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News in Brief
Beatrice Fihn and Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

News in Brief section from the NPT News in Review, the daily NGO newsletter from the
2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
Tuesday, 11 May 2010

Complete PDF of this edition

Main Committee II

Nuclear weapons free zones

  • The NAM and Venezuela said the RevCon should urge all NWS to withdraw or modify any reservations or unilateral interpretations that affect the denuclearization status of the zones.
  • Algeria noted with interest that the US announced that they would ratify the Pelindaba Treaty and urged all other NWS to do the same.
  • The EU hoped that outstanding issues concerning some NWFZs can be resolved through consultations and in accordance with the UNDC guidelines.
  • Indonesia argued that NWFZ should be more active in promoting the establishment of new zones and hoped that nuclear weapon states will sign and ratify a protocol to the South East Asia NWFZ.
  • Mongolia hoped that after a decade of “reflection” about its status as a NWFZ, the NWS could finally provide security assurances. Mongolia also hoped that the RevCon would express support for its policy to institutionalize its nuclear weapon free status.

Middle East

  • The NAM recommended the establishment of a Standing Committee to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East, and called upon all states parties to facilitate the implementation of the IAEA resolutions on Israel’s nuclear capabilities.
  • The NAM also called upon states parties to disclose all information available on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities.
  • Philippines argued for the convening of an international conference on the Middle East at the earliest possible time.
  • The US stated that it fully supports the objective of a Middle East verifiably free of WMDs and they supported concrete and realistic measures to implement the 1995 resolution.
  • Japan said it fully support the Middle East resolution and stands ready to work with all parties to take practical steps towards its implementation.
  • Venezuela argued that Israel should renounce their weapons and join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon states. 
  • Libya argued that one should not attach impossible pre-conditions to the NWFZ in the Middle East
  • The EU stated that it is prepared to consider and work out practical steps to prepare the ground for a full implementation of the Middle East resolution.
  • Norway argued that one main avenue for moving closer to a NWFZ in the Middle East is through improved safeguards.
  • Brazil stated that the RevCon should recommend concrete measures to fulfil the goal of a NWFZ in the Middle East. 

Vertical proliferation

  • Brazil argued that proliferation both within and outside the Treaty is stimulated not only by the existence of nuclear weapons, but also by the on-going qualitative development of such weapon and their delivery systems.

Compliance

  • Canada argued that the RevCon must reaffirm the fundamental importance of full compliance with article III.
  • The EU argued that the RevCon should include in its action plan measures to determine “the consequences of a state’s non-compliance with its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty.”
  • Brazil pointed to nuclear sharing in the context of military alliances and argued that each article of the NPT is binding and that all parties must be in strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.
  • France suggested that all civil nuclear cooperation with countries who do not comply with their obligations should be suspended.

IAEA Safeguards

  • The NAM said the RevCon should acknowledge the distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguard obligations.
  • The NAM also requested that all NWS and non-parties to the NPT should place their nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA safeguards.
  • Egypt argued that the efforts to redefine existing obligations of the Treaty undermine the efforts of achieving the universality of the comprehensive safeguards.
  • Australia, France, the US, Netherlands, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea, Norway, and the EU argued that the safeguard system under article III is evolutionary and the additional protocol should be the verification standard.
  • Australia and New Zealand said the additional protocol should be established as a condition of supply for all nuclear material and equipment.
  • Philippines argued that the IAEA could be strengthened through the universalization of the additional protocol agreements.
  • The US stated that it is committed to enhancing IAEA safeguards' ability to respond to both known and emerging threats as well as to future, unanticipated threats.
  • Venezuela stated that any additional requirements of the safeguards will be a reinterpretation of the NPT and its obligation.
  • Canada argued that the RevCon must urge the 21 states parties that haven’t signed the safeguards agreement to meet their obligations under article III.
  • Iran stated that as long as the comprehensive safeguards agreement is not universally applied and NWS have not fully complied with their obligations under article VI, acceptance of additional legal obligations, such as additional protocols, are absolutely not justified. Iran reminded the participants of that the additional protocol is a voluntary and non-legally binding instrument.
  • Iran and Libya argued that it is essential to establish a similar verification mechanism for dealing with article I as exists for article III, and that IAEA should be entrusted with verifying reductions of nuclear weapon stocks.
  • Iran also proposed that the IAEA should establish a mechanism to deal with the breaches of confidentiality.
  • South Africa argued that while additional protocols are voluntary, they have a great importance for confidence-building measures and called upon all states to conclude such additional protocol with the IAEA.
  • Indonesia and China argued that the additional protocol is vital for strengthening the safeguards system and urged all states to adopt it.
  • Norway said all nuclear activities should be brought under IAEA control and monitoring.
  • Brazil argued that the additional protocol is not a part of the balance of obligations under the NPT and stated that it’s simply not fair to expect NNWS to implement further enhanced verification measures, while the international community has yet to be presented with a timeframe within which to expect the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Export control

