Working Paper Submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada...

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Safeguards in nuclear-weapon States and States with unsafeguarded inventories

Working paper submitted to Main Committee II by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden

1. The Conference calls on nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to reaffirm their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly or indirectly.

2. The Conference affirms the importance of commitments by nuclear-weapon States that nuclear supplies for peaceful purposes will not be used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference strongly believes that these supplies for peaceful purposes should be subject to the safeguards agreements concluded between the nuclear-weapon States and IAEA.

3. The Conference notes with appreciation that all nuclear-weapon States have now concluded additional protocols to their voluntary offer safeguards agreements. The Conference urges them to broaden the scope of those additional protocols so as to incorporate as many measures, capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the model Additional Protocol, as possible.

4. The Conference welcomes the announcement made by some nuclear-weapon States that they have ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices and urges those that have not done so to make a similar announcement. The Conference commends IAEA for making its experience in the verification of nuclear non-proliferation available to the Conference on Disarmament in connection with the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

5. The Conference underlines the importance of the conclusions of the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit of April 1996, and the initiatives stemming from it, including in relation to the safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes.

6. The Conference underlines the importance of international verification of the transfer to peaceful or non-proscribed military utilization of nuclear-weapon materials that have been withdrawn from weapons use. The Conference welcomes and supports recent unilateral offers and mutual initiatives to place excess material under IAEA safeguards and urges all nuclear-weapon States to submit for verification any nuclear materials and nuclear installations that may be transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities by submitting them to the IAEA safeguards system.

7. The Conference urges all States not yet parties to the Treaty, particularly those three which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to conclude without delay comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA and Additional Protocols consistent with the model contained in INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), and to become Parties to the Treaty without delay and without conditions.