Finding the balance Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF
Front page article from the NPT News in
Review, the daily NGO newsletter from the third session
of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference Tuesday, 12 May 2009
Monday saw the conclusion of statements on Cluster Three,
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and on “other provisions
of the Treaty, including Article X.” Article X contains
provisions for withdrawing from the NPT, requiring states
to give notice to other NPT parties and to the UN Security
Council three months in advance.
Delegations expressed diverging views on both subjects. The
crux of both is finding a balance between respecting the rights
and obligations of states parties. Amid all the attention
given to a few recent, isolated compliance cases, many delegations
have emphasized the need to adopt measures to ensure or reinforce
obligations over rights.
With nuclear energy, most states firmly reminded the Committee
that the non-nuclear weapon states are already obligated to
place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and argued
that they should not be expected to take on additional obligations,
such as ratifying the Additional Protocol—especially
since nuclear weapon states are not obligated to have their
facilities under any safeguards.
However, in the debate between rights and obligations, needs
sometimes seem forgotten. For example, additional verification
authority (especially that provided by the Additional Protocol)
will be a necessary condition for achieving and ensuring compliance
with a nuclear weapon free world. This is a view that is compatible
with the approach taken by the International Panel on Fissile
Materials, which recommends that all states parties to a prospective
fissile materials treaty adhere to the Additional Protocol
as the verification standard. Thus, the Additional Protocol
may be ultimately seen as a necessary disarmament measure.
Some states have expressed concern that the so-called “nuclear
renaissance” will lead to increased probabilities of
proliferation of “sensitive” technologies to “irresponsible”
actors, and thus the fuel cycle and related technologies and
materials need to be placed under stricter controls. However,
the Egyptian delegation questioned the rhetoric of “responsible”
versus “irresponsible” nuclear technology or states,
asking, if “emerging nuclear programs should only give
birth to proliferation-resistant reactors without front or
back ends [of the fuel cycle], would not those States who
continue to run front and back-ended heavy water reactors
be, by definition, irresponsible? Or must we consider that
what is irresponsible for some is responsible for another?”
A similar debate, between those concerned with the potential
consequences of withdrawal from the Treaty and those concerned
with restrictions of states rights as spelled out in international
law, occurred during discussion of Article X. While some states
wish to clarify the requirements for withdrawal, others warn
that any added conditions to the process of withdrawal could
potentially undermine international law by contravening the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Further, several delegations seem to equate withdrawal from
the Treaty with a threat to international peace and security
under any circumstance. Some of these delegations also support
measures intended to make withdrawal from the Treaty more
costly in general, regardless of whether the withdrawing state
has actually violated any of its obligations. These views
are often coupled with a call for an immediate convening of
the UN Security Council.
While it would be a worthwhile pursuit to adopt some common
understandings or measures in order to respond to withdrawal
from the Treaty by states that have committed material breaches
of their obligations, it is also important to ensure there
are appropriate mechanisms for establishing the context and
conditions of the withdrawal.
It would also be beneficial to explore incentives to encourage
states parties to remain party to the Treaty, through a general
strengthening of the Treaty’s existing provisions and
fulfillment of its past commitments. For example, the Norwegian
delegation suggested reaffirming the Treaty’s viability
through a “forward-looking outcome of the 2010 Review
Conference;” enhancing nuclear cooperation and IAEA
capacity; codifying security assurances within the NPT context;
and further strengthening the review cycle.
The attempt to balance rights and obligations under the NPT
will undoubtedly continue to be a focus of debate at the Review
Conference, but a careful consideration of what will lead
to the strongest disarmament regime possible offers the best
guide forward.
Michael Spies contributed analysis to this article.
