Working Paper Submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada ... -- Introduction

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Introduction

Working paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden

1. The Conference recalls the generally positive assessment of the previous reviews of the implementation of Article III, and notes that recommendations at previous Conferences for the future implementation of that article provide a helpful basis for States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen the barriers to proliferation and provide assurance of compliance with non-proliferation undertakings.

2. The Conference reaffirms that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is vital to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and in providing significant security benefits. The Parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance with its provisions is the best way to achieve this goal and they urge all States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it and conclude and bring into force the required safeguards agreements.

3. The Conference recognizes that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty. The Conference reaffirms that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States Parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under Article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard.

4. The Conference notes with satisfaction that, since the last Review Conference, with the two regrettable exceptions caused by non-compliance with their safeguards agreements by two States Parties, the IAEA has continued to provide States Parties with assurance that nuclear material that had been declared and placed under safeguards had not been diverted for any military purpose or for purposes unknown, or that facilities, equipment, or non-nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards had not been misused. While the Conference commends the Agency on its effort, it notes with concern that, since December 1998, IAEA has been unable to implement its mandate in Iraq pursuant to the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and is therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

5. The Conference emphasizes the importance of access to the United Nations Security Council by the Director-General of IAEA and the vital role of the Council in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to it by the Agency.