Working Paper Submitted by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Working paper submitted by
Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway,
complementary to the European Union Common Position, for
consideration in Main Committee I and Subsidiary Body 1

1. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)*

1. States parties will make every effort to ensure the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), but not later than the 2005 Review Conference, through ratification without delay and without conditions, especially by those 44 States whose ratification is required for its entry into force.

2. Fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT)*

2. States parties undertake, without any preconditions, to immediately commence negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament of 1995 and the mandate contained therein, and to achieve their successful conclusion at the earliest possible date, but not later than the 2005 Review Conference. Pending the entry into force, States parties will observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

3. Further measures to be taken in the framework of para. 4 (C)*

(a) Non-strategic nuclear weapons

3. States parties underline the importance of the announcement by the United States of America and the Russian Federation that they would unilaterally implement reductions in the non-strategic nuclear weapons. They encourage the United States and the Russian Federation to proceed with the reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent and irreversible manner and to include the reduction and ultimate elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the overall nuclear arms reduction negotiations.

(b) Transparency and accountability

4. States parties confirm the importance of measures aimed at increasing transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals. In particular, such measures could include a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to provide periodically the aggregated numbers of warheads, delivery systems and stocks of fissile materials for explosive purposes in their possession. Nuclear-weapon States undertake to provide periodically within the framework of the strengthened review process a written account of the progress achieved towards the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Principles and Objectives.

(c) Conference on Disarmament

5. States parties agree to pursue as a matter of priority intensive consultations on appropriate ways and means to establish without delay in the Conference on Disarmament an ad hoc working group for the exchange of information and views on endeavours towards nuclear disarmament.

(d) Fissile materials

6. States parties agree to consider options for dealing with fissile material, which could include arrangements regarding weapons-usable fissile material that is designated as excess or that is designated for non-explosive purposes. These options could further include voluntary measures regarding weapons-usable fissile material related to military inventories with a view to achieving increased transparency, which could prepare the ground for ultimately agreed irreversible net reductions.

4. Negative security assurances

7. States parties agree that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

* Item already tabled in Subsidiary Body 1 as NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/SB.1/CRP.1.