  • France argued for the need of rigorous and universal control of exports of sensitive nuclear technologies, and that the Zangger Committee must continue its activities with a view to universalize its general principles for controlling exports.
  • France also argued that the Nuclear Suppliers Group is an essential instrument for the promotion of a credible and balanced approach to export controls.
  • France, Japan, and Argentina highlighted the value of UN Security Council resolution 1540.
  • Canada emphasized the importance of national export control systems and should encourage states parties that have such systems to provide assistance to those that require it.
  • The EU called for the strengthening of exports controls including recognition of the Zangger Committee Memoranda A and B as the minimal NPT export controls for conducting nuclear trade.
  • Iran argued that nuclear cooperation between the US and Israel, as well as the recent exception by the NSG for nuclear trade with India have shown that being a non-party to the NPT is more privileged and even being awarded by Western countries. This double-standard has seriously damaged the integrity of the Treaty.

Iran

  • Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Norway expressed concern with the Iranian situation and called on Iran to comply with relevant UNSC resolutions and cooperate with the IAEA.
  • France argued that Iran was in violation of its safeguard agreements and that there are no civil justification for its programme. France stated that the situation calls for the strongest response from the international community.
  • The EU called upon Iran to engage seriously with the international community in order to find a negotiated solution that will address Iran’s interests as well as the international community’s concerns.
  • South Africa and the Republic of Korea urged Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA.
  • China argued that it is actively committed to solving Iranian problems by peaceful means, since sanctions are not an effective solution.

DPRK

  • Australia, Japan, the EU, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea called upon the DPRK to meet its Six Party Talks commitments, comply with relevant UNSC resolutions, and/or come comply with the NPT and IAEA safeguards.
  • France encouraged the RevCon to send a strong message to DPRK that it will not  tolerate its nuclear ambitions nor its nuclear proliferation cooperation with other countries, particularly in the Middle East.
  • Japan urged the RevCon to condemn the DPRK's nuclear tests.
  • South Africa called upon North Korea to eliminate any nuclear weapons programme, rejoin the NPT and ratify the CTBT, as well as place all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards.
  • China and Norway called for the resumption of the diplomatic process.

Universality

  • Japan urged Israel, India, and Pakistan to accede to the NPT as NNWS.
  • Libya argued that the states parties should encourage states outside the NPT to join the treaty as NNWS.

Institutional issues

  • Canada proposed three measures for strengthening the NPT regime institutionally: convening annual meetings and extraordinary meetings; creating a circle of former chairs of the NPT conferences; and establishing a support unit that could bolster the Treaty’s capacity.
  • The Netherlands argued that a institutional reform could enhance the effectiveness of the review process and thus contribute to progress  on substantive issues.

Main Committee III

“Inalienable right”

  • The NAM urged the RevCon to underscore that nothing in the Treaty can affect article IV rights without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II.
  • Australia and Japan urged the RevCon to reaffirm the right of article IV without discrimination and in conformity with art I, II, and III.
  • Brazil and Venezuela said the RevCon should reaffirm the right of article IV.
  • Canada and the US said the RevCon should stress that compliance with the non-proliferation and verification requirements of the NPT is the essential basis for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
  • Brazil said the RevCon should recognize the legitimacy of peaceful uses programmes carried out under international safeguards.
  • Cuba called for the establishment of a NPT standing committee to address concerns expressed by any state with respect to specific cases of denial of transfers of nuclear material in accordance with article IV.

