Main Committee I: Disarmament and security assurances
The draft text is divided into three sections: review, reaffirmation, and action. The review and reaffirmation is similar to that in 2000, though the language has been updated to reflect current discourse on several important issues. The action plan is the key piece of the draft. It includes 26 actions for implementing article VI, the relevant 1995 principles and objectives, and building upon the 13 practical steps from 2000.
Benchmarks and timeframes
One of the most significant and compelling elements of the draft action plan on disarmament is that it includes dates on specific issues. For example, in order to facilitate the full implementation of article VI in a timely manner, nuclear weapon states will convene consultations “not later than 2011” on accelerating concrete progress on nuclear disarmament (Action 6), on the basis of which the UN Secretary-General will convene “an international conference in 2014 to consider ways and means to agree on a roadmap for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe, including by means of a universal, legal instrument” (Action 7). Other timelines include:
a declaration of all weapons-usable fissile material stocks by 2012 (Action 19);
a standard reporting form by 2012 (Action 25); and
the CD has until the end of its 2011 session to commence substantive work before being referred to the UN General Assembly (Actions 8 and 17).
Concrete steps on disarmament
Actions 6 and 7 are undoubtedly based on calls from the overwhelming majority of states at this Review Conference, who have expressed their dissatisfaction at the slow and incremental pace of unilateral and bilateral reductions by the nuclear weapon states of their monstrous nuclear weapon stockpiles. Most non-nuclear weapon states have noted that 40 years after the NPT's entry into force, there has been grossly inadequate progress on achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons. Some nuclear weapon states have argued that they are waiting for the appropriate “conditions” before they can begin considering ways to eliminate nuclear weapons, though the non-nuclear weapon states have been quick and strong in pointing out that putting preconditions on nuclear disarmament is as absurd and unjustified as putting them on non-proliferation.
Action 6 includes specific items for consideration during the 2011 consultations, noting that these consultations should, inter alia, lead to further reductions; address the question of weapons stationed on the territories of non-nuclear weapon states (ie, the five NATO countries that host US “tactical” nuclear weapons); further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and in military and political alliances; reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems; and increase transparency and mutual confidence. Moving forward from several of the points in step 9 from the 13 practical steps, this appears to have been drafted in such a way so as to facilitate progressive efforts toward disarmament while balancing the competing concerns and interests of the P65.
Other actions in the disarmament plan include some specific ideas on what can be done now, before these consultations. Action 3 calls for NWS to undertake further reductions of all types of nuclear weapons, which reflects a resounding call from NNWS at this Conference for arsenal reductions to include deployed and non-deployed, strategic and “non-strategic” weapons, as well as nuclear weapon related materials. Also flowing from repeated calls of states parties this year, Action 2 calls for the application of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency to nuclear disarmament, arms control, and reduction measures (where as step 5 of the 13 practical steps only calls for irreversibility). Action 5 calls on the nuclear weapon states to cease the development of new nuclear weapons and the qualitative improvement of existing systems that support new military missions. And Action 1 says that all states “shall pursue policies that are fully compatible with the objective of achieving a nuclear weapon free world.” And Action 4 specifically calls on the US and Russia to seek the early entry into force of New START.
Unfortunately, not all of these actions are compatible with each other. It has become starkly clear that ratification of New START, at least in the United States, will result in actions completely incompatible with the objectives of a nuclear weapon free world and will result in the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapon systems, as well as the necessary infrastructure to continue building new nuclear weapons and related components. On Friday morning, the Obama administration submitted New START for ratification to the Senate along with a “Section 1251” report—a classified report required by the National Defense Authorization Act. This report provides a comprehensive plan to: (1) maintain nuclear weapon delivery systems; (2) sustain a “safe, secure, and reliable” US nuclear weapons stockpile; and (3) modernize the nuclear weapons complex. The unclassified fact sheet explains, “This report is based on the policies and principles in the Nuclear Posture Review and describes a comprehensive plan for sustaining a strong nuclear deterrent for the duration of the New START Treaty and beyond. The plan includes investments of $80 billion to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex over the next decade.”
The action plan is lacking any prohibition of increased investment in nuclear weapons and related infrastructure. While the Obama administration's intent to invest $80 billion to “sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex over the next decade” obviously violates Action 1 of the plan, there is no specific language against nuclear weapons expenditure or against the construction of new nuclear weapon facilities or of new nuclear weapon components, as has been called for by some states during this Review Conference. Limiting the prohibition to “qualitative improvements ... that support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities” leaves a loophole in which nuclear weapon states are free to “refurbish” their arsenals, extending their life into the indefinite future, which is counterproductive to achieving their elimination any time soon.
