President: Mr. Baali (Algeria)
later: Mr. Gorita (Vice-President) (Romania)
later: Mr. Baali (President) (Algeria)

Contents

General debate (continued)

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (continued)

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee (continued)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. Goerens (Luxembourg) said the fact that 187 States, including the five nuclear Powers, had become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) demonstrated the vital importance of that instrument and its impact on the maintenance of world peace and security. Unfortunately, however, four countries, including India and Pakistan, which had recently conducted nuclear tests, thus endangering security in their region, remained outside the Treaty. He urged those countries to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the Treaty as soon as possible. He was also alarmed at efforts by some States parties to the Treaty to develop nuclear weapons, in clear violation of their Treaty obligations.

2. Although Luxembourg had decided not to have nuclear power plants on its territory, it benefited from a number of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, particularly for medical and research purposes. His country had always pursued a strict nuclear non-proliferation policy and had established machinery to combat trafficking in sensitive nuclear material and equipment.

3. The nuclear Powers had not made as much progress towards nuclear disarmament as had been hoped. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation's ratification of the second of the strategic arms reduction treaties, START II, was an encouraging development. However, that historic breakthrough had to be consolidated through the ratification of the related protocol and the implementation of the Treaty on schedule. It was equally encouraging that the Russian Federation and the United States of America had stated their willingness to begin negotiations on START III. A substantial reduction in non-strategic nuclear weapons was also necessary in the near future.

4. In the area of non-proliferation, the 13 non-nuclear-weapon States members of the European Union together with France and the United Kingdom had concluded three additional protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Some of the States members of the Union had already ratified their additional protocol, while others, including Luxembourg, would do so in the near future. All those States that had not yet concluded additional protocols with the Agency, should do so without delay.

5. His delegation welcomed the improvement in the political situation in the Middle East and the efforts being undertaken by all the parties concerned to work to bring lasting peace to that region. He hoped that such efforts would have a positive impact on the universal implementation of the Treaty as well as on efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region.

6. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was of utmost importance to nuclear disarmament. He therefore urged those States among the 44 whose accession was required for its entry into force, to assume their responsibilities without further delay. In that regard, the decision by the Russian Federation to ratify the CTBT was a significant breakthrough. He trusted that that bold step would encourage the two other nuclear-weapon States that had still not acceded to the Treaty, as well as India and Pakistan, to ratify it in the near future.

7. It was regrettable that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had not yet started within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. He hoped that one of the positive outcomes of the current work of the Conference would be the start of those negotiations.

8. Mr. Sun Joun-yung (Republic of Korea) said that, in order to make the NPT a strong and effective regime, the Review Conference must address the major issues of nuclear disarmament and the immediate programme of action, universality, non-compliance, safeguards and negative security assurances. The main responsibility for nuclear disarmament rested with the nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, he welcomed the Russian Federation's ratification of START II and looked forward to the commencement of the START III negotiations. He hoped that nuclear-weapon States would reduce their nuclear arsenals and enhance the transparency of the process by submitting the relevant documents as well as their future plans in that regard during periodic NPT review conferences. Moreover, nuclear-weapon States should try to lessen their dependence on nuclear weapons in their military strategies. It was time to enhance a multilateral exchange of information and views on nuclear disarmament. His delegation would support the establishment of an ad hoc working group in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament for that purpose.

9. He called upon all States that had not yet signed or and ratified the CTBT, especially those States among the 44 whose accession was required for its entry into force, to do so without further delay. The nuclear-weapon States must provide leadership in that regard. His delegation therefore welcomed the recent decision of the Russian Federation to ratify the CTBT and urged China and the United States of America to expedite their ratification processes. Moreover, negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty should begin immediately and, pending the conclusion of an agreement, a moratorium should be placed on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

10. Universality and strict observance of the NPT were central to preserving its role in the maintenance of international peace and security. He therefore urged the international community to redouble its efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race in South Asia, in the wake of the nuclear tests conducted there, and to call upon the States concerned to implement Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) as soon as possible. Moreover, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan should accede to the Treaty. No States other than the current five nuclear-weapon States should be recognized as such, nor should any new category of States be created under the NPT.

