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Draft elements on principles
to
promote nuclear disarmament
Working paper submitted by Germany for Main Committee
I
The German delegation believes that the final document of the Review
Conference could usefully include reference to principles which
would give guidance and promote further nuclear disarmament. It
proposes that the attached principles be included in the final document:
The Conference agrees that the principles of transparency, irreversibility,
confidence-building and accountability constitute an indispensable
framework to further nuclear disarmament.
The Conference also agrees that the principle of irreversibility
should guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and
arms control, as a contribution to the maintenance and reinforcement
of international peace, security and stability, taking these conditions
into account. The Conference notes that the application of the principle
of irreversibility is not compatible with measures that undermine
the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
The Conference expresses its conviction that increased transparency
as a voluntary confidence-building measure supports mutual confidence
and furthers progress in nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon
States Parties to the Treaty undertake to examine and, where possible,
apply to themselves, measures as those already taken by some nuclear-weapon
States Parties.
The Conference confirms that confidence-building remains an essential
instrument of cooperative security policy in the twenty-first century.
It underpins international security and stability and thus furthers
the process of nuclear disarmament. The Conference notes the statement
of the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty that none of
their nuclear weapons are targeted at any State. The Conference
invites the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to build
in the forthcoming review period on this.
The Conference is convinced that accountability by the nuclear-weapon
States Parties to the Treaty strengthens the Treaty. The Conference
invites the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to use appropriate
multilateral forums, such as the strengthened review process, for
continuing and enhancing their accountability.
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