President: Mr. Balboni Acqua (Vice-President) (Italy)
later: Mr. Martynov (Vice-President) (Belarus)

Contents

General debate (continued)

In the absence of the President, Mr. Balboni Acqua (Italy), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. Köffler (Austria) said that the task before the Conference was first and foremost to reaffirm the commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Austria had been among the first countries to sign and ratify the Treaty, in 1968, and ever since, it had demonstrated its firm support to that landmark Treaty and advocated its ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. His delegation joined in the calls for universal adherence to the Treaty.
2. With regard to vertical non-proliferation, important disarmament measures had been undertaken and real cuts achieved since 1995. His delegation especially welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the second of the strategic arms reduction treaties, START II, and its Protocol and hoped that negotiations on a START III agreement could soon commence. It also applauded the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the establishment of the provisional technical secretariat of the Preparatory Commission in Vienna. Thus far, 155 States had signed that Treaty and 55 States had ratified it. The signatories must now provide the necessary funding to continue to build up the comprehensive verification system so that it would be fully operational once the Treaty entered into force.

3. The challenge of banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other devices as foreseen in the "Principles and Objectives" of the 1995 review had not been met. During its presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, Austria had made every effort to translate the existing consensus into concrete negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, and although it had not succeeded, it would continue its efforts.

4. As host country of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Austria attached particular importance to the implementation of NPT-related safeguards agreements. The measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol would also strengthen the safeguards system and the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

5. In focusing on the way ahead, it was important that the "Principles and Objectives" adopted at the 1995 Conference should remain intact and be put into action. His delegation favoured the idea of a plan of action for the coming five-year period in order to achieve a more systematic review of implementation, which would contain both unresolved issues from past reviews and new initiatives. The interests of both non-nuclear-weapon States and States possessing nuclear weapons must be taken into account as well. Such a programme would include a number of elements, including the early entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. A comprehensive strategy had been presented at the previous meeting by the representative of Norway, which could provide an interesting basis for those negotiations. Irreversible reduction and destruction of strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals, universal implementation of the additional protocols to the IAEA safeguards, negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, promotion of existing and new nuclear-weapon-free zones, and guidelines for missiles capable of carrying nuclear, chemical and biological weapons were other elements of such a programme. Transparency and information-sharing, both on a global and on a regional level, needed careful consideration, as public awareness of nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation was growing.

6. Archbishop Tauran (Observer for the Holy See) said that the Holy See had become a Party to the Treaty with a view to promoting peace. The Treaty had been one of the most significant efforts towards disarmament ever undertaken, and its 187 ratifications were the most of any international instrument on disarmament. The Review Conference provided an opportunity to take stock of the implementation of the Treaty's objectives. The preparatory work for the current Conference had shown, unfortunately, how uncertain the situation with regard to non-proliferation remained, despite the indefinite extension of the Treaty agreed in 1995. The Conference also had symbolic significance: at the beginning of a new millennium, humanity was seeking reassurance about its future.

7. Progress in the implementation of article VI of the Treaty had been very slow. The current stage of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament indicated that many still believed in the use of force and counted on nuclear weapons instead of giving priority to the rule of law, mutual trust and the will to engage in dialogue. There had certainly been progress between 1968 and 2000, but goals for the future must be more ambitious. What the world lacked was an authentic culture of peace founded on the primacy of law and respect for human life. The time had come to discard the inherited mindset of the cold war. Only universal and verifiable disarmament would guarantee the necessary climate of trust, collaboration and respect for peace to flourish.

8. Mr. Kukan (Slovakia) said that his delegation aligned itself with the statement given by Portugal on behalf of the European Union and associated countries.

9. In Slovakia, nuclear energy was used solely for peaceful purposes, a principle enshrined in the national legislation. The first nuclear power plant in Slovakia had begun operating in 1972. Since that time, his Government had always attached great importance to nuclear safety and had sought international cooperation. It felt that IAEA played a crucial role in the non-proliferation regime by applying the safeguards system to prevent the conversion of fissile materials from peaceful to military purposes. As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Slovakia vigorously supported the Agency's programme for strengthening safeguards to enhance its ability to detect clandestine nuclear materials and activities. In 1999, Slovakia had signed a new agreement with IAEA on the application of safeguards and an additional protocol to that agreement, which was about to be submitted to the National Council for approval.

