News Proposals and Recommendations
to the 2010 Review Conference A Survey of Working Papers submitted
to the 2009 Preparatory Committee Michael Spies | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF
Article from the NPT News in Review,
the daily NGO newsletter from the third session of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference Monday, 11 May 2009
This article survey proposals to the 2010 NPT
Review Conference (RevCon), drawn primarily from working papers
submitted to the third (2009) Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)
session that were available on the Official Document System
of the UN as of 10 May.1 Many proposals
reflect recommendations tabled during the current review cycle,
though many of the papers elaborate on, refine, or supplement
earlier drafts. This review deals with those proposals that
concern nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues.
The order in which proposals are presented does not necessarily
a reflect their priority or likelihood of achieving consensus.
Disarmament
Toward 2010, a number of governments have put forward various
proposals intended to achieve a nuclear weapon free world.
During the present PrepCom, the EU and Japan have submitted
papers outlining their respective disarmament proposals. The
EU action plan, described in WP.26, includes steps related
to all three pillars of the Treaty. Japan, in WP.13, forwarded
the eleven benchmarks for achieving nuclear disarmament and
a nuclear weapon free world, as presented by Foreign Minister
Hirofumi Nakasone in April 2009. The benchmarks are divided
into three areas, including: steps by the NWS to reduce their
arsenals; steps by all states; and steps to promote the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. In addition, the New Agenda Coalition
(NAC) and the Vienna Group of Ten have also introduced papers
outlining recommendations to the RevCon on disarmament.
Further reductions in strategic nuclear forces. Several
delegations have recommended further reductions in nuclear
arsenals. The NAC and Japan, in WP.11 and WP.13 respectively,
called for negotiation on further cuts to US/Russian arsenals,
deeper irreversible and verifiable reductions, and efforts
by other NWS to reduce their arsenals. The Coalition also
welcomed the US/Russia decision to seek a replacement to START.
Reductions in sub-strategic nuclear forces. Following
early proposals for inclusion for binding commitments dealing
with sub-strategic forces, Japan and the NAC have called for
verifiable, transparent, and irreversible reductions in US
and Russian sub-strategic forces in their respective papers.
The EU in WP.26 called for inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons
by states that possess them in the disarmament process.
Cooperation on missile defences. Stepping back from
measures called for in 2000 in light of subsequent events,
Japan in WP.13 called for cooperation on missile defense programmes.
Reporting on nuclear arsenals and reductions.
Following on calls made during the present review cycle, one
of Japan’s benchmarks calls for regular reporting from
the NWS on arsenals as a transparency measure. The EU expressed
support for unspecified transparency and confidence-building
measures in WP.26.
Entry in force of the CTBT. For many delegations,
entry into force of the CTBT remains a top disarmament and
non-proliferation priority. Continued calls toward this end
are reflected in the working papers of the NAC (WP.11), Japan
(WP.13), the Vienna Group (WP.15), and the EU (WP.26). Pending
this step, many have emphasized the need for moratoria on
testing to be maintained. The NAC recognized the recent reaffirmation
of these goals by the United States and China. The Vienna
Group’s paper calls for the RevCon to support the Provisional
Technical Secretariat and to ensure the international monitoring
system is operation by the time the Treaty enters into force.
Negotiation of a verifiable FMCT. Many delegations
to the PrepCom have recognized growing momentum for negotiation
of a verifiable FMCT. Such a step is one of the benchmarks
identified by Japan in WP.13 and an element recommended by
the EU in WP.26.
Banning short and intermediate range missiles.
Support continues to slowly spread for internationalizing
the commitments contained in the INF Treaty, as proposed by
the United States and Russia in 2007. Japan explicitly expressed
support for the US/Russian initiative as part of its disarmament
benchmarks in WP.13. The EU in WP.26 called for the start
of consultations on a treaty banning short- and intermediate-range
missiles and for adherence to the Hague Code of Conduct.
Implementation of past agreements. The NAC,
in WP.11, emphasized the need to take concrete action to implement
the outcomes of past NPT conferences, particularly those from
1995 and 2000. They recommended that the 2010 RevCon reaffirm
past commitments.
Security Assurances and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
Many governments continue to call for the nuclear weapon states
to grant legally-binding assurances to the non-nuclear weapon
states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. A subset
of these states believe the NPT is the appropriate place for
such assurances, which could take the form of an additional
protocol to the Treaty.
