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Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/3
28 April 1998
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH
Second session
Geneva, 27 April - 8 May 1998
INPUT FOR POSSIBLE REVISED CHAIR'S
WORKING PAPER
Working paper submitted by Canada
States Party to the NPT, reaffirming their commitment to assuring
that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the treaty
are fully realized, and their decision to strengthen the Review Process
to that end agree on the following points:
Reaffirmation of commitment to the preamble and the articles of the
Treaty. [paragraph 3: agreed text]
Reaffirmation of commitment to efforts designed to promote the full
realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the
Treaty, as well as reaffirmation of the decisions on principles and
objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament and on strengthening
the review process for the Treaty as well as the resolution on the
Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of
the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
[(paragraph 3: agreed text]
- Reaffirmation of the crucial role of the Treaty in nuclear non-proliferation,
nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. [paragraph
4: amended]
- Reaffirmation that the integrity of the Treaty is essential
to international peace and security. [paragraph 4: amended]
- Reaffirmation of the necessity for full compliance with the
Treaty. [new text]
_________________
Note: 'Paragraph 3' and 'paragraph 4' refer to paragraphs 3 and 4
of the Chairman's Working Paper, as contained in Annex II of the Report
of the Preparatory Committee on its first session. (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.l/32.
18 April 1997)
The resolution on the Middle East
- Recognition of the value of universality of the NPT. [new text]
- Recognition of the value of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions
and the value of lessons in achieving them for progress toward university
of the NPT. [new text]
- Emphasize the vital importance of all States Parties in the region
implementing all obligations under the NPT. [new text]
- Emphasize the importance of renewed progress on the Middle East
peace process and recognize that the Arms Control and Regional Security
(ACRS) process is a useful forum for the discussion of a nuclear-weapon-free
zone in the Middle East. [new text]
- Call upon States in the region to place all unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities under full-scope lAEA safeguards as an important confidence-building
measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing
peace and security. [new text]
- Recognize confidence-building measures taken by states in the Middle
East could be important steps toward the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-
free zone in that region; examples of confidence-building measures
include: mutual visits to safeguarded facilities, information sharing,
and cooperative technical evaluations of a regional verification regime,
regional cooperation on nuclear safety and/or nuclear waste management
issues as a step toward the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free
zone in the Middle East. [new text]
- Encourage creation of a laboratory for safeguards purposes in the
Middle East as a step toward the creation of a regional verification
system. [new text]
(I) Universality
Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty;
welcome for the eight new accessions to the Treaty since 1995, bring
the number of States parties to 186; urgency for all States not yet
party to the Treaty to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible
date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities. [paragraph 3: agreed text]
(ii) Main Committee l issues
Non-Proliferation
Reaffirmation that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty
in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. [paragraph
3: agreed text]
Nuclear Disarmament
The importance of all States to make every effort to promote the earliest
entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in
accordance with article XlV of that Treaty. [paragraph 3: agreed text]
Reaffirmation of the need for immediate commencement and early conclusion
of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable
convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the
statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament
and the mandate contained therein. [paragraph 3: agreed text]
Recognition of the progress in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear-weapon
States, including those made unilaterally or bilaterally under the
START process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament; reaffirmation
of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to the determined pursuit
of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally,
with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons and of the commitment
by all States to the achievement of general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control. [paragraph 3: agreed
text]
- Reaffirmation of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to
a systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally,
with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. [paragraph 4:
amended]
- Reaffirmation of support for progress made in nuclear weapons
reductions by the nuclear-weapon States, including those made unilaterally
or bilaterally under the START Process, as steps towards nuclear
disarmament. [new text]
- Confirmation by States Parties of their expectation that the START
Process as currently defined by the United States of America and
the Russian Federation will be pursued energetically and diligently,
beginning with the earliest possible ratification and entry-into-force
of START II. [paragraph 4: amended]
- Recognition of the importance of progress in measures related
to tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed SLCMs, including confidence-building
and transparency measures, as called for by the USA and the Russian
Federation in the Helsinki "Joint Statement on Parameters on
Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces". [paragraph 4: amended]
- Affirmation of the necessity for the current bilateral nuclear-weapon
reductions process, as it progresses beyond START II, to be expanded
to engage the other three nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.
