Summary Record of the 9th Meeting

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Conference on Disarmament

General Assembly First Committee

UN Disarmament Commission

Special Session on Disarmament

Summary record of the 9th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 1 May 2000, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Baali (Algeria)
later: Mr. Kuindwa (Vice-President) (Kenya)
later: Mr. Baali (Algeria)

Contents

Election of Vice-Presidents (continued)

continued

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Election of Vice-Presidents (continued)

1. The President said that the Group of Non-Aligned Countries had proposed the candidacies of C?e d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria for three of the four remaining vacancies for Vice-President of the Conference.

2. C?e d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria were elected Vice-Presidents of the Conference.

General debate (continued)

3. Mr. Oskanian (Armenia), after emphasizing the crucial role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in eliminating both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, commended the decision of the Russian Federation to ratify the second of the strategic arms reductions treaties, START II, and hoped that it would open the way to negotiations on START III. His country had joined 155 States in signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), whose entry into force was a priority element in the implementation of article VI of the NPT. His Government supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and welcomed the zones established in South-East Asia and Africa since 1995.

4. The five-year period under review had been marked by both achievements and setbacks for the global non-proliferation regime. Universality of the Treaty remained a high priority for all States parties. Yet regional security problems stood in the way of universality, and the security concerns of the four States which were not parties must be addressed on the regional level. The non-parties would have a reason to join and parties would be more inclined to comply fully with their obligations if effective security assurances could be achieved to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons as a guarantee of security. Some nuclear-weapon States had announced that they had ceased production of fissile material for use in weapons, and it urged all States capable of producing fissile material for weapons purposes to declare a moratorium on production pending the conclusion of a legally binding fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament should make full use of its capability as the sole multilateral forum for such negotiations and find a compromise solution leading to the adoption of a treaty.

5. Just three days after Armenia had declared its independence in 1991, the Armenian parliament had adopted a decision to abide by the NPT. After formally acceding to the Treaty in 1993 as a non-nuclear-weapon State, Armenia had concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It had then reactivated its nuclear energy programme with the assistance of IAEA, which had helped to solve a serious energy crisis. The right of States parties to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy under international safeguards was of critical importance and should be maintained

6. Mr. Kuindwa (Kenya), Vice-President, took the Chair.

7. Ms. Rodrigues (Mozambique) said that, despite the positive developments in the past five years, there had been setbacks in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including the nuclear tests carried out in South Asia, the failure of some countries to ratify the CTBT and ongoing nuclear modernization programmes in nuclear-weapon States. In order to create a world free of nuclear weapons, comprehensive and practical strategies must be devised to meet the specific situations of individual countries. Such strategies would be based on comprehensive national surveys, effective coordination, information management and advocacy for non-proliferation. Inspections conducted by IAEA were one of the most important ways to prevent the acquisition, development and spread of new nuclear weapons technology. The NPT had provided the international community with a framework for action and grounds for optimism. It had also established an international standard: no longer would States parties to the Treaty be allowed to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons with impunity.

8. Her delegation attached particular importance to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and it was concerned at the delay in the ratification and implementation of the Treaty of Pelindaba. It invited all States concerned to take appropriate action for its effective implementation and the resulting denuclearization of Africa. It also called on States with special responsibility in international security to help to remove the obstacles impeding the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones.

9. During the cold war, the developing countries had suffered the effects of the nuclear arms race both directly and indirectly. They had lived under the threat of a nuclear strike, and they had witnessed the devotion of precious resources to the vertical development of nuclear weapons. With the end of the cold war, they had hoped to see an end to that threat. A freeze on the development of new weapons would allow resources to be redirected to development needs. The developing countries could benefit greatly from the availability of nuclear energy, and they would like to see IAEA set up a non-selective programme to circulate relevant information so that countries like her own could benefit from Agency projects. Indeed, as a developing State struggling to eradicate absolute poverty, Mozambique strongly supported the idea of linking disarmament to sustainable development initiatives. Through the effective implementation of the NPT, States could enhance their mutual assurances and, through nuclear disarmament, free huge amounts of resources for development.

10. Mr. Hasan (Iraq) said it was clear that, while the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had abided by their commitments, some of the nuclear-weapon States parties had failed to do so. There was still no clear prospect of the elimination of nuclear weapons; universality had not been achieved; Israel, backed by nuclear weapons, continued its arrogant behaviour; no tangible steps had been taken to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons; and no clear progress had been achieved to ensure the exercise by all the parties to the Treaty of their right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Failure to implement the Treaty and the resolutions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference reflected an international atmosphere in which hegemony, increased reliance on nuclear deterrence, military alliances, the unilateral use of force and the constant marginalization of United Nations mechanisms, were used to achieve the political interests of the dominating great Power, as in the case of the sanctions imposed on Iraq and the use of inspection activities in Iraq for United States intelligence purposes.