11. He expressed concern over the non-compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the IAEA safeguards agreement and called upon that country to implement that agreement fully and faithfully. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement and hoped that the Agency would establish an integrated safeguards system as soon as practical. His delegation upheld the principle that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT that fully complied with their obligations had a legitimate right to receive assurances from nuclear-weapon States that the latter would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

12. Mr. Gorita (Romania), Vice-President, took the Chair.

13. Mr. Mra (Myanmar) said that Myanmar was strongly in favour of nuclear disarmament and was fully committed to its realization. Apart from the conclusion of the CTBT, there had been no tangible achievement in the implementation of the NPT since its indefinite extension in 1995. Two of the threshold States had established their de facto nuclear-weapon status by conducting nuclear tests, which had seriously set back the non-proliferation regime. Moreover, two nuclear-weapon States had yet to ratify the CTBT. It was necessary to build a stronger international consensus to discourage any new development of nuclear weapons and to dismantle the existing weapons. The nuclear Powers should set an example in that area. His delegation welcomed the decision by the Russian Federation to ratify START II and the CTBT. The ratification of START II paved the way for the commencement of negotiations on START III.

14. At the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties, his delegation had submitted some proposals for incorporation into the document on Principles and Objectives, and a programme of action on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. His delegation believed that universal adherence to the NPT remained an urgent priority. The best defence against a nuclear catastrophe remained the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only genuine guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones through the adoption of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba had gone a long way in limiting the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons and enhancing global and regional peace and security. He urged all States parties to call for an early entry into force of the protocols, which had still to be ratified by the nuclear-weapon States, through the swift resolution of the remaining issues in a spirit of amity and cooperation.

15. Mr. Wehbe (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his country had been one of the first in the Middle East to sign the NPT and noted that all Arab States of the Middle East had since then become parties to the Treaty. Israel, however, had so far shown no intention of doing so or of placing its nuclear installations under the comprehensive safeguards regime of the IAEA. The Syrian Arab Republic had been the first to call for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Yet Israel had failed to respond to any call from the United Nations or the international community as a whole to achieve that goal.

16. The Treaty had been in force for some 30 years, but universality of adherence to it had not been achieved, the world was not a more secure place after the end of the cold war, and nuclear weapons continued to proliferate. The non-nuclear-weapon States might well wonder to what extent the nuclear-weapon States parties had fulfilled their commitments to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons, prevent proliferation and help non-nuclear-weapon States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

17. Although the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes was a legitimate right of all parties to the Treaty, double standards prevailed: the nuclear-weapon States which exported nuclear material hindered the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties, even though the latter were committed to subjecting their nuclear installations to international inspection. Yet at the same time those exporting States covertly and overtly transferred advanced nuclear technology to Israel. Indeed, one nuclear-weapon State had agreed to give Israeli scientists access to its nuclear establishments, enabling Israel to improve its nuclear technology and develop nuclear weapons. Such actions violated the Treaty in letter and spirit. The security guarantees which the nuclear-weapon States had given to the non-nuclear-weapon States did not satisfy the requirements of the latter and did nothing to dispel their fears, since those guarantees were non-binding and had not been negotiated in an international forum.

18. It was therefore important to begin negotiations on the drafting of a binding document providing comprehensive security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The IAEA comprehensive safeguards system was a major factor in preserving nuclear peace in the world, and it was incumbent on all States parties under article III to conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency.

19. His delegation wondered how long the nuclear-weapon States would continue to defend Israel, which used its nuclear power for aggression and expansion, pursued an ambiguous policy in respect of its nuclear facilities and ignored all appeals of the international community. Pressure must be brought to bear on Israel to induce it to accede to the Treaty and subject its nuclear facilities to Agency supervision. Its continued military occupation of Arab territories and its continued defiance of international commitments and agreements threatened to destabilize peace and security in the region.

20. At the 1995 Conference, the nuclear-weapon States had achieved their goal — the indefinite extension of the Treaty — but had not yet fulfilled their part of the compact, which was to address the grievances of the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the deficiencies of the Treaty. His delegation appealed to States to make the Treaty universal and called upon the nuclear-weapon States to abide by article VI. Furthermore, profoundly concerned over Israel's behaviour and its rejection of the Treaty, it urgently advocated a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. That could be achieved only if Israel acceded to the Treaty and placed its nuclear facilities under international control.

21. His Government endorsed the resolution recently adopted by the League of Arab States, which had called for: a comprehensive review of compliance by States parties with the commitments undertaken at the 1995 Conference; renewed emphasis on the fact that Israel's continuation of its nuclear programme outside the purview of the Treaty and its refusal to accede to the Treaty and to subject its nuclear facilities to IAEA supervision constituted a direct threat to international peace and security and undermined the credibility of the non-proliferation regime; renewed efforts by all States parties, and particularly the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, as sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference, to induce Israel to accede to the Treaty and to subject its nuclear installations to the safeguards regime; reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their commitment under article I of the Treaty not to assist Israel in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; the creation of a subsidiary body of Main Committee II to review the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; and renewed efforts to transform the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

22. In conclusion, his delegation called on the States parties, and particularly the Depositary Governments, to put pressure on Israel to heed the appeals of the international community so as to banish the nuclear nightmare and bring about stability and peace in the Middle East.