10. The IAEA safeguards system could be greatly strengthened by universal application. It was encouraging that the Board of Governors had recently agreed on an additional protocol with the Russian Federation. His delegation urged all States to apply the strengthened safeguards system and to adopt additional protocols, which should follow as closely as possible the wording of the Model Additional Protocol approved by the Board of Governors, to their safeguards agreements concluded under article III of the NPT.

11. His Government had consistently stressed the importance of the CTBT and hoped that the necessary ratifications for its entry into force would soon be obtained. It welcomed the decision of the Russian Federation to ratify the CTBT and START II. Both ratifications should give a positive impulse to global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. By opening the way for negotiations on START III, ratification of START II demonstrated the usefulness of a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament.

12. Slovakia considered the NPT an exceptionally important mechanism for dealing with issues vital to humanity. The number of States parties to the Treaty was evidence of its paramount significance to the international community. It was essential, therefore, to preserve the momentum created at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference in order to minimize the risk of nuclear conflict and further the development of cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind.

13. Mr. Martynov (Belarus) said that the international community could not ignore the external factors affecting the implementation of the non-proliferation regime. His delegation was deeply concerned about the recent nuclear tests in South Asia, the failure to ratify the CTBT, especially by the United States, and the fact that four States remained outside the NPT system. There was reason for hope, however, in the fact that nine new Parties had joined the NPT since the 1995 review, there had been a de facto moratorium on nuclear testing by the five nuclear Powers, and real progress had been made towards disarmament.

14. His Government regarded the NPT as the cornerstone of international security. Its erosion would also erode the systems that kept the world safe. The new challenges to the NPT regime required a new level of commitment and responsibility on the part of its members. Just a few days earlier, the parliament in Belarus had ratified the CTBT, showing a firm commitment to international peace and security. Further progress was needed in universalizing the non-proliferation regime and in bringing all States under IAEA safeguards. Equal and fair access must also be provided to scientific developments in the field of nuclear energy.

15. Belarus had been the first former Soviet republic to renounce nuclear weapons and to remove them from its territory, in 1997. Thus, it was very important to his Government to have a legal framework of guarantees and assurances in place for non-nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, the slow progress towards an agreement on fissile material was disappointing.

16. A realistic and consistent approach was needed to make nuclear disarmament a reality. His Government was deeply concerned at the possibility that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) could be vitiated by the development of a missile-based defence system by one State. That could undermine the entire NPT regime and the system of strategic stability built up over decades. Belarus was actively involved in defending the ABM Treaty.

17. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in several regions of the world was a very important development, and Belarus welcomed the progress made towards establishing a similar zone in Central Asia, as well as the announcement by Mongolia that it had renounced nuclear weapons. The initiative towards such a zone in Central and Eastern Europe also should continue, and he called on other States to strengthen the de facto non-nuclear status of Eastern Europe. His Government also supported efforts in the Middle East to make that region a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and called on all Middle Eastern countries to become parties to the NPT and to put their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Full implementation of article VI of the Treaty was of paramount importance.

18. Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian Federation had borne the brunt of the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster 14 years earlier. The experience had taught them that the human factor was the weak link in the chain of nuclear security. In closing, he expressed the hope that participants in the Conference could find the right balance between their own interests and the future of the world.

19. Mr. Jayanama (Thailand) said that at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference his delegation had initially supported a fixed-period extension of the NPT but had been persuaded to join the consensus for an indefinite extension of the Treaty on the basis of the "package" approach set forth in the decision on the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", which included the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to meet their nuclear disarmament obligations.

20. Since the 1995 Conference, however, little progress had been made. There had been some achievements, including the adoption of the CTBT, the establishment of two additional nuclear-weapon-free zones and the recent decisions by the Russian Federation to ratify START II and CTBT. But the past five years had seen a number of negative trends, including the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, the announced intention of the United States to develop a new national missile defence system, a delay in the entry into force of the CTBT and the announcement by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of its new nuclear doctrine and nuclear-sharing policy.