11. Owing to the non-implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference, the Arab countries faced constant danger and blackmail from Israel, which continued to build up its nuclear capability and to practise a policy of hegemony. Israel's nuclear arsenal included sophisticated weapons built with United States assistance. Indeed, the United States had recently agreed to give Israeli experts access to its nuclear facilities with a view to developing Israel's nuclear technology. Israel, in turn, transferred American nuclear technology to other countries. Yet the Treaty provided the Arab countries with no guarantee against the Israeli threat.

12. Under the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and various United Nations resolutions, the international community was legally bound to require Israel to accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision. The recent Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, for its part, had expressed great concern over Israel's nuclear capability and had condemned Israel for continuing to develop its nuclear arsenal. The working paper submitted by the Group of Arab States to Main Committee II of the Conference contained recommendations with a view to removing the Israeli threat.

13. The United States continued its own violation of the Treaty by supplying nuclear technology to Israel, deploying nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States parties, refusing to ratify the CTBT and indicating its intention to develop a national missile defence system.

14. Iraq, for its part, fully complied with its obligations under the Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. In March 2000, the Agency had reported that Iraq had fully cooperated with the inspection team and that all nuclear materials had been found in agreement with the IAEA inventory. Prior to that, in October 1998, the Agency had stated in its report to the Security Council (S/1998/927) that there were no indications that there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance (para. 17).

15. However, the activities of IAEA and the defunct United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) had been used as a cover for prolonging the embargo imposed on Iraq and achieving certain political aims of the United States, thereby constituting a serious deviation from their mandates from the Security Council. Agents of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had transmitted to Washington all the information which IAEA had obtained from inspection activities in Iraq, their aim being to conspire against Iraq and its leadership. They had also installed eavesdropping devices to monitor the movements and communications of Iraqi officials. Thus, the inspection and monitoring regime in Iraq had been a tool in the hands of the United States Administration, seriously damaging the credibility of IAEA and the United Nations by continuing the genocidal embargo in the name of the United Nations. Iraq demanded compensation for the damage it had suffered as a result of those acts of aggression; it also demanded that those responsible should be punished, and that the Conference should adopt recommendations that condemned activities undermining the impartiality of the work of IAEA.

16. The United States and the United Kingdom had used depleted uranium in their aggression against Iraq in 1991 and against Yugoslavia in 1999, despite the disastrous effects of such a radiological weapon on human beings and the environment — effects which would continue for centuries unless action was taken to decontaminate Iraq's environment. His delegation invited the Conference to call for the prohibition of the use of such weapons and also invited IAEA to help Iraq reduce the negative effects of that disaster, and affirmed Iraq's right to demand compensation.

17. In December 1998, immediately following the withdrawal of IAEA inspectors from Iraq, upon instructions from the United States Administration, the United States and the United Kingdom had launched a full-scale aggression against Iraq, including destruction of the nuclear-monitoring instruments, thereby dealing a fatal blow to the IAEA monitoring regime. The Conference should condemn that aggression and provide for compensation to Iraq. A previous blow directed at the IAEA safeguards regime had been Israel's aggression in 1981 against the Iraqi nuclear reactor. The Security Council had condemned that aggression and called upon Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards (resolution 487 (1981), para. 5), but its resolution continued to be mere ink on paper. Iraq hoped that the Conference would explicitly prohibit military attacks against nuclear facilities placed under IAEA supervision. He noted, however, that the background papers submitted by IAEA and the United Nations Secretariat had failed to mention those facts; indeed, the papers submitted by the Secretariat had presented a distorted picture of the Iraqi situation that bespoke a total surrender to the American master.

18. His delegation urged all States parties to intensify their efforts to increase awareness of the threats to humankind posed by nuclear weapons. It welcomed the various international and regional proposals on nuclear disarmament, including the working paper in document NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3. It welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and START II and stressed the legal and moral responsibility of those States possessing nuclear weapons to eliminate them at the earliest date. The nuclear-weapon States which preached democracy and human rights must learn that the first principles of democracy and human rights were the equality of all human beings with regard to their need for security and safety. The goal of the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction must be adopted as the standard by which to measure the extent to which States had abided by their commitments.

19. Mr. Erwa (Sudan) said that his country supported the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the paper submitted by the Movement to the Conference. As one of the first States to sign and ratify the NPT, the Sudan reaffirmed its full commitment to the Treaty in the interests of promoting international peace and security.

20. The nuclear threat was as grave as ever: nuclear weapons continued to proliferate outside the IAEA safeguards system. As the Secretary-General had noted at the outset of the Conference, there was a lack of political will to activate the international mechanisms for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and those mechanisms had been left to rust. Consequently, the Conference had a historic responsibility to redress the current nuclear imbalance and to pursue efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

21. Some limited progress had been made towards the prevention of proliferation, the latest being the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT. The Sudan hoped that that action would prompt other nuclear-weapon States to take serious steps towards banishing the nuclear threat and reaffirming their commitments under the Treaty.

