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News in Brief: Non-comprehensive but notable news
Ray Acheson and Beatrice Fihn| Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

News in Brief section from the NPT News in Review, the daily NGO newsletter from the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
Thursday, 6 May 2010

Complete PDF of this edition.

Procedureal decisions

  • The President of the Review Conference, Ambassador Cabactulan, announced that the Conference had agreed to set up three subsidiary bodies to the main committees. The first subsidiary body will deal with practical nuclear disarmament and will be chaired by Austria. The second body will deal with regional issues including the 1995 Middle East resolution and will be chaired by Ireland. The third subsidiary body will deal with institutional deficit and strengthening of the treaty's operations, including consideration of how to respond to potential withdrawal. This body will be chaired by Uruguary. These subsidiary bodies will have at least 4 sessions within each main committee.

Disarmament

  • Lebanon urged for movement on disarmament issues, calling for no first use and reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrine as well as the start of negotiations on an NWC.
  • Egypt stated that there was a need to verify the number of dismantled nuclear weapons as well as a need to create a legally-binding treaty that will abolish nuclear weapons in a set time frame.
  • South Africa argued that the undertakings of the RevCon in 2000 should be reaffirmed as a step-by-step approach to disarmament and urged all nuclear weapon states to do their part in fulfilling the 13 steps.
  • Kenya stated that the 13 steps contain pragmatic and substantive efforts to implement article VI, and argued that the RevCon should reaffirm these and move even further.
  • Syria urged the RevCon to agree on a time bound programme for eliminating nuclear weapons and the implementation of the 13 steps.
  • Syria also proposed that the RevCon adopt a resolution establishing a subcommittee on the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
  • Tunisia pointed out that the obligation to pursue disarmament in good faith was confirmed by the International Court of Justice. 
  • Colombia urged all states possessing nuclear weapons to honor their unequivocal commitment to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.
  • Colombia also insisted on the urgent need for a legally-binding instrument prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.
  • The P5 reaffirmed their enduring commitment to the fulfillment of their obligations under article VI of the NPT and their responsibility to take concrete and credible steps towards irreversible disarmament. The P5 also noted that stocks of nuclear weapons are now at lower levels than at any time in the past half-century.
  • Mongolia supported the UNSG’s 5 point proposal on nuclear disarmament, and argued that it was balanced, realistic, and a promising initiative.
  • Colombia stated that nuclear weapons should have a predominant role in international politics, and argued that since the political realities have changed, such change must be reflected in security and defense doctrines.
  • The African Group noted that diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies is a step toward ensuring that they are never used in any circumstances.
  • Cuba called for a clear undertaking of no first use of nuclear weapons by all NWS.
  • Kuwait and El Salvador noted that nuclear weapon programmes divert resources that could otherwise be used for achieving MDGs.
  • Cuba argued that the multimillion dollars allocated for new types of nuclear weapons are unacceptable when billions of people live in poverty, illiteracy, and without potable water and food.
  • Costa Rica argued that nuclear reductions “have been almost irrelevant” while “trillions of dollars have been spent on vertical proliferation.” This has resulted in “a source of weakness” for both disarmament and non-proliferation.
  • Costa Rica also argued that nuclear weapons “are, in themselves, a greater threat than any other they intend to confront.”
  • El Salvador urged NWS to give up their policies of nuclear deterrence, arguing that it far from guarantees security and undermines coexistence. It called for NWS to engage in open and sincere dialogue that leads to verifiable agreements on disarmament.
  • Kazakhstan called on NWS “and politico-military alliances to revise their military doctrines to exclude all possible use of nuclear weapons” in order to “overcome the existing belief that nuclear weapons can provide security, and derived from this delusion, the aspiration to acquire them.”
  • El Salvador, Cuba, and Peru urged that NWS cannot be allowed to continue to improve or modernize their arsenals.
  • Samoa noted that “the nuclear weapons industry is more entrenched in the national nuclear weapons laboratories now than ever and more is spent today on nuclear weapons than ever before, even at the height of the Cold War.”
  • Cuba also highlighted the importance of full implementation of the 13 practical steps. It called for a clear plan of action with a concrete timetable for compliance with all provisions of the NPT and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by 2025.
  • Argentina argued that the NWS “are the only ones that seem not to have fulfilled their responsibilities.”
  • Malaysia said the NWS need to do more to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, noting that the possession of nuclear weapons by one country is incentive for another to have its own. It urged all states to fulfill the article VI obligation by initiating negotiations on an NWC.
  • Burkina Faso stressed the need for NWS to move from progressive reductions of their nuclear weapon stocks to more far reaching goal of their elimination and to prohibit defence strategies based on use of nuclear weapons.
  • Costa Rica highlighted its proposal with Malaysia for an NWC.
  • Liechtenstein expressed support for a NWC in line with UNSG five-point plan. It thanked Switzerland for reminding the Conference “that nuclear disarmament is not just a geopolitical necessity, but also a moral and legal imperative—in particular in view of international humanitarian law.”
  • Malta encouraged the inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons in irreversible disarmament initiatives; de-marginalization of the role of nuclear weapons; and deep reductions of deployed weapons.
  • Liechtenstein argued that de-alerting can reduce the role of nuclear weapons in military strategy and as such contribute to nuclear disarmament.
  • Lebanon, Costa Rica, and Malaysia also urged NWS to de-alert their nuclear weapon systems.