NPT Protocol. Iran, in WP.2 and WP.5, in line
with the position expressed by the NAM, called for the RevCon
to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a protocol to
the Treaty granting security assurances to non-nuclear weapon
states. Iran further repeated its past call for the RevCon
to adopt a decision holding “that the threat or use
of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States shall
be prohibited.”
Recognition of the Central Asian NWFZ. The
five Central Asian states, in WP.12, recommended a number
of paragraphs related to the PrepCom recognizing their efforts
related to the negotiation and consultation process on the
Semipalatinsk Treaty.
Non-Proliferation
Western governments continue to advocate for further strengthening
of the non-proliferation regime through a variety of measures.
Key proposals to this end have been made by the EU and the
Vienna Group, which have submitted papers to the present PrepCom
outlining many recommendations.
Verification of Article I. Iran, in WP.6, reiterated
its view that the RevCon should address a mechanism to verify
compliance with Article I of the Treaty.
Action on proliferation cases. The EU, in WP.26,
called for the RevCon to take unspecified resolute action
on proliferation crises, in particular in the cases of Iran
and the DPRK. The Vienna Group, in WP.14, recommended that
the RevCon urge all states to cooperate fully with the IAEA
in the expeditious resolution of anomalies, inconsistencies,
and questions identified by the Agency. The Vienna Group further
recommended that the RevCon stress the need for the IAEA to
receive early design information and the need for all states
to provide such information on a timely basis.
Determining consequences of non-compliance.
The EU, in WP.26, proposed that the RevCon should consider
measures that could be taken as a result of safeguards violations
or withdrawal from the Treaty, including suspension of technical
cooperation and transfers.
Recognizing the Zangger Committee lists. The EU, in WP.26,
proposed adopting Zangger Committee memoranda A and B as the
minimal export controls for nuclear trade under the Treaty.
Taking a slightly different approach, the Vienna Group, in
WP.16, called for the RevCon to recognize the importance of
the Committee and invite all states to adopt its Understandings
in all nuclear cooperation. The Vienna Group also called for
the RevCon to underline the legitimacy and desirability of
export controls.
Universalization of the Additional Protocol.
Many delegations have continued to call for, promote, or even
require adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol. Calls for
universal adherence are reflected in the working papers of
the EU and Japan. Similar to a proposal made by the EU at
the 2008 PrepCom, the Vienna Group, in WP.14, recommended
that the RevCon recognize the Additional Protocol as the verification
standard under Article III.1 of the Treaty.
Additional Protocol as a condition of supply.
The Vienna Group, in WP.16, called for the RevCon to take
a decision to make adherence to the Additional Protocol a
condition of supply for the transfer of source or special
fissionable material or related processing equipment.
Nuclear terrorism and physical protection.
Toward combating the risk of nuclear terrorism, the EU in
WP.26 and the Vienna Group in WP.19 recommended that the RevCon
call on all states to ratify the amended Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Japan, in WP.13,
expressed support for combating the threat of nuclear terrorism,
including through a global summit, as proposed by US President
Obama.
Measures to combat and prevent proliferation.
Toward checking proliferation, the EU, in WP.26, suggested
a variety of measures including: supporting national laws
to criminalize acts of proliferation; combating proliferation
financing; preventing transfer of knowledge; and developing
proliferation-resistant technology.
Nuclear Energy
During the present review cycle, NPT parties have engaged
in lengthy debate over recent proposals to control the nuclear
fuel cycle. Toward this end, the IAEA may take action on the
establishment of a fuel supply assurance mechanism later in
2009. Amid concerns from developing states regarding the erosion
of rights, Iran and Syria have tabled recommendations seeking
in effect to address sanctions against their nuclear programmes.
Considering of nuclear fuel supply assurances.
In order to create alternatives to national development of
national nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, the EU, in WP.26,
recommended the consideration of nuclear fuel supply assurances.
Reviewing the implementation of Article IV. Iran, in WP.7,
proposed the RevCon consider issues related to the implementation
of Article IV, especially in regard to denial of IAEA technical
assistance stemming from accusations of non-compliance and
decisions adopted by the UN Security Council.
Cessation of technical and commercial restrictions.
Syria, in WP.9, proposed that the RevCon recommend that the
nuclear weapon states stop placing “restrictions and
obstacles” to the benefit of peaceful uses of nuclear
technology by the non-nuclear weapon states.
Environmental consequences of uranium mining.
