Reaching Critical Will

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

News in Brief
Ray Acheson and Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

News in Brief section from the NPT News in Review, the daily NGO newsletter from the
2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference
Thursday, 13 May 2010

Complete PDF of this edition

Procedural issues

The RevCon decided to move consideration of NPT institutional reform matters to Subsidiary Body III from Main Committee II.

Main Committee I

Action plan for nuclear disarmament

Ukraine called on the RevCon to reaffirm the unequivocal undertaking by NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
Iraq called on NWS to respect their commitments under article VI, 1995, and 2000.
South Africa said this RevCon needs to build on the unequivocal undertaking and NWS need to engage in accelerated negotiations that will entail concrete, transparent, irreversible, and verifiable disarmament.
Philippines called for the RevCon to focus on “Four Rs”: reducing arsenals, reducing roles, reducing alert status, and regular reporting.

Reductions

Ukraine called on all NWS to apply principles of irreversibility and verifiability to the disarmament process.
Canada welcomed the will of the US and Russia to expand their reductions process to other NWS and said that multilateralization of this process must form the next stage and linchpin of disarmament.

Security doctrines

Lebanon said that continuing to include nuclear weapons in security doctrines undermines international nuclear disarmament obligations and contradicts the NPT in letter and spirit.
Ukraine called on all NWS to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies.
Iran expressed concern with NATO and new NPR that “maintain unjustifiable concepts” of reliance on nuclear weapons for security.

Operational status

Ukraine called on all NWS to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems.

Modernization

Lebanon said NWS manufacturing new or new types of nuclear weapons undermines international nuclear disarmament obligations and contradicts NPT in letter and spirit.

Transparency and reporting

Ukraine called on NWS to report regularly on the numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and their deployment status.
Japan noted that increased transparency is most fundamental basis for nuclear disarmament, arguing that without transparency, verifiability and irreversibility are impossible to determine. It said this RevCon should review how transparency can be enhanced.
Canada welcomed NWS transparency initiatives and called for regular reporting.
Ireland highlighted the importance of transparency by NWS.

Security assurances

Lebanon, South Africa, Egypt, Ireland, Philippines, Cuba, Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria called for negotiations of a international legally-binding instrument on NSAs.
Egypt called for the RevCon outcome document to launch the process of negotiations for such a treaty. Ireland, Philippines, Cuba, Algeria, and Nigeria supported this suggestion.
Algeria suggested the RevCon could recommend that such negotiations take place in the Conference on Disarmament in order to help it restart its substantive work.
The Republic of Korea said the provision of NSAs can enhance the relevance of the NPT regime and give states that are not party incentive to accede to NPT.
The ROK also emphasized that it should be clear that assurances are only granted until the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
South Africa explained that a NSA is not an ultimate objective in of itself—it is a pragmatic, interim measure aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation regime in the course of developing a nuclear weapon free world.
South Africa argued that NSAs should be granted under the NPT, as called for by the 1996 ICJ opinion and the 2000 NPT outcome document, not just by UNSC resolutions or NWFZ protocols.
Cuba argued that current NSAs are insufficient, noting that except for one NWS, unilateral NSAs have so far been tied to conditions and that the majority of NWS have ratified NWFZ protocols with interpretations that create conditions on the security assurances.
Algeria noted that not all NWS have ratified the relevant protocols to NWFZ treaties.

Nuclear weapon free zones

Egypt, Ireland, Libya, and Australia noted the importance of establishing NWFZs for strengthening nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Australia welcomed entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty and the NWFZ Conference held on 30 April 2010.

CTBT

Ukraine called for ratification and entry into force of the CTBT.

FMCT

Ukraine, Lebanon, Iraq called for the negotiation of an FMCT and for states to declare or maintain their moratoriums on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

Machinery

Canada called on the RevCon to refrain from linking any recommendations it may come out with to the Conference on Disarmament, arguing that the CD has not been able to demonstrate its capacity to move forward on important issues.