21. Given that sombre picture, it was not surprising that the three Preparatory Committee sessions had not been able to arrive at substantive recommendations for the 2000 Review Conference. It was now up to the Conference itself to decide what could be done on the three main issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, nuclear-weapon-free zones and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

22. In the past five years, there had been insufficient progress in nuclear disarmament and an increase in nuclear proliferation. Unless the nuclear-weapon States made an unequivocal commitment to engage without delay in negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament, the credibility and viability of the Treaty would be threatened. The conclusion of an internationally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a good starting point. The nuclear-weapon States could then take several other practical steps recommended by the New Agenda coalition, namely: reducing tactical nuclear weapons with a view to their elimination; de-alerting or de-activating and removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles; demonstrating transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals and fissile material inventories; and placing all fissile material for nuclear weapons declared to be in excess of military requirements under IAEA safeguards. His delegation strongly supported those measures, which would reduce the risk of accidental nuclear first strike and serve as confidence-building measures among all States parties to the Treaty.

23. Another important issue was the universality of the Treaty. Until States with nuclear technology became, in one form or another, members of the Treaty regime, complete non-proliferation could not be achieved. Indeed, after the nuclear tests conducted in South Asia in 1998, the goal had became even more elusive.

24. One of the achievements since 1995 had been the increase in nuclear-weapon-free zones. To the treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga had been added the treaties of Bangkok and Pelindaba. In addition, Mongolia had declared its nuclear-weapon-free status and the States of Central Asia were in the process of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

25. Under Thailand's chairmanship, the States parties to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) had been proceeding on two tracks, pursuing the implementation of the treaty provisions while at the same time intensifying consultations with the five nuclear-weapon States to secure their accession to the Protocol to the Treaty. On the first track, the various treaty organs had been set up and had met to consider rules of procedure and future work plans, and consultations had been undertaken with IAEA concerning safeguards, safety issues and assistance. With regard to the Protocol, China had reiterated its readiness to be the first nuclear-weapon State to sign the Protocol. The States parties hoped that the other nuclear-weapon States would show greater flexibility in negotiations on the Protocol.

26. Under article IV of the NPT, States parties had an inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. His delegation therefore believed that the transfer of nuclear technology and the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes should be fully supported. In that regard it commended IAEA for its significant role in promoting nuclear technical cooperation. His delegation felt that the Technical Cooperation Fund, although voluntary in nature, should be treated as a political commitment consistent with treaty obligations. Resources for the Fund should be predictable, adequate and assured. Despite economic difficulties, Thailand had pledged in full its share of the Fund target.

27. Export controls on nuclear technology, although necessary in order to comply with non-proliferation obligations, should be applied in a transparent, realistic and non-discriminatory manner and should in no way hamper the flow of technical cooperation. His delegation believed that nuclear-related export control regimes needed to be reviewed once the new strengthened system of safeguards was fully implemented. A balance should be struck between the promotional and regulatory activities of IAEA.

28. His delegation fully supported the Secretary-General's proposal to convene an international conference, in order to maintain the momentum of the overall nuclear disarmament process. It also welcomed the decision taken by the Conference of States Parties to establish two subsidiary bodies, one under Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons and another under Main Committee II to consider proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East.

29. Mr. Ben Mustapha (Tunisia) said that the near-universal ratification of the Treaty gave it credibility and demonstrated the international community's will to address the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, nuclear arsenals had been reduced and the CTBT had been opened for signature and acceded to by 155 States, including his own. However, it had not yet entered into force, nor had negotiations on a treaty banning the use of fissile material for military purposes been initiated. Moreover, the Conference on Disarmament, the only body responsible for the multilateral negotiation of disarmament treaties, had not even been able to reach agreement on its programme of work. He welcomed the Russian Federation's ratification of START II and said he hoped that negotiations on START III would soon begin.

30. It was disturbing that the CTBT had not yet been ratified by certain nuclear States whose accession was required for its entry into force. He therefore welcomed the holding of the Vienna Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in October 1999.

31. Decision 2 of the 1995 Conference ("Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament") had called for the early conclusion of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Those negotiations should be initiated as soon as possible. Pending nuclear disarmament, effective security assurances should be put in place to protect countries which had voluntarily renounced the use of nuclear weapons — the majority of United Nations Member States — from their use or the threat thereof. Nuclear-weapon States had special obligations in that regard under article VI of the Treaty, and events had shown that there could be no true solution to the problem unless nuclear weapons were totally eliminated and the doctrine of nuclear deterrence was renounced.

32. As a State party to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), Tunisia attached great importance to the creation of such zones and of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction. In that regard, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East remained blocked by Israel's continued refusal to accede to the Treaty despite numerous General Assembly resolutions and the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference. Lastly, he endorsed the appeal of the Non-Aligned Movement for the holding of a conference with a view to the rapid conclusion of an agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons.

