General debate (continued)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. Kasiev (Kyrgyzstan) said that the 2000 Review Conference, which was taking place against a background of mounting challenges to the non-proliferation regime, was an opportunity to revive and strengthen the spirit of cooperation that had prevailed at the 1995 Conference, when the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had been indefinitely extended. While the Conference must build on the decisions and the resolution adopted in 1995, it must look forward as well as back, identifying practical steps to strengthen the implementation of all aspects of the Treaty and achieve its universality.

2. The events in South Asia in 1998 had underlined the importance of regional efforts in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation as a means of strengthening the global regime. His delegation welcomed in that connection the significant progress made towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, which would enhance both global and regional peace and security. It commended the efforts of the expert group established to prepare the form and elements of an agreement for such a zone. The group had held a series of meetings with the participation of representatives of the five Central Asian States, the five nuclear Powers, the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and was close to completing its work.

3. His delegation supported previous speakers who had emphasized the importance of progress towards implementing the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) and the early commencement of negotiations on a third such treaty, as well as achieving significant reductions in the number of nuclear weapons deployed and expediting the negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. He regretted the impasse reached in the Conference on Disarmament on that issue and called on it to seek alternative ways forward.

4. His Government strongly supported the IAEA safeguards system. It had concluded a safeguards agreement with the Agency in March 1998 and would begin negotiations on an Additional Protocol in the near future. The disarmament process required strict procedures for the safe transport, storage and use of sensitive nuclear materials. The 2000 Conference should consider new steps to strengthen nuclear-related export controls, enhance physical protection, prevent the unlawful transfer of nuclear materials and counter the threat of nuclear terrorism.

5. It was important to give due regard to the serious environmental consequences that had resulted, in some exceptional cases, from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. His Government called on all States and international organizations with expertise in the field of cleanup and disposal of radioactive contaminants to provide appropriate assistance for remedial purposes in Kyrgyzstan and other affected countries.

6. At the dawn of the new millennium, the non-proliferation regime was facing new problems and challenges. There was thus no reason for complacency. Indeed, if it was to remain viable, the Treaty would require constant care and attention. His delegation looked forward to working at the Conference to find new approaches with a view to ensuring the integrity and effectiveness of the Treaty in the long term.

7. Mr. Vohidov (Uzbekistan), Vice-President, took the Chair.

8. Mr. Botnaru (Moldova) said that the end of the cold war had brought with it the promise of the eventual elimination of weapons of mass destruction. In order to achieve that goal, there must be continuing progress in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. The Non-Proliferation Treaty's indefinite extension in 1995 had demonstrated the importance that the States parties attached to it in that context. In accordance with the provisions of the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the 1995 Conference, there must be systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament. His delegation welcomed in that regard the conclusion in 1995 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which represented an effective obstacle to the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, and, at the regional level, the voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

9. Since nuclear-weapon-free zones were an important complement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the commitment by the Central Asian States to establish such a zone and the adoption by the Commission on Disarmament of guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones were also to be welcomed. There had, in addition, been significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation, while the Russian State Duma had decided to ratify START II and the CTBT, and France and the United Kingdom had taken unilateral measures to downsize their nuclear arsenals.

10. However, the nuclear tests conducted in 1998 in South Asia represented a serious challenge to the non-proliferation regime, and the lack of progress towards the entry into force of the CTBT and the differences over the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) threatened to impede the process of nuclear disarmament. His delegation urged those countries whose ratification was essential for the entry into force of the CTBT to accede to that instrument without delay. It hoped that a more constructive atmosphere in the Conference on Disarmament would lead to the adoption of verifiable nuclear disarmament measures.

11. His Government strongly supported the activities of IAEA as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States with the Safeguards Agreements concluded with the Agency and welcomed the adoption in May 1997 of a Model Protocol Additional to the existent Safeguards Agreements. Although Moldova had no nuclear materials in its territory, his Government intended to conclude an additional protocol with IAEA for the purpose of promoting universal compliance with the Treaty. The Conference must consider other means of strengthening the safeguards system.

12. Conscious of Moldova's location at an important commercial crossroads, his Government was taking all necessary measures to prevent the transit through the country of components, materials and technology intended for use in weapons of mass destruction. It appreciated the assistance provided in that area by the Government of the United States and the European Union. Although the Preparatory Committee for the Conference had failed to produce any substantive recommendations, it had made all the necessary procedural preparations, thus clearing the ground for a result-oriented Conference and providing a good opportunity to produce a realistic programme of action to enhance the Treaty and ensure the full implementation of its provisions by all States parties. His delegation stood ready to contribute to that process.

