The political goal of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) has become clearer and closer over the past decade. The concept of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons and setting out a framework for their elimination has been promoted and debated for over a dozen years now. Counter-arguments to the calls for negotiations on such a treaty—or a framework of inter-locking agreements—have characterized the goal as idealistic, unrealistic, and premature.
But times have changed since the concept of an NWC and calls for negotiations towards such a treaty first emerged. The change over time in reactions to the model NWC that was introduced in 1997 reflects this shift. This model, drafted by a team that included lawyers, scientists, political analysts and former diplomats, was warmly received by some. In fact it was a response to demands for such a model. But the notion of such a treaty was dismissed as premature and idealistic by others, including disarmament advocates. Today many of those same governmental and non-governmental representatives are calling for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Voices that rejected the possibility of complete nuclear disarmament five or ten years ago, and others that accepted it but rejected the NWC as part of the process, have changed their tune.
It is time to reassess the assertions that it would be idealistic, unrealistic, or premature to begin efforts towards a nuclear weapons convention. As Rebecca Johnson commented: “Civil society is frequently credited with the idealistic thinking that identifies ’visions of how we would like the world to be’, only to be patronised as ’well meaning but ignorant’ when we campaign to turn these aspirations into reality.”
In fact, it is idealistic to think that we can maintain current policies and practices—knowing that ‘domino effect’ is written into nuclear policies—without some unforeseen or unforeseeable nuclear catastrophe. To think that current nuclear policies are capable of meeting the underlying inter-linking dangers posed by the widespread availability of nuclear materials and the prevailing post-cold war complacency—that is the real La La Land.
Is the goal of the NWC unrealistic? Again, citing Johnson: “we have to challenge [the] political limits and limitations and... identify and work for the transformational progress that so-called realists believe to be impossible. As we commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Berlin wall being pulled down, let’s remind ourselves how quickly civil society can accomplish what governments and experts think is impossible!” A generation of academics with a rather limited vision of human capabilities gave themselves the complacent label ‘realists’. “...such labels act as linguistic sleight of hand to make it harder to ask essential questions.” It is much harder to ask HOW an NWC can be achieved— and to question old doctrines—than to dismiss the concept by declaring the goal impossible. True, if no efforts are made, an NWC is not possible. But if governments engage in good faith efforts to identify points of agreement and potential progress, then they might be able to create the conditions that will make disarmament more realistic. It is the familiar question of political will.
Lack of political will is the scapegoat for lack of progress on nuclear disarmament. But rather than dismiss the option of engaging on the basis of lack of political will, each and every government might take a closer look at its own political will and at ways of exercising that will. Perhaps today progress on disarmament turns not on the question political will, which exists in potential form, as much as on the question of the energy to inspire and exercise this will. Popular energy needs to drive political will.
If disarmament succeeds, many will (rightfully) claim credit, but for this to happen they must invest in advance and help make it happen. Some will need to be inspired or provoked into taking action, others still need to be persuaded of the feasibility of the NWC. The tools are available in the form of various campaigns, networks and political mechanisms.2 It is also important not to allow disingenuous calls for the NWC to cloud our judgment or deter clear thinking about its feasibility. As the NWC gains credibility, we can expect to see a wide range of expressions of support, some genuine, others possibly some form of political posturing, particularly if com- ing from states that have a nuclear weapons program or come under a nuclear umbrella. Such expressions of support for the NWC should not be dismissed as disingenuous, however, since they can be used to hold governments to their word and to engage them, using the concept and elements of the NWC as talking points.
The political logic of a nuclear weapons convention has been disputed but never refuted. Often the goal was dismissed as a political impossibility, as ‘unrealistic’ and incompatible with the political reality and the inevitability of armed conflict. But even these arguments did not dismiss the logic of the NWC—the need for some form of agreed upon regime—if the conditions for disarmament were to exist. Rather, these realists dismissed the possibility of political conditions that would make planning for complete disarmament planning a meaningful pursuit. But times have changed, and those who reject the notion that it is time to begin negotiations are losing ground.
There is no need to recount here yet again the variety of voices that have added their support to the NWC concept—whether using this terminology or not—over the past half-decade. From the four nuclear ‘horsemen’* to presidents and prime ministers, to the UN Secretary-General’s Five Point Plan, to international dignitaries and popular entertainers, voices from sources steeped in the tradition of realism, trained to reason, and toughened by hard reality, as well as voices reflecting the rhythm and mood of popular opinion, these and others have come to see that a comprehensive and united effort to rid the world of nuclear weapons is essential if our world as we know it is to survive.
The political logic of eliminating nuclear weapons is nothing new. It is exactly as old as the weapons themselves. The very first United Nations General Assembly resolution, coming just after the first use of nuclear weapons, called for their elimination. It is the question of timing (when real nuclear disarmament will begin) and the approach to time (now is the time) that has changed.
Political realities have presented themselves in such stark terms in recent years that the nuclear threat appears more real, and therefore its solution more imperative. Can we afford to get tied up today over questions of precisely what timelines and deadlines will apply tomorrow? Many former and presumably continuing sceptics have come to realise that the answer to this question is no. No, we cannot afford to waste time debating the most ‘realistic’ approach. We must approach the challenge of disarmament head on, undertaking what we know will be a work in progress, setting forth goals and goalposts that will create new realities, refining the framework and timelines as real disarmament work progresses.
A civil society strategy for starting the process towards a nuclear weapons convention involves getting the goal of the NWC into the mainstream, “to gain recognition for the NWC as a realistic and reasonable concept even among those who disagree with its aims.”3 The elements of such a strategy include:
• Engaging governments in discussions about the legal framework for prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons
• Encouraging governments to including consideration of the NWC (whether using this terminology or not) in their official statements, to generate an “accumulation of proposals” and/or to endorse the UN Secretary General’s five-point disarmament plan of 24 October 2008
• Following the 2010 NPT Review Conference, internationally coordinated and locally implemented actions in support of the NWC, regardless of the outcome of the Conference
• Creating a partnership between civil society and governments to establish the conditions for the NWC The most prevalent counter-argument against starting negotiations towards a Nuclear Weapons Convention has been that it is premature, not that it is illogical if the conditions for disarmament exist. Times have changed, and the many old and new voices calling for complete nuclear disarmament are evidence that the conditions exist, and the time to begin discussions about the goal and content of such a treaty is now.
Merav Datan is an international lawyer and board member of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy. This article orginally appeared in the journal of the Swedish Physicans Against Nuclear Weapons, Nr 120, Feb 2010, www.slmk.org. Reprinted with permission. •