Technical cooperation

  • The NAM urged the RevCon to note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries persist; to emphasize that NPT does not prohibit the use or transfer of equipment based on their sensitivity but only that it be subject to full scope safeguards; that IAEA technical cooperation will not be subject to political, economic, military conditions incompatible with the provisions of its Statute; and that technical cooperation should be undertaken exclusively in accordance with the decisions of the IAEA's policy making organs.
  • South Africa called for funding of technical cooperation programmes to be sufficient, assured, and predictable and to be incorporated into the IAEA's regular budget.
  • France said it will create an international institute of nuclear energy with scholarships and grants for foreign students and called for investments from financial institutions.
  • Canada said the RevCon should encourage technical cooperation programmes to become more transparent, accountable, and results-oriented.
  • The NAM and Brazil said the RevCon should reaffirm the importance of international cooperation and agree on strengthening the capabilities of IAEA.
  • The Netherlands said  technical cooperation programmes should be conducted under the best safety, security, and non-proliferation conditions.
  • Venezuela urged states parties to avoid restrictions on technical cooperation predicated on political consideration.

Nuclear safety and security

  • Australia called on all states planning or building nuclear power facilities to join the four conventions on nuclear safety and security and urged all states to take further measures to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and facilities.
  • France said it supports creation of a European Institute of Safety Training, which would form the basis of an international network of nuclear safety experts, and called for the development of independent evaluations of the safety of nuclear power plants under the IAEA.
  • Brazil said the RevCon should request states parties bring into force the highest possible standards of safety and security.
  • The EU called on states parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention.

Multilateral fuel cycle

  • Egypt expressed its concern with initiatives related to multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle that contain inherent restrictions on access to fuel.
  • Brazil argued that any multilateral fuel cycle should not impinge upon the article IV or hinder the normal functioning of the international market of nuclear goods and services.
  • Cuba called for comprehensive and transparent negotiations on these issues, based on premise that the supply of nuclear fuel can't become a monopoly of a few. It said that any decision on supply of nuclear fuel should be adopted by consensus with participation of all countries.
  • Mongolia said a multilateral fuel bank should not be subject to political consideration.
  • France expressed support for the establishment of a uranium bank under the IAEA.
  • Canada, the EU, and Netherlands welcomed the decision to establish in an LEU reserve in Russia.
  • Canada called on the RevCon to acknowledge the value of multilateral fuel supply assurance mechanisms in developing nuclear energy and establish basic parameters for such mechanisms.
  • The EU reiterated that it remains ready to contribute up to 25 million Euros for the establishment of the IAEA nuclear fuel bank.
  • The Netherlands said the RevCon should endorse the multilateralization process and encourage all states to remain engaged in the discussions.

Proliferation resistent techn

  • Brazil said the RevCon should support the development of proliferation-resistant technologies.

Waste

  • France said it wishes to develop long term solutions for managing spent fuel and final waste and that it will continue to let other states use France's processing and recycling facilities.

Attack on facilities

  • The NAM and Cuba called for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Non-proliferation and PUNE

  • The NAM said the RevCon should emphasize that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented without exception through strict observance of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements.
  • France said the first condition on peaceful uses should be to ensure that the development of civil nuclear energy will never help a proliferating country.
  • The US said that efforts to prevent proliferation should not restrain the facilitation of peaceful uses.
  • Brazil argued that there is no automatic link between the increasing interest in nuclear energy and a purported increase risk of nuclear proliferation.
  • Egypt expressed concern that preconditions on nuclear supply and cooperation and added obligations are completely ignored when some states enter into new agreements with non-states parties without comprehensive safeguards.

Withdrawal from NPT

  • Egypt expressed concern with attempts to restrict the right to withdraw from the treaty, noting that calls to impose selective considerations as a precondition for nuclear cooperation and calls to restrict the right of withdrawal emanate from the same sources.
  • Japan argued that collective efforts are warranted to make sure that violators do not take undue advantage of the right to withdraw from the Treaty and that proposals should be considered without revising article X.
  • Canada said NPT states parties should be able to convene extraordinary meetings of states parties in cases of withdrawal notification, as per WP.4.
  • The EU said states parties should respond to a notice of withdrawal and its consequences with urgency and purpose and should require the UNSC to act promptly.
  • The US said the international community should respond to a notice of withdrawal by getting together and taking common sense measures to determine whether withdrawal would result in serious consequences.

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