13. Mr. Estevez-Lopez (Guatemala) said that, with the development of nuclear weapons, mankind had been confronted with the previously unimaginable spectre of an armed conflict that could result in its complete annihilation. Recognizing the need to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples the international community had concluded the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That instrument was certainly not perfect. Indeed, it had maintained the inequality between the five States that possessed nuclear weapons prior to 1967 and the other States parties, which were required under the Treaty to renounce the nuclear option forever. The Treaty, however, constituted no more than an intermediate step towards the goal of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

14. His delegation had welcomed the Treaty's indefinite extension and the measures taken at the 1995 Conference to strengthen and refine the review process. It noted with satisfaction the positive developments in the areas of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation since 1995, including the accession of a further nine States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the decision by the Russian State Duma to ratify START II and the CTBT, the reaffirmation by the five nuclear Powers of their commitment to nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the progress made towards establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central Asia and Mongolia. His delegation urged all States not yet party to that Treaty to accede to it and called on those States whose ratification of the CTBT was necessary for its entry into force to accede to that instrument. Lastly, he hoped that the States of South Asia and the Middle East would continue their efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions.

15. Mr. Neewoor (Mauritius) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty's objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were inextricably linked. It was the promise of disarmament that provided the rationale for the permanent renunciation of the nuclear option by the non-nuclear-weapon States. The failure of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty was the most important issue before the Conference. The continued deployment in the world of 36,000 nuclear warheads showed how little the nuclear Powers had done to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament. At the same time, efforts were being made to achieve the qualitative enhancement of existing nuclear capabilities and there were plans to deploy weapons in outer space. The very credibility of the non-proliferation regime was at stake.

16. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence had resulted in greater proliferation of nuclear weapons and upgrading of nuclear capability by one nation inevitably led to a new nuclear arms race. There was therefore no alternative to total nuclear disarmament, which must be achieved within an established time-frame. The end of the cold war had presented opportunities for serious dialogue among the nuclear Powers. Small steps had been taken by the United States and the Russian Federation in 1997 to reduce their nuclear arsenals, and other nuclear Powers had made unilateral pledges to reduce their nuclear arsenals. He welcomed the recent ratification of START II by the Russian Federation and its decision to ratify the CTBT and hoped that the United States and the Russian Federation, along with other nuclear States, would act boldly to implement START III and agree on a time-frame for total denuclearization. It was regrettable that a time-frame for the total elimination of nuclear weapons had not been included in the CTBT, which was the major reason why Mauritius had not yet become a signatory.

17. The 1995 Conference had envisioned not only the conclusion of the CTBT by 1996, but also a fissile material cut-off treaty, the establishment of new nuclear-free zones and determined efforts by the nuclear Powers to reduce nuclear weapons globally with a view to their eventual elimination. Unfortunately, there had been no movement towards a fissile material cut-off treaty and nuclear disarmament remained stalled. On the other hand, non-nuclear-weapon States had concluded the treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok creating two major nuclear-free zones. Mauritius had been among the first States to ratify the former and called upon States which had not done so to ratify that Treaty as soon as possible. The countries of the Middle East, Israel in particular, should also take the steps necessary for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in that region.

18. He deplored the reluctance of the nuclear Powers to fulfil their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty concerning the transfer of nuclear materials and technology for peaceful uses to developing countries under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, which was the only tangible benefit that the developing countries expected from the NPT. The transport of nuclear waste across the seas and the risks that that entailed were also a source of concern to developing countries. That situation was further aggravated by the absence of a proper compensation regime, which must be addressed by the Review Conference.

19. A registry should be created under the auspices of IAEA where records could be kept of all nuclear weapons wherever they might be stationed, since they represented a serious danger for adjacent populations. That registry should be accessible under strict conditions to sovereign Governments, which were responsible for the safety and security of their peoples. The fact that there were nuclear-weapon States which had not acceded to the NPT or the CTBT should be recognized. Accordingly, he called for the early convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament which would broaden the scope of the discussion of nuclear issues in a new, global, perspective and also address the issue of the growing threat of nuclear terrorism.

20. Ms. Raholinirina (Madagascar) said that the Review Conference was taking place at a time when the international situation was complex and unstable. Hopes for peace and prosperity raised by the end of the cold war had been dashed by the growing level of violence in the world. Since the 1995 Conference, there had been both progress and setbacks in the areas of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The nuclear tests in South Asia in 1998 had contributed to regional and international insecurity and undermined the objectives of the NPT. In that regard, she reaffirmed her delegation's commitment to the principles contained in the 1971 Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and welcomed the recent decisions by four States of that region, the Comoros, Djibouti, Oman and the United Arab Emirates to accede to the NPT. She hoped that India and Pakistan would soon add their names to that list in order to promote a culture of peace in the region.