Main Committee II

Middle East

Saudi Arabia argued that the UN Security Council should exert pressure on Israel to make progress on NWFZ in the Middle East and called upon the UN to hold a conference which would set up a timetable for the completion of such zone.
Lebanon, the Arab League, Iraq, Kuwait, Ukraine, Switzerland, and Nigeria called for the implementation of the 1995 resolution.
Nigeria called for a stakeholder conference on a NWFZ in the Middle East, which would include Iran, Israel, and the P5, and be convened within the framework of the UN.
Kuwait urged states parties to put pressure on Israel to join the NPT and submit its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
Iraq pointed out that stability in the Middle East could only be achieved through the removal of weapons of mass destruction.

Nuclear weapon free zones

Uzbekistan and Ukraine reaffirmed the importance of establishing NWFZs in order to promote international peace and security.
Uzbekistan commended the readiness of the US to discuss ratification of NWFZs and called for all other NWS to follow this example.
Nigeria called for closer cooperation between the different NWFZ.

CTBT

Malaysia called upon the Annex II states to sign and ratify the CTBT.

Negative security assurances

Colombia hoped for legally-biding instrument for negative security assurances.

Non-proliferation

Lebanon encouraged a paradigm shift in the way states view their own national security and argued that the most effective barrage against proliferation remains elimination of nuclear weapons and acknowledging their irrelevance for fostering security.
Iraq argued that non-proliferation only can be achieved once all states join the NPT and sign and ratify the CTBT and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
Switzerland argued that the debate on avoiding proliferation of nuclear weapons is linked to a debate on confidence and pointed out that NWS still have a long way to go in order to meet such confidence-building obligations.

IAEA safeguards

Russia argued that states should consider the additional protocol to be a mandatory commitment for nuclear export
Russia, Malaysia, and Iraq called upon all states to adhere to the additional protocol.
Ukraine argued that the additional protocol is now an integral part of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
Lebanon recognized the importance of additional protocol, but emphasized that it is a voluntary, confidence-building instrument and not a legally-binding one.
Switzerland suggested that the RevCon request the IAEA to initiate an internal debate to enhance the attractiveness of implementing the additional protocol, and argued that countries that implemented the additional protocol should get additional benefits.
Malaysia said the IAEA needs to enhance rules and modalities on preserving the confidentiality of safeguards related information.
Iraq highlighted that it had signed the additional protocol and pending its ratification would voluntary implement it.

Nuclear Export

Russia commended the work of the NSG and Zangger Committee and argued for the universality of its arrangements and their check lists of nuclear exports.

Nuclear Safety

Russia highlighted its decision to give a significant voluntary contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, and expected this contribution to further facilitate the strengthening of its physical security regime.
Russia supported the IAEA programme designed to reduce the level of enrichment of nuclear fuel in all IAEA member countires to less than 20%.
Russia supported the implementation of UNSCR 1540.

Iran

Russia argued that Iran had every right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as long as it complied with its obligations under the NPT.

Institutional issues

Switzerland argued that nuclear issues are constantly undergoing development and called for the establishment of a support unit for the NPT.

Main Committee III

Rights vs. obligations

France argued that the right to civilian nuclear energy exists in a balance with the responsibilities of states.
Switzerland said there must be return to confidence among states based on the links between articles I, II, III, and IV.
Indonesia expressed concern with the potential of a two-tiered system of haves and have-nots developing over nuclear power under the guise of non-proliferation and urged the outcome document to reflect the inalienable right of article IV.
Iran argued that states parties should avoid linking peaceful uses to any other provisions or conditions other than those specified in the Treaty, arguing that there is threshold or limit to the extent to which a state party might exercise its rights under article IV.
Australia argued that some states' call for no undue restrictions on article IV implies that there are “due” restrictions. It argued that compliance is an important consideration and that acceptance of safeguards means more than just bringing them into force.
Australia argued that the IAEA safeguards system is evolutionary in nature and that article III, which refers not just to safeguards but to the safeguards system, could include the additional protocol. It urged for the outcome document to note that safeguards + the additional protocol is the verification standard.
Chile argued that states cannot just put forth allegations regarding the nature of article IV so that it can get the supplies it wants and suggested the outcome document could include a sentence that underscores the importance of good will so that article IV can be met in a voluntary, fluid, and natural manner.
Ireland called for a strong reaffirmation of the right to nuclear energy without discrimination in conformity with articles I, II, and III.