33. Mr. Nguyen Thanh Chau (Viet Nam), after recalling that the 1995 decision to extend the Treaty had been reached as part of a politically binding package set forth in the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", including the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate aim of eliminating them, said that he welcomed the recent decision of the Russian Federation to ratify START II and the CTBT. In other respects, however, the events of the past five years with regard to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had been disappointing. The expansion of NATO, its actions in the former Yugoslavia, and the prospective deployment of national missile defence systems undermining the integrity of the ABM Treaty were contentious issues which could have damaging global repercussions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

34. Since 1995 the nuclear-weapon States had made commendable efforts towards reducing their arsenals, but much remained to be done if the NPT was not to lose its credibility. At the 2000 Review Conference it was important that all States parties to the Treaty should reaffirm their unequivocal commitment to the goal of a speedy and total elimination of nuclear weapons. He urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue in good faith and bring to conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in fulfilment of their obligation under article VI of the Treaty, an obligation confirmed by the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice.

35. In the interim, steps should be taken to complement and reinforce the bilateral reductions currently under way. Those interim measures might include the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, removal of nuclear warheads from their delivery systems, agreement not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and greater transparency with regard to stocks of fissile materials. In that regard his delegation fully supported the New Agenda for nuclear disarmament.

36. Since nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were complementary, his delegation joined others in calling for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nuclear-weapon States should put excess military stocks of fissile materials under IAEA safeguards. IAEA should be endowed with the financial and human resources necessary to meet its responsibilities for technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. Control arrangements should not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. Viet Nam was grateful for the technical cooperation and support it had received from IAEA and various countries.

37. One of the few significant achievements of the past five years had been the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996. His country was in the process of ratifying the CTBT and urged the other signatories, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to do likewise.

38. With regard to security assurances, his delegation would like to reiterate that the only genuine guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending achievement of that goal, all the nuclear-weapon States must commit themselves, without any conditions, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and to conclude international legally binding instruments to that effect. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, by voluntarily renouncing their nuclear option, were entitled to receive such assurances.

39. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones had made a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament, confidence-building and security. For such zones to be effective, commitments by the nuclear-weapon States were indispensable. For example, his delegation felt that the accession of all nuclear-weapon States to the Protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was essential for confidence-building.

40. The NPT had played a vital role in preventing nuclear proliferation, but its continued success depended on the cooperation of States parties in adhering to the Treaty, and much of the responsibility lay in the hands of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2000 Review Conference should arrive at a balanced assessment of progress since 1995 and take a forward-looking approach that identified areas and means for further progress in implementing the Treaty. The participants must provide the review process with clearer terms of reference to ensure that the NPT remained a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.

41. Mr. Martynov (Belarus), Vice-President, took the Chair.

42. Mr. Herman (Hungary) said that his delegation aligned itself with the statement made by the Presidency of the European Union. While his delegation shared many of the concerns expressed about the prospects of nuclear non-proliferation, it believed that the current situation was not all that bleak. Welcome developments since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference included the development of the IAEA Additional Protocol and the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT. Moreover, steps had been taken by some nuclear-weapon States to increase transparency and reduce nuclear armaments.

43. The decisions and the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference provided a solid basis for the further promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and the achievement of the ultimate goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. A consistent effort by the current Conference to build a consensus in identifying the areas where progress could be achieved coupled with a focus on practical measures would result in a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regime. He reaffirmed his delegation's support for Security Council resolution 1172 (1998), in particular paragraph 13 thereof. Hungary, one of the 44 countries that had to ratify the CTBT for it to enter into force, had already adopted the relevant legislation.

44. Nuclear-weapon-free zones played an important role in enhancing regional peace and security and promoting nuclear non-proliferation. His delegation endorsed the guidelines adopted at the most recent session of the Disarmament Commission to the effect that such zones must be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. In that regard, positive developments in the Middle East peace process would undoubtedly be instrumental in promoting the idea of making the Middle East a region free from nuclear weapons.

45. Hungary steadfastly supported the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while also stressing the need for proper implementation of relevant safeguards. It was among the countries that had concluded an additional protocol with IAEA. It urged all States that had not yet done so, to do likewise.

