News Proposals and Recommendations
to the 2010 Review Conference A Survey of Working Papers submitted
to the 2009 Preparatory Committee - Week Two Michael Spies | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF
Article from the NPT News in Review,
the daily NGO newsletter from the third session of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference Monday, 18 May 2009 (Final Edition)
This article survey proposals to the 2010 NPT
Review Conference (RevCon) made during the second week of
the third (2009) Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) session.
For proposals made during the first week, see NPT News
in Review No. 6.1 This reviews
primarily draws upon working papers submitted to the PrepCom.
Many proposals reflect recommendations that have been previously
tabled during the current review cycle, though many of the
papers elaborate on, refine, or supplement earlier drafts.
This review deals with those proposals that concern issues
related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The
order in which proposals are presented does not necessarily
a reflect their priority or likelihood of achieving consensus.
Disarmament
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in WP.30, outlined a comprehensive
set of recommendations covering all aspects of the Treaty,
building upon its past working papers submitted during the
present review cycle. In addition, Belgium, on behalf of seven
countries (Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Poland, and Turkey), tabled a paper complementing proposals
the group submitted to the 2005 RevCon, also dealing with
all areas of the NPT. Negotiation of a verifiable FMCT. Echoing numerous
other calls, the NAM, in WP.30, called for negotiation of
a verifiable FMCT, specifying that such a treaty should be
concluded within five years. Entry into Force of the CTBT. The NAM, in WP.30,
also added its voice to those that continue to promote efforts
to bring the CTBT into force. Further reductions of the role of nuclear weapons.
Seven countries, in WP.33, called for measures to operationalize
the “unequivocal undertaking” to pursue nuclear
disarmament, focusing on further diminishing the role of nuclear
weapons in security policies. Toward this end, they recommended,
inter alia: inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons in
arms control processes; publishing of aggregate nuclear weapon
holdings; further progress in reducing the operational status
of nuclear weapons; and placing nuclear material no longer
required for military purposes under IAEA safeguards. Implementation of the 13 Steps. Building upon
calls for the reaffirmation of past commitments—such
as the one made by the New Agenda Coalition in WP.11—the
Arab Group in WP.24 and the NAM in WP.30, called for immediate
implementation of the 13 steps. The Arab Group specified that
states parties should use the steps “as [sic] basis
for measuring verifiable and irreversible progress in that
regard, including the achievement of tangible reductions in
existing nuclear arsenals, halting weapons production and
the destruction of stockpiles.” Launch disarmament negotiations. The NAM, in
WP.30, called for the immediate commencement of a negotiation
process “towards a phased programme for the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame,
including a nuclear weapons convention.” Placement of all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
The NAM, in WP.30, called for the nuclear weapon states and
non-party states to place all their nuclear facilities under
comprehensive safeguards with a view toward facilitating future
disarmament steps.
Security Assurances
Proposals for the conclusion of legally-binding assurances
against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, as contained
in working papers released during the second week, echoed
views expressed during the first week of the PrepCom. Consideration of security assurances in the NPT context.
Compatible with calls for negotiation of an NPT Protocol granting
legally-binding assurances, the NAM, in WP.30, called for
the RevCon to undertake further work toward this end through
a subsidiary body. Recommendations from the RevCon. The Arab Group,
in WP.24, called for the RevCon to formulate recommendations
for the development of legally-binding assurances, falling
short of Iran’s and NAM’s proposals for such an
agreement to take the form of a Protocol to the NPT.
Non-Proliferation and Safeguards
Seven countries, in WP.33, generally laid out their positions
on various non-proliferation and safeguards issues facing
the NPT, generally stopping short of making explicit recommendations
to the RevCon. Nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking. Seven
countries in WP.33 did, however, call for a comprehensive
and mutually reinforcing approach to preventing non-state
acquisition of nuclear materials and weapons, including: implementing
existing international conventions; the Global Initiative
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; the Proliferation Security Initiative;
and voluntary efforts to convert civilian research reactors
from using highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium.
Implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East
The Arab and the NAM outlined their respective proposals and
positions on implementing the Middle East resolution in working
papers submitted during the second week. The Arab Group’s
paper generally reflects the proposals made by Egypt in WP.20,
though it takes a harder line on some points, as noted below.
International Conference. Essentially identical
to Egypt’s proposal (see WP.20), the Arab Group, in
WP.23, called for the convening of an international conference
“with a view to initiating negotiations on the establishment
of a zone free from nuclear weapons in the Middle East by
2011.” Unlike the Egyptian proposal, the Arab Group
paper specifies that the RevCon should call upon the UN to
hold the conference. Affirming non-transfer of nuclear weapons to Israel.
The Arab Group, in WP.23, proposed that the nuclear weapon
states reaffirm their basic non-proliferation commitment to
not transfer or in any way assist Israel in the acquisition
of a nuclear weapon.
Cessation of nuclear cooperation with Israel. Similar to Iran’s
proposal in WP.5, the Arab Group in WP.23 and the NAM in WP.30
further proposed that all NPT states declare (or reiterate)
a commitment not to engage in nuclear trade with Israel. This
proposal contrasts with Egypt’s proposal that any nuclear
cooperation with Israel be conditioned on its accession to
the NPT and placement of its nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards. NPT Standing Committee. The Arab Group and the
NAM also proposed, following similar requests from Egypt,
Iran, and Palestine, for an NPT standing committee to follow
up on implementation of the 1995 resolution intercessionally
and report to the 2015 RevCon.
Withdrawal from the Treaty NPT consultative mechanism. Seven countries,
in WP.33, called for further development of a consultative
mechanism and an institutional framework, “which would
provide States parties with an ability to react adequately
and in a timely manner to developments and challenges.”
Notes
1. For a comprehensive survey of proposals
submitted to the first two PrepCom sessions, see Michael Spies,
“Toward 2010: Proposals, Positions, and Prospects,”
Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 90, Spring 2009.