21. She regretted that the NPT was not yet universal and that the nuclear Powers still had some 35,000 nuclear weapons, thousands of which were ready for immediate launching. The total elimination of nuclear weapons must be the international community's ultimate objective in order to remove that threat to mankind. The impasse in negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials and the differences of opinion concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which could lead to a renewed arms race, were also sources of concern. In addition, recent statements by nuclear Powers reaffirming their strategic doctrines based on nuclear deterrence could compromise the NPT itself.

22. There had, nevertheless, been some positive developments. The nuclear Powers had taken steps to substantially reduce their nuclear arsenals and the Disarmament Commission at its 1999 session had adopted without a vote principles and guidelines for the established of new nuclear-weapon-free zones. The establishment of such zones was a powerful and irreversible trend which would certainly lead to a nuclear-weapon-free world. Zones free of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, should be set up in areas of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia. It was also encouraging that the Russian Parliament had approved START II and the CTBT for ratification, which should prepare the way for negotiations on START III.

23. Since the NPT was the key to preventing a nuclear holocaust, its provisions and the 1995 Principles and Objectives must be fully implemented. The indefinite extension of the Treaty should not be taken to mean that nuclear weapons would also continue to exist indefinitely. There was no justification for the possession of nuclear weapons, the use of which was considered a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity.

24. Nuclear energy could, however, contribute to the well-being of mankind and there should be a wide-ranging exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technical knowledge in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Special attention must be given to the developing countries in accordance with the Principles and Objectives of the 1995 Conference. Her delegation supported the convening of a special conference of the States parties on the promotion of cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and stressed the excellent relationship which her Government enjoyed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Review Conference provided an ideal opportunity to renew commitments under the NPT and work towards a new era of peace and harmony. A world free of the spectre of nuclear war was possible if delegations joined in putting the interests of mankind above all other considerations.

25. Mr. LaFortelle (France) introduced on behalf of his own delegation as well as those of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America a common statement of their positions on issues relating to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses. He drew attention to paragraph 10 of the statement, which declared in particular that none of their nuclear weapons were targeted at any State. They also reaffirmed their willingness to continue efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in general, in accordance with decision 2 (1995). The text of that statement would be circulated as an official Conference document.

26. Mr. Roman-Morey (Secretary-General, Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)) noted that the Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean continued to be an example for the international community. Nearly 40 years before, at the height of the cold war, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, a group of Latin American intellectuals had laid out the principles of the first treaty on nuclear disarmament. As a result, in February 1967 the Treaty of Tlatelolco had been opened for signature and had since been ratified by 18 States, thus establishing the first nuclear-arms-free zone, covering a large and densely populated region of the planet.

27. The NPT, although a close contemporary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, had been concluded and entered into force after the Latin American regional instrument. In addition, unlike the latter, which categorically prohibited nuclear weapons and was valid indefinitely, the NPT simply sought to put an end to the proliferation of nuclear arms in the international community and had not been extended indefinitely until a quarter century after its creation. The Treaty of Tlatelolco and other regional disarmament agreements were therefore essential elements in the international regime of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Despite the near universality of the NPT at the international level and the Treaty of Tlatelolco at the regional level, and more than 30 years after their entry into force, the issue of nuclear weapons continued to concern the international community.

28. Since 1995, additional States had associated themselves with the cause of non-proliferation and disarmament. Chile and Brazil had acceded to the NPT in 1995 and 2000 respectively. However, of the four States still not signatories, India and Pakistan had acquired de facto nuclear status while Israel continued to be an undeclared nuclear State. The fourth State, Cuba, was a special case since it did not have any real nuclear military capability, had signed the nuclear safeguards of IAEA and had signed but not ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its amendments.

29. In the area of nuclear disarmament, article VI of the NPT was very clear, and the Principles and Objectives had in addition committed the nuclear Powers to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. In that context, the CTBT had been concluded and opened for signature yet the major nuclear Powers were delaying its entry into force. He applauded the decision by the Russian Duma to ratify the CTBT and hoped that the United States and the other States whose participation was necessary for its entry into force would follow suit. In Latin America, the Treaty had been ratified by nine States and signed by 14 others.

30. The Conference on Disarmament had made little progress in finalizing the Convention banning the production of fissile material for military uses. He recognized the efforts, albeit slow, of the nuclear Powers to dismantle their arsenals and thereby achieve effective nuclear disarmament and welcomed the declaration made by the representative of France. Nevertheless, as the Secretary-General had stated at the beginning of the Conference, there were still more than 35,000 active nuclear warheads in the world, barely 3,000 fewer than in 1970 at the height of the cold war. Although there were not 25 or 30 nuclear Powers as predicted by President Kennedy when he launched his Atoms for Peace programme, the five nuclear Powers, plus two, plus one more, were keeping the 182 States which had decided never to possess nuclear weapons in a situation of permanent insecurity by virtue of the very existence of such weapons. Nuclear weapons must be completely eliminated since they posed a continued threat to the very existence of the human race.

31. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba had been concluded, and negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia were well under way. Mongolia had also unilaterally declared itself a nuclear-weapon-free country. However, in the Middle East, the only region mentioned specifically in the Resolution annexed to the Principles and Objectives, there had been no real progress.

32. The issue of nuclear-free zones was important for his agency because OPANAL had created the first and most universal nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean had decided to reject nuclear weapons in 1967; at least two States in that region had been capable of developing nuclear weapons but had freely decided to choose the path of peace, security and development offered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That example had been followed by other regions of the world. In that regard, he pointed out that the Treaty of Pelindaba had become possible only when one of the States parties had freely decided to give up not only its nuclear capability but also its nuclear status in the interests of universal security. In addition, 110 States, representing more than 60 per cent of the international community of nations, were now included in nuclear-weapon-free zones, proving that, where a clear and definite political will existed, nuclear disarmament was possible.

33. The peoples of the world and future generations should not have to wait any longer after having lived through more than 40 years of nuclear anxiety. There was no room for complacency since it had been proven that the end of the cold war had in no way put an end to the nuclear threat and the peoples of the world would not forgive delegates if the Conference failed to reach agreement. They must ensure that the nuclear arms race would not resume and that there would be no new incentives for nuclear proliferation. The Treaty of Tlatelolco had succeeded in achieving those objectives and would continue to inspire the world community in the areas of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

34. Mr. Baali (Algeria) resumed the Chair.

35. Mr. Naciri (Observer for the League of Arab States) said that it was a source of concern for the non-nuclear-weapon States that the Treaty had not laid down a timetable for nuclear disarmament, bearing in mind that those States lacked sufficient guarantees in the event of nuclear aggression. Universality of the Treaty had still not been achieved, since four States, including Israel, India and Pakistan, the "undeclared nuclear States", had not acceded to it. Furthermore, the non-proliferation regime had suffered two setbacks, namely, the nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan and India in 1998, and the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the CTBT, which might discourage the ratifications and accessions needed for its entry into force.

36. The Arab States, considering a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East to be an irrevocable strategic goal, were concerned that Israel possessed nuclear weapons and categorically refused to accede to the Treaty. Furthermore, it kept its nuclear activities shrouded in mystery, pursuing deterrence based on uncertainty and insistence on the nuclear option to put pressure on Arab States to accept its conditions in the peace process. The Israeli stance disrupted the balance of power in the region, and could even lead to a new arms race, exposing the whole world to incalculable risks. Despite Israeli intransigence, the Arab States had spared no efforts to transform the Middle East into a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. The idea behind the resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, adopted by the General Assembly over 25 years earlier and re-emphasized at every session since then, enjoyed broad acceptance among Member States.

37. At the 1995 Conference, the nuclear-weapon States had achieved the indefinite extension of the Treaty as part of a package that had included the resolution on the Middle East, However, the failure by the three depositary nuclear States, which had sponsored that resolution, to exert the utmost efforts for its implementation might further harden the position of Israel without providing the non-nuclear-weapon States parties with significant guarantees.

38. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the League of Arab States, meeting in Beirut in March 2000, had adopted a resolution which called on the 2000 Review Conference to evaluate the extent of fulfilment by States parties of their commitments under the Treaty; emphasized that continuation by Israel of its nuclear programme outside the context of the non-proliferation regime threatened security and stability; called on the States parties, and especially the depositary States as sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East, to spare no effort to secure Israel's accession without further delay and placement of its facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime as a step towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone; called on the nuclear-weapon States to pledge, under article I of the Treaty, not to transfer to Israel any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist or encourage it in their production or acquisition; called on the States parties to cease the transfer of any nuclear technology to Israel, so long as it failed to accede and to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards regime; and supported the call by the Non-Aligned Movement for the establishment of a subsidiary body under Main Committee II of the Conference to consider means of implementing the resolution on the Middle East.

39. The international community was seriously seeking universality and was proceeding with the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Well over 100 States had signed treaties establishing such zones, which now covered more than half the land surface of the globe. In that context, and in the face of the challenge posed by Israel's ambiguous nuclear policy, the League of Arab States had established a committee to prepare a draft treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The League had also established a committee to monitor Israeli nuclear activities and assess the risks which they posed to international peace and security.

40. The position taken by the League consisted in continued efforts to achieve universality of the Treaty and the greatest degree of transparency, including Israel's accession and its submission to the safeguards regime; mobilization of support for the Arab position at the Conference, including support for the "Resolution on the Middle East" and renunciation of the nuclear option; and encouragement of the Arab States to acquire peaceful nuclear technology, with support from the advanced nuclear States, with a view to harnessing such technology for development.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.

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