22. The Sudan shared the international community's concern at the refusal of the nuclear-weapon States to enter into serious negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. He endorsed the call of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Conference on Disarmament for the setting up of an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations for a phased programme of nuclear disarmament within a specific time-frame, including the conclusion of a multilateral convention on nuclear disarmament, in keeping with the spirit of article VI of the Treaty and the unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, in which the Court had reaffirmed the obligation to pursue negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

23. Even though all the other States in the Middle East had become party to the Treaty, Israel still refused to do so. Whereas some major Powers had brought pressure to bear on certain disadvantaged States to become parties to certain treaties, they at the same time gave Israel full access to nuclear technology and assistance in developing its nuclear programme, in clear violation of the Treaty. His Government's call for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East was based on the importance of achieving a just and comprehensive peace in that region. Peace would be unattainable unless all such weapons owned by Israel were eliminated. It was the clear responsibility of the Conference to take action, in the light of Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty and to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. That responsibility included efforts to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference, which had called for Israel's accession to the Treaty without delay, as a step towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

24. The nuclear-weapon States were committed under article I of the Treaty to withhold nuclear assistance from Israel as long as it refused to accede to the Treaty and to submit its facilities to IAEA safeguards. The States parties to the Treaty, and particularly the United States, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom were, as sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East, called upon to exert the utmost effort to induce Israel to accede to the Treaty.

25. In conclusion, he stressed the importance of the unwavering commitment of all States parties to all provisions of the Treaty. They must refrain from selectively implementing only certain provisions, and they must be firmly committed to the implementation of the resolutions adopted at the 1995 Conference. It might be the last opportunity for States to eliminate the nuclear option, achieve the universality of the Treaty and avert its collapse.

26. Mr. Minoves-Triquell (Andorra) said that Andorra, a country without a Ministry of Defence, an army or missiles, had lived in peace and neutrality for 700 years, yet it had become clear that, in the twenty-first century, neither isolation nor neutrality was a guarantee of peace. Since it had joined the United Nations in 1993, Andorra had been actively involved in the cause of disarmament and had provided whatever assistance it could in that area. Although Andorra had no military structures or nuclear installations, it had wished to join the moral stand against nuclear proliferation, and had signed the NPT and the CTBT in 1996. It welcomed the fact that eight other States had joined the NPT since the 1995 review.

27. It was a common responsibility of humanity to preserve the planet from destruction and, if possible, to turn back the clock to a time when the means of global annihilation had not existed. To that end, existing disarmament agreements must be fully implemented and new ones developed to foster safe and progressive disarmament.

28. Mr. Baali (Algeria), President, resumed the Chair.

29. Mr. Kuindwa (Kenya) said that his country had excellent credentials in the area of disarmament: it had been one of the first to sign the NPT in 1968 and one of the original 21 members of the Conference on Disarmament, and it was on that basis that his Government had lent its unswerving support to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Thus, the lack of progress in many areas was of great concern to his delegation. The easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which had resulted from the end of the cold war had been expected to facilitate nuclear disarmament, but it had had a contrary effect in some cases. Nuclear-weapon States had reneged on their commitments under the NPT, the United States had failed to ratify the CTBT, nuclear tests had taken place in South Asia, and effective international arrangements on negative security assurances were lacking, showing an absence of political will to fulfil obligations.

30. All those factors were contributing to an erosion of the non-proliferation regime and threatening collective security. The insecurity created by a lack of commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to move towards disarmament had provided others with an excuse to test. Deplorable though the actions by India and Pakistan might be, a wake-up call had been sounded that must be clearly heard.

31. It was also disappointing that posturing by some at the Conference on Disarmament had rendered it moribund. Discussions must start sooner rather than later on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which would help to salvage the non-proliferation regime. The recent decisions taken in the Russian Federation on the CTBT and START II were to be commended and brought the entry into force of the CTBT closer.

32. Among issues of particular importance to Kenya, the failure to achieve universality of the NPT was especially disappointing. It was imperative for States which possessed nuclear weapons capability to be Parties to the Treaty so that they could be subject to IAEA safeguards. Conversely, States which had opted not to join should not benefit from the transfer of technology for peaceful uses. The question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy was of great significance to countries like his which continued to grapple with economically crippling energy deficiencies. Therefore, access to nuclear technology by all States parties should be provided on an assured and predictable basis, and technical assistance should be extended without any constraints.

33. The success of the Conference would depend entirely on whether participants believed that the NPT was still relevant in its current form, or whether the changes which had taken place since its extension and the lack of progress on commitments called for a new approach. For instance, the need for security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States was apparent and had the support of most members of the international community, yet still such assurances had not been provided. They would best take the form of an international convention of a legally binding character and would encourage those outside the NPT process to consider joining it.

34. The dumping of radioactive waste in the developing world, particularly in Africa, was once again becoming a problem. He appealed to all States generating such waste to act responsibly in dealing with it, especially as countries which were without the benefits of nuclear technology did not possess the know-how to handle its waste.

35. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that, in addition to taking new decisions, the Conference would ensure that the decisions made earlier were implemented.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.