1.1 Paragraph 7 of the Decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons that dealt with "Strengthening the Review
Process for the Treaty" tasked future Review Conferences
with looking forward as well as back, evaluating the results of
the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of
undertakings of the States Parties under the Treaty, and identifying
the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress
should be sought in the future.
1.2 Paragraphs 9 to 13 of the "Principles and Objectives
for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", which was
adopted as Decision 2 at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference,
and which addressed forward-looking elements address the safeguards
issue. Several of these paragraphs deal with issues that have
already been addressed in the intervening period, and others deal
with issues where the wording can be strengthened.
2.1 Proposed language
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the competent
authority responsible for verifying and assuring in accordance with
the Statute of IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance
with its safeguards agreements with States Parties undertaken in
fulfilment of their obligations under article III(1) of the Treaty,
with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing
should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard.
States Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with
the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States Parties should
direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information,
to IAEA for it to consider, investigate, draw independent conclusions
and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its Statute.
Explanatory note
Paragraph 9 of the Principles and Objectives has been amended by
emphasizing "independent" conclusions to be drawn by IAEA
and changing "mandate" to "statute".
2.2 Proposed language
All States Parties required by Article III of the Treaty to sign
and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which
have not yet done so should do so without delay. This includes States
Parties without substantial nuclear activities which should receive
appropriate assistance in this regard.
Explanatory note
Paragraph 10 of the Principles and Objectives has been amended
as indicated, the reason being that States with little or no nuclear
activities may not have the knowledge or infrastructure to conclude
and implement the required formalities.
2.3 Proposed language
All States Parties should also sign and bring into force the Additional
Protocol to Safeguards Agreements.
Explanatory note
This is new language (relating to the Additional Protocol) and
the emphasis is on "all" States Parties. Some nuclear-weapon
States have already concluded Additional Protocols.
2.4 Proposed language
States not party to the Treaty should be urged to enter into comprehensive
safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol with IAEA.
Explanatory note
This language is a restatement of the last part of the paragraph
11 of the Principles and Objectives but with the addition of the
Additional Protocol.
2.5 Proposed language
The safeguards measures under comprehensive safeguards agreements,
the measures adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors to strengthen
safeguards and new measures provided by the Additional Protocol
and technological advances, should be integrated into a flexible,
effective and cost-efficient new safeguards system to detect the
diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices and to provide credible assurance of the absence
of undeclared material and activities. The effectiveness and cost-efficiency
of IAEA safeguards should be regularly reviewed and evaluated.
Explanatory note
This is new language (with some elements of paragraph 11 of the
Principles and Objectives) focusing on the integration of traditional
and new safeguards measures and combining the elements of non-diversion
and the detection of undeclared activities.
2.6 Proposed language
New supply arrangements for the transfer of nuclear material or
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing,
use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon
States should require, as necessary preconditions, the application
of comprehensive IAEA safeguards and State-to-State assurances not
to acquire or build nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
and to require the same conditions and assurances on further transfers
of the material or equipment to third parties.
Explanatory note
This language is similar to paragraph 12 of the Principles and
Objectives. The reference in the Principles and Objectives to "internationally
legally binding commitments" outside the context of the Treaty
is not clear. The following approach is consequently recommended:
(a) Require "comprehensive" safeguards, that is, of the
type required by the Treaty;
(b) Require "State-to-State assurances";
(c) Require control over re-transfers.
2.7 Proposed language
Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful
nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under
appropriate IAEA verification arrangements in the framework of the
voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon
States. The verification arrangements should ensure the irreversible
removal of fissile material from military to peaceful use. Comprehensive
safeguards and the Additional Protocol should be universally applied
once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.
Explanatory note
Addresses the issues raised in paragraph 13 of the Principles and
Objectives amended as follows:
(a) IAEA "safeguards" for ex-weapons materials has been
changed to "appropriate IAEA verification arrangements"
since normal safeguards implementation with direct access to materials
is not possible;
(b) A statement on the irreversibility of the process is added.