Non-proliferation

  • The Arab League also called upon the IAEA to implement its resolution on the nuclear capabilities of Israel that was adopted in September 2009.
  • The P5 reaffirmed their determination to abide by the moratorium on nuclear test explosions before the entry into force of the CTBT. The P5 also called upon all NNWS to bring the comprehensive safeguards agreement into force.
  • Cuba called for a prohibition on nuclear trade with Israel.
  • Peru welcomed Indonesia's announcement that it is seeking ratification of the CTBT.
  • Burkina Faso argued that strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and “peaceful uses” of nuclear energy are not contradictory as long as articles I, II, III are duly taken into account.
  • Malaysia said it has enacted a new comprehensive law on controlling the export, transshipment, transit, and brokering of items that could facilitate the development of nuclear weapons.
  • Kazakhstan pointed out that 29 August has been established as the International Day against Nuclear Tests to mark the closure of the world's largest nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk.

Nuclear energy and fuel cycle

  • Estonia noted that it is important to facilitate multilateral solutions to the growing peaceful uses of nuclear energy and argued for the establishment of LEU fuel bank under the control of the IAEA.
  • Portugal supported the creation of a nuclear fuel bank under the IAEA, which it says should only be available for states that have signed the additional protocol.
  • Belarus supported the multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle as a measure to decrease proliferation risks and establish fuel security.
  • Egypt argued that an international fuel bank should not impose new constrains on NNWS.
  • Cuba expressed concern with persistence of some states to impose excessive restrictions on nuclear technology for “peaceful purposes”.
  • Liechtenstein expressed support for a multilateral fuel bank under the auspices of IAEA.
  • Kazakhstan highlighted its proposal to the IAEA to host an international fuel bank on its territory.
  • Belarus argued that further strengthening the IAEA safeguards agreement would strengthen the NPT.
  • The Arab League stated that they were committed to the comprehensive safeguard systems but emphasized that additional protocols are not legally binding documents.
  • The African Group and Cuba emphasized that the IAEA is the sole competent authority to determine compliance with safeguards.
  • Malta and Slovakia expressed support for the additional protocol as the verification standard.
  • Malaysia suggested the RevCon establish clear incentives to ensure that states parties that comply with safeguards are given preferential treatment in establishing nuclear energy programmes.