23. Mr. Shihab (Maldives) said that, although the optimism generated by the end of the cold war had not produced the hoped-for results, the past 50 years had seen major progress towards nuclear disarmament and arms control at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The CTBT had become a reality, several nuclear-weapon-free zones had been declared, the number of nuclear weapons had been almost halved, the world's military expenditure had declined by about 30 per cent during the past two decades alone, and START II had finally been ratified, paving the way for negotiations on START III. Nevertheless, hundreds of nuclear warheads remained; weapons research, production and testing continued unabated; there had been no progress towards the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty and the threat of nuclear terrorism loomed.

24. No State party to the Treaty should ignore its obligations under that instrument or interpret the Treaty in any way contrary to the intended objectives. The indefinite extension and near-universality of the Treaty had reaffirmed its validity as the basis for the non-proliferation regime. However, developments since the 1995 Conference had shown the importance of achieving universal ratification of the Treaty and improving implementation of its provisions.

25. The nuclear-weapon States had an obligation to provide unconditional, legally binding security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States and to refrain from sharing nuclear material, equipment or technology with non-nuclear-weapon States or States not parties to the Treaty. Moreover, all States parties should have an equal right, without discrimination, to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

26. His Government supported all efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and called for urgent measures that would make it possible to establish such a zone in the Middle East. It was firmly opposed to nuclear testing and called on those who had not yet become parties to the CTBT to do so as soon as possible and without conditions.

27. The relationship between disarmament and development could not be overemphasized; there could be no rationale for spending billions of dollars on weapons of mass destruction when millions of people were plagued by poverty, hunger, malnutrition and disease. Funds spent on military build-up should be diverted to the eradication of poverty and disease throughout the world, and an increased portion of the resources made available through the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements should be made available for economic and social development with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between the developed and developing countries.

28. Mr. Grudziñski (Poland) said that his Government was convinced that the Treaty remained the mainstay of the global non-proliferation regime and a principal element of international peace and security. Since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Poland had ratified the CTBT and was actively involved in the proceedings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna. Its safeguards agreement with the IAEA had been in force since 1972; it had recently ratified the additional protocol to that agreement and urged other States parties to do the same; and its National Atomic Energy Agency was working to bring national legislation into line with the international instruments to which Poland was a party.

29. He was concerned at the fact that three of the four States not parties to the Treaty were believed to possess nuclear-weapon capability and that two of them, India and Pakistan, had carried out nuclear-weapon tests, thereby placing in jeopardy both the Treaty and international peace and security. It was also disturbing that some nuclear-weapon States had not yet ratified the CTBT. He therefore welcomed the Russian Federation's recent decision to ratify that instrument and was encouraged by the continued efforts of the Administration of the United States of America to induce Congress to follow suit. He hoped that China would also pursue ratification and that the United States of America and the Russian Federation would soon begin START III negotiations. He was pleased that two nuclear-weapon States, France and the United Kingdom, had unilaterally reduced their nuclear arsenals and made them more transparent, thereby contributing to the development of a climate of confidence among countries, but it was disappointing that the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to undertake productive negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

30. A new nuclear arms race would threaten the existing international security balance. He therefore urged the Governments of certain Asian and Middle Eastern States to comply fully with their safeguards obligations. He also welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), which had established a new United Nations monitoring, verification and inspection commission for Iraq, and called for its full and early implementation.

31. The past five years had shown that, while the strengthened review process developed in 1995 did not require any major change, it needed a more effective implementation mechanism. Substantial progress having been made during the past five years, the 2000 Review Conference should focus on a positive, realistic programme of action that would reinforce the Treaty and thereby consolidate international peace and security.

32. Mr. Arcaya (Venezuela) said that while he was encouraged by the fact that various States had become parties to the Treaty since 1995 and by the entry into force of the CTBT, a number of negative developments had cast doubt on the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and created a climate of uncertainty and confusion in the area of disarmament. The lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament, the nuclear tests carried out in South Asia, the increased emphasis on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence by nuclear-weapon States and the possible deployment of a national anti-missile defence system had hindered the development of genuine cooperation for arms control. He hoped that the 2000 Review Conference would help to restore the confidence necessary to that process and called on States parties to display flexibility in order to overcome difficulties and ensure implementation of the decisions taken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

33. Given its commitment to nuclear disarmament, as reflected in its accession to the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, his Government was discouraged by the delays in implementation of START II and by the fact that START III negotiations had not yet begun. When the Treaty had been extended indefinitely in 1995, it had hoped that both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States would assume their obligations under that instrument in a balanced manner. However, to date, the nuclear-weapon States had failed to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty. While the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT was gratifying, it was more important than ever for all nuclear-weapon States to further decrease their nuclear arsenals.

