Preparatory Committee for the 2000
Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II /5
28 April 1998
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
Second session
Geneva, 27 April - 8 May 1998
LETTER DATED 28 APRIL 1998 FROM
THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE WORKING GROUP ON DISARMAMENT OF THE
MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ADDRESSED
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
On behalf of the Group of States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned
Countries and other States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, in my capacity as Chairman of the Working Group
on Disarmament of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, I have the
honour to enclose herewith the document entitled "Working Paper
presented by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries
parties to the Treaty" (see Annex). it contains various aspects
related to the Treaty that are of paramount importance to the present
and subsequent Preparatory Committee meeting as well as the 2000 Review
Conference in the form of the NAM proposal of draft recommendation
to be considered by the Preparatory Committee.
It would be highly appreciated if you could circulate the present
letter and its Annex as an official document of the Preparatory Committee.
(Signed) Makarim WIBISONO
WORKING PAPER PRESENTED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE MOVEMENT
OF
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES PARTIES TO THE TREATY
The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons believe, in terms of the strengthened review process
and in the context of fully implementing the Treaty and in pursuant
to the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and
Extension Conference, that recommendations which have been deliberated
upon throughout its preparatory process, should be forwarded to the
Review Conference in 2000 for further refining, finalization and adoption.
We also believe that this kind of approach will strengthen the review
process and will provide the basis for a successful outcome of the
2000 Review Conference. In this vein, the NAM proposes the following
draft recommendations to be considered by the Preparatory Committee:
Preamble
The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to
halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and
they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations
and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon
States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons.
2. The States Parties undertake to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the Treaty and
they shall fulfill their commitments on the unimpeded and non-discriminatory
transfer of materials, equipments, scientific and technological information
for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all States Parties without
exception.
Article I
3. The States Parties agree that the strict observance of the terms
of Article I remains central to achieving the shared objectives of
preventing under any circumstances further proliferation of nuclear
weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and
security.
4. The Nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments
to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from,
among themselves, with non-nuclear weapons states, and with States
not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under
any kind of security arrangements.
5. The States Parties remain concerned about the ability of certain
States not parties to the Treaty to obtain nuclear materials, technology
and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The States Parties call for
the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related
equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices
and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological
fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception.
Article II
6. Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments
to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from
nuclear sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non nuclear-weapon States,
and States not party to the Treaty for military purposes under any
kind of security arrangements.
Article III
7. The States Parties believe that the International Atomic Energy
Agency is the competent authority to verify the compliance of the
States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reaffirm that IAEA
safeguards are an essential element in guaranteeing compliance with
their Article III undertakings. In this regard, all States Parties
which have not yet done so should sign without delay the safeguards
agreements required by Article III of the Treaty.
8. The States Parties call on the nuclear weapon States and all States
not party to the Treaty to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope
safeguards of IAEA.
9. The States Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance
with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by any State Party should
direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information,
to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide
on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Measures should
be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all State Parties
under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty are
fully protected and that no state party is limited in the exercise
of this right based on allegations of non-compliance not verified
by the IAEA.
10. The States Parties support the principles that new supply arrangements
for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment
or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use
or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear weapon
States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance by all
States Parties of fullscope safeguards; and that excess nuclear material
in military stockpiles and nuclear materials removed from nuclear
weapons as a result of nuclear weapons reduction agreements should
be placed under IAEA safeguards.
1l. Every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA has the financial
and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively its responsibilities
in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.
Article IV
12. The States Parties reaffirm their inalienable right to engage
in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination; and that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory
transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States
Parties be fully ensured.
13. The States Parties reaffirm that beyond safeguards required under
the Treaty, unilaterally enforced restrictive measures which prevent
peaceful nuclear development should be removed.
14. The States Parties reaffirm the responsibility of nuclear supplier
states parties to the Treaty to promote the legitimate needs of nuclear
energy of the states parties to the Treaty, with preferential treatment
rendered to developing ones, by allowing the latter to participate
to the fullest in possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials,
scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with
a view to achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements
of sustainable development in their activities.
15. The States Parties reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear
activities emanating from the international norms prohibiting the
use of force in international relations, and in particular Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter in considering that any attacks
or threat of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses
of nuclear energy would entail highly dangerous political, economic
and environmental implications particularly on the civilian inhabitants;
and believe that they bear a solemn responsibility to continue to
play a leading role towards the establishment of comprehensive and
universal norms and standards specifically prohibiting attacks, or
threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of
nuclear energy.
16. The States Parties encourage the adoption of appropriate measures
to regulate international maritime transportation of radioactive waste
and spent fuel to the highest standards in international security
and support current efforts within the IAEA to adopt and improve international
regulations in that regard.