The plan also does not call for any kind of measures to reduce the perceived legitimacy, legality, morality, or usefulness of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the action plan could have called for a study into the relationship between nuclear weapons and international humanitarian law, for example, as raised specifically by several delegations at this Review Conference, including the Swiss and Norwegians.
Finally, the action plan does not include any reference to reviving the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (the strengthening of which was called for in step 7 of the 13 practical steps, before the US abrogated the Treaty) or initiating any other agreement on limiting or reducing anti-ballistic missiles or delivery systems. Paragraph 16 of the review portion of the draft text does recognize the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms and paragraph 17 recognizes that ballistic missiles with conventional warheads or the placement of weapons in outer space “would adversely impact strategic stability and have negative consequences for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”
Security assurances
During an MCI debate, many delegations called for the commencement of negotiations on a legally-binding negative security assurance instrument. However, the action plan only calls for discussions within the Conference on Disarmament (CD), though it uses the mandate from the CD's programme of work adopted unanimously last year regarding the formulation of “recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument” (Action 8). However, this is an improvement from the 13 practical steps, which did not provide for security assurances at all. Action 9 of this draft calls on NWS to “fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances” pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally-binding assurances and Action 10 calls on states to encourage the establishment of further nuclear weapon free zones where appropriate and that all states shall consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant protocols.
Fissile materials
Negotiation of a fissile materials treaty is also kept within the CD, though Action 19 states that NWS will declare all weapons-usable fissile material stocks by 2012 (which adds a timeframe to step 3 of the 13 steps). Action 20 has NWS place excess materials under IAEA verification (as does step 10 of the 13 steps); Action 21 says all states will support legally-binding verification arrangements to remove fissile material from nuclear weapons; and Action 22 calls for dismantlement of weapons-usable fissile material production sites.
The question of the CD
Both security assurances and a fissile materials treaty are kept in the CD context by this action plan, though it only gives the CD until the end of its 2011 session to start working on these issues before asking the UN General Assembly to determine how discussions or negotiations should be pursued. This is an odd declaration, given that the CD has not been given its mandate or agenda from the NPT and has members that are not party to the Treaty. However, this clearly states the political intent of NPT states parties to look toward progress in other fora if the CD is unable to begin work. If the UN General Assembly were to take up this call in September 2011, it would give a forum that does not work by consensus to determine if a new negotiating body should be established or if alternative processes should be initiated.
Nuclear testing
Action 11 specifies that all states should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without conditions, which is an important qualification given the climate in the US Senate which will seek further investment in and modernization of the nuclear weapons stockpile in exchange for CTBT ratification. In the 13 practical steps from 2000, step 1 simply agreed on “the importance and urgency” of achieving the entry into force of the CTBT. Step 2 of the 13 steps called for a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions, which is echoed in Action 12 of the new action plan, but Action 12 goes further also calling on states to refrain “from any action which would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT,” which undoubtedly includes subcritical testing and other means of testing. The new action plan also pushes for increased promotion of the CTBT (Actions 13 and 14); completion of the CTBT verification regime (Action 15); and the closure and dismantlement of all nuclear test sites (Action 16).
Transparency, confidence-building, and civil society
The action plan ends strongly with points on cooperation with civil society, among other actors; the establishment of verification capabilities for a nuclear weapon free world (as in step 13 of the 13 steps); regular reporting on this action plan and all other disarmament commitments in the NPT context (as in step 12 of the 13 steps); and implementation of the UN recommendations on disarmament and non-proliferation education.
The draft text welcomes new proposals and initiatives from civil society that are aimed at achieving the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Civil society has never before been mentioned in a final document of a Review Conference.
Conclusion
Overall, the draft text from MCI is strong. It responds to many of the challenges preventing the elimination of nuclear weapons and it accurately reflects most of the calls made by the overwhelming majority of states party to the NPT at this Review Conference for real concrete action on nuclear disarmament with benchmarks and timelines by which to measure implementation. Throughout the text—the reaffirmation, review, and action plan—the draft strongly supports and carries forward the “vision” of a nuclear weapon free world proclaimed even by most of the nuclear weapon states.
Main Committee II: Non-proliferation and regional issues
The Main Committee II text consists of two sections: one that looks at past commitments and reviews the Treaty, and a second part that consists of a forward-looking action plan. Both of these sections deal with non-proliferation and nuclear weapon free zones. Regarding the issue of the Middle East NWFZ, the topic of the subsidiary body for MCII, the text only reaffirms the importance of the 1995 resolution. As states parties are still in the process of negotiating details on the implementation of the Middle East resolution, this draft does not include any specific language on the issue yet.