46. Mr. Ogunbanwo (Nigeria) said that the NPT had undoubtedly contributed immensely to an international environment conducive to peace and stability. As a result of its firm belief in the Treaty, his Government had concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA. Its signing of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) was further proof of its commitment to building a nuclear-weapon-free world. Universality of the NPT was within reach. The challenge facing the international community was how to engage the States still outside the NPT regime through some sort of consultative mechanism. The fact that 182 out of 187 States parties to the NPT were non-nuclear-weapon States demonstrated that security was possible without nuclear weapons. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by those same non-nuclear-weapon States in their various regions further reinforced the fact that nuclear weapons did not guarantee security but rather distracted from it.

47. When the NPT had been indefinitely extended in 1995, the possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States had not been extended indefinitely. Regrettably, the 1995 programme of action for nuclear disarmament was still unimplemented. There had been no new treaty on the reduction of nuclear weapons, nor had there been any negotiations on the reduction and destruction of all tactical nuclear weapons. Although the ratification of START II by both parties was a welcome step forward, which he hoped would lead to an accelerated process of negotiations under START III, regrettably there were no negotiations covering the weapons possessed by the other three nuclear-weapon States. After welcoming the Russian Federation's recent decision to ratify the CTBT, he noted that the CTBT had not yet entered into force owing to delays in securing the required number of ratifications. Furthermore, the Conference on Disarmament had failed to engage in negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Another cause for concern was the possible deployment of national anti-missile defence systems, a development which could adversely affect efforts to reduce nuclear weapons.

48. While the nuclear-weapon States bore primary responsibility for taking tangible steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, the international community also had a role to play. In that connection, his delegation endorsed the proposal by the New Agenda Coalition that nuclear disarmament efforts could be pursued in a sort of constructive parallelism at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels. The international community must capitalize on the positive trends of the new initiatives and proposals and use them to advance nuclear disarmament. The time had come for serious dialogue between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. The review process must also be upgraded so that it could accomplish more than just the adoption of decisions and procedures.

49. The issue of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States deserved serious attention. In that regard, he hoped that all States parties would lend their support to the draft protocols to the NPT submitted in 1997 by Nigeria, Myanmar, Kenya and the Sudan and in 1999 by South Africa. Management questions had too often been at the core of the problems of the NPT review processes. During the long intervening periods between review conferences, States parties did not have treaty-based mechanisms to which to turn. His delegation therefore proposed that the Conference should consider the desirability of establishing an NPT management board to deal with the management challenges facing the Treaty. It further proposed that the issue of security assurances should be dealt with by a working group established under Main Committee I.

50. Commending the crucial role played by IAEA in the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, he noted that, in order for the Agency to continue to function effectively and efficiently, there should be some real growth in its regular budget. The current review conference should focus attention on strengthening the Treaty, not weakening it. The best way forward, in that regard, was to look beyond national priorities and focus on collective interests.

51. Mr. Snoussi (Morocco) said that, while the NPT had had a positive impact on international peace and security, its overall record was rather mixed, since the Principles and Objectives agreed upon at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had been only partially achieved. The situation with regard to nuclear non-proliferation was much more complicated than it had been a few decades ago. Indeed, his delegation was concerned about the ease with which nuclear weapons technology was acquired. The situation had been further complicated in recent years by the accessibility of nuclear technology as well as the proliferation of the number of suppliers of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Indeed, many non-nuclear-weapon States were sceptical about the willingness of nuclear-weapon States to conduct negotiations on nuclear arms reduction in good faith. His delegation welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT and wished to inform the Conference that Morocco had deposited its instrument of ratification of the CTBT with the United Nations Secretariat.

52. In his delegation's view, a fissile material cut-off treaty would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and also constitute a major step towards nuclear disarmament. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament could not be achieved without an international legally binding instrument that provided negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

53. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia, was an essential measure at the regional level. In that regard, Morocco had always been concerned about the universality of the NPT and the need to place all nuclear installations in the Middle East under the IAEA monitoring regime. The resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Conference served as the basis for further negotiations to restore peace and security in that region. He therefore hoped that the leaders of Israel would issue a clear and unambiguous statement announcing their intention of acceding to the NPT and placing their nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. Such an initiative on the part of Israel would give a clear signal of its determination to rebuild confidence in the wake of a number of procrastinations and acts of provocation. Flexibility was also needed to implement the resolution on the Middle East, and his Government would spare no efforts to achieve consensus on that issue.