Noting there have been serious environmental consequences
from uranium mining and nuclear fuel cycle activities, the
five Central Asian states, in WP.29, recommended that the
RevCon reiterate its 1995 and 2000 appeals for the consideration
of assistance to be given toward radiological assessment and
remediation in affect areas.
Implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East
Implementation of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East
continues to be a major priority for many states. Following
on its concrete measures put forward in 2008, Egypt, in WP.20,
submitted a revised comprehensive proposal for steps to be
adopted in 2010 toward implementation of the resolution. The
Egyptian package generally contains more moderate iterations
of similar proposals that have been tabled during the present
review cycle. Further, it appears to be carefully drafted
in a manner to attract widespread support as a whole. The
Egyptian package continues to deal only with establishment
of a nuclear weapon free zone, rather than WMD free zone.
Elements contained in the Egyptian package, as well as those
proposed by others, are detailed below.
Steps to implement the 1995 resolution. Several
delegations have suggested or supported a general call for
the RevCon to adopt practical steps to implement the 1995
resolution, as reflected in working from Iran in (WP.1), Syria
in (WP.9), the NAC (WP.11), and Palestine (WP.21).
Intercessional Standing Committee. Repeating
proposals submitted to previous PrepComs in the current review
cycle, a number of states continued to urge the RevCon to
establish some sort of standing NPT body—either a committee
or a bureau—to follow up on implementation of the 1995
resolution intercessionally and report to the 2015 RevCon.
Such calls were reflected in working papers from Iran (WP.1),
Egypt (WP.20), and Palestine (WP.21).
Iran further specified that it saw the purpose of such a committee
as “monitoring” implementation of the resolution.
Egypt’s proposal provided for a committee to be composed
of the chair and bureau of the RevCon, plus the sponsors of
the 1995 resolution—Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.
Nuclear supply to Israel. Egypt, in WP.20, proposed
that the RevCon decide that any supply arrangement to Israel,
related to source or special fissionable material, require
it to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and place
its all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. In contrast,
Iran, in WP.5, proposed that the RevCon should decide in effect
to adopt a decision to prohibit NPT parties from engaging
in any nuclear cooperation with non-party states, especially
Israel.
International Conference. Egypt, in WP.20,
elaborated on its proposal for the RevCon to endorse the convening
of “an international conference to launch negotiations
with participation of all States of the Middle East on an
internationally and effectively verifiable treaty for the
establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle
East.”
Measures to force Israel to accede. Iran, in
WP.1, repeated its past calls for the RevCon to “make
recommendations on measures to force [Israel] to accede to
the [NPT] and place its unwarranted nuclear facilities under
the full scope of IAEA safeguards.” Adopting a softer
tone, Syria and Libya, in WP.9 and WP.10 respectively, requested
the RevCon to put pressure on Israel, through unspecified
measures, to toward these ends.
Institutional Reform
Canada provided further details on its campaign to achieve
further reform of NPT institutions and the review process.
As described in WP.8, Canada designed its proposals either
to be budget neutral or to result in significant savings throughout
the review process. The overall intent for the proposals is
to create a shorter, but more focused and cost-effective review
mechanism able to respond in a more timely manner to developments.
Annual General Conferences. Canada elaborated
on its proposal for annual meetings, calling for the RevCon
to replace the PrepComs with seven day annual meetings to
be held in each of the four years leading up to the RevCon.
The RevCon would be shortened to 10 days. The annual meetings
would be empowered with decision-making authority. This change
would result in 12 fewer meeting days per review cycle.
Standing Bureau. Canada reiterated its proposal
for establishment of a standing bureau to convene starting
in 2011, which would be comprised of the two immediate past
and present chairs of the NPT meetings. The bureau would also
be empowered, under the Canadian proposal, to convene extraordinary
sessions of states parties.
NPT Support Unit. Canada proposed establishment
of the position of a single NPT Support Officer, to be hosted
by the Office of Disarmament Affairs, “whose sole responsibility
it would be to support and facilitate Treaty meetings and
intersessional work on a full-time basis.” Canada also
suggested that, if additional resources could be found, additional
officers could be hired to perform substantive, administrative,
logistical, and representative support.
Notes
1. For a comprehensive survey of proposals
submitted to the first two PrepCom sessions, see Michael Spies,
“Toward 2010: Proposals, Positions, and Prospects,”
Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 90, Spring 2009.