IAEA safeguards
The draft puts a lot of emphasis on the role of the IAEA and reaffirms that the safeguard system is a fundamental pillar of the non-proliferation regime. The draft urges all 19 states parties that haven’t brought into force the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) to do so as soon as possible. In accordance with the preferred language of many western delegations, the draft text notes that implementation of the additional protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement provides increased confidence about absence of undeclared nuclear material; in its action plan, the draft text encourages all states parties to conclude additional protocols and to bring them into force as soon as possible, and affirms that the CSA, together with the additional protocol “represents the verification standard that best fulfil the objectives of article III”. This issue is still controversial and during the debates in Main Committee II, it was quite clear that many non-nuclear weapon states are resistant to redefining commitments under article III, especially in light of the vague commitments and verification measures required by nuclear weapon states under article VI. For nuclear weapon states, the draft only calls for the wider application of safeguards on peaceful nuclear facilities and does not include any other additional obligations.
Non-compliance
The draft states clearly that non-compliance with the NPT undermines its integrity and it puts a clear emphasize on the central role played by the IAEA in verifying compliance with obligations under article III. As for suspected non-compliance, the draft only mentions that states parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty should direct such concerns, along with evidence and information, to the IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions, and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. While noting the importance of addressing compliance challenges, and expressing in particular the need for strict compliance with non-proliferation obligations, the draft fails to explicitly mention that both vertical and horizontal proliferation are included in such obligations.
Export controls
The draft encourages states parties to consider whether a recipient state has brought into force an additional protocol in making nuclear export decisions, as well as notes the useful role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee in the area of export control. However, it does not discuss export controls in relation to non-NPT states; neither does it mention the exception made by the NSG regarding nuclear trade with India. It also does not mention the critique by the NAM and other NNWS that the conduct of these suppliers cartels are non-transparent and non-inclusive.
Universality
In the action plan for non-proliferation, the draft text calls upon all states parties to exert “all possible efforts” to promote universal adherence to the Treaty and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the treaty. This is stronger than the commitments in the 2000 document, which only focused on calling upon states to join the treaty, and not actions taken by parties to encourage this.
Nuclear weapon free zones
The draft text welcomes the entry into force of the Pelindaba and the Semipalitinsk Treaty. It also stresses the importance of the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon states of the relevant protocols to the NWFZ and reaffirms the guidelines on NWFZ, developed by the Disarmament Commission. The draft also explicitly supports Mongolia’s policy to institutionalize its status of nuclear weapon free zones.
Conclusion
In the meetings of Main Committee II, safeguards and the additional protocol have been the main topics of debate. It has been clear that divergences of opinion between delegations are quite wide. While the document does not call for states to sign and ratify the additional protocol, it includes a straightforward reference to additional protocol as representing the verification standard for article III, which has clearly been opposed by some delegations.
The main strength of the text is the concrete suggestion that states parties refrain from undertaking actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty, a significantly stronger commitment than in previous documents. It will also be interesting to see what comes out of the negotiations on implementation of the Middle East resolution, something that most certainly will add another dimension to this document.
Main Committee III: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and institutional issues
The draft text from Main Committee III includes a section on decisions and recommendations of previous conferences as well as a section on forward-looking actions. It does not include any report from the subsidiary body and it is still missing a section on actions on the issue of institutional reform of the NPT review process, pending discussion of this issue in the subsidiary body.
Nuclear energy
The draft text focuses mainly on promoting nuclear energy as part of a “diverse portfolio of energy sources” needed “to allow access to sustainable energy and electricity resources” and helpful for to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It strongly reaffirms states parties “inalienable right” to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes “without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II, and II of the Treaty,” as in the 2000 final document. As in 2000, it also recognizes this right as “one of the fundamental objectives” of the NPT and “confirms that each country’s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.” NNWS, in particular those from the NAM, have strongly emphasized the importance of reaffirming this approach to peaceful uses throughout the first two weeks of the Review Conference.
Technical cooperation
The draft seems to emphasize two dimensions of technical cooperation: that it foster the development of peaceful uses and that it ensure that nuclear materials and facilities do not contribute to proliferation.
Echoing the vast majority of claims made by states at this RevCon, the draft highlights the importance of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation programme as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and encourages continued efforts to strengthening this programme. It also notes that states parties try to ensure that the IAEA's resources for TC activities should be “sufficient, assured, and predictable,” but it does not call on these activities to be funded by the IAEA's regular budget, as called for by several developing states at this RevCon. Instead, it just notes that “all members share a common responsibility towards financing and enhancing the TC activities of the IAEA.” While a few western delegations, including the European Union, called for TC to be suspended in suspected cases of non-compliance, and others, such as Canada, urged the IAEA to assess the “necessity” of TC requests by counties, the draft text does not incorporate either of these and instead uses language from 2000 for the IAEA and states parties to enhance the effectiveness of IAEA TC activities “in light of changing circumstances and needs of states concerned.”