34. He endorsed the proposals made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and by the representative of Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. In particular, he supported those who had called for nuclear weapons to be progressively taken off alert status, for nuclear warheads to be separated from their systems of delivery and for the non-deployment of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. His Government attached great importance to the development of a binding legal instrument establishing standards and principles to provide security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

35. Negotiations on a multilateral fissile material cut-off treaty should be initiated as quickly as possible; in the interim, nuclear-weapon States should agree to a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The decision recently taken by the Government of the United Kingdom was an encouraging step in that direction.

36. He hoped that the Russian Federation's recent decision to ratify the CTBT would lead other nuclear-weapon States not yet parties to that instrument to follow suit. It was also important to increase the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including scientific research, electrical power, agriculture, medicine and industry, through international cooperation with developing countries.

37. He welcomed the nuclear-weapon-free zones established under the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok and supported the establishment of such zones in other regions such as the Middle East and Central Asia. In that regard, he welcomed the Mongolian Government's decision to declare its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

38. Mr. Abulhasan (Kuwait) noted that adequate progress had still not been made towards eliminating nuclear stockpiles and freeing the world of nuclear weapons. The spectre of a nuclear war was ever-present, and nuclear arsenals continued to proliferate outside the purview of IAEA. However, the opportunity remained for the nuclear-weapon States to show serious intentions of abandoning their nuclear weapons and stockpiles. In that regard, he welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT.

39. As the Secretary-General had noted, there were in the world more than 35,000 nuclear missiles, a small fraction of which would be sufficient to reduce the world to ashes. His Government hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would heed the appeals of the peoples and Governments of the world to renounce their nuclear weapons and stockpiles, for which no justification remained. It reminded the nuclear-weapon States of their obligation to refrain from encouraging or assisting other States in the manufacture or acquisition of such weapons, and drew attention to the unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. A spirit of pessimism and grave concern prevailed among the peoples of the world regarding the failure to realize nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, peace being sacrificed in favour of selfish national interests.

40. Iraq had still failed to comply with Security Council resolutions on renouncing weapons of mass destruction. That failure had been borne out by the Director General of IAEA, who had indicated earlier in the Conference that the Agency had not been in a position during the past two years to implement its mandate from the Security Council, namely, to guarantee that Iraq had complied with its commitments. Ever since Iraq had ceased its cooperation, the Security Council had spared no effort to induce it to resume cooperation but had been compelled to conclude that Iraq had not fully complied with its resolutions and had not cooperated with United Nations inspectors. There were many steps which Iraq must still take. His Government therefore renewed its appeal to Iraq to renounce its weapons of mass destruction. He welcomed the establishment in December 1999 by the Security Council of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and hoped that Iraq would be prompted to cooperate with it.

41. The fact that all the Arab States had become parties to the NPT had not provided the minimum security requirements to ward off the Israeli nuclear threat. Israel, the only State in the region not a party to the Treaty, continued to defy the appeals of the international community and refused to allow IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities. Its actions destabilized the balance of power in the Middle East and threatened international peace and security. The international community should put pressure on Israel to eliminate its nuclear arsenal and to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Conference and to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime. It should call on all States to cease providing any assistance that might contribute to Israel's nuclear programme. Israel's actions clearly contradicted its claim that it desired peace.

42. His delegation welcomed the accession by nine States, including three Arab States, to the Treaty. They were currently undertaking procedures to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA. The world looked forward to a twenty-first century of peace and stability, and a way must be found to eliminate nuclear weapons and to cease all nuclear tests. His delegation welcomed the expression of good intentions by the nuclear-weapon States in their statements at the Conference. It earnestly called on those nuclear-weapon States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so or suffer the censure of future generations.

43. Mr. Baali resumed the Chair.

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (continued)

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee (continued)

44. The President said that rule 3 of the rules of procedure provided that, in addition to the election of the Chairman and the two Vice-Chairmen, the Conference should appoint six members of the Credentials Committee on the proposal of the President of the Conference. He therefore proposed the appointment of Austria, Chile, Morocco, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt that proposal.

45. It was so decided.

46. Austria, Chile, Morocco, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland were appointed members of the Credentials Committee.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

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