Nuclear weapon free zones

  • The Arab Group argued that by undermining the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, states undermine the credibility of the NPT.
  • Egypt argued that the RevCon must promote and implement the resolution on the Middle East and proposed a regional conference to further explore the issue in 2011, with a bureau to prepare for, supervise, and follow-up the conference.
  • Syria proposed that the Review Conference should adopt a new resolution on a NWFZ in the Middle East, but by specifically mentioning Israel, as opposed from the resolution from 1995.
  • The P5 expressed their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and stated that they are ready to consider all relevant proposals in the course of the Review Conference
  • Mongolia stated that it is in the process of defining the international aspects of its status together with its immediate neighbors and reflect such agreement in a trilateral treaty.
  • The African Group called on all NWS to ratify relevant NWFZ protocols.
  • The states parties to NWFZs noted that with NWFZs covering almost all of the southern hemisphere and moving steadily north, the vision of a nuclear weapon free world is almost already 50% materialized.
  • They called on NWS to sign relevant protocols, grant NSAs, and withdraw reservations from all NWFZs.
  • They called for a denuclearized Korean peninsula.
  • They urged the establishment of NWFZs in Central Europe and the Middle East.
  • They also highlighted the civil society forum on NWFZs, which strongly expressed support for nuclear disarmament, noting that the forum's conclusion has been included as annex to governmental NWFZ Conference final document.
  • The states parties to the Treaty of Tlateloco that spoke all called on NWS to ratify relevant protocols and withdraw their reservations.
  • Kazakhstan said it welcomes the readiness of the US to consult with the parties of the Central Asian NWFZ to resolve the issues it has with the protocol.

Negative security assurances

  • Portugal stated that assurances should be provided to non-nuclear NPT states parties who are in compliance with the Treaty and to nuclear weapon free zones.
  • Most other NNWS called for negotiation of a legally-binding treaty on NSAs and granting of NSAs to NWFZs.


Withdrawal

  • Estonia argued that there was a need to agree on measures that would discourage withdrawal from the NPT.
  • Egypt pointed out that the withdrawal clause presents an inalienable right for each State if the Treaty fails to fulfill its security in accordance with paragraph two of article X.
  • South Africa argued that while article X acknowledges the right to withdraw under certain circumstances, the issue still needs to be considered, especially in relation to safeguards for the material and equipment already supplied to the withdrawing state.
  • Slovenia recognized the sovereign right to withdraw from the Treaty, but argued that it must be ensured that such country is in compliance with its safeguard obligations and that the IAEA can verify the absence of undeclared activities to prevent a threat to the entire world.
  • Syria asserted the need for the sovereign right to withdraw from the Treaty if a state finds that new circumstances endanger its security.
  • While recognizing the inalienable right to withdraw from the NPT, the P5 argued that such a right should not automatically be exercised. The P5 argued that a state remains responsible for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal but emphasized that any decision taken in relation to this should not lead to the revision of article X or reopen the text of the Treaty.
  • Peru argued that right to withdraw is governed by international law.
  • Argentina said it is “inadmissible” for a state to withdraw or threaten to withdraw from the NPT.
  • Liechtenstein and Portugal said the RevCon should clarify the withdrawal clause.

Institutional reform

  • Egypt argued that the organizational framework of the Treaty needs to be improved, such as through intersessional meetings.
  • Peru called for an implementation mechanism for strengthening the NPT review process, highlighting Canada's working paper on this subject.
  • Liechtenstein called for the establishment of a small implementation support unit for the NPT.

Universality

    • Most non-nuclear weapon states stated that states outside the NPT should accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states.
    • The Arab Group warned that if not all states to the NPT work for the accession of Israel to the NPT, the ability of the treaty to provide security for its member states could be questioned
    • The P5 argued that they attach great importance to achieving the universality of the NPT, and urged those states outside the treaty to accede as non-nuclear weapon states, and pending accession, to adhere to its terms. The P5 also stated that they stand ready to work with parties to engage the non-parties with a view to achieving this goal.

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