Working Paper Submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, ...

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Export controls

Working paper submitted to Main Committee II by Australia, Austria, Canada,
Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden

1. The Conference reaffirms that each State Party to the Treaty has undertaken not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by Article III of the Treaty.

2. The Conference urges all States Parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports to non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty do not assist any nuclear-weapon programme. The Conference reiterates that each States Party should not transfer any nuclear-related items to any recipient whatsoever unless the transfer is in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly in Articles I, II, III and IV. The Conference reaffirms the sovereign right and obligation of each State Party in implementing its national export policy, consistent with Articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, not to transfer nuclear-related items to non-nuclear-weapon States, taking into account, inter alia, arrangements mutually agreed upon between the States Parties concerned, if such exports will contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference further reaffirms that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

3. The Conference notes the complementary and important role of national export- and import-control mechanisms in giving effect to States Parties' obligations under Articles I, II and III not to contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Conference recognizes that such controls are intended to provide an environment of confidence for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

4. The Conference recognizes that coordination of national policies to this end can contribute to the non-proliferation objectives of the Treaty and facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technical information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in accordance with Article IV.

5. The Conference notes that a number of States Parties engaged in the supply of nuclear material and equipment have met regularly as an informal group known as the Zangger Committee, in order to coordinate their implementation of Article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty. To this end, these States have adopted certain understandings, including a list of items triggering IAEA safeguards, for their export to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty, as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/209 as amended.

6. The Conference invites all States to adopt the understandings of the Zangger Committee in connection with any nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty. The Conference recommends that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation be reviewed from time to time to take into account advances in technology and changes in procurement practices.

7. The Conference recommends that States Parties consider further ways to improve the measures to prevent the diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive purposes, or nuclear-weapon capabilities.

8. The Conference notes that a number of States Parties also cooperate through guidelines for their nuclear-related exports, as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/254 as amended.

9. The Conference requests that the Zangger Committee and any other supplier arrangement should continue to take appropriate measures to ensure that the export guidelines formulated by them do not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States Parties, in conformity with Articles I, II, III and IV.

10. The Conference recognizes that there are items of equipment, technology and materials not identified in Article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty that are relevant to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore to the Treaty as a whole. Without prejudice to the existing principles guiding international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially Article IV of the Treaty, the Conference in this regard calls for consultations among States to ensure that their supply and export controls are appropriately coordinated.

11. The Conference recommends that transparency in export controls should continue to be promoted within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States Parties to the Treaty. In this regard, the Conference welcomes the two International Seminars on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation organized by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, held in 1997 in Vienna and 1999 in New York. The Conference also welcomes other continuing efforts by nuclear suppliers to respond to the call by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference for the promotion of transparency in nuclear-export controls.