Nuclear transfers

Egypt, noting that NPT states parties seem to be at a comparative disadvantage in terms of nuclear trade when compared to states outside the Treaty, said the outcome document should request as a precondition for nuclear transfers full scope IAEA safeguards and legally-binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons.
Cuba called for the cessation of unilateral restrictions to nuclear trade.
Australia said it is not attracted to the proposal to establish a committee to hear cases of transfer denials. It suggested using the Vienna Group of Ten language that in transfers, states parties will aim to facilitate the greatest possible cooperation in safe and secure environment in accordance with the NPT.
The United States said that the decision of transfer by a supplier state is a sovereign decision and is not something that can be taken to an arbitration body. It said the proposal for a mechanism to assess denial decisions is not appropriate.
Brazil, Chile, and Ireland agreed that nuclear transfers are sovereign decisions.
Ireland said it would be concerned about efforts to affect national sovereign decisions in the context of this RevCon and that it does not see a role for a body dealing with transfer denials.
Iran and Algeria did not agree that nuclear transfers are sovereign decisions.
Iran argued that all obligations under the Treaty are equal and states parties have an obligation to trade with states that act in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty. It argued that there need to be an international framework for these decisions.
Algeria argued that export regimes exist to ensure compliance with provisions of the Treaty, especially article III, but that the mandate of the regime stops there. It argued that if there is a refusal to supply nuclear materials to another state party then the motivations should be explained and justified in detail.

Export controls

Australia argued that export controls should be reflected positively in the outcome document, which should recognize that they are legitimate, necessary, and desirable.
Ireland argued that export controls, when properly implemented, have an important role in implementing provisions of the NPT.

Sensitive materials

Australia said that while the NPT does not prohibit transfers based on the sensitivity of materials, the IAEA Board has characterized several technologies as sensitive, based on their dual-use nature. It argued the outcome document should recognize that some technologies are sensitive.
Brazil noted that it is not the particular technology that is sensitive but the way it is potentially used.

Safety and security

Switzerland and Norway called on all states with nuclear infrastructure to ratify the relevant safety conventions.
Austria recalled that states that possess nuclear power facilities hold the primary responsibility for maintaining the safety of their installations, noting that the risks of nuclear power far outweigh any potential benefits if safety is not upheld.
Brazil and Ireland said that safety, security, and safeguards are integral to any responsible energy programme.
Ireland and France urged the outcome document to reaffirm the role of the IAEA in facilitating countries to reach the highest levels of safety.
Brazil noted that the safety of nuclear facilities is evolving, arguing that safety does not involve just procedures but the constant development of technologies that are built along with the reactors themselves.
Indonesia said it maintains a “safety first” principle in all of its nuclear activities.
Ireland and Norway emphasized the importance of safe transportation of nuclear materials.
France noted that the development of the nuclear field should be based on solid infrastructure, regulations, technological levels, and in human resources to ensure safety and urged the development of a “culture of safety”.

Technical cooperation

South Africa called for states to provide the IAEA with additional resources for its technical cooperation programme.

Multilateral fuel cycle

Russia and Belarus argued that a guaranteed fuel supply will contribute to a new architecture for international cooperation in nuclear energy.

Nuclear vs. renewable energy

Austria noted that the Chernobyl disaster left a legacy that affects millions of people and requires billions of euros in resources, which led to Austria enshrine its nuclear free status in its constitution in 1999.
Austria also argued that nuclear power applications are not a viable means to address climate change; noting that discussions on this issue in the competent forums have not included recommendations to bring nuclear power into the energy mix to combat climate change, Austria does not see the value of bringing those types of discussions into the NPT forum.
Austria noted that while it fully respects the right of all states to decide what energy mix they want, it noted that this decision should be made on the basis of aiming for more efficient use of power in general. It noted that while the IAEA has tools to help states make decisions about this matter, other organizations like IRENA can also help provide guidance.
Ireland also noted that while it is right of every state to determine its own energy mix, as with Austria, it has taken the decision not to pursue nuclear power due to concerns related to sustainability, legacy for future generation, and concerns with inappropriate linkages to climate change.