCon to recognize the export control regimes and
adopt measures to prevent the transfer of knowledge related
to proliferation-sensitive technologies.
• The NAM argued NPT states must refrain from restrictions
on transfers of nuclear technology.
Security, Physical Protection, and Terrorism
• As part of its proliferation action plan, the EU called
on the RevCon to support efforts to improve nuclear security
and to minimize the use of HEU.
• The United States called for states to transform the
Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international institutions.
• The Netherlands described nuclear terrorism as one
of the biggest threats to international security.
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
• The NAM recommended that the RevCon reaffirm establishment
of all existing NWFZs and reiterate need for the speedy establishment
of such a zone in the Middle East.
• Uzbekistan on behalf of the Central Asian states would
like the PrepCom to positively reflect their efforts to implement
the Semipalatinsk Treaty. The UK reaffirmed its willingness
to resume consultations to allow it to sign the Treaty’s
Protocol.