The draft text does not deal with the issue of transfer denials, as requested by the Iranian and Algerian delegations.
Nuclear safety
The draft recognizes the safety and security issues associated with nuclear energy, including the “need to resolve the issue of managing radioactive waste in a sustainable manner.” However, the draft fails to deal with any of the other problems related to the development and use of nuclear energy, such as economic and environmental costs; legacy issues; sustainability problems; and the problems of uranium mining. The delegations of Ireland and Austria raised all of these issues during the general debate, but the draft text fails to reflect their concerns. The action plan of the text does call on states to ensure “the highest levels of safety, security, non-proliferation and environmental protection” when developing nuclear energy.
The draft also confirms that the use of nuclear power must be accompanied by ongoing implementation of the highest levels of IAEA safeguards, safety, and security standards. The draft notes that while nuclear safety is a national responsibility, international cooperation on all safety-related matters is indispensable and calls on all states parties to accede to the relevant treaties on nuclear safety and security as well as the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Pulling heavily from suggested language by the French delegation, the draft also calls on states to ensure the development of appropriate nuclear infrastructure to ensure safety and security; to promote the sharing of best practices; and to develop a “safety culture” through training and capacity-building.
Maritime transport of radioactive materials
Several delegations, particularly that of CARICOM, raised the issue of the environmental and health risks posed by the transshipment of nuclear materials through the Caribbean. The draft text, however, recognizes the “excellent” safety record in this regard and reaffirms maritime and air navigation rights and freedoms. It does take note of the concerns of small island and coastal states, but only “welcomes efforts to improve communication” between these states and those shipping radioactive materials through their regions.
Armed attacks against peaceful nuclear installations
In an attempt to balance between NAM language on this issue and Australian concerns that said language was “too prescriptive,” the draft text stipulates that the RevCon “considers that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful poses jeopardize nuclear safety, have dangerous political, economic and environmental implications [rather than the NAM's “poses a great danger human beings and the environment”], and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases [rather than, “constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the UN Charter and regulations of the IAEA”]. The draft text does not call for a negotiated instrumented prohibiting such attacks or threats as called for in the NAM statement, but notes that such attacks or threats “could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”
Nuclear liability
The draft's action plan calls for states to “put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or by adopting a national legislation.”
Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle
After an intense debate on this issue during the first two weeks of the Review Conference, the draft text stresses that proposals for assurance of fuel supply should be addressed in a multilateral, economically viable, non-discriminatory, and transparent manner under the auspices of the IAEA, while not affecting the rights under the NPT. It “notes the various proposals” and encourages all efforts to further develop them, but does not put forward or recommend any specific measures on how to move forward on this. In the action plan, the draft only encourages “continue discussions on opportunities to create additional mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply.”
Universality
In a more concise manner than the outcome in 2000, this draft text expresses concerns regarding lack of progress on this issue and states that this represents a threat to international peace and security. It calls upon India, Israel and Pakistan to bring into force IAEA safeguards and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development, as well as become parties to the CTBT. Reflecting the concern of most NNWS to the NPT over the US-India deal and subsequent Nuclear Suppliers Group decision to permit nuclear trade with India, the draft stresses that NPT states parties “should reverse any form of nuclear cooperation” with non-NPT states.
Withdrawal
In the last outcome document from 2000, withdrawal from the NPT was not mentioned. However, since the DPRK announced its withdrawal without regarding the provisions of article X, the issue has gained attention. The draft reaffirms the sovereign right to withdraw from the NPT under article X as well as under international law, such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. However, it also underscores that article X allows for such action only in the face of extraordinary events and notes that withdrawing states are still liable for breaches of the Treaty prior to the withdrawal. It stresses that all nuclear material and equipment acquired prior to withdrawal “must remain subject to peaceful uses under the IAEA safeguards even after withdrawal.”
In case of a withdrawal, the draft calls upon states to undertake collective consultations immediately to address the legitimate security interests of the withdrawing party. The draft also reaffirms the role of the Security Council as already provided for in article X. Going beyond the text of article X, the draft text recommends that nuclear supplying states “consider incorporating dismantling and/or return clauses in the event of withdrawal” in arrangements concluded with other states parties as appropriate in accordance with international law and national legislation.
Conclusion
The draft from Main Committee III consists of the usual pro-nuclear energy arguments and promotes an increased use of nuclear energy within the framework of safety, security, and safeguards. The language on universality is strong and it is positive that the text encourages states to reverse their nuclear cooperation with non-NPT states parties, arrangements which have gravely upset the non-proliferation regime. The issue of withdrawal is new and the language carefully tries to highlight the importance of keeping all states parties in the Treaty while not undermining the sovereign right under article X. Once the concrete proposals for institutional reform will be included, it could hopefully add a significant practical application to the draft.