[paragraph 4: amended]
- Recognition of the desirability of actively pursuing steps towards
greater transparency in nuclear weapons and weapon-usable material
matters.[new text]
- Reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States that the cessation
of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions
constrains the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear
weapons and ends the development of advanced new types of weapons,
thereby consisting an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation in all its aspects. [paragraph 4: amended]
- Reaffirmation of the vital importance of all States signing and
ratifying the CTBT as soon as possible. [paragraph 4: amended]
- Urging the nuclear-weapon States, as a confidence-building measure,
to report individually and on a regular basis to the CD and the
NPT Preparatory Committee on the steps they have taken toward fulfilling
their article VI commitments. [new text]
- Affirmation of support for the proposal in the CD of an Ad Hoc
Committee on Nuclear Disarmament for the substantive discussion
of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to identifying if and
when one or more such issues might be negotiated multilaterally.
[paragraph 4: amended]
- Recognition of the FMCT obligation in the P&O's document.
[new text]
- Affirmation by the nuclear weapon States of a moratorium of the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons on other nuclear
explosive devices, pending conclusion of an FMCT. [paragraph 4:
amended]
- Recognition by the nuclear weapon States that greater transparency
of, and continuing steps to reduce, their nuclear weapons usable
fissile material stockpiles should be pursued energetically. [paragraph
4: amended]
- Welcoming any steps which could move the FMCT negotiation forward,
including the establishment of a committee to discuss technical
questions related to an FMCT, including, but not limited to, verification,
implementation, and existing stocks. [new text]
- Urging the nuclear weapons States to take further steps to increase
transparency of activities related to military stockpiles of fissile
materials. We urge the NWS to take the following steps:
1) increase the amount of military fissile material declared excess,
and put this material under permanent safeguards;
2) declare the amount of fissile material dedicated to military
(weapon or naval propulsion) use, and the amount declared excess;
3) declare the forms in which military fissile materials are held,
and their manner of storage; and
4) provide information about status and location of facilities
involved in HEU production and PU separation. [new text]
- Urging the nuclear weapon States to ascertain their total holdings
of fissile material for nuclear explosive and naval propulsion purposes.
[new text]
- Affirmation that all production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons purposes has ceased, and commitment to declare all facilities
related to fissile material production for nuclear weapon purposes.
[new text]
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
Welcome for the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone
treaties since 1995 and reaffirmation of the conviction that the
establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free
zones freely arrived at among the States concerned enhances global
and regional peace and security. [paragraph 3: agreed text]
Recognition of the importance attached by signatories and States
parties to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and
Bangkok to establishing a mechanism for cooperation among their
respective Treaty agencies. [paragraph 3: agreed text]
Reaffirmation of the view that further steps, which could take the
form of an international legally binding instrument, should be considered
to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. [paragraph 3: agreed
text]
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
- Reaffirmation that the provisions of Article V of the Treaty with
regard to peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are to be
interpreted in the light of the CTBT, and in particular of Article
VII of that Treaty. [paragraph 4: amended]
(iii) Main Committee II issues
Welcome for the conclusion of negotiations on the IAEA 93+2 programme
to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the
Agency's safeguards system and expectation that IAEA will endorse
that outcome at its special session in May; reaffirmation that lAEA
is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring,
in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards
system, compliance with its safeguards agreements. [paragraph 3:
agreed text]
- Urge every State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons which has not already done so to bring into force
a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the international Atomic
Energy Agency (lAEA) pursuant to Article III of the Treaty. Also
urge States not party to the Treaty to enter into comprehensive
Safeguards Agreements with the lAEA. [paragraph 4: amended]
- States strongly support the development and implementation of
the Safeguards System so as to strengthen the safeguards regime
by improving its effectiveness and efficiency and also strongly
support ongoing efforts to meaningfully integrate the new safeguards
measures arising from Part 1 of Programme 93+2 and the model Protocol
with elements of the existing system. [new text]
- Applaud the May 1997 decision of IAEA Board of Governors to approve
the text of the Model Protocol to existing Safeguards Agreements
(93+2 Programme, Part II). [new text]
- Urge all states with Safeguards Agreements with the lAEA to conclude
as quickly as possible an Additional Protocol to their respective
Safeguards Agreement(s), pursuant to INFCIRC/540. [new text]
- Calls upon the nuclear-weapons States to make arrangements within
the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements to place permanently
under lAEA safeguards nuclear material transferred from military
uses to peaceful activities. [paragraph 4: amended]
- Urge all states to adopt the IAEA's recommendations on the physical
protection of nuclear material, currently set forth in INFCIRC-225rev3.