54. The IAEA safeguards regime needed to be reviewed in order to make the Agency's monitoring mechanisms more effective. Clearly, the Agency's role was fundamental in ensuring that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would contribute to economic and technological development.

55. Despite its purely modest achievements, the Preparatory Committee had nevertheless developed essential recommendations on procedural matters. The Conference now had the important task of dealing with a long list of uncompleted measures. Given the complexity of many of the issues, some concentrated work was required in order to strengthen the Treaty, which still remained the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

56. Mr. de Saram (Sri Lanka) said that States parties' obligations under the Treaty fell into three principal categories: first, that of nuclear-weapon States not to transfer such weapons and of non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire them; second, that of the IAEA to monitor compliance with those obligations and to ensure that the restrictions on transfer and acquisition did not prejudice non-nuclear-weapon States in their use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; and, third, that of achieving a fundamental balance between the commitment by the vast majority of States parties never to acquire nuclear weapons and the fact that the nuclear-weapon States parties were permitted to retain their nuclear weapons indefinitely under article VI of the Treaty.

57. Article VI did not ban nuclear weapons or their use. Rather, it imposed on nuclear-weapon States the lesser obligation of nuclear disarmament in exchange for a guarantee that the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States would never acquire them. In an advisory opinion of 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice had stressed that article VI of the Treaty imposed not a mere obligation of conduct, but an obligation to achieve a precise result — nuclear disarmament in all its aspects — by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith. It had also stressed that any realistic search for general and complete disarmament necessitated the cooperation of all States.

58. While he welcomed the unilateral and bilateral disarmament measures adopted by nuclear-weapon States, it was disappointing that the provisions of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference concerning the proposed convention banning the production of fissile materials and the expectation of a determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating them had not been fulfilled. He therefore welcomed the fact that the 2000 Conference had decided that the subsidiary body established under Main Committee I would discuss and consider the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty and the provisions of the section on nuclear disarmament contained in decision 2 of 1995.

59. Mr. Tupou (Tonga), speaking on behalf of the South Pacific Forum, called on States that had not yet acceded to the NPT to do so in the near future. Although the South Pacific States were geographically distant from contemporary centres of international tension, they, like all nations, derived security benefits from the Treaty. Without that instrument, disturbing predictions that the world would include 25 or more nuclear-weapon States by the 1980s could well have come to pass. Although the commitment of such States to pursue nuclear disarmament was a central element of the bargain at the heart of the Treaty, article VI thereof had not been fully implemented. He welcomed the Russian Federation's recent ratification of START II and hoped that START III negotiations would soon begin, and he encouraged all nuclear-weapon States to move towards the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and to display maximum transparency regarding that process.

60. A strong non-proliferation regime was essential to nuclear disarmament. The CTBT had been of direct, practical benefit to the South Pacific countries; since the French Government's ratification of that Treaty, it had finished dismantling its testing sites on the Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls. He welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and urged nuclear-weapon States that were not yet parties to that instrument to ratify it without delay. In the meantime, the South Pacific Forum countries were proceeding with the establishment of the international monitoring system network of stations in that region.

61. The 1995 Conference had stressed the importance of negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty as a means to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. It was therefore disappointing that the Conference on Disarmament had yet to begin negotiations on the subject, and he hoped that the 2000 Conference would give new impetus to that process. He called on States parties that had not yet concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA to do so with a view to achieving the universal application of the safeguards regime.

62. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were another essential complement to the Treaty. The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, established in 1986 by the Treaty of Rarotonga, was the region's contribution to non-proliferation and global security. He welcomed the ratification of the related protocols by certain nuclear-weapon States and said he hoped that the only such State that had yet to ratify them would commit itself to doing so during the Conference.

63. Shipments of radioactive materials and mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel through the South Pacific was a source of continuing concern. Such shipments should be made only if the cargo was of demonstrably minimal risk, on ships of the highest standard and by States that agreed to promote the safety of the material and, in the event of an accident, to provide compensation for any industries harmed as a result of changes in the market value of the region's fisheries and tourism products. He noted the constructive dialogue with nuclear industry representatives from France, Japan and the United Kingdom on the current liability and compensation regime for shipments of radioactive materials and MOX fuel through the region and stressed the importance of International Maritime Organization and IAEA efforts to develop a strong regime of prior notification of, and consultation with, coastal States and of the development of a regime for the preparation of environmental impact statements and emergency response plans.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

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