ArticleV
17. The States Parties will take into account all the provisions of
the CTBT related to this Article.
18. The States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon states to refrain
from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives
of the CTBT. They also call upon nuclear-weapon states to provide
transparency on-site and other measures to build confidence on the
full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet
international concern.
19. The States Parties call upon all of the States which have not
yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. Pending the entry into force
of the CTBT, the States Parties called upon the nuclear-weapon states
to comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT.
Article VI
20. The States Parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion
of limited agreements, the provisions of article VI and the ninth
to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled
since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the States Parties
stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament,
thus reaffirming their role in achieving this objective.
21. The States Parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest
danger to mankind and to the survival of the civilization. It is essential
to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order
to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. In this context,
the goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task
of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, all States Parties bear
responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States which possess
the most important nuclear arsenals.
22. The States Parties reaffirm that priority in disarmament negotiations
shall be nuclear weapons in accordance with the Final Document of
the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.
23. The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination
their obligations under article VI, in particular nuclear-weapon States
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament.
24. The States Parties in particular the nuclear-weapon States shall
inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts
and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous
conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists
an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and
effective international control.
25. The States Parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to
establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament taking into account
all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of
2l, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear
disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with
a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention
prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling,
transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their
elimination.
26. The States Parties renew their call for the immediate commencement
and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc
committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the
production and stockpiling-of fissile material for nuclear weapons
and other nuclear explosive devices, as an essential measures of nuclear
disarmament as well as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons taking
into account the I995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item
and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should
be nondiscriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.
27. The States parties regret the continuing lack of progress on items
relevant to nuclear issues in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.
ArticleVII
28. The States Parties express support on measures taken by a State
Party or Group of States Parties to conclude nuclear-weapon-free-zone
treaties. They also support proposals to these zones in other parts
of the world where they do not exist, such as the Middle East and
South Asia, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the
States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening
of nuclear non-proliferation regime and realizing the objectives of
nuclear disarmament. States Parties welcome the initiative taken by
States in Central Asia freely arrived at among themselves to establish
a nuclear-weapon free zone in that region.
29. The States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco,
Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba that are parties to the NPT reaffirm
their commitment to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties,
explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including
the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern
hemisphere and adjacent areas.
Article VIII
30. The States Parties will continue their endeavors to strengthen
the review process of the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring
that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty
in their entirety are being realized.
Article IX
3 1. The States Parties reemphasize the urgency and the importance
of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession
to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing
nuclear capabilities. They will make determined efforts to achieve
this goal.
Security Assurances
32. The States Parties reaffirm that total elimination of nuclear
weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapons
states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending
the achievement of such a goal, a legally-binding negative security
assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon
states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be
urgently concluded. Hence, the States Parties should agree to negotiate,
in the Preparatory Committee meetings for the NPT Review Conference
in the year 2000 on a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear weapon
states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be finally
adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference as an annexed protocol to
the NPT. They note the Ad-hoc Committee on NSA established by the
Conference on Disarmament in 1998 to conclude an international legally-binding
instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons.
The Resolution on the Middle East
33. The States Parties recall that the adoption of the Resolution
on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on
11 May 1995 constituted an integral part of the package of the 1995
outcome comprising three decisions and a Resolution, and as such they
reaffirm their firm commitment to work towards the full implementation
of that Resolution. In this regard, the States parties recognize the
special responsibility of the depository states, as cosponsors of
the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
34. The States Parties note that since the adoption of the 1995 Resolution
on the Middle East, all states in the region have become parties to
the Treaty, with the exception of Israel. The States parties stress
the urgent need for Israel to accede to the Treaty without further
delay and to place all its nuclear facilities under full scope IAEA
safeguards, in order to enhance the universality of the Treaty and
to avert the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
35. The nuclear-weapon-states, in conformity with their obligations
udder Article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly to Israel,
and further undertake not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce
Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive
devices under any circumstances whatsoever.
36. All States Parties, in conformity with the seventh preambular
paragraph and Article 4 of the Treaty, hereby declare their commitment
to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear related equipment,
information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the
extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific
or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party
to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under
fullscope IAEA safeguards.
37. The States parties reaffirm once again, their determination to
extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts
with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East
a zone free of nuclear as well as all other weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems.
777 UN Plaza - 6th Floor - New York, NY - 10017 - Ph: 212.682.1265 - Fax: 212.286.8211 - info@reachingcriticalwill.org
This site was created by Kache Productions ©2008
|