[paragraph 4: amended]
- Urge all States parties that are parties to the Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials to undertake a review
of the Convention at the earliest possible time, with the goal of
determining the adequacy of the current regime and extending the
Convention if required. [paragraph 4: amended]
Export Controls/Transparency
- Recognition that national nuclear export controls are an essential
element of an effective national nuclear non-proliferation regime
and are a means for States Parties to seek to ensure that their nuclear
exports do not contribute to nuclear proliferation and thereby fulfil
their obligations under the Treaty. By so doing, they contribute to
a climate of confidence in the trade in nuclear items that encourages
and facilitates international nuclear cooperation in pursuit of economic
and technological development. [new text]
- Urge transparency in nuclear-related export controls within
the framework of dialogue and cooperation among interested States
Party to the NPT. The October
7-8, 1997 International Seminar on the Role of Export Controls
in Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Vienna was a positive step
in this regard. Express support for the development of other
initiatives aimed at furthering this objective. [new text]
(iv) Main Committee III issues
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
Reaffirmation of commitment to continue to take further steps
for the full realization of the relevant provisions of the Treaty,
taking into account the undertakings in the principles and objectives
on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. [paragraph 3: agreed
text]
Reaffirmation that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities
devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise
serious concerns regarding the application of international
law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate
action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations.(paragraph 3: agreed text]
- Recognition that nuclear energy can be a safe, environmentally
sound and cost-effective source of energy for those states
that choose to include it in their mix of energy sources.
[new text]
- Recognition that bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements
can be effective instruments for facilitating the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. [paragraph 4: amended]
- Recognition of the importance of signing, ratifying and implementing
the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Call upon all states to participate
actively in the implementation of the Convention. States also
look forward to the first meeting of the Conference of the Contracting
Parties in 1999, and the peer review of National Reports, as an
essential element of that process. [paragraph 4: amended]
- Recognition of the importance of working actively to implement
the provisions of the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel,
Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board
Ships (the INF Code). [paragraph 4: amended]
- Welcome the adoption by the lAEA of the Joint Convention
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management and call on states to ratify the Convention
in the near future. [paragraph 4: amended]
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
- Welcome proposals for the international community, through
the IAEA, to review international standards for the physical
protection of nuclear material, both during international
transit and while under national jurisdiction. [new text]
IAEA Technical Cooperation
- Continued support for the International Atomic Energy Agency's
Technical Cooperation Fund and strongly supports broadening
the bases of contributors. [new text]
- Support for the technical cooperation efforts undertaken
by the IAEA and its Member States and, in particular, support
for the new lAEA strategic goal to promote tangible socio-economic
impact by contributing directly in a cost-effective manner
to the achievement of the major sustainable development objectives
of each country. [new text]
- Urges all Member States to contribute to the IAEA Technical
Cooperation Fund (TCF) as a means of ensuring that resources
are available for those IAEA technical cooperation activities
financed through the TCF. [new text]
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